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SKETCHES

OF THE

HISTORY OF MAN.

VOLUME II.

SKETCHES

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HISTORY OF MAN.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOLUME II.

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SKETCHES

OF THE

HISTORY OF MAN.

BOOK II.

Progreſs of MEN in SOCIETY.

SKETCH IX.

MILITARY Branch of GOVERNMENT.

DURING the infancy of a nation, every member depends on his own induſtry for procuring the neceſſaries of life: he is his own maſon, his own tailor, his own phyſician; and on himſelf he chiefly relies for offence as well as defence. Every ſavage can ſay, what few beggars among us can ſay, *Omnia mea mecum porto;* and hence the aptitude

of a ſavage for war, which makes little alteration in his manner of living. In early times accordingly, the men were all warriors, and every known art was exerciſed by women; which is the caſe at preſent of American ſavages. And even after arts were ſo much improved as to be exerciſed by men, none who could bear arms were exempted from war. In feudal governments, the military ſpirit was carried to a great height: all gentlemen were ſoldiers by profeſſion; and every other art was deſpiſed, as low, if not contemptible.

Even in this untoward ſtate, arts made ſome progreſs, not excepting thoſe for amuſement; and many conveniencies, formerly unknown, became neceſſary to comfortable living. A man cannot bear to be deprived of the conveniencies and amuſements to which he is accuſtomed: he hates war, and clings to the ſweets of peace. Hence the neceſſity of a military eſtabliſhment, hardening men by ſtrict diſcipline to endure the fatigues of war. By ſtanding armies, war is carried on more regularly and ſcientifically than in feudal governments; and as it is carried on with infinitely greater expence, nations are more reſerved in declaring war than formerly. Long experience has at the ſame time made it evident, that a nation ſeldom gains by war; and that agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, are the only ſolid foundations of power and grandeur. Theſe arts accordingly have become the chief objects of European governments, and the only rational cauſes of war. Among the warlike nations of Greece and Italy, how would it have ſounded, that their effeminate deſcendents would employ ſoldiers by profeſſion to fight their battles? And yet this is neceſſary, in every country where arts and manufactures flouriſh; which, requiring little exerciſe, tend to enervate the body, and of courſe the mind. Gain, at the ſame time, being the ſole object of induſtry, advances ſelfiſhneſs to be the ruling paſſion, and brings on a timid anxiety about property and ſelf-preſervation.

Cyrus,

Cyrus, tho' flaming with reſentment againſt the Lydians for revolting, liſtened to the following ſagacious advice, offered by Crœſus, their former King. "O Cyrus, deſtroy not Sardis, an ancient city, famous for arts and arms; but, pardoning what is paſt, demand all their arms, encourage luxury, and exhort them to inſtruct their children in every art of gainful commerce. You will ſoon ſee, O King, that inſtead of men, they will be women." The Arabians, a brave and generous people, conquered Spain, and drove into the inacceſſible mountains of Biſcay and Aſturia, the few natives who ſtood out. When no longer an enemy appeared, they turned their ſwords into ploughſhares, and became a rich and flouriſhing nation. The inhabitants of the mountains, hardened by poverty and ſituation, ventured, after a long interval, to peep out from their ſtrong-holds, and to lie in wait for ſtraggling parties. Finding themſelves now a match for a people, whom opulence had betrayed to luxury, and the arts of peace to cowardice; they took courage to diſplay their banners in the open field; and after many military atchievements, ſucceeded in reconquering Spain. The Scots, inhabiting the mountainous parts of Caledonia, were an overmatch for the Picts, who occupied the fertile plains, and at laſt ſubdued them *.

* Before the time that all Scotland was brought under one king, the highlanders, divided into tribes or clans, made war upon each other; and continued the ſame practice irregularly many ages after they ſubmitted to the king of Scotland. Open war was repreſſed, but it went on privately by depredations and repriſals. The clan-ſpirit was much depreſſed by their bad ſucceſs in the rebellion 1715; and totally cruſhed after the rebellion 1745. The mildneſs with which the highlanders have been treated of late, and the pains that have been taken to introduce induſtry among them, have totally extirpated depredations and repriſals, and have rendered them the moſt peaceable people in Scotland; but have at the ſame time reduced their military ſpirit to a low ebb. To train them for war, military diſcipline has now become no leſs neceſſary than to others.

Where arts, manufactures, and commerce, have arrived at perfection, a pacific ſpirit prevails univerſally: not a ſpark is left of military ardor, nor will any man be a ſoldier. Hence in ſuch a ſtate, the neceſſity of mercenary troops, hired among nations leſs effeminate, who fight for pay, not for the ſtate they ſerve. Benjamin de Tudele, a Spaniſh Jew, who wrote in the twelfth century, reports, that the Greeks, by luxury and effeminacy, had contracted a degree of ſoftneſs, that made them reſemble women more than men; and that the Greek Emperor was reduced to the neceſſity of employing mercenary troops, to defend his country againſt the Turks. And accordingly when, in the year 1453, the city of Conſtantinople, defended by a garriſon not exceeding 6000 men, was beſieged by the Turks, and reduced to extremity, not a ſingle inhabitant had courage to take up arms, all waiting with torpid deſpondence the hour of utter extirpation. Venice, Genoa, and other ſmall Italian ſtates, became ſo effeminate by long and ſucceſsful commerce, that not a citizen ever thought of ſerving in the army; which obliged them to employ mercenaries, officers as well as private men. Theſe mercenaries at firſt fought conſcientiouſly for their pay; but reflecting, that the victors were not better paid than the vanquiſhed, they learned to play booty. In a battle particularly between the Piſans and Florentines, which laſted from ſun-riſing to ſun-ſetting, there was but a ſingle man loſt, who, having accidentally fallen from his horſe, was trode under foot. Charles VIII. of France, when he invaded Italy *anno* 1498, underſtood nothing of ſuch mock battles; and his men were held to be devils incarnate, who ſeemed to take delight in ſhedding human blood. The Dutch, who for many years have been reduced to mercenary troops, are more indebted to the mutual jealouſy of their neighbours for their independence, than to their own army. In the year 1672, Lewis of France invaded Holland, and in forty days took forty walled towns. That country

country was ſaved, not by its army, but by being laid under water. Froſt, which is uſual at that ſeaſon, would have put an end to the ſeven United Provinces.

The ſmall principality of Palmyra is the only inſtance known in hiſtory, where the military ſpirit was not enervated by opulence. Pliny deſcribes that country as extremely pleaſant, and bleſſed with plenty of ſprings, tho' ſurrounded with dry and ſandy deſerts. The commerce of the Indies was at that time carried on by land; and the city of Palmyra was the centre of that commerce between the Eaſt and the Weſt. Its territory being very ſmall, little more than ſufficient for villas and pleaſure-grounds, the inhabitants, like thoſe of Hamburgh, had no way to employ their riches for profit but in trade. At the ſame time, being ſituated between the two mighty empires of Rome and Parthia, it required great addreſs, and the moſt aſſiduous military diſcipline, to preſerve the inhabitants from being ſwallowed up by the one or the other. This tickliſh ſituation preſerved them from luxury and effeminacy, the uſual concomitants of riches. They made a better figure with their ſuperfluous wealth: they laid it out on magnificent buildings, and adorning their country-ſeats. The fine arts in general, were among them carried to a high degree of perfection. The famous Zenobia, their Queen, led captive to Rome after being deprived of her dominions, was admired and celebrated for ſpirit, for learning, and for an exquiſite taſte in the fine arts.

Thus, by accumulating wealth, a manufacturing and commercial people become a tempting object for conqueſt; and by effeminacy become an eaſy conqueſt. The military ſpirit ſeems to be much decayed in Britain; and ere it be gone, will no phantom appear, even in a dream, to diſturb our downy reſt? Formerly, the culture of corn in the temperate regions of Europe and Aſia, proved a tempting bait to northern ſavages who wanted bread: have

have we no cauſe to dread a ſimilar fate from ſome warlike neighbour, impelled by hunger, or by ambition, to extend his dominions? The difficulty of providing for defence, without hurting induſtry, has produced a general opinion among political writers, that a nation, if it will preſerve its military ſpirit, muſt exclude induſtry; and, if it will preſerve its induſtry, muſt give up all hopes of retaining its military ſpirit. In the former caſe, we are ſecure againſt any invader: in the latter, we indeed make a conſiderable figure, but lie open to every invader. Happy would Britain be, could the ſpirit of war and of commerce be made compatible by ſome military plan, that would protect us againſt enemies, without hurting our induſtry and manufactures. That ſuch a plan is not abſolutely impracticable, will, I hope, appear from what follows; tho' I am far from hoping that it will meet with univerſal approbation. To prepare the reader, I ſhall premiſe an account of the different military eſtabliſhments that exiſt, and have exiſted, in Europe, with the advantages and diſadvantages of each. In examining theſe, who knows whether ſome hint may not occur of a plan more perfect than any of them.

The moſt illuſtrious military eſtabliſhment of antiquity is that of the Romans, by which they ſubdued almoſt all the known world. The Roman citizens were many of them huſbandmen, and all of them ſoldiers. The inhabitants of Rome, in particular, lived upon their pay when in the field; but if they happened not to be ſucceſsful in plundering, they had no means of living at home. An annual diſtribution of corn among them became neceſſary, which in effect correſponded to the halfpay of our officers. It is believed, that ſuch a conſtitution would not be adopted by any modern ſtate. It was a forc'd conſtitution; contrary to nature, which gives different diſpoſitions to men, in order to ſupply hands for every neceſſary art. It was, at the ſame time, extremely precarious, there being in it no medium between univerſal

verſal conqueſt and the moſt wretched ſlavery. Had the Gauls, who conquered Rome, entertained any view but of plunder, Rome would never have been more heard of. It was on the brink of ruin in the war with Hannibal. What would have happened had Hannibal been victorious? It is eaſy to judge, by comparing it with Carthage. Carthage was a commercial ſtate, the people all employ'd in arts, manufactures, and navigation. The Carthaginians were ſubdued; but they could not be reduced to extremity, while they had acceſs to the ſea. In fact, they proſpered ſo much by commerce, even after they were ſubdued, as to raiſe jealouſy in their maſters, who thought themſelves not ſecure while a houſe remained ſtanding in Carthage. On the other hand, what reſource for the inhabitants of Rome, had they been ſubdued? They muſt have periſhed by hunger; for they could not work. In a word, ancient Rome reſembles a gameſter who ventures all upon one deciſive throw: if he loſe, he is undone.

I take it for granted, that our feudal ſyſtem will not have a ſingle vote. It was a ſyſtem that led to confuſion and anarchy, as little fitted for war as for peace. And as for mercenary troops, it is unneceſſary to bring them again into the field, after what is ſaid of them above.

The only remaining forms that merit attention, are a ſtanding army, and a militia; which I ſhall examine in their order, with the objections that lie againſt each. The firſt ſtanding army in modern times was eſtabliſhed by Charles VII. of France, on a very imperfect plan. By an edict *anno* 1448, he appointed each pariſh to furniſh an archer: theſe were termed *franc-archers*, becauſe they were exempted from all taxes. This little army was intended for reſtoring peace and order at home, not for diſturbing neighbouring ſtates. This good prince had been forced into many perilous wars, ſome of them for reſtraining the turbulent ſpirit of his vaſſals, and moſt of them for defending his crown againſt

gainſt a powerful adverſary, Henry V. of England. As theſe wars were carried on in the feudal manner, the ſoldiers, who had no pay, could not be reſtrained from plundering; and inveterate practice rendered them equally licentious in peace and in war. Charles, to leave no pretext for free quarters, laid upon his ſubjects a ſmall tax, ſufficient for regular pay to his little army *.

Firſt attempts are commonly crude and defective. The franc-archers, diſperſed one by one in different villages, and never collected but in time of action, could not eaſily be brought under regular diſcipline. They were idle when not in the field; and in the field, they diſplay'd nothing but vicious habits, a ſpirit of lazineſs, of diſorder, and of pilfering. Neither in peace were they of any uſe: their character of ſoldier made them deſpiſe agriculture, without being qualified for war: in the army they were no better than peaſants: at the plough, no better than idle ſoldiers. But in the hands of a monarch, a ſtanding army is an inſtrument of power, too valuable ever to be abandoned: if one ſovereign entertain ſuch an army, others in ſelf-defence muſt follow the example. Standing armies are now eſtabliſhed in every European ſtate, and are brought to a competent degree of perfection.

This new inſtrument of government, has produced a wonderful change in manners. We now rely on a ſtanding army, for

* This was the firſt tax impoſed in France without conſent of the three eſtates: and, however unconſtitutional, it occaſioned not the ſlighteſt murmur, becauſe the viſible good tendency of the tax reconciled all the world to it. Charles, beſide, was a favourite of his people; and juſtly, as he ſhewed by every act his affection for them. Had our firſt Charles been ſuch a favourite, who knows, whether the taxes he impoſed without conſent of parliament, would have met with any oppoſition? Such taxes would have become cuſtomary, as in France; and a limited monarchy would, as in France, have become abſolute. Governments, like men, are liable to many revolutions: we remain, it is true, a free people; but for that bleſſing, we are perhaps more indebted to fortune, than to patriotic vigilance.

defence

defence as well as offence: none but thoſe who are trained to war, ever think of handling arms, or even of defending themſelves againſt an enemy: our people in general have become altogether effeminate, terrified at the very ſight of a hoſtile weapon. It is true, they are not the leſs qualified for the arts of peace; and if manufacturers be protected from being obliged to ſerve in the army, I diſcover not any incompatibility between a ſtanding army and the higheſt induſtry. Huſbandmen at the ſame time make the beſt ſoldiers: a military ſpirit in the lower claſſes ariſes from bodily ſtrength, and from affection to their natal ſoil: both are eminent in the huſbandman: conſtant exerciſe in the open air renders him hardy and robuſt; and fondneſs for the place where he finds comfort and plenty, attaches him to his country in general *. An artiſt or manufacturer, on the

* Numquam credo potuiſſe dubitari, aptiorem armis ruſticam plebem, quæ ſub divo et in labore nutritur; ſolis patiens; umbræ negligens; balnearum neſcia; deliciarum ignara; ſimplicis animi; parvo contenta; duratis ad omnem laborum tolerantiam membris: cui geſtare ferrum, foſſam ducere, onus ferre, conſuetudo de rure eſt. Nec inficiandum eſt, poſt urbem conditam, Romanos ex civitate profectos ſemper ad bellum: ſed tunc nullis voluptatibus, nullis deliciis frangebantur. Sudorem curſu et campeſtri exercitio collectum nando juventus abluebat in Tybere. Idem bellator, idem agricola, genera tantum mutabat armorum. *Vegetius, De re militari, l.* 1. *cap.* 3.—[*In Engliſh thus:* "I believe it was never doubted, that "the country-labourers were, of all others, the beſt ſoldiers. Inured to the open "air, and habitual toil, ſubjected to the extremes of heat and cold, ignorant of the "uſe of the bath, or any of the luxuries of life, contented with bare neceſſaries, "there was no ſeverity in any change they could make: their limbs, accuſtomed to "the uſe of the ſpade and plough, and habituated to burden, were capable of the "utmoſt extremity of toil. Indeed, in the earlieſt ages of the commonwealth, "while the city was in her infancy, the citizens marched out from the town to "the field: but at that time they were not enfeebled by pleaſures, nor by luxury: "The military youth, returning from their exerciſe and martial ſports, plunged "into the Tyber to waſh off the ſweat and duſt of the field. The warrior and the "huſbandman were the ſame, they changed only the nature of their arms."]

contrary, is attached to no country but where he finds the beſt bread; and a ſedentary life, enervating his body, renders him puſillanimous. For theſe reaſons, among many, agriculture ought to be honoured and cheriſhed above all other arts. It is not only a fine preparation for war, by breeding men who love their country, and whom labour and ſobriety fit for being ſoldiers; but is alſo the beſt foundation for commerce, by furniſhing both food and materials to the induſtrious.

But ſeveral objections of the moſt intereſting nature occur againſt a ſtanding army, that call aloud for a better model than has hitherto been eſtabliſhed, at leaſt in Britain. The ſubject is of importance, and I hope for attention from every man who loves his country. During the vigour of the feudal ſyſtem, which made every land-proprietor a ſoldier, every inch of ground was tenaciouſly diſputed with an invader: and while a ſovereign retained any part of his dominions, he never loſt hopes of recovering the whole. At preſent, we rely entirely on a ſtanding army, for defence as well as offence, which has reduced every nation of Europe to a very precarious condition. If the army of a ſtate happen to be defeated, even at the moſt diſtant frontier, there is little reſource againſt a total conqueſt. Compare the hiſtory of Charles VII. with that of Lewis XIV. Kings of France. The former, tho' driven into a corner by Henry V. of England, and deprived of the bulk of his provinces, was however far from yielding: on the contrary, relying on the military ſpirit of his people, and indefatigably intent on ſtratagem and ſurpriſe, he recovered all he had loſt. When Lewis XIV. ſucceeded to the crown, the military ſpirit of the people, was contracted within the narrow ſpan of a ſtanding army. Behold the conſequence. That ambitious monarch, having provoked his neighbours into an alliance againſt him, had no reſource againſt a more numerous army, but to purchaſe peace by offering to abandon all his conqueſts, upon which

he

he had laviſhed much blood and treaſure (*a*). France at that period contained ſeveral millions capable of bearing arms; and yet was not in a condition to make head againſt a diſciplined army of 70,000 men. Poland, which continues upon the ancient military eſtabliſhment, wearied out Charles XII. of Sweden, and had done the ſame to ſeveral of his predeceſſors. But Saxony, defended only by a ſtanding army, could not hold out a ſingle day againſt the prince now mentioned, at the head of a greater army. Mercenary troops are a defence ſtill more feeble, againſt troops that fight for glory, or for their country. Unhappy was the invention of a ſtanding army; which, without being any ſtrong bulwark againſt enemies, is a grievous burden on the people; and turns daily more and more ſo. Liſten to a firſt-rate author on that point. " Sitôt qu' un état augmente ce qu' il appelle ſes " troupes, les autres augmentent les leurs; de façon qu' on ne " gagne rien par-là que la ruine commune. Chaque monarque " tient ſur pied toutes les armées qu' il pourroit avoir ſi ſes peuples " étoient en danger d' être exterminées; et on nomme paix cet état " d' effort de tous contre tous. Nous ſommes pauvres avec les " richeſſes et le commerce de tout l' univers; et bientôt à force " d' avoir des ſoldats, nous n' aurons plus que des ſoldats, et " nous ſerons comme de Tartares * (*b*)."

* " As ſoon as one ſtate augments the number of its troops, the neighbouring " ſtates of courſe do the ſame; ſo that nothing is gained, and the effect is, the ge- " neral ruin. Every prince keeps as many armies in pay, as if he dreaded the ex- " termination of his people from a foreign invaſion; and this perpetual ſtruggle, " maintained by all againſt all, is termed *peace*. With the riches and commerce " of the whole univerſe, we are in a ſtate of poverty; and by thus continually " augmenting our troops, we ſhall ſoon have none elſe but ſoldiers, and be redu- " ced to the ſame ſituation as the Tartars.

(*a*) Treaty of St Gertrudenberg.

(*b*) L' eſprit des loix, liv. 13. chap. 17.

But with reſpect to Britain, and every free nation, there is an objection ſtill more formidable; which is, that a ſtanding army is dangerous to liberty. It avails very little to be ſecure againſt foreign enemies, ſuppoſing a ſtanding army to afford ſecurity, if we have no ſecurity againſt an enemy at home. If a warlike king, heading his own troops, be ambitious to render himſelf abſolute, there are no means to evade the impending blow; for what avail the greateſt number of effeminate cowards againſt a diſciplined army, devoted to their prince, and ready implicitly to execute his commands? In a word, by relying entirely on a ſtanding army, and by truſting the ſword in the hands of men who abhor the reſtraint of civil laws, a ſolid foundation is laid for military government. Thus a ſtanding army is dangerous to liberty, and yet no ſufficient bulwark againſt powerful neighbours.

Deeply ſenſible of the foregoing objections, Harrington propoſes a plan for a militia, which he holds to be unexceptionable. Every male between eighteen and thirty, is to be trained to military exerciſes, by frequent meetings, where the youth are excited by premiums to contend in running, wreſtling, ſhooting at a mark, &c. &c. But Harrington did not advert, that ſuch meetings, enflaming the military ſpirit, muſt create an averſion in the people to dull and fatiguing labour. His plan evidently is inconſiſtent with induſtry and manufactures: it would be ſo at leaſt in Britain. A moſt ſucceſsful plan it would be, were defence our ſole object; and not the leſs ſucceſsful, by rendering Britain ſo poor as ſcarce to be a tempting conqueſt. Our late war with France is a conſpicuous inſtance of the power that can be exerted by a commercial ſtate, entire in its credit; a power that amaz'd all the world, and ourſelves no leſs than others. Politicians begin to conſider Britain, and not France, to be the formidable power that threatens univerſal monarchy. Had Harrington's plan been adopted, Britain, like Sweden or Denmark, muſt have been contented with an inferior

inferior ſtation, having no ambition but to draw ſubſidies from its more potent neighbours.

In Switzerland, it is true, boys are, from the age of twelve, exerciſed in running, wreſtling, and ſhooting. Every male who can bear arms is regimented, and ſubjected to military diſcipline. Here is a militia in perfection upon Harrington's plan, a militia neither forc'd nor mercenary; invincible when fighting for their country: and as the Swiſs are by no means an idle people, we learn from this inſtance, that the martial ſpirit is not an invincible obſtruction to induſtry. But the original barrenneſs of Switzerland, compelled the inhabitants to be ſober and induſtrious: and induſtry hath among them become a ſecond nature, there ſcarcely being a child above ſix years of age but who is employ'd, not excepting children of opulent families. England differs widely in the nature of its ſoil, and of its people. At the ſame time, there is little occaſion to inſiſt upon that difference; as Switzerland affords no clear evidence, that a militia gives no obſtruction to a ſpirit of induſtry: the Swiſs, it is true, may be termed induſtrious; but their induſtry is confined to neceſſaries and conveniencies: they are leſs ambitious of wealth than of military glory; and they have few arts or manufactures, either to ſupport foreign commerce, or to excite luxury.

Fletcher of Salton's plan of a militia, differs little from that of Harrington. Three camps are to be conſtantly kept up in England, and a fourth in Scotland; into one or other of which, every man muſt enter upon completing his one and twentieth year. In theſe camps the art of war is to be acquired and practiſed: thoſe who can maintain themſelves muſt continue there two years, others but a ſingle year. Secondly, Thoſe who have been thus educated, ſhall for ever after have fifty yearly meetings, and ſhall exerciſe four hours every meeting. It is not ſaid, by what means young men are compelled to reſort to the camp; nor is any exception

exception mentioned of perſons deſtin'd for the church, for liberal ſciences, or for the fine arts. The weak and the ſickly muſt be exempted; and yet no regulation is propoſed againſt thoſe who abſent themſelves on a falſe pretext. But waving theſe, the capital objection againſt Harrington's plan ſtrikes equally againſt Fletcher's, That by rouſing a military ſpirit, it would alienate the minds of our people from arts and manufactures, and from any conſtant and uniform occupation. The author himſelf remarks, that the uſe and exerciſe of arms, would make the youth place their honour upon that art, and would enflame them with love of military glory; not adverting, that love of military glory, diffuſed through the whole maſs of the people, would unqualify Britain for being a manufacturing and commercial country, rendering it of little weight or conſideration in Europe.

The military branch is eſſential to every ſpecies of government: the Quakers are the only people who ever doubted of it. Is it not then mortifying, that a capital branch of government, ſhould to this day remain in a ſtate ſo imperfect? One would ſuſpect ſome inherent vice in the nature of government, that counteracts every effort of genius to produce a more perfect mode. I am not diſpoſed to admit any defect of Providence, eſpecially in an article eſſential to the well-being of ſociety; and rather than yield to the charge, I venture to propoſe the following plan, even at the hazard of being thought an idle projector. And what animates me greatly to make the attempt is, a firm conviction, that a military and an induſtrious ſpirit are of equal importance to Britain; and that if either of them be loſt, we are undone. To reconcile theſe ſeeming antagoniſts, is my chief view in the following plan; to which I ſhall proceed, after paving the way by ſome preliminary conſiderations.

The firſt is, that as military force is eſſential to every ſtate, no man is exempted from bearing arms for his country: all are bound;

bound; becauſe none can be bound, if every one be not bound. Were any difference to be made, perſons of figure and fortune ought firſt to be called to that ſervice, as being the moſt intereſted in the welfare of their country. Liſten to a good ſoldier delivering his opinion on that ſubject. " Les levées qui ſe font par ſu-
" percherie ſont tout auſſi odieuſes; on met de l'argent dans la
" pochette d'un homme, et on lui dit qu'il eſt ſoldat. Celles qui
" ſe font par force, le ſont encore plus; c'eſt une deſolation pu-
" blique, dont le bourgeois et l'habitant ne ſe ſauvent qu'à
" force d'argent, et dont le fond eſt toujours un moyen odieux.
" Ne voudroit-*il* pas mieux établer, par une loi, que tout homme,
" de quelque condition qu'il fût, ſeroit obligé de ſervir ſon
" prince et ſa patrie pendant cinq ans? Cette loi ne ſçauroit être
" deſapprouvée, parce qu'il eſt naturel et juſte que les citoyens
" s'emploient pour la défenſe de l'état. Cette methode de lever
" des troupes ſeroit un fond inépuiſable de belles et bonnes re-
" crues, qui ne ſeroient pas ſujetes a déſerter. L'on ſe feroit même,
" par la ſuite, un honneur et un devoir de ſerver ſa tâche. Mais,
" pour y parvenir, il faudroit n'en excepter aucune condition,
" être sévére *ſur ce point*, et s'attacher a faire exécuter cette loi
" de préférence aux nobles et aux riches. Perſonne n'en mur-
" mureroit. Alors ceux qui auroient ſervi leur temps, verroient
" avec mépris ceux qui repugneroient à cette loi, et inſenſible-
" ment on ſe feroit un honneur de ſervir: le pauvre bourgeois ſe-
" roit conſolé par l'example du riche; et celui-ci n'oſeroit ſe
" plaindre, voyant ſervir le noble (*a*) *."

Take

(*a*) Les reveries du Comte de Saxe.

* " The method of inliſting men, by putting a trick upon them, is fully as o-
" dious. They ſlip a piece of money into a man's pocket, and then tell him he is
" a ſoldier. Inliſting by force is ſtill more odious. It is a public calamity, from
" which the citizen has no means of ſaving himſelf but by money; and it is conſe-
" quently the worſt of all the reſources of government. Would it not be more
" expedient

Take another preliminary conſideration. While there remained any portion of our original martial ſpirit, the difficulty was not great of recruiting the army. But that taſk hath of late years become extremely troubleſome; and more diſagreeable ſtill than troubleſome, by the neceſſity of uſing deceitful arts for trepanning the unwary youth. Nor are ſuch arts always ſucceſsful: in our late war with France, we were neceſſitated to give up even the appearance of voluntary ſervice, and to recruit the army on the ſolid principle of obliging every man to fight for his country: the juſtices of peace were empowered by the legiſlature, to force into the ſervice ſuch as could be beſt ſpared from civil occupation. If a ſingle clauſe had been added, limiting the ſervice to five or ſeven years, the meaſure would have been unexceptionable, even in a land of liberty. To relieve officers of the army from practiſing deceitful arts for recruiting their corps, by ſubſtituting a fair and conſtitutional mode, was a valuable improvement. It was of importance with reſpect to its direct intendment; but of much greater with reſpect to its conſequences. One of the

" expedient to enact a law, obliging every man, whatever be his rank, to ſerve his " King and country for five years? This law could not be diſapproved of, be- " cauſe it is conſiſtent both with nature and juſtice, that every citizen ſhould be " employed in the defence of the ſtate. Here would be an inexhauſtible fund of " good and able ſoldiers, who would not be apt to deſert, as every man would " reckon it both his honour and his duty to have ſerved his time. But to effect " this, it muſt be a fixed principle, That there ſhall be no exception of ranks. This " point muſt be rigorouſly attended to, and the law muſt be enforced, by way of " preference, firſt among the nobility and the men of wealth. There would not " be a ſingle man who would complain of it. A perſon who had ſerved his time, " would treat with contempt another who ſhould ſhow reluctance to comply with " the law; and thus, by degrees, it would become a taſk of honour. The poor " citizen would be comforted and inſpirited by the example of his rich neighbour; " and he again would have nothing to complain of, when he ſaw that the noble- " man was not exempted from ſervice."

few

few diſadvantages of a free ſtate, is licentiouſneſs in the common people, who may wallow in diſorder and profligacy without control, if they be but cautious to refrain from groſs crimes, puniſhable by law. Now, as it appears to me, there never has been deviſed a method more efficacious for reſtoring induſtry and ſobriety, than that under conſideration. Its ſalutary effects were conſpicuous, even during the ſhort time it ſubſiſted. The dread of being forc'd into the ſervice, rendered the populace peaceable and orderly: it did more; it rendered them induſtrious in order to conciliate favour. The moſt beneficial diſcoveries have been accidental: without having any view but for recruiting the army, our legiſlature ſtumbled upon an excellent method for reclaiming the idle and the profligate; a matter, in the preſent depravity of manners, of greater importance than any other that concerns the police of Britain. A perpetual law of that kind, by promoting induſtry, would prove a ſovereign remedy againſt mobs and riots, diſeaſes of a free country, full of people and of manufactures *. Why were the foregoing ſtatutes, for there were two of them, limited to a temporary exiſtence? There is not on record another ſtatute better intitled to immortality.

And now to the project, which, after all my efforts, I produce with trepidation; not that I doubt of its ſolidity, but as ill ſuited to the preſent manners of this iſland. To hope that it will be put in practice, would indeed be highly ridiculous: this can never happen, till patriotiſm flouriſh more in Britain than it has done for ſome time paſt. Suppoſing now an army of 60,000 men to be

* Several late mobs in the ſouth of England, all of them on pretext of ſcarcity, greatly alarmed the adminiſtration. A fact was diſcovered by a private perſon (*Six-weeks tour through the ſouth of England*), which our miniſters ought to have diſcovered, that theſe mobs conſtantly happened where wages were high and proviſions low; conſequently that they were occaſioned, not by want, but by wantonneſs.

ſufficient for Britain, a rational method for raiſing ſuch an army, were there no ſtanding forces, would be, that land-proprietors, in proportion to their valued rents, ſhould furniſh men to ſerve ſeven years, and no longer *. But as it would be no leſs unjuſt than imprudent, to diſband at once our preſent army, the ſoft and natural way is, to begin with moulding gradually the old army into the new, by filling up vacancies with men bound to ſerve ſeven years and no longer. And for raiſing proper men, a matter of much delicacy, it is propoſed, that in every ſhire a ſpecial commiſſion be given to certain landholders of rank and figure, to raiſe recruits out of the lower claſſes, ſelecting always thoſe who are the leaſt uſeful at home.

Second. Thoſe who claim to be diſmiſſed after ſerving the appointed time, ſhall never again be called to the ſervice, except in caſe of an actual invaſion. Every one of them ſhall be intitled to a premium of eight or ten pounds, for enabling him to follow a trade or calling, without being ſubjected to corporation-laws. The private men in France are inliſted but for ſix years; and that mode has never been attended with any inconvenience.

Third. With reſpect to the private men, idleneſs muſt be totally and for ever baniſhed. Suppoſing three months yearly to be ſufficient for military diſcipline, the men, during the reſt of the year, ought to be employ'd upon public works, forming roads, erecting bridges, making rivers navigable, clearing harbours, &c. &c. Why not alſo furniſh men for half-pay to private undertakers of uſeful works? And ſuppoſing the daily pay of a ſoldier to be ten pence, it would greatly encourage

* In Denmark, every land-proprietor of a certain rent, is obliged to furniſh a militia-man, whom he can withdraw at pleaſure upon ſubſtituting another; an excellent method for taming the peaſants, and for rendering them induſtrious.

extenſive

extenſive improvements, to have at command a number of ſtout fellows, under ſtrict diſcipline, at the low wages of five pence a-day. An army of 60,000 men thus employ'd, would not be ſo expenſive to the public, as 20,000 men upon the preſent eſtabliſhment: for beſide the money contributed by private undertakers, public works carried on by ſoldiers, will be miſerably ill contrived, if not cheaply purchaſed with their pay *.

The moſt important branch of the project, is what regards the officers. The neceſſity of reviving in our people of rank ſome portion of military ſpirit, will be acknowledged by every perſon of reflection; and in that view, the following articles are propoſed. Firſt: That there be two claſſes of officers, one ſerving for pay, one without pay. In filling up every vacant office of cornet or enſign, the latter are to be preferred; but in progreſſive advancement, no diſtinction is to be made between the claſſes. An officer who has ſerved ſeven years without pay, may retire with honour.

Second. No man ſhall be privileged to repreſent a county in parliament, who has not ſerved ſeven years without pay; and, excepting an actual burgeſs, none but thoſe who have performed that ſervice, ſhall be privileged to repreſent a borough. The ſame qualification ſhall be neceſſary to every one who aſpires to ſerve the public or the King in an office of dignity, excepting only churchmen and lawyers, with regard to offices in their reſpective profeſſions. In old Rome, none were admitted candidates for any civil employment, till they had ſerved ten years in the army.

Third. Officers of this claſs are to be exempted from the taxes

* Taking this for granted, I bring only into the calculation the pay of the three months ſpent in military diſcipline; and the calculation is very ſimple, the pay of 20,000 for twelve months amounting to a greater ſum than the pay of 60,000 for three months.

impoſed on land, coaches, windows, and plate; not for ſaving a trifling ſum, but as a mark of diſtinction.

The military ſpirit muſt in Britain be miſerably low, if ſuch regulations prove not effectual to decorate the army with officers of figure and fortune. Nor need we to apprehend any bad conſequence, from a number of raw officers who ſerve without pay: among men of birth, emulation will have a more commanding influence than pay or profit; and at any rate, there will always be a ſufficiency of old and experienc'd officers receiving pay, ready to take the lead in every difficult enterpriſe.

Fourth. To improve this army in military diſcipline, it is propoſed, that when occaſion offers, 5 or 6000 of them be maintained by Great Britain, as auxiliaries to ſome ally at war. And if that body be changed from time to time, knowledge and practice in war will be diffuſed thro' the whole army.

Officers who ſerve for pay, will be greatly benefited by this plan: frequent removes of thoſe who ſerve without pay, make way for them; and from the very nature of the plan, buying and ſelling is abſolutely excluded.

I proceed to the alterations neceſſary for accommodating this plan to our preſent military eſtabliſhment. As a total revolution at one inſtant would breed confuſion, the firſt ſtep ought to be a ſpecimen only, ſuch as the levying two or three regiments on the new model; the expence of which ought not to be grudged, as the forces preſently in pay, are not ſufficient, even in peace, to anſwer the ordinary demands of government. And as the proſpect of civil employments, will excite more men of rank to offer their ſervice than there is room for, the choice muſt be in the crown, not only with reſpect to the new regiments, but with reſpect to the vacant cornetcies and enſigncies in the old army. But as theſe regulations will not inſtantly produce men qualified to be ſecretaries of ſtate or commiſſioners of treaſury, ſo numerous as to

afford

afford his Majeſty a ſatisfactory choice, that branch of the plan may be ſuſpended, till thoſe who have ſerved ſeven years without pay, amount to one hundred at leaſt. The article that concerns members of parliament muſt be ſtill longer ſuſpended: it may however, after the firſt ſeven years, receive execution in part, by privileging thoſe who have received no pay to repreſent a borough, refuſing that privilege to others, except to actual burgeſſes. We may proceed one ſtep farther, That if in a county there be five gentlemen who have the qualification under conſideration, over and above the ordinary legal qualifications, one of the five muſt be choſen, leaving the electors free as to their other repreſentative.

With reſpect to the private men of the old army, a thouſand of ſuch as have ſerved the longeſt may be diſbanded annually, if ſo many be willing to retire; and in their ſtead an equal number may be inliſted, to ſerve but ſeven years. Upon ſuch a plan, it will not be difficult to find recruits.

The advantage of this plan, in one particular, is eminent. It will infallibly fill the army with gallant officers: Other advantages concerning the officers themſelves, ſhall be mentioned afterward. An appetite for military glory, cannot fail to be rouſed in officers who ſerve without pay, when their ſervice is the only paſſport to employments of truſt and honour. And may we not hope, that officers who ſerve for pay, will, by force of imitation, be inſpired with the ſame appetite? Nothing ought to be more ſedulouſly inculcated into every officer, than to deſpiſe riches, as a mercantile object, below the dignity of a ſoldier. Often has the courage of victorious troops been blunted by the pillage of an opulent city; and may not rich captures at ſea have the ſame effect? Some ſea-commanders have been ſuſpected, of beſtowing their fire more willingly upon a merchantman, than upon a ſhip of war. A triumph, an ovation, a civic crown, or ſome ſuch mark of honour,

were

were in old Rome the only rewards for military atchievemeſits *. Money, it is true, was ſometimes diſtributed among the private men, as an addition to their pay, after a fatiguing campaign; but not as a recompence for their good behaviour, becauſe all ſhared alike. It did not eſcape the penetrating Romans, that wealth, the parent of luxury and ſelfiſhneſs, fails not to eradicate the military ſpirit. The ſoldier who to recover his baggage performed a bold action, gave an inſtructive leſſon to all governments. Being invited by his general to try his fortune a ſecond time; Invite, ſays the ſoldier, one who has loſt his baggage. Many a bold adventurer goes to the Indies, who, returning with a fortune, is afraid of every breeze. Britain, I ſuſpect, is too much infected with the ſpirit of gain. Will it be thought ridiculous in any man of figure, to prefer reputation and reſpect before riches; provided only he can afford a frugal meal, and a warm garment? Let us compare an old officer, who never deſerted his friend nor his country, and a wealthy merchant, who never indulged a thought but of gain: the wealth is tempting;—and yet does there exiſt a man of ſpirit, who would not be the officer rather than the merchant, even with his millions? Sultan Mechmet granted to the Janiſaries a privilege of importing foreign commodities free of duty: was it his intention to metamorphoſe ſoldiers into merchants, loving peace, and hating war?

But tho' I declare againſt large appointments beforehand, which,

* A Roman triumph was finely contrived to excite heroiſm; and a ſort of triumph not leſs ſplendid, was diſplay'd by the Fatemite Califs of Egypt. After returning from a ſucceſsful expedition, the Calif pitched his camp in a ſpacious plain near his capital, where he was attended by all his grandees, in their fineſt equipages. Three days were commonly ſpent in all manner of rejoicings, feaſting, muſic, fireworks, &c. He marched into the city with this great cavalcade, through roads covered with rich carpets, ſtrewed with flowers, gums, and odoriferous plants, and hedged on both ſides with crouds of congratulating ſubjects.

inſtead

inſtead of promoting ſervice, are a temptation to luxury and idleneſs; yet to an officer of character, who has ſpent his younger years in ſerving his king and country, a government, or other ſuitable employment that enables him to paſs the remainder of his life in caſe and affluence, is a proper reward for merit, reflecting equal honour on the prince who beſtows, and on the ſubject who receives; beſide affording an enlivening proſpect to others, who have it at heart to do well.

With reſpect to the private men, the rotation propoſed, aims at improvements far more important, than that of making military ſervice fall light upon individuals. It tends to unite the ſpirit of induſtry with that of war, and to form the ſame man to be an induſtrious labourer, as well as a good ſoldier. The continual exerciſe recommended, cannot fail to produce a ſpirit of induſtry; which will occaſion a demand for the private men after their ſeven years ſervice, as valuable above all other labourers, not only for regularity, but for activity. And with reſpect to ſervice in war, conſtant exerciſe is the life of an army, in the literal as well as metaphorical ſenſe. Boldneſs is inſpired by ſtrength and agility, to which conſtant motion mainly contributes. The Roman citizens, trained to arms from their infancy, and never allowed to reſt, were invincible. To mention no other works, ſpacious and durable roads carried to the very extremities of that vaſt empire, ſhow clearly how the ſoldiers were employ'd during peace; which hardened them for war, and made them orderly and ſubmiſſive (*a*). So eſſential was labour held by the Romans for training an army, that they never ventured to face an enemy, with troops debilitated in any degree by idleneſs. The Roman army in Spain, having been worſted in ſeveral engagements, and confined within their entrenchments, were ſunk in idleneſs and

(*a*) Bergiere hiſtoire des grands chemins, vol. 2. p. 152.

luxury.

luxury. Scipio Naſica, after demoliſhing Carthage, taking the command of that army, durſt not oppoſe it to the enemy, till he accuſtomed the ſoldiers to temperance and hard labour. He exerciſed them without relaxation in marching and countermarching, in fortifying camps and demoliſhing them, in digging trenches and filling them up, in building high walls and pulling them down; he himſelf, from morning to night, going about, and directing every operation. Marius, before engaging the Cimbri, exerciſed his army in turning the courſe of a river. Appian relates, that Antiochus, during his winter-quarters at Calchis, having married a beautiful virgin, with whom he was greatly enamoured, ſpent the whole winter in pleaſure, abandoning his army to vice and idleneſs: and when the time of action returned with the ſpring, he found his ſoldiers unfit for ſervice. The idleneſs of our ſoldiers in time of peace, promoting debauchery and licentiouſneſs, is no leſs deſtructive to health than to diſcipline. Unable for the fatigues of a firſt campaign, our private men die in thouſands, as if ſmote with a peſtilence *. We never read of any mortality in the Roman legions, tho' frequently engaged in climates very different from their own. Let us liſten to a judicious writer, to whom every one liſtens with delight: " Nous remarquons " aujourd'hui, que nos armées périſſent beaucoup par le travail

* The idleneſs of Britiſh ſoldiers appears from a tranſaction of the commiſſioners of the annexed eſtates in Scotland. After the late war with France, they judged, that part of the King's rents could not be better beſtow'd, than in giving bread to the diſbanded ſoldiers. Houſes were built for them, portions of land given them to cultivate at a very low rent, and maintenance afforded them till they could reap a crop. Theſe men could not wiſh to be better accommodated: but ſo accuſtomed they had been to idleneſs, and change of place, as to be incapable of any ſort of work: they deſerted their farms one after another, and commenced thieves and beggars. Such as had been made ſerjeants muſt be excepted: theſe were ſenſible fellows, and proſpered in their little farms.

" immodéré

" immodéré des ſoldats; et cependant c'étoit par un travail im-
" menſe que les Romains ſe conſervoient. La raiſon en eſt, je
" croix, que leurs fatigues étoient continuelles; au lieu que nos
" ſoldats paſſent ſans ceſſe d'un travail extreme à une extreme oi-
" ſivété, ce qui eſt la choſe du monde la plus propre à les faire
" perir. Il faut que je rapporte ici ce que les auteurs nous diſent
" de l'education de ſoldats Romains. On les accoutumoit à aller
" le pas militaire, c'eſt-a-dire, à fair en cinq heures vingt milles,
" et quelquefois vingt-quatre. Pendant ces marches, on leur fai-
" ſoit porter de poids de ſoixante livres. On les entretenoit dans
" l'habitude de courir et de ſauter tout armés; ils prenoient
" dans leurs exercices des epées, de javelots, de flêches, d'une pé-
" ſanteur double des armes ordinaires; et ces exercices étoient
" continuels. Des hommes ſi endurcis étoient ordinairement
" ſains; on ne remarque pas dans les auteurs que les armées Ro-
" maines, qui faiſoient la guerre en tant de climats, periſſoient
" beaucoup par les maladies; au lieu qu'il arrive preſque conti-
" nuellement aujourd'hui, que des armées, ſans avoir combattu,
" ſe fondent, pour ainſi dire, dans une campagne * (*a*)." Ma-
reſchal

(*a*) Monteſquieu, Grandeur de Romains, chap. 2.

* " We obſerve now-a-days, that our armies are conſumed by the fatigues and
" ſevere labour of the ſoldiers; and yet it was alone by labour and toil that the
" Romans preſerved themſelves from deſtruction. I believe the reaſon is, that
" their fatigue was continual and unremitting, while the life of our ſoldiers is a
" perpetual tranſition from ſevere labour to extreme indolence, a life the moſt rui-
" nous of all others. I muſt here recite the account which the Roman authors
" give of the education of their ſoldiers. They were continually habituated to the
" military pace, which was, to march in five hours twenty, and ſometimes twenty-
" five miles. In theſe marches each ſoldier carried ſixty pounds weight. They
" were accuſtomed to run and leap in arms; and in their military exerciſes,
" their ſwords, javelins, and arrows, were of twice the ordinary weight. Theſe
" exerciſes

reſchal Saxe, a ſoldier, not a phyſician, aſcribes to the uſe of vinegar the healthineſs of the Roman legions: were vinegar ſo potent, it would of all liquors be the moſt in requeſt. Exerciſe without intermiſſion, during peace as well as during war, produced that ſalutary effect; which every prince will find, who is diſpoſed to copy the Roman diſcipline *. The Mareſchal gueſſes better with reſpect to a horſe. Diſcourſing of cavalry, he obſerves, that a horſe becomes hardy and healthful by conſtant exerciſe, and that a young horſe is unable to bear fatigue; for which reaſon he declares againſt young horſes for the ſervice of an army.

That the military branch of the Britiſh government is ſuſceptible of improvements, all the world will admit. To improve it, I have contributed my mite; which is humbly ſubmitted to the public, a judge from whom there lies no appeal. It is ſubmitted in three views. The firſt is, Whether an army, modelled as above, would not ſecure us againſt the boldeſt invader; the next, Whether ſuch an army be as dangerous to liberty, as an army in its

" exerciſes were continual, which ſo ſtrengthened the conſtitution of the men, " that they were always in health. We ſee no remarks in the Roman authors, " that their armies, in the variety of climates where they made war, ever periſhed " by diſeaſe; whilſt now-a-days it is not unuſual, that an army, without ever " coming to an engagement, dwindles away by diſeaſe in one campaign."

* Rei militaris periti, plus quotidiana armorum exercitia ad ſanitatem militum putaverunt prodeſſe, quam medicos. Ex quo intelligitur quanto ſtudioſius armorum artem docendus ſit ſemper exercitus, cum ei laboris conſuetudo et in caſtris ſanitatem, et in conflictu poſſit præſtare victoriam. *Vegetius, De re militari, lib. 3. cap. 2.* — [*In Engliſh thus:* " Our maſters of the art-military were of opinion, " that daily exerciſe in arms contributed more to the health of the troops, than " the ſkill of the phyſician: from which we may judge, what care ſhould be " taken, to habituate the ſoldiers to the exerciſe of arms, to which they owe both " their health in the camp, and their victory in the field."] —— The ſame author obſerves, that the Romans in his time had become ſo inactive, as to leave off the fortifying their camps.

preſent

preſent form; and the laſt, Whether it would not be a ſchool of induſtry and moderation to our people.

With reſpect to the firſt, we ſhould, after a few years, have not only an army of ſixty thouſand well-diſciplined troops, but the command of another army, equally numerous, and equally well diſciplined. It is true, that troops inured to war have an advantage over troops that have not the ſame experience: but with aſſurance it may be pronounced impracticable, to land at once in Britain an army that can ſtand againſt 100,000 Britiſh ſoldiers well diſciplined, fighting even their firſt battle, for their country, and for their wives and children.

A war with France raiſes a panic on every ſlight threatening of an invaſion. The ſecurity afforded by the propoſed plan, would enable us to act offenſively at ſea, inſtead of being reduced to keep our ſhips at home, for guarding our coaſts. Would Britain any longer be obliged to ſupport her continental connections? No ſooner does an European prince augment his army, or improve military diſcipline, than his neighbours, taking fright, muſt do the ſame. May not one hope, that by the plan propoſed, or ſome ſuch, Britain would be relieved from jealouſy and ſolicitude about its neighbours?

With reſpect to the ſecond view, having long enjoy'd the ſweets of a free government, under a ſucceſſion of mild princes, we begin to forget, that our liberties ever were in danger. But drouſy ſecurity is of all conditions the moſt dangerous; becauſe the ſtate may be overwhelmed before we even dream of danger. Suppoſe only, that a Britiſh King, accompliſhed in the art of war, and beloved by his ſoldiers, heads his own troops in a war with France; and after more than one ſucceſsful campaign, gives peace to his enemy, on terms advantageous to his people: what ſecurity have we for our liberties, when he returns with a victorious army, devoted to his will? I am talking of a ſtanding

army in its preſent form. Troops modelled as above will not be ſo obſequious: a number of the prime nobility and gentry ſerving without pay, who can be under no temptation to enſlave themſelves and their country, will prove a firm barrier againſt the ambitious views of ſuch a prince. And even ſuppoſing that army to be totally corrupted, the prince can have little hope of ſucceſs againſt the nation, ſupported by another army, compoſed of men, who, having completed their military ſervice, may be relied on as champions for their country.

And as to the laſt view mentioned, the plan propoſed cannot fail to promote induſtry and virtue, not only among the ſoldiers, but among the working people in general. To avoid hard labour and ſevere diſcipline in the army, men will be ſober and induſtrious at home; and ſuch untractable ſpirits as cannot be reached by the mild laws of a free government, will be effectually tamed by military law. At the ſame time, as ſobriety and innocence are conſtant attendants upon induſtry, the manners of our people would be much purified; a circumſtance of infinite importance to Britain. The ſalutary influence of the plan, would reach perſons in a higher ſphere. A young gentleman, whipt at ſchool, or falling behind at college, contracts an averſion to books; and flies to the army, where he is kept in countenance by numbers, idle and ignorant like himſelf. How many young men are thus daily ruined, who, but for the temptation of idleneſs and gaiety in the army, would have become uſeful ſubjects! In the plan under conſideration, the officers who ſerve for pay would be ſo few in number, and their proſpect of advancement ſo clear, that it would require much intereſt to be admitted into the army. None would be admitted but thoſe who have been regularly educated in every branch of military knowledge; and idle boys would be remitted to their ſtudies.

Here is diſplay'd an agreeable ſcene with relation to induſtry.

Suppoſing

Suppoſing the whole threeſcore thouſand men to be abſolutely idle; yet, by doubling the induſtry of thoſe who remain, I affirm, that the ſum of induſtry would be much greater than before. And the ſcene becomes enchanting, when we conſider, that theſe threeſcore thouſand men, would not only be of all the moſt induſtrious, but be patterns of induſtry to others.

Upon concluſion of a foreign war, we ſuffer grievouſly by diſbanded ſoldiers, who muſt plunder or ſtarve. The preſent plan is an effectual remedy: men accuſtomed to hard labour under ſtrict diſcipline, can never be in want of bread: they will be ſought for every where, even at higher than ordinary wages; and they will prove excellent maſters for training the peaſants to hard labour.

A man indulges emulation more freely in behalf of his friend or his country, than of himſelf: the latter is ſelfiſh; the former proceeds from a ſocial principle. In that view, have we not reaſon to hope, that the ſeparating military officers into different claſſes, will excite a laudable emulation, prompting individuals to exert themſelves on every occaſion, for the honour of their corps? Nor will ſuch emulation, a virtuous paſſion, be any obſtruction to private friendſhip between members of different claſſes. On the contrary, may it not be expected, that young officers of birth and fortune, zealous to qualify themſelves, at their own expence, for ſerving their country, will cling for inſtruction to officers of experience, who have no inheritance but perſonal merit? Both find their account in that connection: men of rank become adepts in military affairs, a valuable branch of education for them; and officers who ſerve for pay, acquire friends at court, who will embrace every opportunity of teſtifying their gratitude.

The advantages mentioned are great and extenſive; and yet are not the only advantages. Will it be thought extravagant to hope,

that

that the propoſed plan would form a better ſyſtem of education for young men of fortune, than hitherto has been known in Britain? Before pronouncing ſentence againſt me, let the following conſiderations be duly weigh'd. Our youth go abroad to *ſee* the world in the literal ſenſe; for to pierce deeper than eye-ſight, cannot be expected of boys. They reſort to gay courts, where they find nothing for imitation but pomp, luxury, diſſembled virtues, and real vices: ſuch ſcenes make a deep impreſſion on young men of a warm imagination. Our plan would be an antidote to ſuch poiſonous education. Suppoſing eighteen to be the earlieſt time for the army, here is an object held up to our youth of fortune, for rouſing their ambition: they will endeavour to make a figure, and emulation will animate them to excel: ſuppoſing a young man to have no ambition, ſhame alone will puſh him on. To acquire the military art, to diſcipline their men, to direct the execution of public works, and to conduct other military operations, would occupy their whole time, and baniſh idleneſs. A young gentleman, thus guarded againſt the enticing vices and ſauntering follies of youth, muſt be ſadly deficient in genius, if, during his ſeven years ſervice, reading and reflection have been totally neglected by him. Hoping better things from our youth of fortune, I take for granted, that during their ſervice they have made ſome progreſs, not only in military knowledge, but in morals, and in the fine arts, ſo as at the age of twenty-five to be qualified for profiting, inſtead of being undone, by *ſeeing* the world *.

* Whether hereditary nobility may not be neceſſary, in a monarchical government, to ſupport the King againſt the multitude, I take not on me to pronounce: but this I pronounce with aſſurance, that ſuch a conſtitution is unhappy with reſpect to education; and appears to admit no remedy, if it be not that above mentioned, or ſome ſuch. In fact, few of thoſe who received their education while they were the eldeſt ſons of Peers, have been duly qualified to manage public affairs.

Further,

Further, young men of birth and fortune, acquire indeed the ſmoothneſs and ſuppleneſs of a court, with reſpect to their ſuperiors; but the conſtraint of ſuch manners, makes their temper break out againſt inferiors, where there is no conſtraint. Inſolence of rank is not ſo viſible in Britain, as in countries of leſs freedom; but it is ſufficiently viſible to require correction. To that end, no method promiſes more ſucceſs than military ſervice; as command and obedience alternately, are the beſt diſcipline for acquiring temper and moderation. Can pride and inſolence be more effectually ſtemmed, than to be commanded by an inferior?

Still upon the important article of education. Where pleaſure is the ruling paſſion in youth, intereſt will be the ruling paſſion in age: the ſelfiſh principle is the foundation of both, the object only is varied. This obſervation is ſadly verified in Britain: our young men of rank, loathing an irkſome and fatiguing courſe of education, abandon themſelves to pleaſure. Trace theſe very men through the more ſedate part of life, and they will be found graſping at power and profit, by means of court-favour, with no regard to their country, and with very little regard to their friends. The education propoſed, holding up a temping prize to virtuous ambition, is an excellent fence againſt a life of indolent pleaſure. A youth of fortune, engaged with many rivals in a train of public ſervice, acquires a habit of buſineſs; and as he is conſtantly employ'd for the public, patriotiſm becomes his ruling paſſion *.

The

* The following portrait is ſketched by a good hand, (Madame Pompadour); and if it have any reſemblance, it ſets our plan in a conſpicuous light. The French nobleſſe, ſays that lady, ſpending their lives in diſſipation and idleneſs, know as little of politics as of economy. A gentleman hunts all his life in the country, or perhaps

The advantages of a military education, ſuch as that propoſed, are not yet exhauſted: one of conſiderable importance remains to be unfolded. Under regular government promoting the arts of peace, ſocial intercourſe refines, and fondneſs for company increaſes in proportion. And hence it is, that the capital is crouded with every perſon who can afford to live there. A man of fortune, who has no taſte but for a city life, happens to be forc'd into the country by buſineſs: finding buſineſs and the country equally inſipid, he becomes impatient, and returns to town, with a diſguſt at every rural amuſement. In France, the country has been long deſerted: ſuch fondneſs for ſociety prevails there, that ſeldom has the King occaſion to inflict a greater puniſhment on a man of faſhion, than to baniſh him to his country-ſeat. In Britain the ſame fondneſs for a town-life is gaining ground daily. A ſtranger conſidering the immenſe ſums expended in England upon country-ſeats, would conclude, in appearance with great certainty, that the Engliſh ſpend moſt of their time in the country. But how would it ſurpriſe him to be told, not only that people of faſhion in England paſs little of their time in the country, but that the immenſe ſums laid out upon gardening and pleaſure-grounds, are the effect of vanity more than of taſte! In fact, ſuch embelliſhments are beginning to wear our of faſhion; appetite for ſociety leaving neither time nor inclination for rural pleaſures.

perhaps comes to Paris to ruin himſelf with an opera-girl. Thoſe who are ambitious to be of the miniſtry, have ſeldom any merit, if it be not in caballing and intrigue. The French nobleſſe have courage, but without any genius for war, the fatigue of a ſoldier's life being to them unſupportable. The King has been reduced to the neceſſity of employing two ſtrangers for the ſafety of his crown: had it not been for the Counts Saxe and Louendahl, the enemies of France might have laid ſiege to Paris.

If

If the progreſs of that diſeaſe can be ſtay'd, the only means is military education. In youth laſting impreſſions are made; and men of fortune who take to the army, being confined moſtly to the country in prime of life, contract a liking for country occupations and amuſements; which withdraw them from the capital, and contribute to the health of the mind, no leſs than of the body.

A military education would contribute equally to moderation in ſocial enjoyments. The pomp, ceremony, and expence, neceſſary to thoſe who adhere to a court, and live always in public, are not a little fatiguing and oppreſſive. Man is naturally moderate in his deſire of enjoyment; and it requires much practice to make him bear exceſs without ſatiety and diſguſt. The pain of exceſs, prompts men of opulence to paſs ſome part of their time in a ſnug retirement, where they live at eaſe, free from pomp and ceremony. Here is a retirement, which can be reached without any painful circuit; a port of ſafety and of peace, to which we are piloted by military education, avoiding every dangerous rock, and every fatiguing agitation.

Reflecting on the advantages of military education above diſplay'd, is it fooliſh to think, that our plan might produce a total alteration of manners in our youth of birth and fortune? The idlers, the gameſters, the profligate, compared with our military men, would make a deſpicable figure: ſhame, not to talk of pride, would compel them to reform.

How conducive to good government might the propoſed plan be, in the hands of a virtuous king, ſupported by a public-ſpirited miniſtry! In the preſent courſe of advancement, a youth of quality, who aſpires to ſerve his country in a civil employment, has nothing to rely on but parliamentary intereſt. The military education propoſed, would afford him opportunity to improve his

talents, and to convince the world of his merit. Honour and applauſe thus acquired, would intitle him to demand preferment; and he ought to be employ'd, not only as deſerving, but as an encouragement to others. Frequent inſtances of neglecting men who are patronized by the public, might perhaps prove dangerous to a Britiſh miniſter.

If I have not all this while been dreaming, here are diſplay'd illuſtrious advantages of the military education propoſed. Fondneſs for the ſubject excites me to prolong the entertainment; and I add the following reflection, on the education of ſuch men as are diſpoſed to ſerve in a public ſtation. The ſciences are mutually connected; and a man cannot be perfect in any one, without being in ſome degree acquainted with every one. *The ſcience of politics*, in particular, being not a little intricate, cannot be acquired in perfection by any one whoſe ſtudies have been confined to a ſingle branch, whether relative to peace or to war. The Duke of Marlborough made an eminent figure in the cabinet, as well as in the field; and ſuch was equally the illuſtrious Sully, who may ſerve as a model to all miniſters. The great aim in modern politics is, to ſplit government into the greateſt number poſſible of departments, truſting nothing to genius. China is a complete model of ſuch a government. National affairs are there ſo ſimplified by diviſion, as to require ſcarce any capacity in the mandarines. Theſe officers, having little occaſion for activity, either of mind or of body, ſink down into ſloth and ſenſuality: motives of ambition or of fame make no impreſſion: they have not even ſo much delicacy as to bluſh when they err: and as they regard no puniſhment but what touches the perſon or the purſe, it is not unuſual to ſee a mandarine beaten with many ſtripes, ſometimes for a very ſlight tranſgreſſion. Let arts be ſubdivided into many parts; the more ſubdiviſions the better: but I venture to pronounce, that no man ever did, nor ever will, make a capital fi-

gure

gure in the government of a ſtate, whether as a judge, a general, or a miniſter, whoſe education is rigidly confined to one ſcience *.

Senſible am I that the foregoing plan is in ſeveral reſpects imperfect; but if it be found at bottom, poliſh and improvement are eaſy operations. My capital aim has been, to obviate the objections that preſs hard againſt every military plan, hitherto embraced or propoſed. A ſtanding army in its preſent form, is dangerous to liberty; and but a feeble bulwark againſt ſuperior force. On the other hand, a nation in which every ſubject is a ſoldier, muſt not indulge any hopes of becoming powerful by manufactures and commerce: it is indeed vigorouſly defended, but is ſcarce worthy of being defended. The golden mean of rotation and conſtant labour in a ſtanding army, would diſcipline multitudes for peace as well as for war. And a nation ſo defended would be invincible.

* Phocion is praiſed by ancient writers, for ſtruggling againſt an abuſe that had crept into his country of Attica, that of making war and politics different profeſſions. In imitation of Ariſtides and of Pericles, he ſtudied both equally.

SKETCH X.

PUBLIC POLICE with reſpect to the POOR.

AMong thoſe nations of Europe where government is a ſcience, that part of public police which concerns the poor, makes now a conſiderable branch of ſtatute-law. The poor-laws are ſo multiplied, and ſo anxiouſly framed, as to move one to think, that there cannot remain a ſingle perſon wanting bread. It is however a ſad truth, that the diſeaſe of poverty, inſtead of being eradicated, has become more and more inveterate. England in particular overflows with beggars, tho' in no other country are the indigent ſo amply provided for. Some radical defect there muſt be in theſe laws, when, after endleſs attempts to perfect them, they all prove abortive. Every writer, diſſatisfied with former plans, fails not to produce one of his own; which, in its turn, meets with as little approbation as any of the foregoing.

The firſt regulation of the ſtates of Holland concerning the poor, was in the year 1614, prohibiting all begging. The next was in the year 1649. " It is enacted, That every town, vil-
" lage, or pariſh, ſhall maintain its poor out of the income of
" its charitable foundations and collections; and in caſe theſe
" means fall ſhort, the magiſtrates ſhall maintain them at the
" general expence of the inhabitants, as can moſt conveniently be
" done: Provided always, that the poor be obliged to work ei-
" ther for merchants, farmers, or others, for reaſonable wages,

" in

" in order that they may, as far as poſſible, be ſupported that " way; provided alſo, that they be indulged in no idleneſs nor " inſolence." The advice or inſtruction here given to magiſtrates, is ſenſible; but falls ſhort greatly of what may be termed a *law*, the execution of which can be enforc'd in a court of juſtice.

In France, the precarious charity of monaſteries proving ineffectual, a hoſpital was erected in the city of Paris *anno* 1656, having different apartments; one for the innocent poor, one for putting vagabonds to hard labour, one for foundlings, and one for the ſick and maimed; with certain funds for defraying the expence of each, which produce annually much about the ſame ſum. In imitation of Paris, hoſpitals of the ſame kind were erected in every great town of the kingdom.

The Engliſh began more early to think of their poor; and in a country without induſtry, the neceſſity probably aroſe more early. The firſt Engliſh ſtatute bears date in the year 1496, directing, " That every beggar unable to work, ſhall reſort to the hun- " dred where he laſt dwelt or was born; and there ſhall remain, " upon pain of being ſet in the ſtocks three days and three nights, " with only bread and water, and then ſhall be put out of town." This was a law againſt vagrants, for the ſake of order. There was little occaſion, at that period, to provide for the innocent poor; their maintenance being a burden upon monaſteries. But monaſteries being put down by Henry VIII. there was a ſtatute, 22d year of his reign, cap. 12. impowering the juſtices of every county, to grant licences to poor aged and impotent perſons, to beg within a certain diſtrict; thoſe who beg without it, to be whipt, or ſet in the ſtocks. In the firſt year of Edward VI. cap. 3. a ſtatute was made in favour of impotent, maimed, and aged perſons, that they ſhall have convenient houſes provided for them, in the cities or towns where they were born, or where they reſided for three

three years, to be relieved by the *willing and charitable diſpoſition* of the pariſhioners. By 2d and 3d Philip and Mary, cap. 5. the former ſtatutes of Henry VIII. and Edward VI. were confirmed, of gathering weekly relief for the poor by charitable collections. "A man licenced to beg, ſhall wear a badge on his breaſt and "back openly."

The firſt compulſory ſtatute was 5° Eliſab. cap. 3. empowering juſtices of peace to raiſe a weekly ſum for the poor, by taxing ſuch perſons as obſtinately refuſe to contribute, after repeated admonitions from the pulpit. In the next ſtatute, 14° Eliſab. cap. 5. a bolder ſtep was made, empowering juſtices to tax the inhabitants of every pariſh, in a weekly ſum for their poor. And taxations for the poor being now in ſome degree familiar, the remarkable ſtatutes, 39° Eliſab. cap. 3. and 43° Eliſab. cap. 2. were enacted, which make the ground-work of all the ſubſequent ſtatutes concerning the poor. By theſe ſtatutes, certain houſeholders, named by the juſtices, are, in conjunction with the church-wardens, appointed overſeers for the poor; and theſe overſeers, with conſent of two juſtices, are empowered to tax the pariſh in what ſums they think proper, for maintaining the poor.

Among a people ſo tenacious of liberty as the Engliſh are, and ſo impatient of oppreſſion, is it not ſurpriſing, to find a law, that, without ceremony, ſubjects individuals to the arbitrary will of men, who ſeldom either by birth or education deſerve that important truſt; and without even providing any effectual check againſt embezzlement? At preſent, a Britiſh parliament would reject with ſcorn ſuch an abſurd plan; and yet, being familiarized to it, they never ſeriouſly have attempted a repeal. We have been always on the watch to prevent the ſovereign's encroachments, eſpecially with regard to taxes: but as pariſh-officers are low perſons who inſpire no dread, we ſubmit to have our pockets pick'd by them, almoſt without repining. There is provided, it is true,

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an appeal to the general ſeſſions for redreſſing inequalities in taxing the pariſhioners: but it is no effectual remedy; artful overſeers will not over-rate any man ſo groſsly as to make it his intereſt to complain, conſidering that theſe overſeers have the poor's money to defend themſelves with. Nor will the general ſeſſions readily liſten to a complaint, that cannot be verified but with much time and trouble. If the appeal have any effect, it will make a ſtill greater inequality, by relieving men of figure at the expence of their inferiors; who muſt ſubmit, having little intereſt to obtain redreſs.

The Engliſh plan, beſide being oppreſſive, is groſsly unjuſt. If it ſhould be reported of ſome diſtant nation, that the burden of maintaining the idle and profligate, is laid upon the frugal and induſtrious, who work hard for a maintenance to themſelves; what would one think of ſuch a nation? Yet this is literally the caſe of England. I ſay more: the plan is not only oppreſſive and unjuſt, but miſerably defective in the checking of maladminiſtration. In fact, great ſums are levied beyond what the poor receive: it requires briguing to be named a church-warden: the nomination, in London eſpecially, gives him credit at once; and however meagre at the commencement of his office, he is round and plump before it ends. To wax fat and rich by robbing the poor! Let us turn our eyes from a ſcene ſo horrid *.

* In the pariſh of St George, Hanover Square, a great reform was made ſome years ago. Inhabitants of figure, not excepting men of the higheſt rank, take it in turn to be church-wardens; which has reduced the poor-rates in that pariſh to a trifle. But people, after acquiring a name, ſoon tire of drudging for others. The drudgery will be left to low people as formerly, and the tax will again riſe as high in that pariſh as in others. The poor-rates, in Dr Davenant's time, were about L. 700,000 yearly: at preſent they amount to between two and three millions.

Inequality

Inequality in taxing, and embezzlement of the money levied, which are notorious, poiſon the minds of the people; and impreſs them with a notion, that all taxes raiſed by public authority are ill managed.

Theſe evils are great, and yet are but ſlight compared with what follow. As the number of poor in England, as well as the expence of maintenance, are increaſing daily, proprietors of land, in order to be relieved of a burden ſo grievous, drive the poor out of the pariſh, and prevent all perſons from ſettling in it who are likely to become a burden: cottages are demoliſhed, and marriage obſtructed. Influenced by the preſent evil, they look not forward to depopulation, nor to the downfall of huſbandry and manufactures by ſcarcity of hands. Every pariſh is in a ſtate of war with every other pariſh, concerning pauper ſettlements and removals.

The price of labour is generally the ſame in the different ſhires of Scotland, and in the different pariſhes. A few exceptions are occaſioned by the neighbourhood of a great town, or by ſome extenſive manufacture that requires many hands. In Scotland, the price of labour reſembles water, which always levels itſelf: if high in any one corner, an influx of hands brings it down. The price of labour varies in every pariſh of England. A labourer who has gain'd a ſettlement in a pariſh, on which he depends for bread when he inclines to be idle, dares not remove to another pariſh where wages are higher, fearing to be cut out of a ſettlement altogether. England is in the ſame condition with reſpect to labour, that France lately was with reſpect to corn; which, however plentiful in one province, could not be exported to ſupply the wants of another. The pernicious effects of the latter with reſpect to food, are not more obvious, than of the former with reſpect to manufactures.

Engliſh manufactures labour under a ſtill greater hardſhip than inequality of wages. In a country where there is no fund for the poor

poor but what nature provides, the labourer muſt be ſatisfied with ſuch wages as are cuſtomary: he has no reſource; for pity is not moved by idleneſs. In England, the labourers command the market: if not ſatisfied with cuſtomary wages, they have an excellent reſource; which is, to abandon work altogether, and to put themſelves on the pariſh. Labour is much cheaper in France than in England: I have heard ſeveral plauſible reaſons; but in my opinion, the difference ariſes from the poor-laws. In England, every man is entitled to be idle; and every idler is entitled to a maintenance. In France, the funds appropriated to the poor, yield the ſame ſum annually: that ſum is always preoccupied; and France, with reſpect to all but thoſe on the liſt, approaches to the ſtate of a nation that has no fund provided by law for the poor.

Depopulation, inequality in the price of labour, and extravagant wages, are deplorable evils. But the Engliſh poor-laws are productive of evils ſtill more deplorable: they are ſubverſive both of morality and induſtry. This is a heavy charge, but no leſs true than heavy. Fear of want is the only effectual motive to induſtry with the labouring poor: remove that fear, and they ceaſe to be induſtrious. The ruling paſſion of thoſe who live by bodily labour, is to ſave a pittance for their children, and for ſupporting themſelves in old age: ſtimulated by deſire of accompliſhing theſe ends, they are frugal and induſtrious; and the proſpect of ſucceſs is to them a continual feaſt. Now what worſe can malice invent againſt ſuch a man, under colour of friendſhip, than to ſecure bread to him and his children whenever he takes a diſlike to work; which effectually deadens his ſole ambition, and with it his honeſt induſtry? Relying on the certainty of a proviſion againſt want, he relaxes gradually till he ſink into idleneſs: idleneſs leads to profligacy: profligacy begets diſeaſes: and the wretch becomes an object of public charity before he has run half his courſe. Such are the genuine effects of the Engliſh tax for the poor, un-

der a miſtaken notion of charity. There never was known in any country, a ſcheme for the poor more contradictory to ſound policy. Might it not have been foreſeen, that to a groveling creature, who has no ſenſe of honour, and ſcarce any of ſhame, the certainty of maintenance would prove an irreſiſtible temptation to idleneſs and debauchery? The poor-houſe at Lyons contained originally but forty beds, of which twenty only were occupied. The eight hundred beds it contains at preſent, are not ſufficient for the poor who demand admittance. A premium is not more ſucceſsful in any caſe, than where it is given to promote idleneſs. A houſe for the poor was erected in a French village, the revenue of which, by economy, became conſiderable. Upon a repreſentation by the curate of the pariſh, that more beds were neceſſary, the proprietor undertook the management. He ſold the houſe, with the furniture; and to every proper object of charity, he ordered a moderate proportion of bread and beef. The poor and ſick were more comfortably lodged at home, than formerly in the poor-houſe. And by that plan of management, the pariſh-poor decreaſed, inſtead of increaſing, as at Lyons. How few Engliſh manufacturers labour the whole week, if the work of four or five days afford them maintenance? Is not this a demonſtration, that the malady of idleneſs is widely ſpred? In Briſtol, the pariſh-poor twenty years ago did not exceed four thouſand: at preſent, they amount to more than ten thouſand. But as a malady, when left to itſelf, commonly effectuates its own cure; ſo it will happen in this caſe: when, by prevailing idleneſs, every one without ſhame claims pariſh-charity, the burden will become intolerable, and the poor will be left to their ſhifts.

The immoral effects of public charity are not confined to thoſe who depend on it, but extend to their children. The conſtant anxiety of a labouring man to provide for his children, endears them to him. Being relieved of that anxiety by the tax for the poor,

poor,' his affection cools gradually, and he turns at laſt perfectly indifferent about them. Their independence, on the other hand, weans them from their duty to him. And thus, affection between parent and child, which is the corner-ſtone of ſociety, is in a great meaſure obliterated among the labouring poor. In a plan publiſhed by the Earl of Hilſborough, there is an article, obliging parents to maintain their indigent children, and children to maintain their indigent parents. Natural affection muſt indeed be at a low ebb, where ſuch a regulation is neceſſary: but it is neceſſary, at leaſt in London, where it is common to ſee men in good buſineſs neglecting their aged and diſeaſed parents, for no better reaſon, than that the pariſh is bound to find them bread: *Proh tempora, proh mores!*

The immoral effects of public charity ſpread ſtill wider. It fails not to extinguiſh the virtue of charity among the rich; who never think of giving charity, when the public undertakes for all. In a ſcheme publiſhed by Mr Hay, one article is, to raiſe a ſtock for the poor by voluntary contributions, and to make up the deficiency by a pariſh-tax. Will individuals ever contribute, when it is not to relieve the poor, but to relieve the pariſh? Every hoſpital has a poor-box, which ſeldom produces any thing *. The great comfort of ſociety is aſſiſtance in time of need; and its firmeſt cement is, the beſtowing and receiving kindly offices, eſpecially in diſtreſs. Now to unhinge or ſuſpend the exerciſe of charity, by rendering it unneceſſary, relaxes every ſocial virtue, by ſupplanting the chief of them. The conſequence is diſmal: exerciſe of benevolence to the diſtreſſed is our ſureſt guard againſt

* One exception I am fond to mention. The poor-box of the Edinburgh infirmary was neglected two or three years, little being expected from it. When opened, L. 74 was found in it; beſide a few ſhillings and halfpence, contributed probably by the lower ſort, who were aſhamed to give their mite publicly.

the encroachments of ſelfiſhneſs: if that guard be withdrawn, ſelfiſhneſs will prevail, and become the ruling paſſion. In fact, the tax for the poor has contributed greatly to the growth of that groveling paſſion, ſo conſpicuous at preſent in England.

Engliſh authors who turn their thoughts to the poor, make heavy complaints of decaying charity, and increaſing poverty: never once dreaming, that theſe are the genuine effects of a legal proviſion for the poor; which on the one hand eradicates the virtue of charity, and on the other is a violent temptation to idleneſs. Wonderfully ill contrived muſt the Engliſh charity-laws be, when their conſequences are to ſap the foundation of voluntary charity; to deprive the labouring poor of their chief comfort, that of providing for themſelves and children; to relax mutual affection between parent and child; and to reward, inſtead of puniſhing, idleneſs and vice. Conſider whether a legal proviſion for the poor, be ſufficient to atone for ſo many evils.

No man had better opportunity than Fielding to be acquainted with the ſtate of the poor: let us liſten to him. "That the poor "are a very great burden, and even a nuiſance to the kingdom; "that the laws for relieving their diſtreſſes, and reſtraining their "vices, have not anſwered; and that they are at preſent very ill "provided for, and much worſe governed, are truths which e-"very one will acknowledge. Every perſon who hath property, "muſt feel the weight of the tax that is levied for the poor; and "every perſon of underſtanding, muſt ſee how abſurdly it is ap-"plied. So uſeleſs indeed is this heavy tax, and ſo wretched its diſ-"poſition, that it is a queſtion, whether the poor or rich are actu-"ally more diſſatisfied, ſince the plunder of the one ſerves ſo little "to the real advantage of the other: for while a million yearly is "raiſed among the rich, many of the poor are ſtarved; many more "languiſh in want and miſery; of the reſt, numbers are found "begging or pilfering in the ſtreets to-day, and to-morrow are

"locked

" locked up in gaols and Bridewells. If we were to make a pro-
" greſs through the outſkirts of the metropolis, and look into the
" habitations of the poor, we ſhould there behold ſuch pictures
" of human miſery, as muſt move the compaſſion of every heart
" that deſerves the name of human. What indeed muſt be his
" compoſition, who could ſee whole families in want of every
" neceſſary of life, oppreſſed with hunger, cold, nakedneſs,
" and filth; and with diſeaſes, the certain conſequence of all
" theſe! The ſufferings indeed of the poor are leſs known than
" their miſdeeds; and therefore we are leſs apt to pity them.
" They ſtarve, and freeze, and rot, among themſelves; but they
" beg, and ſteal, and rob, among their betters. There is not a
" pariſh in the liberty of Weſtminſter, which doth not raiſe
" thouſands annually for the poor; and there is not a ſtreet in
" that liberty, which doth not ſwarm all day with beggars, and
" all night with thieves."

There is not a ſingle beggar to be ſeen in Penſylvania. Luxury and idleneſs have got no footing in that happy country; and thoſe who ſuffer by misfortune, have their maintenance out of the public treaſury. But luxury and idleneſs cannot for ever be excluded; and when they take place, this regulation will be as pernicious in Penſylvania, as the poor-rates are in Britain.

Of the many propoſals that have been publiſhed for reforming the poor-laws, not one has pierced to the root of the evil. None of the authors entertain the ſlighteſt doubt, of a legal proviſion being neceſſary, tho' all our diſtreſſes ariſe evidently from that very cauſe. Travellers complain, of being infeſted with an endleſs number of beggars in every Engliſh town; a very different ſcene from what they meet with in Holland or Switzerland. How would it ſurpriſe them to be told, that this proceeds from an overflow of charity in the good people of England!

Few inſtitutions are more tickliſh than thoſe of charity. In London,

don, common proſtitutes are treated with ſingular humanity: a hoſpital for them when pregnant, diſburdens them of their load, and nurſes them till they be again fit for buſineſs: another hoſpital cures them of the venereal diſeaſe: and a third receives them with open arms, when, inſtead of deſire, they become objects of averſion. Would not one imagine, that theſe hoſpitals have been erected for encouraging proſtitution? They undoubtedly have that effect, tho' far from being intended. Mr Stirling, ſuperintendant of the Edinburgh poor-houſe, deſerves to be kept in perpetual remembrance, for a ſcheme he contrived to reform common proſtitutes. A number of them were confined in a houſe of correction, on a daily allowance of three pence; and even part of that ſmall pittance was embezzled by the ſervants of the houſe. Pinching hunger did not reform their manners; for being abſolutely idle, they encouraged each other in vice, waiting impatiently for the hour of deliverance. Mr Stirling, with conſent of the magiſtrates, removed them to a clean houſe; and inſtead of money, which is apt to be ſquandered, appointed for each a pound of oat-meal daily, with ſalt, water, and fire for cooking. Relieved now from diſtreſs, they longed for comfort: what would they not give for milk or ale? Work, ſays he, will procure you plenty. To ſome who offered to ſpin, he gave flax and wheels, engaging to pay them half the price of their yarn, retaining the other half for the materials furniſhed. The ſpinners earned about nine pence weekly, a comfortable addition to what they had before. The reſt undertook to ſpin, one after another; and before the end of the firſt quarter, they were all of them intent upon work. It was a branch of his plan, to ſet free ſuch as merited that favour; and ſome of them appeared ſo thoroughly reformed, as to be in no danger of a relapſe.

The ingenious author of *The Police of France*, who wrote in the year 1753, obſerves, that notwithſtanding the plentiful proviſion for

for the poor in that kingdom, mentioned above, there was a general complaint, of the increaſe of beggars and vagrants; and adds, that the French political writers, diſſatisfied with their own plan, had preſented ſeveral memorials to the miniſtry, propoſing to adopt the Engliſh parochial aſſeſſments, as greatly preferable. This is a curious fact; for at the very ſame time people in London, no leſs diſſatisfied with theſe aſſeſſments, were writing pamphlets in praiſe of the French hoſpitals. One thing is certain, that no plan hitherto invented has given ſatisfaction. Whether an unexceptionable plan is at all poſſible, ſeems extremely doubtful.

In every plan for the poor that I have ſeen, workhouſes make one article; to provide work for thoſe who are willing, and to make thoſe work who are unwilling. With reſpect to the former, men need never be idle in England for want of employment; and they always ſucceed the beſt at the employment they chuſe for themſelves. With reſpect to the latter, puniſhment will not compel a man to labour ſeriouſly: he may aſſume the appearance, but will make no progreſs; and the pretext of ſickneſs or weakneſs is ever at hand for an excuſe. The only compulſion to make a man work ſeriouſly, is fear of want.

A hoſpital for the ſick, for the wounded, and for the maimed, is an excellent eſtabliſhment; being productive of good, without doing any harm. Such a hoſpital ſhould depend partly on voluntary charity; to procure which a general conviction of its being well managed, is neceſſary. Hoſpitals that have a ſufficient fund of their own, and that have no dependence on the good will of others, are commonly ill managed.

Lies there any objection againſt a workhouſe, for training to labour deſtitute orphans, and begging children? It is an article in Mr Hay's plan, that the workhouſe ſhould relieve poor families of all their children above three. This has an enticing appearance, but

but is unſound at bottom. Children require the tenderneſs of a mother, during the period of infantine diſeaſes; and even after that period, they are far from being ſafe in the hands of mercenaries, who ſtudy nothing but their own eaſe and intereſt. Would it not be better, to diſtribute ſmall ſums from time to time among poor families overburdened with children, ſo as to relieve them from famine, not from labour? And with reſpect to orphans and begging children, I incline to think, that it would be a more ſalutary meaſure, to encourage mechanicks, manufacturers, and farmers above all, to educate ſuch children. A premium for each, the half in hand, and the other half when they can work for themſelves, would be a proper encouragement. The beſt-regulated orphan-hoſpital I am acquainted with, is that of Edinburgh. Orphans are taken in from every corner, provided only they be not under the age of ſeven, nor above that of twelve: under ſeven, they are too tender for a hoſpital; above twelve, their relations can find employment for them. Beſide the being taught to read and write, they are carefully inſtructed in ſome art, that may afford them comfortable ſubſiſtence.

No man ever called in queſtion the utility of the marine ſociety; which will reflect honour on the members as long as we have a navy to protect us: they deſerve a rank above that of gartered knights. That inſtitution is the nobleſt exertion of charity and patriotiſm, that ever was known in any country.

A ſort of hoſpital for ſervants who for twenty years have faithfully adhered to the ſame maſter, would be much to my taſte; with a few adjoining acres for a kitchen-garden. The fund for purchaſing, building, and maintenance, muſt be raiſed by contribution; and none but the contributors ſhould be entitled to offer ſervants to the houſe. By ſuch encouragement, a malady would be remedied, that of wandering from maſter to maſter for better wages, or eaſier ſervice, which ſeldom fails to corrupt ſervants.

vants. They ought to be comfortably provided for, adding to the allowance of the houſe what pot-herbs are raiſed by their own labour. A number of virtuous men thus aſſociated, would end their days in comfort; and the proſpect of attaining a ſettlement ſo agreeable, would form excellent ſervants. How advantageous would ſuch a hoſpital prove to huſbandry in particular!

Of all the miſchiefs that have been engendered by over-anxiety about the poor, none have proved more fatal than foundling-hoſpitals. They tend to cool affection for children, ſtill more effectually than the Engliſh pariſh-charity. At every occaſional pinch for food, away goes a child to the hoſpital; and parental affection among the lower ſort turns ſo languid, that many who are in no pinch, relieve themſelves of trouble by the ſame means. It is affirmed, that of the children born annually in Paris, about a third part are ſent to the foundling-hoſpital. The Paris almanack for the year 1768, mentions, that there were baptized 18,576 infants, of whom the foundling-hoſpital received 6025. The proportion originally was much leſs; but vice creeps on with a ſwift pace. How enormous muſt be the degeneracy of the Pariſian populace, and their want of parental affection!

Let us next turn to infants ſhut up in this hoſpital. Of all animals, infants of the human race are the weakeſt: they require a mother's affection to guard them againſt numberleſs diſeaſes and accidents; a wiſe appointment of Providence to connect parents and children in the ſtricteſt union. In a foundling-hoſpital, there is no fond mother to watch over her tender babe; and the hireling nurſe has no fondneſs but for her own little profit. Need we any other cauſe for the deſtruction of infants in a foundling-hoſpital, much greater in proportion than of thoſe under the care of a mother? And yet there is another cauſe equally potent, which is corrupted air. What Hanway obſerves upon pariſh-workhouſes, is equally applicable to a foundling-hoſpital.

" To attempt," ſays he, " to nouriſh an infant in a workhouſe, " where a number of nurſes are congregated into one room, and " conſequently the air become putrid, I will pronounce, from in- " timate knowledge of the ſubject, to be but a ſmall remove " from ſlaughter; *for the child muſt die.*" Down then with found- ling-hoſpitals, more noxious than peſtilence or famine. An in- fant expoſed at the door of a dwelling-houſe, muſt be taken up: but in that caſe, which ſeldom happens, the infant has a better chance for life with a hired nurſe than in a hoſpital; and a chance perhaps little worſe, bad as it is, than with an unnatural mo- ther. I approve not indeed of a quarterly payment to ſuch a nurſe: would it not do better to furniſh her bare maintenance for three years; and if the child be alive at that time, to give her a handſome addition?

A houſe of correction is neceſſary for good order; but belongs not to the preſent eſſay, which concerns maintenance of the poor, not puniſhment of vagrants. I ſhall only by the way borrow a thought from Fielding, that faſting is the proper puniſhment of profligacy, not any puniſhment that is attended with ſhame. Pu- niſhment, he obſerves, that deprives a man of all ſenſe of honour, never will contribute to make him virtuous.

Charity-ſchools might have been proper, when few could read, and fewer write; but theſe arts are now ſo common, that in moſt families children may be taught to read at home, and to write in a private ſchool at little expence. Charity-ſchools at preſent are more hurtful than beneficial: young perſons who continue there ſo long as to read and write fluently, become too delicate for hard labour, and too proud for ordinary labour. Knowledge is a dan- gerous acquiſition to the labouring poor: the more of it that is poſſeſſed by a ſhepherd, a ploughman, or any drudge, the leſs fit- ted is he to labour with content. The only plauſible argument for a charity-ſchool, is, " That children of the labouring poor are " taught

"taught there the principles of religion and of morality, which they "cannot acquire at home." The argument would be invincible, if without education we could have no knowledge of theſe principles. But Providence has not left man in a ſtate ſo imperfect: the principles of theology and of morality are ſtamped on his heart; and none can be ignorant of them, who attend to their own perceptions. Education is indeed of uſe to ripen ſuch perceptions; and it is of ſingular uſe to thoſe who have time for reading and thinking: but education in a charity-ſchool is ſo ſlight, as to render it doubtful, whether it be not more hurtful by foſtering lazineſs, than advantageous by conveying inſtruction. The natural impreſſions of religion and morality, if not obſcured by vitious habits, are ſufficient for good conduct: preſerve a man from vice by conſtant labour, and he will not be deficient in his duty either to God or to man. Heſiod, an ancient and reſpectable poet, ſays, that God hath placed labour as a guard to virtue. More integrity accordingly will be found among a number of induſtrious poor taken at random, than among the ſame number in any other claſs.

I heartily approve every regulation that tends to prevent idleneſs. Chief Juſtice Hale ſays, "That prevention of poverty and "idleneſs would do more good than all the gibbets, whipping-"poſts, and gaols in the kingdom." In that view, gaming-houſes ought to be heavily taxed, as well as horſe-racing, cock-fighting, and all meetings that encourage idleneſs. The admitting low people to vote for members of parliament, is a ſource of idleneſs, corruption, and poverty. The ſame privilege is ruinous to every ſmall parliament-borough. Nor have I any difficulty to pronounce, that the admitting the populace to vote in the election of a miniſter, a frequent practice in Scotland, is productive of the ſame pernicious effects.

What then is to be the reſult of the foregoing enquiry? Is it from defect of invention that a good legal eſtabliſhment for the

poor is not yet diſcovered? or is it impracticable to make any legal eſtabliſhment that is not fraught with corruption? I incline to the latter, for the following reaſons, no leſs obvious than ſolid, That in a legal eſtabliſhment for the poor, no diſtinction can be made between virtue and vice; and conſequently that every ſuch eſtabliſhment muſt be a premium for idleneſs. And where is the neceſſity, after all, of any public eſtabliſhment? By what unhappy prejudice have people been led to think, that the Author of our nature, ſo beneficent to his favourite man in every other reſpect, has abandoned the indigent to famine and death, if municipal law interpoſe not? We need but inſpect the human heart to be convinced, that perſons in diſtreſs are his peculiar care. Not only has he made it our duty to afford them relief, but has ſuperadded the paſſion of pity to enforce the performance of that duty. This branch of our nature fulfils in perfection all the ſalutary purpoſes of charity, without admitting any one of the deplorable evils that a legal proviſion is fraught with. The contrivance, at the ſame time, is extremely ſimple: it leaves to every man the objects as well as meaſure of his charity. No man eſteems it a duty to relieve wretches reduced to poverty by idleneſs and profligacy: they move not our pity; nor do they expect any good from us. Wiſely therefore is it ordered by Providence, that charity ſhould in every reſpect be voluntary, to prevent the idle and profligate from depending on it for ſupport.

This plan is in many reſpects excellent. The exerciſe of charity, when free from compulſion, is extremely pleaſant. The pleaſure, it is true, is ſcarce felt where charity is rendered unneceſſary by municipal law; but were that law laid aſide, the gratification of pity would become one of our ſweeteſt pleaſures. Charity, like other affections, is envigorated by exerciſe, and no leſs enfeebled by diſuſe. Providence withal hath ſcattered benevolence among the ſons of men with a liberal hand: and notwithſtanding

ſtanding the obſtruction of municipal law, ſeldom is there found one ſo obdurate, as to reſiſt the impulſe of compaſſion, when a proper object is preſented. In a well regulated government, promoting induſtry and virtue, the perſons who need charity are not many; and ſuch perſons may, with aſſurance, depend on the charity of their neighbours *.

It may, at the ſame time, be boldly affirmed, that thoſe who need charity, would be more comfortably provided for by the plan of Providence, than by any legal eſtabliſhment. Creatures, loathſome by diſeaſe or naſtineſs, affect the air in a poor-houſe, and have little chance for life, without more care and kindlineſs, than can be hoped from ſervants, rendered callous by continual ſcenes of miſery. Conſider, on the other hand, the conſequences of voluntary charity, equally agreeable to the giver and receiver. The kindly connection it forms between them, grows ſtronger and ſtronger by reiteration; and ſquallid poverty, far from being an obſtruction, excites a degree of pity, proportioned to the diſtreſs. It may happen for a wonder, that an indigent perſon is overlooked; but for one who will ſuffer by ſuch neglect, multitudes ſuffer by compelled charity.

But what *I* inſiſt on with peculiar ſatisfaction is, that natural charity is an illuſtrious ſupport to virtue. Indigent virtue can never fail of relief, becauſe it never fails to enflame compaſſion. Indigent vice, on the contrary, raiſes indignation more than pity (*a*); and therefore can have little proſpect of relief. What a

* The Italians are not more remarkable for a charitable diſpoſition, than their neighbours. No fewer however than ſeventy thouſand mendicant friars live there upon voluntary charity; and I have not heard that any one of them ever died of want.

(*a*) Elements of Criticiſm, chap. 2. part 7.

glorious

glorious encitement to induſtry and virtue, and how diſcouraging to idleneſs and vice! Lamentable it is, that ſo beautiful a ſtructure ſhould be razed to the ground by municipal law, which, in providing for the poor, makes no diſtinction between virtue and vice. The execution of the poor-laws would indeed be impracticable, were ſuch a diſtinction attempted by enquiring into the conduct and character of every *pauper*. Where are judges to be found who will patiently follow out ſuch a dark and intricate expiſcation? To accompliſh the taſk, a man muſt abandon every other concern.

In the firſt Engliſh ſtatutes mentioned above, the legiſlature appear carefully to have avoided compulſory charity: every meaſure for promoting voluntary charity was firſt try'd, before the fatal blow was ſtruck, empowering pariſh-officers to impoſe a tax for the poor. The legiſlature certainly did not foreſee the baneful conſequences: but how came they not to ſee that they were diſtruſting Providence, declaring in effect, that the plan eſtabliſhed by our Maker for the poor, is inſufficient? Many are the municipal laws that enforce the laws of nature, by additional rewards and puniſhments; but it was ſingularly bold to aboliſh the natural law of charity, by eſtabliſhing a legal tax in its ſtead. Men will always be mending: what a confuſed jumble do they make, when they attempt to mend the laws of Nature! Leave Nature to her own operations: ſhe underſtands them the beſt.

Few regulations are more plauſible than what are political; and yet few are more deceitful. An ingenious writer makes the following obſervations upon the 43° Eliſ. eſtabliſhing a maintenance for the poor. "Laws have been enacted in many other "countries, which have puniſhed the idle beggar, and exhorted "the rich to extend their charity to the poor: but it is peculiar "to the humanity of England, to have made their ſupport a mat-"ter of obligation and neceſſity on the more wealthy. The Eng-

"liſh

" liſh ſeem to be the firſt nation in Europe in ſcience, arts, and " arms: they likewiſe are poſſeſſed of the freeſt and moſt perfect " of conſtitutions, and the bleſſings conſequential to that free- " dom. If virtues in an individual are ſometimes ſuppoſed to be " rewarded in this world, I do not think it too preſumptuous to " ſuppoſe, that national virtues may likewiſe meet with their re- " ward. England hath, to its peculiar honour, not only made " their poor free, but hath provided a certain and ſolid eſtabliſh- " ment to prevent their neceſſities and indigence, when they a- " riſe from what the law calls *the act of God:* and are not theſe " beneficent and humane attentions to the miſeries of our fellow- " creatures, the firſt of thoſe poor pleas which we are capable of " offering, in behalf of our imperfections, to an all-wiſe and " merciful Creator!" To this writer, who ſhows more zeal than knowledge, I oppoſe another, whoſe reflections are more rational. " In England, there is an act of the legiſlature, obliging every " pariſh to maintain its own poor. Scarce any man living, who " has not ſeen the effects of this law, but muſt approve of it; and " yet ſuch are its effects, that the ſtreets of London are filled " with objects of miſery beyond what is ſeen in any other city. " The labouring poor, depending on this law to be provided in " ſickneſs and old age, are little ſolicitous to ſave, and become " habitually profuſe. The principle of charity is eſtabliſhed by " Providence in the human heart, for relieving thoſe who are diſ- " abled to work for themſelves. And if the labouring poor had " no dependence but on the principle of charity, they would be " more religious; and if they were influenced by religion, they " would be leſs abandoned in their behaviour. Thus this ſeem- " ing-good act turns to a national evil: there is more diſtreſs a- " mong the poor in London than any where in Europe; and " more drunkenneſs both in males and females (*a*)."

(*a*) Author of Angelom's letters.

I am aware, that during the reign of Eliſabeth, ſome compulſion might be neceſſary to preſerve the poor from ſtarving. Henry VIII. had ſequeſtered all the hoſpitals, a hundred and ten in number, and ſquandered their revenus; he had alſo demoliſhed all the abbeys. By theſe means, the poor were reduced to a miſerable condition; eſpecially as private charity, for want of exerciſe, was at a low ebb. That critical juncture required indeed help from the legiſlature: and a temporary proviſion for the poor would have been a proper meaſure; ſo contrived as not to ſuperſede voluntary charity, but rather to promote it. Unlucky it is for England, that ſuch a meaſure was overlooked; but Queen Eliſabeth and her parliaments had not the talent of foreſeeing conſequences without the aid of experience. A perpetual tax for the poor was impoſed, the moſt pernicious tax that ever was impoſed in any country.

With reſpect to the preſent times, the reaſon now given pleads againſt aboliſhing at once a legal proviſion for the poor. It may be taken for granted, that charity is in England not more vigorous at preſent, than it was in the days of Eliſabeth. Would our miniſtry but lead the way, by ſhowing ſome zeal for a reformation, expedients would probably be invented, for ſupporting the poor, without unhinging voluntary charity. The following expedient is propoſed, merely as a ſpecimen. Let a tax be impoſed by parliament on every pariſh for their poor, variable in proportion to the number; but not to exceed the half of what is neceſſary; and directing the landholders to make up quarterly, a liſt of the names and condition of ſuch perſons as in their opinion need charity; with an eſtimate of what each ought to have weekly. The public tax makes the half, and the other half is to be raiſed by voluntary contribution. To prevent colluſion, the roll of the poor, and their weekly appointment, with a ſubſcription of gentlemen for their part of the ſum, ſhall be examined by the

juſtices

juſtices of peace at a quarterly meeting; who, on receiving ſatiſfaction, muſt order the ſum ariſing from the public tax to be diſtributed among the poor contained in the roll, according to the eſtimate of the landholders. As the public fund lies dead till the ſubſcription is completed, it is not to be imagined, that any gentleman will ſtand out: it would be a public imputation on his character. Far from apprehending any deficiency, confident I am, that every gentleman would conſider it as honourable to contribute largely. This agreeable work muſt be blended with what is rather diſagreeable, that of excluding from the roll every profligate, male or female. If that rule be followed out with a proper degree of ſeverity, the innocent poor will diminiſh daily; ſo as in time to be ſafely left upon voluntary charity, without neceſſity of any tax.

But muſt miſerable wretches, reduced to poverty by idleneſs or intemperance, be, in a Chriſtian country, abandoned to diſeaſes and famine? It is this very argument, ſhallow as it is, that has corrupted the induſtry of England, and reduced multitudes to diſeaſes and famine. Thoſe who are able to work, may be locked up in a houſe of correction, to be fed with bread and water; but with liberty of working for themſelves. And as for the remainder, their caſe is not deſperate, when they have acceſs to ſuch tender-hearted perſons as are more eminent for pity than for principle. If by neglect or overſight any happen to die of want, the example will tend more to reformation, than the moſt pathetic diſcourſe from the pulpit.

Even at the hazard of loſing a few lives by neglect or overſight, common begging ought abſolutely to be prohibited. The moſt profligate, are the moſt impudent, and the moſt expert at feigning diſtreſs. If begging be indulged to any, all will ruſh into the public: idlers are fond of that wandering and indolent ſort of life; and there is no temptation to idleneſs more ſucceſsful, than liberty

to beg. In order to be relieved from common beggars, it has been propoſed, to fine thoſe who give them alms. Little penetration muſt they have, to whom the inſufficiency of ſuch a remedy is not palpable. It is eaſy to give alms without being ſeen; and compaſſion will extort alms, even at the hazard of ſuffering for it; not to mention, that every one in ſuch a caſe will avoid the odious character of an informer. The following remedy is ſuggeſted, as what probably may anſwer better. An officer muſt be appointed in every pariſh, with a competent ſalary, for apprehending and carrying to the workhouſe every ſtrolling beggar; under the penalty of loſing his office, with what ſalary is due to him, if any beggar be found ſtrolling four and twenty hours after the fact comes to his knowledge. In the workhouſe ſuch beggars ſhall be fed with bread and water for a year, but with liberty of working for themſelves.

I declare reſolutely againſt a perpetual tax for the poor. But if there muſt be ſuch a tax, I know of none leſs ſubverſive of induſtry and morals, than that eſtabliſhed in Scotland, obliging the landholders in every pariſh to meet at ſtated times, in order to provide a fund for the poor; but leaving the objects of their charity, and the meaſure, to their own humanity and diſcretion. In this plan, there is no encroachment on the natural duty of charity, but only that the minority muſt ſubmit to the opinion of the majority.

In large towns, where the character and circumſtances of the poor are not ſo well known as in country-pariſhes, the following variation is propoſed. Inſtead of landholders, who are proper in country-pariſhes, let there be in each town-pariſh a ſtanding committee, to be choſen by the proprietors of houſes, the third part to be changed annually. This committee, with the miniſter, make up a liſt of ſuch as deſerve charity, adding an eſtimate of what, with their own labour, may be ſufficient for each of them. The miniſter,

niſter, with one or two of the committee, carry about this liſt to every family that can afford charity, ſuggeſting what may be proper for each to contribute. This liſt, with an addition of the ſum contributed or promiſed by each houſeholder, muſt be affixed on the principal door of the pariſh-church, to honour the contributors, and to inform the poor of the proviſion made for them. Some ſuch mode may probably be effectual, without tranſgreſſing the bounds of voluntary charity. But if any one obſtinately refuſe to contribute after ſeveral applications, the committee at their diſcretion may tax him. If it be the poſſeſſor who declines contributing, the tax muſt be laid upon him, reſerving relief againſt his landlord.

In great towns, the poor, who ought to be prohibited from begging, are leſs known than in country-pariſhes. And among a croud of inhabitants, it is eaſier for an individual to eſcape the eye of the public, when he with-holds charity, than in country-pariſhes. Both defects will be remedied by the plan above propoſed: it will bring to light, in great cities, the poor who deſerve charity; and it will bring to light every perſon who with-holds charity.

SKETCH XI.

A GREAT CITY conſidered in Phyſical, Moral, and Political Views.

IN all ages an opinion ſeems to have been prevalent, that a great city is a great evil, and that a capital may be too great for the ſtate, as a head may be for the body. Conſidering however the very ſhallow reaſons that have been given for this opinion, it ſhould ſeem to be but ſlightly founded. There are ſeveral ordinances limiting the extent of Paris, and prohibiting new buildings beyond the preſcribed bounds; the firſt of which is by Henry II. ann. 1549. Theſe ordinances have been renewed from time to time, down to the 1672, in which year there is an edict of Louis XIV. to the ſame purpoſe. The reaſons aſſigned are, "Firſt, "That by enlarging the city, the air would be rendered unwhole- "ſome. Second, That cleaning the ſtreets would prove a great ad- "ditional labour. Third, That adding to the number of inhabi- "tants would raiſe the price of proviſions, of labour, and of ma- "nufactures. Fourth, That ground would be covered with "buildings inſtead of corn, which might hazard a ſcarcity. "Fifth, That the country would be depopulated by the deſire "that people have to reſort to the capital. And, laſtly, That the "difficulty of governing ſuch numbers would be an encourage- "ment to robbery and murder."

Theſe reaſons for confining the city of Paris within certain bounds are wonderfully ſhallow. The moſt important of them conclude

conclude juſtly againſt permitting an increaſe of inhabitants: the ſecond and fourth conclude only againſt enlarging the city; and theſe, at the beſt, are trifling. The firſt reaſon urged againſt enlarging the city, is a ſolid reaſon for enlarging it, ſuppoſing the numbers to be limited; for to prevent crouding is an excellent preventive of unwholeſome air. Paris, with the ſame number of inhabitants that were in the days of the fourth Henry, occupies thrice the ſpace, much to the health as well as comfort of the inhabitants. Had the ordinances mentioned been made effectual, the houſes in Paris muſt all have been built, like thoſe in the old town, ſtory above ſtory, aſcending to the ſky like the tower of Babel. Before the great fire *anno* 1666, the plague was frequent in London; but by widening the ſtreets, and enlarging the houſes, there has not ſince been known in that great city, any contagious diſtemper that deſerves the name of a plague. The third, fifth, and laſt reaſons, conclude againſt permitting any addition to the number of inhabitants; but conclude nothing againſt enlarging the town. In a word, the meaſure adopted in theſe ordinances has little or no tendency to correct the evils complained of; and infallibly would enflame the chief of them. The meaſure that ought to have been adopted, is to limit the number of inhabitants, not the extent of the town.

Queen Eliſabeth of England, copying the French ordinances, iſſued a proclamation *anno* 1602, prohibiting any new buildings within three miles of London. The preamble is in the following words: "That foreſeeing the great and manifold inconveniencies "and miſchiefs which daily grow, and are likely to increaſe, in "the city and ſuburbs of London, by confluence of people to in-"habit the ſame; not only by reaſon that ſuch multitudes can "hardly be governed to ſerve God, and obey her Majeſty, with-"out conſtituting an addition of new officers, and enlarging their "authority; but alſo can hardly be provided of food and other "neceſſaries

" neceſſaries at a reaſonable price; and finally, that as ſuch mul-
" titudes of people, many of them poor, who muſt live by beg-
" ging, or worſe means, are heaped up together, and in a ſort
" ſmothered, with many children and ſervants, in one houſe or
" ſmall tenement; it muſt needs follow, if any plague or other
" univerſal ſickneſs come amongſt them, that it would preſently
" ſpread through the whole city and confines, and alſo into all
" parts of the realm."

There appears no deeper penetration in this proclamation, than in the French ordinances. The ſame error is obſervable in both, which is the limiting the extent of the town, inſtead of limiting the number of inhabitants. True it is indeed, that the regulation would have a better effect in London than in Paris. As ſtone is in plenty about Paris, houſes there may be carried to a very great height; and are actually ſo carried in the old town: but there being no ſtone about London, the houſes formerly were built of timber, now of brick; materials too frail for a lofty edifice.

Proceeding to particulars, the firſt objection, which is the expence of governing a great multitude, concludes againſt the numbers, not againſt the extent of the city. At the ſame time, the objection is at beſt doubtful in point of fact. Tho' vices abound in a great city, requiring the ſtricteſt attention of the magiſtrate; yet with a well-regulated police, it is much leſs expenſive to govern 600,000 in one city, than the ſame number in ten different cities. The ſecond objection, viz. the high price of proviſions, ſtrikes only againſt numbers, not extent. Beſide, whatever might have been the caſe in the days of Eliſabeth, when agriculture and internal commerce were in their infancy; there are at preſent not many towns in England, where a temperate man may live cheaper than in London. The hazard of contagious diſtempers, which is the third objection, is an invincible argument againſt limiting the extent of a great town. It is mentioned above, that from the

year

year 1666, when the ſtreets were widened, and the houſes enlarged, London has never been once viſited by the plague. If the proclamation had taken effect, the houſes muſt have been ſo crouded upon each other, and the ſtreets ſo contracted, as to have occaſioned plagues ſtill more frequently than before the year 1666.

The miniſtry of the Queen's immediate ſucceſſors were not more clear-ſighted than ſhe and her miniſters were. In the year 1624, King James iſſued a proclamation againſt building in London upon new foundations. Charles I. iſſued two proclamations to the ſame purpoſe; one in the year 1625, and one in the year 1630.

The progreſs of political knowledge has unfolded many bad effects of a great city, more weighty than any urged in theſe proclamations. The firſt I ſhall mention is, that people born and bred in a great city are commonly weak and effeminate. Vegetius (*a*) obſerving, that men bred to huſbandry make the beſt ſoldiers, adds what follows. "Interdum tamen neceſſitas exigit, et-
"iam urbanos ad arma compelli: qui ubi nomen dedere mili-
"tiæ, primum laborare, decurrere, portare pondus, et ſolem
"pulveremque ferre, condiſcant; parco victu utantur et ruſtico;
"interdum ſub divo, interdum ſub papilionibus, commorentur.
"Tunc demum ad uſum erudiantur armorum: et ſi longior ex-
"peditio emergit, in angariis plurimum detinendi ſunt, procul-
"que habendi a civitatis illecebris: ut eo modo, et corporibus
"eorum robur accedat, et animis *." The luxury of a great city deſcends

(*a*) De re militari, lib. 1. cap. 3.

* "But ſometimes there is a neceſſity for arming the townſpeople, and calling
"them out to ſervice. When this is the caſe, it ought to be the firſt care, to en-
"ure them to labour, to march them up and down the country, to make them
"carry heavy burdens, and to harden them againſt the weather. Their food
"ſhould

deſcends from the higheſt to the loweſt, infecting all ranks of men; and there is little opportunity in it for ſuch exerciſe as renders the body vigorous and robuſt. This is a phyſical objection againſt a great city: the next regards morality. Virtue is exerted chiefly in reſtraint: vice, in giving freedom to deſire. Moderation and ſelf-command form a character the moſt ſuſceptible of virtue: ſuperfluity of animal ſpirits, and love of pleaſure, form a character the moſt liable to vice. Low vices, pilfering for example, or lying, draw few or no imitators; but vices that indicate a ſoul above reſtraint, fail not to produce admirers. Where a man boldly ſtruggles againſt unlawful reſtraint, he is juſtly applauded and imitated; and the vulgar are not apt to diſtinguiſh nicely between lawful and unlawful reſtraint: the boldneſs is viſible, and they pierce no deeper. It is the unruly boy, full of animal ſpirits, who at public ſchool is admired and imitated; not the virtuous and modeſt. Vices accordingly that ſhow ſpirit, are extremely infectious; virtue very little. Hence the corruption of a great city, which increaſes more and more in proportion to the number of inhabitants. But it is ſufficient here barely to mention that objection; becauſe it has been much inſiſted on in antecedent parts of this work.

The following bad effects are more of a political nature. A great town is a profeſſed enemy to the free circulation of money. The current coin is accumulated in the capital: and diſtant provinces muſt ſink into idleneſs; for without ready money neither

" ſhould be coarſe and ſcanty, and they ſhould be habituated to ſleep alternately " in their tents, and in the open air. Then is the time to inſtruct them in the ex- " erciſe of their arms. If the expedition is a diſtant one, they ſhould be chiefly " employ'd in the ſtations of poſts or expreſſes, and removed as much as poſſible " from the dangerous allurements that abound in large cities; that thus they may " be envigorated both in mind and body."

arts

arts nor manufactures can flouriſh. Thus we find leſs and leſs activity, in proportion commonly to the diſtance from the capital, and an abſolute torpor in the extremities. It may be obſerved beſide, that as horſes in a great city muſt be provided with provender from a diſtance, the country is robbed of its dung for the benefit of the rich fields round the city. But as manure laid upon poor land is of more advantage to the farmer than upon what is already highly improved, the depriving diſtant parts of manure is a loſs to the country in general. Nor is this all: The dung of an extenſive city, the bulk of it at leaſt, is ſo remote from the fields to which it muſt be carried, that the expence of carriage ſwallows up the profit.

Another bad effect of accumulating money in the capital is, to raiſe there the price of labour; and the temptation of high wages, making every one flock to the capital, robs the country of its beſt hands. And as they who reſort to the capital are commonly young people, who remove as ſoon as they are fit for work, diſtant provinces are burdened with their maintenance, without reaping any benefit by their labour.

But of all, the moſt deplorable effect of a great city, is the preventing of population, by ſhortening the lives of its inhabitants. Does a capital ſwell in proportion to the numbers that are drained from the country? Far from it. The air of a populous city is infected by multitudes crouded together; and people there ſeldom make out the uſual time of life. With reſpect to London in particular, the fact is but too well aſcertained. The burials in that immenſe city greatly exceed the births: the difference ſome affirm to be no leſs than ten thouſand yearly: by the moſt moderate computation, not under ſeven or eight thouſand. As London is far from being on the decline, the conſumption of ſo many inhabitants muſt be ſupplied from the country; and the annual ſupply amounts probably to a greater number than were needed annually for recruiting our armies and navies in the late war with

France. If ſo, London is a greater enemy to population, than a bloody war would be, ſuppoſing it even to be perpetual. What an enormous tax is Britain thus ſubjected to for ſupporting her capital! The rearing and educating yearly for London 7 or 8000 perſons, require an immenſe ſum.

In Paris, if the bills of mortality can be relied on, the births and burials are nearly equal, being each of them about 19,000 yearly; and according to that computation, Paris ſhould need no recruits from the country. But in that city, the bills of mortality cannot be depended on for burials. It is there univerſally the practice of high and low, to have their infants nurſed in the country, till they be three years of age; and conſequently thoſe who die before that age, are not inliſted. What proportion theſe bear to the whole is uncertain. But a gueſs may be made from ſuch as die in London; which are computed to be one half of the whole that die (*a*). Now giving the utmoſt allowance for the healthineſs of the country above that of a town, Paris children that die in the country before the age of three, cannot be brought ſo low as a third of thoſe that die. On the other hand, the London bills of mortality are leſs to be depended on for births than for burials. None are inliſted but infants baptized by clergymen of the Engliſh church; and the numerous children of Papiſts, Diſſenters, and other ſectaries, are left out of the account. Upon the whole, the difference between the births and burials in Paris and in London, is much leſs than it appears to be on comparing the bills of mortality of theſe two cities.

At the ſame time, giving full allowance for children that are not brought into the London bills of mortality, there is the higheſt probability that a greater number of children are born in Paris than in London; and conſequently that the former requires fewer recruits from the country than the latter. In Paris, dome-

(*a*) See Dr Price, p. 362.

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ſtic ſervants are encouraged to marry: they are obſerved to be more ſettled than when bachelors, and more attentive to their duty. In London, ſuch marriages are diſcouraged, as rendering a ſervant more attentive to his own family, than to that of his maſter. But a ſervant attentive to his own family, will not, for his own ſake, neglect that of his maſter. At any rate, is he not more to be depended on, than a ſervant who continues a bachelor? What can be expected of idle and pampered bachelors, but debauchery and every ſort of corruption? Nothing reſtrains them from abſolute profligacy, but the eye of the maſter, who for that reaſon is their averſion not their love. If the poor-laws be named the folio of corruption, bachelor-ſervants in London may well be conſidered as a large appendix. And this attracts the eye to the poor-laws, which indeed make the chief difference between Paris and London, with reſpect to the preſent point. In Paris, certain funds are eſtabliſhed for the poor, the yearly produce of which admits but a limited number. As that fund is always preoccupied, the low people who are not on the liſt, have little or no proſpect of bread, but from their own induſtry; and to the induſtrious, marriage is in a great meaſure neceſſary. In London, a pariſh is taxed in proportion to the number of its poor; and every perſon who is pleaſed to be idle, is entitled to maintenance. Moſt things thrive by encouragement, and idleneſs above all. Certainty of maintenance, renders the low people in England idle and profligate; eſpecially in London, where luxury prevails, and infects every rank. So inſolent are the London poor, that ſcarce one of them will condeſcend to eat brown bread. There are accordingly in London, a much greater number of idle and profligate wretches, than in Paris, or in any other town in proportion to the number of inhabitants. Theſe wretches, in Doctor Swift's ſtyle, never think of poſterity, becauſe poſterity never thinks of them: men who hunt after pleaſure, and live from day to day,

have no notion of being burdened with a family. Theſe cauſes produce a greater number of children in Paris than in London; tho' probably they differ not much in populouſneſs.

I ſhall add but one other objection to a great city, which is not ſlight. An overgrown capital, far above a rival, has, by numbers and riches, a diſtreſſing influence in public affairs. The populace are ductile, and eaſily miſled by ambitious and deſigning magiſtrates. Nor are there wanting critical times, in which ſuch magiſtrates, acquiring artificial influence, may have power to diſturb the public peace. That an overgrown capital may prove dangerous to ſovereignty, has more than once been experienced both in Paris and London.

It would give one the ſpleen, to hear the French and Engliſh zealouſly diſputing about the extent of their capitals, as if the proſperity of their country depended on that circumſtance. To me it appears like one glorying in the king's-evil, or in any contagious diſtemper. Much better employ'd would they be, in contriving means for leſſening thoſe cities. There is not a political meaſure, that, in my opinion, would tend more to aggrandize the kingdom of France, or of Britain, than to ſplit its capital into ſeveral great towns. My plan would be, to confine the inhabitants of London to 100,000, compoſed of the King and his houſehold, ſupreme courts of juſtice, government-boards, prime nobility and gentry, with neceſſary ſhopkeepers, artiſts, and other dependents. Let the reſt of the inhabitants be diſtributed into nine towns properly ſituated, ſome for internal commerce, ſome for foreign. Such a plan would diffuſe life and vigour thro' every corner of the iſland.

To execute ſuch a plan, would, I acknowledge, require the deepeſt political ſkill, and much perſeverance. I ſhall ſuggeſt what occurs at preſent. The firſt ſtep muſt be, to mark proper ſpots for the nine towns, the moſt advantageous for trade, or for manufactures.

manufactures. If any of theſe ſpots be occupied already with ſmall towns, ſo much the better. The next ſtep is a capitation-tax on the inhabitants of London; the ſum levied to be appropriated for encouraging the new towns. One encouragement would have a good effect; which is, a premium to every man who builds in any of theſe towns, more or leſs, in proportion to the ſize of the houſe. This tax would baniſh from London, every manufacture but of the moſt lucrative kind. When, by this means, the inhabitants of London are reduced to a number not much above 100,000, the near proſpect of being relieved from the tax, will make every houſeholder active to baniſh all above that number: and to prevent a renewal of the tax, a greater number will never again be permitted. It would require great penetration to proportion the ſums to be levied and diſtributed, ſo as to have their proper effect, without overburdening the capital on the one hand, or giving too great encouragement for building on the other, which might tempt people to build for the premium merely, without any further view. Much will depend on an advantageous ſituation: houſes built there will always find inhabitants.

The two great cities of London and Weſtminſter are extremely ill fitted for local union. The latter, the ſeat of government and of the nobleſſe, infects the former with luxury and with love of ſhow. The former, the ſeat of commerce, infects the latter with love of gain. The mixture of theſe oppoſite paſſions, is productive of every groveling vice.

SKETCH

SKETCH XII.

Origin and Progreſs of AMERICAN NATIONS.

HAving no authentic materials for a natural hiſtory of all the Americans, the following obſervations ſhall be confined to a few tribes, the beſt known; and to the kingdoms of Peru and Mexico, as they were at the date of the Spaniſh conqueſt.

As there appears no paſſage by land to America from the old world, no problem has more embarraſſed the learned, than to give an account from whence the Americans ſprung: there are as many different opinions, as there are writers. Many attempts have been made for diſcovering a paſſage by land; but hitherto in vain. Kamſkatka, it is true, is divided from America by a narrow ſtrait, full of iſlands: and M. Buffon, to render the paſſage ſtill more eaſy than by ſea, conjectures, that thereabout there may formerly have been a land-paſſage, tho' now waſh'd away by violence of the ocean. There is indeed great appearance of truth in this conjecture; as all the quadrupeds of the north of Aſia ſeem to have made their way to America; the bear, for example, the roe, the deer, the rain-deer, the beaver, the wolf, the fox, the hare, the rat, the mole. He admits, that in America there is not to be ſeen a lion, a tiger, a panther, or any other Aſiatic quadruped of a hot climate: not, ſays he, for want of a land-paſſage;

ſage; but becauſe the cold climate of Tartary, in which ſuch animals cannot ſubſiſt, is an effectual bar againſt them *.

But in my apprehenſion, much more is required to give ſatisfaction upon this ſubject, than a paſſage from Kamſkatka to America, whether by land or ſea. An enquiry much more deciſive is totally overlooked, relative to the people on the two ſides of the ſtreight; particularly, whether they ſpeak the ſame language. Now by late accounts from Ruſſia we are informed, that there is no affinity between the Kamſkatkan tongue, and that of the Americans on the oppoſite ſide of the ſtreight. Whence we may conclude, with great certainty, that the latter are not a colony of the former.

But I go farther. There are ſeveral cogent arguments to evince, that the Americans are not deſcended from any people in the north of Aſia or in the north of Europe. Were they deſcended from either, Labrador, or the adjacent countries, muſt have been firſt peopled. And as ſavages are remarkably fond of their natal ſoil, they would have continued there, till by over-population they ſhould have been compelled to ſpread wider for food. But the fact is directly contrary. When America was diſcovered by the Spaniards, Mexico and Peru were fully peopled; and the other parts leſs and leſs, in proportion to their diſtance from theſe central countries. Fabry reports, that one may travel one or two hundred leagues north-weſt from the Miſſiſippi, without ſeeing a human face, or any veſtige of a houſe. And ſome French offi-

* Our author, with ſingular candor, admits it as a ſtrong objection to his theory, that there are no rain-deer in Aſia. But it is doing no more but juſtice to ſo fair a reaſoner, to obſerve, that according to the lateſt accounts, there are plenty of rain-deer in the country of Kamſkatka, which of all is the neareſt to America.

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cers ſay, that they travelled more than a hundred leagues from the dilicious country watered by the Ohio, through Louiſiana, without meeting a ſingle family of ſavages. Labrador is very thin of inhabitants; no people having been diſcovered in it, but the Eſquimaux, a very ſmall tribe. And as that tribe has plenty of food at home, there is no appearance, that they ever ſent a colony to any other part of America. The civilization of the Mexicans and Peruvians, as well as their populouſneſs, make it extremely probable that they were the firſt inhabitants of America. In travelling northward, the people are more and more ignorant and ſavage: the Eſquimaux, the moſt northern of all, are the moſt ſavage. In travelling ſouthward, the Patagonians, the moſt ſouthern of all, are ſo ſtupid as to go naked in a bitter cold region.

I venture ſtill farther; which is, to conjecture, that America has not been peopled from any part of the old world. The external appearance of the inhabitants, makes this conjecture approach to a certainty; as that appearance differs widely from the appearance of any other known people. Excepting the eye-laſhes, eye-brows, and hair of the head, which is invariably jet black, there is not a ſingle hair on the body of any American: not the leaſt appearance of a beard. Another diſtinguiſhing mark is their copper-colour, uniformly the ſame in all climates, hot and cold; and differing from the colour of all other nations. Ulloa remarks, that the Americans of Cape Breton, reſemble the Peruvians in complexion, in manners, and in cuſtoms; the only viſible difference being, that the former are of a larger ſtature. A third circumſtance no leſs diſtinguiſhing is, that American children are born with down upon the ſkin, which diſappears the eighth or ninth day, and never grows again. Children of the old world are born with ſkins ſmooth and poliſhed, and no down appears till puberty.

That the original inhabitants of America are a race diſtinct from

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all others, I once thought demonſtrable from ſome reports concerning the Eſquimaux. The author of the hiſtory of New France and ſeveral other writers report, that the Eſquimaux are bold, miſchievous, ſuſpicious, and untamable; that it is not even ſafe to converſe with them but at a diſtance; that no European ſkin is whiter; and that they are bearded up to the eyes. Suppoſing theſe facts to be true, had I not reaſon to believe, that the Eſquimaux muſt have ſprung from ſome nation in the north of Europe or Aſia, tho' I could not pretend to ſay, whether the tranſmigration was by land or ſea? From the ſame facts, however, I was forc'd to conclude, that the reſt of the Americans could not have had the ſame origin; for if the Canadians or any other American nation were of Aſiatic or European extraction, they muſt, like the Eſquimaux, have had a beard and white ſkin to this day. But one cannot be too cautious in giving faith to odd or ſingular facts, reported of diſtant nations. It is diſcovered by later accounts more worthy of credit, that the foregoing deſcription of the Eſquimaux is falſe in every particular. Of all the northern nations, not excepting the Laplanders, the Eſquimaux are of the ſmalleſt ſize, few of them exceeding four feet in height. They have heads extremely groſs, feet and hands very ſmall. That they are neither cruel nor ſuſpicious, appears from what Ellis ſays in his account of a voyage *anno* 1747, for diſcovering a north-weſt paſſage, that they offered their wives to the Engliſh ſailors, with expreſſions of ſatisfaction for being able to accommodate them. But what is the moſt to the preſent purpoſe; they are of a copper colour, like the other Americans, only a degree lighter, occaſioned probably by the intenſe cold of their climate; and they are alſo altogether deſtitute of a beard. It is common indeed among them, to bring forward the hair of the head upon the face, for preſerving it from flies, which rage in that country during ſummer; an ap-

pearance that probably has been miſtaken by travellers for a beard.

It has been lately diſcovered, that the language of the Eſquimaux is the ſame with that of the Greenlanders. A Daniſh miſſionary, who by ſome years reſidence in Greenland had acquired the language of that country, made a voyage with Commodore Palliſer to Newfoundland ann. 1764. Meeting a company of about two hundred Eſquimaux, he was agreeably ſurpriſed to hear the Greenland tongue. They received him kindly, and drew from him a promiſe to return the next year. And we are informed by Crantz, in his hiſtory of Greenland, that the ſame Daniſh miſſionary viſited them the very next year, in company with the Rev. Mr Drachart. They agreed, that the difference between the Eſquimaux language and that of Greenland was not greater than between the dialects of North and South Greenland, which differ not ſo much as the High and Low Dutch. Both nations call themſelves *Innuit* or *Karalit*, and call the Europeans *Kablunet*. Their ſtature, features, manners, dreſs, tents, darts, and boats, are entirely the ſame. As the language of Greenland reſembles not the language of Finland, Lapland, Norway, Tartary, nor that of the Samoides, it is evident, that neither the Eſquimaux nor Greenlanders are a colony from any of the countries mentioned. Geographers begin now to conjecture, that Greenland is a part of the continent of North America, without intervention of any ſea *. One thing is certain, that the Greenlanders reſemble the North-Americans in every particular: they are of a copper colour, and have no beard; they are of a ſmall ſize, like the Eſquimaux, and have the ſame

* The Danes had a ſettlement in Greenland long before Columbus ſaw the Weſt Indies. Would it not appear paradoxical to ſay, that America was diſcovered by the Danes long before the time of Columbus, and long before they knew that they had made the diſcovery?

language.

language. And thus I am obliged to abandon my favourite argument, for proving the Americans, the Eſquimaux excepted, to be indigenous, and not indebted to the old world for their exiſtence. At the ſame time, the other arguments urged above remain entire; and from what is now ſaid a circumſtance occurs, that fortifies greatly the chief of them. People, who with a bold face ſurmount all difficulties rather than give up a favourite opinion, make light of the copper colour and want of beard, willing to attribute all to the climate. We want *data*, I acknowledge, to determine with accuracy what effects can be produced by a climate. But luckily we have no occaſion at preſent to determine that difficult point. It is ſufficient that the climate of Labrador is much the ſame with that of the northern parts of Europe and Aſia. From that circumſtance I conclude with certainty, that the copper colour and want of beard in the Eſquimaux cannot be the reſult of climate. And if ſo, what foundation can there be for making theſe circumſtances depend on the climate in any other part of America? Truly none at all. I add, that as the copper colour and want of beard continue invariably the ſame in every variety of climate, hot and cold, moiſt and dry, they muſt depend on ſome invariable cauſe acting uniformly; which may be a ſingularity in the race of people (*a*), but cannot proceed from the climate.

If we can rely on the conjectures of an eminent writer (*b*), America emerged from the ſea later than any other part of the known world: and ſuppoſing the human race to have been planted in America by the hand of God later than the days of Moſes, Adam and Eve might have been the firſt parents of mankind, *i. e.* of all who at that time exiſted, without being the firſt parents of the Americans.

(*a*) Book 1. ſketch 1.

(*b*) M. Buffon.

The *Terra Auſtralis incognita* is ſeparated from the reſt of the world by a wide ocean, which carries a ſhip round the earth without interruption. How has that continent been peopled? There is not the ſlighteſt probability, that it ever has been joined to any other land. Here a local creation, if it may be termed ſo, appears unavoidable; and if we muſt admit more than one act of creation, even the appearance of difficulty, from reiteration of acts, totally vaniſheth. M. Buffon, in his natural hiſtory, bears teſtimony, that not a ſingle American quadruped of a hot climate is found in any other part of the earth: with reſpect to theſe we muſt unavoidably admit a local creation; and nothing ſeems more natural, than under the ſame act to comprehend the firſt parents of the American people.

It is poſſible, indeed, that a ſhip with men and women may, by contrary winds, be carried to a very diſtant ſhore. But to account thus for the peopling of America, will not be much reliſhed: Mexico and Peru muſt have been planted before navigation was known in the old world, at leaſt before a ſhip was brought to ſuch perfection as to bear a long courſe of bad weather. Will it be thought, that any ſuppoſition ought to be embraced, however improbable, rather than admit a ſeparate creation? We are, it is true, much in the dark as to the conduct of creative providence; but every rational conjecture leans to a ſeparate creation. America and the *Terra Auſtralis* muſt have been planted by the Almighty with a number of animals and vegetables, ſome of them peculiar to thoſe vaſt continents: and when ſuch care has been taken about inferior life, can ſo wild a thought be admitted, as that man, the nobleſt work of terreſtrial creation, would be left to chance? But it is ſcarce neceſſary to inſiſt upon this topic, as the external characters of the Americans above mentioned reject the ſuppoſition of their being deſcended from any people of the old world.

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It is highly probable, that the fertile and delicious plains of Peru and Mexico were the firſt planted of all the American countries; being more populous at the time of the Spaniſh invaſion than any other part of that great continent. This conjecture is ſupported by analogy: we believe that a ſpot, not centrical only, but extremely fertile, was choſen for the parents of the old world; and there is not in America a ſpot more centrical, or more fertile, than Mexico or Peru, for the parents of the new world.

Having thus ventured to throw out what occurred upon the origin of the Americans, without pretending to affirm any thing as certain, we proceed to their progreſs. The North-American tribes are remarkable with reſpect to one branch of their hiſtory, that, inſtead of advancing, like other nations, toward the maturity of ſociety and government, they continue to this hour in their original ſtate of hunting and fiſhing. A caſe ſo ſingular rouſes our curioſity; and we wiſh to be made acquainted with the cauſe.

It is not the want of animals capable to be domeſticated, that obliges them to remain hunters and fiſhers. The horſe, it is true, the ſheep, the goat, were imported from Europe; but there are plenty of American quadrupeds no leſs docile than thoſe mentioned. There is, in particular, a ſpecies of horned cattle peculiar to America, having long wool inſtead of hair, and an excreſcence upon the ſhoulder like that of the Eaſt-India buffalo. Theſe wild cattle multiply exceedingly in the fertile countries which the Miſſiſippi traverſes; and Hennepin reports, that the Indians, after killing numbers, take no part away but the tongue, which is reckoned a delicious morſel. Theſe creatures are not extremely wild; and, if taken young, are eaſily tamed: a calf, when its dam is killed, will follow the hunter, and lick his hand. The wool, the hide, the tallow, would be of great value in the Britiſh colonies.

If the ſhepherd-ſtate be not obſtructed in America by want of proper

proper cattle, the only account that can or need be given is, paucity of inhabitants. Conſider only the influence of cuſtom, in rivetting men to their local ſituation and manner of life: once hunters, they will always be hunters, till ſome cauſe more potent than cuſtom force them out of that ſtate. Want of food, occaſioned by rapid population, brought on the ſhepherd-ſtate in the old world. That cauſe has not hitherto taken place in North America: the inhabitants, few in number, remain hunters and fiſhers, becauſe that ſtate affords them a competency of food. I am aware, that the natives have been decreaſing in number from the time of the firſt European ſettlements. But even at that time the country was ill peopled: take for example the country above deſcribed, ſtretching north-weſt from the Miſſiſippi: the Europeans never had any footing there, and yet to this day it is little better than a deſert. I give other examples. The Indians who ſurround the lake Nippiſong, from whence the river St Laurence iſſues, are in whole but five or ſix thouſand; and yet their country is of great extent: they live by hunting and fiſhing, having bows and arrows, but no fire-arms; and their cloathing is the ſkins of beaſts: they are ſeldom, if ever, engaged in war; have no commerce with any other people, Indian or European, but live as if they had a world to themſelves (*a*). If that country be ill peopled, it is not from ſcarcity of food; for the country is extenſive, and well ſtored with every ſort of game. On the ſouth and weſt of the lake *Superior*, the country is level and fruitful all the way to the Miſſiſippi, having large plains covered with rank graſs, and ſcarce a tree for hundreds of miles: the inhabitants enjoy the greateſt plenty of fiſh, fowl, deer, &c.; and yet their numbers are far from being in proportion to their means of ſubſiſtence. In ſhort, it is the conjecture of the ableſt writers, that in the vaſt extent of North

(*a*) Account of North America by Major Robert Rogers.

America,

America, when diſcovered, there were not as many people, laying aſide Mexico, as in the half of Europe.

Paucity of inhabitants explains clearly why the North-American tribes remain hunters and fiſhers, without advancing to the ſhepherd-ſtate. But if the foregoing difficulty be removed, another ſtarts up, no leſs puzzling, viz. By what adverſe fate are ſo rich countries ſo ill peopled? It is a conjecture of M. Buffon, mentioned above, that America has been planted later than the other parts of this globe. But ſuppoſing the fact, it has however not been planted ſo late as to prevent a great population, witneſs Mexico and Peru, fully peopled at the era of the Spaniſh invaſion. We muſt therefore ſearch for another cauſe; and none occurs but the infecundity of the North-American ſavages. M. Buffon, a reſpectable author, and for that reaſon often quoted, remarks, that theſe ſavages are feeble in their organs of generation, that they have no ardor for the female ſex, and that they have few children; to enforce which remark he adds, that the quadrupeds of America, both native and tranſplanted, are of a diminutive ſize, compared with thoſe of the old world. A woman never admits her huſband, till the child ſhe is nurſing be three years old; and this led Frenchmen to go often aſtray from their Canadian wives. The caſe was reported by the prieſts to their ſuperiors in France; but what order was taken has eſcaped my memory. Among the males, it is an inviolable law, to abſtain from females while they are engaged in a military expedition. This is pregnant evidence of their frigidity; for among ſavages the authority of law, or of opinion, ſeldom prevails over any ſtrong appetite: vain would be the attempt to reſtrain them from ſpirituous liquors, tho' much more debilitating. Neither is there any inſtance, of violence offered by any North-American ſavage, to European women taken captives in war.

Mexico and Peru, when conquered by the Spaniards, afforded

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to their numerous inhabitants the neceſſaries of life in profuſion. Cotton was in plenty, more than ſufficient for the cloathing needed in warm climates: Indian wheat was univerſal, and was cultivated without much labour. The natural wants of the inhabitants were thus ſupplied with very little trouble; and artificial wants had made no progreſs. But the preſent ſtate of theſe countries is very different. The Indians have learned from their conquerors a multitude of artificial wants, good houſes, variety of food, and rich cloaths, which muſt be imported, becauſe not manufactured at home. They are prohibited from exerciſing any art or calling except agriculture, which ſcarce affords them neceſſaries; and this obliges a great proportion of them to live ſingle. Even agriculture itſelf is cramped; for in moſt of the provinces there is a prohibition to plant vines or olives. In ſhort, it is believed that the inhabitants who exiſted at the Spaniſh invaſion are reduced to a fourth part. The ſavages alſo of North America who border on the European ſettlements are viſibly diminiſhing. When the Engliſh ſettled in America, the five nations could raiſe 15,000 fighting men: at preſent they are not able to raiſe 2000. Upon the whole, it is computed by able writers, that the preſent inhabitants of America amount not to a twentieth part of thoſe who exiſted when that continent was diſcovered by Columbus. This decay is aſcribed to the intemperate uſe of ſpirits, and to the ſmall-pox, both of them introduced by the Europeans *.

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* In all the Weſt-Indian colonies, the ſlaves continually decreaſe ſo as to need frequent recruits from Africa. "This decreaſe," ſays the author of a late account of Guiana, "is commonly attributed to oppreſſion and hard labour; tho' with "little reaſon, as the ſlaves are much more robuſt, healthy, and vigorous, than "their maſters. The true cauſe is, the commerce of white men with young negro "wenches, who, to ſupport that commerce, uſe every mean to avoid conception, and "even to procure abortion. By ſuch practices they are incapacitated to bear chil-

"dren

It is obſervable, that every ſort of plague becomes more virulent when tranſplanted, than in its native place. The plague commits leſs ravage in Egypt, its native place, than in any other country. The venereal diſeaſe was for many ages more violent and deſtructive in Europe, than ever it was in America, where it was firſt known. The people who ſailed with Chriſtopher Columbus, brought it to Spain from Hiſpaniola. Columbus, with thirty or forty of his ſailors, went directly to Barcelona, where the King then was, to render an account of his voyage. All the inhabitants, who at that time tripled the preſent number, were immediately ſeized with the venereal diſeaſe, which raged ſo furiouſly as to threaten deſtruction to all. The ſmall pox comes under the ſame obſervation; for it has ſwept away many more in America, than ever it did in Europe. In the 1713, the crew of a Dutch veſſel infected the Hottentots with the ſmall pox; which left ſcarce a third of the inhabitants. And the ſame fate befel the Laplanders and Greenlanders. In all appearance, that diſeaſe, if it abate not ſoon of its tranſplanted virulence, will extirpate the natives of North America; for they know little of inoculation.

But ſpiritous liquors are a ſtill more effectual cauſe of depopulation. The American ſavages, male and female, are inordinately fond of ſpiritous liquors; and ſavages generally abandon themſelves to appetite, without the leaſt control from ſhame. The noxious effects of intemperance in ſpirits, are too well known, from

" dren when they ſettle in marriage with their own countrymen. That this is the " true cauſe, will be evident, from conſidering, that in Virginia and Maryland, the " ſtock of ſlaves is kept up without any importation; becauſe in theſe countries " commerce with Negro women is deteſted, as infamous and unnatural." The cauſe here aſſigned may have ſome effect: but there is a ſtronger cauſe of depopulation, viz. the culture of ſugar, laborious in the field, and unhealthy in the houſe by boiling, &c. The Negroes employ'd in the culture of cotton, coffee, and ginger, ſeldom need to be recruited.

fatal experience among ourſelves: before the uſe of gin was prohibited, the populace of London were debilitated by it to a degree of loſing, in a great meaſure, the power of procreation. Happily for the human ſpecies, the invention of ſavages never reached the production of gin; for ſpirits in that early period would have left not one perſon alive, not a ſingle Noah to reſtore the race of men: in order to accompliſh the plan of Providence, creation muſt have been renewed oftener than once *.

In the temperate climates of the old world, there is great uniformity in the gradual progreſs of men from the ſavage ſtate to the higheſt civilization; beginning with hunting and fiſhing, advancing to flocks and herds, and thereafter to agriculture and commerce. One would be much diſappointed if he expected the ſame progreſs in America. Among the northern tribes, there is nothing that reſembles the ſhepherd-ſtate: they continue hunters and fiſhers as originally; becauſe there is no cauſe ſo potent as to force them from that ſtate to become ſhepherds. So far clear. But there is another fact of which we have no example in the old world, that ſeems not ſo eaſily explained: theſe people, without paſſing through the ſhepherd-ſtate, have advanced to ſome degree of agriculture. Before the ſeventeenth century, the Iroquois, or five nations, had villages, and cultivated Indian corn: the Cherokees have many ſmall towns; they raiſe corn in abundance, and fence in their fields: they breed poultry, and have orchards of peach-trees: the Chickeſaws and Creek Indians live pretty much in the ſame manner. The Apalachites ſow and reap in common;

* Charlevoix ſays, that an Indian of Canada will give all he is worth for a glaſs of brandy. And he paints thus the effect of drunkenneſs upon them. "Even in "the ſtreets of Montreal are ſeen the moſt ſhocking ſpectacles of ebriety; huſ- "bands, wives, fathers, mothers, brothers, and ſiſters, ſeizing one another by the "throat, and tearing one another with their teeth, like ſo many enraged wolves."

and

and put up the corn in granaries, to be diſtributed among individuals when they want food. The Hurons raiſe great quantities of corn, not only for their own uſe, but for commerce. Many of theſe nations, particularly the Cherokees, have of late got horſes, ſwine, and tame cattle; an improvement borrowed from the Europeans. But corn is of an earlier date: when Sir Richard Greenville took poſſeſſion of Virginia in the reign of Queen Eliſabeth, the natives had corn; and Hennepin aſſures us, that the nations bordering on the Miſſiſippi had corn long before they were viſited by any European. Huſbandry, it is true, is among thoſe people ſtill in its infancy; being left to the women, who ſow, who reap, who ſtore up in public granaries, and who diſtribute as need requires. The inhabitants of Guiana in South America, continue to this day hunters and fiſhers. But tho' they have neither flocks nor herds, they have ſome huſbandry; for the women plant caſſava, yams, and plantains. They make a liquor, like our ale, termed *piworee*, which they drink with their food. And tho' they are extremely fond of that liquor, their indolence makes them often neglect to provide againſt want. To a people having a violent propenſity to intemperance, as all ſavages have, this improvidence is a bleſſing; for otherwiſe they would wallow in perpetual drunkenneſs. They are by no means ſingular; for unconcern about futurity is the characteriſtic of all ſavages. To forego an immediate for a diſtant enjoyment, can only be ſuggeſted by cultivated reaſon. When the Canary iſlands were firſt viſited by the Europeans, which was in the fourteenth century, the inhabitants had corn; for which the ground was prepared in the following manner. They had a wooden inſtrument, not unlike a hoe, with a ſpur or tooth at the end, on which was fixed a goat's horn. With this inſtrument the ground was ſtirred; and if rain came not in its proper ſeaſon, water was brought by canals from the rivulets. It was the womens province to reap the corn: they took only the ears; which

they threſhed with ſticks, or beat with their feet, and then winnowed in their hands. Huſbandry probably will remain in its preſent ſtate among American ſavages; for as they are decreaſing daily, they can have no difficulty about food. The fact however is ſingular, of a people uſing corn before tame cattle: there muſt be a cauſe, which, on better acquaintance with that people, will probably be diſcovered.

America is full of political wonders. At the time of the Spaniſh invaſion, the Mexicans and Peruvians had made great advances toward the perfection of ſociety, while the northern tribes, ſeparated from them by diſtance only, remained in the original ſtate of hunters and fiſhers, and remain ſo at this day. To explain the difference, appears difficult. It is ſtill more difficult to explain, why the Mexicans and Peruvians, inhabitants of the torrid zone, were highly poliſhed in the arts of ſociety and government; conſidering that in the old world, the inhabitants of the torrid zone are for the moſt part little better than ſavages. We are not ſufficiently acquainted with the natural hiſtory of America, nor with that of its people, to attempt an explanation of theſe wonders: it is however part of our taſk, to ſtate the progreſs of ſociety among the Mexicans and Peruvians; which cannot fail to amuſe the reader, as he will find theſe two nations differing eſſentially from the North-American tribes, in every article of manners, government, and police.

When the Spaniards invaded America, the Mexicans were ſkilful in agriculture. Maize was their chief grain, which, by careful culture, produced great plenty, even in the mountainous country of Tlaſcalla. They had gardening and botany, as well as agriculture: a phyſic-garden belonging to the Emperor was open to every one for gathering medicinal plants.

The art of cookery was far advanced among that people. Montezuma's table was generally covered with 200 diſhes, many of them exquiſitely

exquiſitely dreſſed in the opinion even of the Spaniards. They uſed ſalt, which was made by the ſun.

The women were dextrous at ſpinning; and manufactures of cotton and hair abounded every where.

The populouſneſs of Mexico and Peru afford irrefragable evidence, that the arts of peace were there carried to a great height. The city of Mexico contained 60,000 families *; and Montezuma had thirty vaſſals who could bring into the field, each of them, 100,000 fighting men. Tlaſcalla, a neighbouring republic, governed by a ſenate, was ſo populous as to be almoſt a match for the Emperor of Mexico.

The public edifices in the city of Mexico, and houſes of the nobility, were of ſtone, and well built. The royal palace had thirty gates opening to as many ſtreets. The principal front was of jaſper, black, red, and white, well poliſhed. Three ſquares, built and adorned like the front, led to Montezuma's apartment, having large rooms, floors covered with mats of different kinds, walls hung with a mixture of cotton-cloth and rabbit-furs; the innermoſt room adorned with hangings of feathers, beautified with various figures in lively colours. In that building, large ceilings were formed ſo artificially without nails, as to make the planks ſuſtain each other. Water was brought into the city of Mexico, from a mountain at a league's diſtance.

Gold and ſilver were in ſo high eſteem, that veſſels made of theſe metals were permitted to none but to the Emperor. Conſidering the value put upon gold and ſilver, the want of current coin would argue great dulneſs in that nation, if inſtances did

* We cannot altogether rely on what is reported of this ancient empire with reſpect to numbers. The city of Mexico, tho' conſiderably enlarged ſince the Spaniſh conqueſt, doth not at preſent contain more than 60,000 ſouls, including 20,000 Negroes and Mulattoes.

not

not daily occur of improvements, after being carried to a conſiderable height, ſtopping ſhort at the very threſhold of perfection. The want of current coin made fairs the more neceſſary, which were carried on with the moſt perfect regularity: judges on the ſpot decided mercantile differences; and inferior officers, making conſtant circuits, preſerved peace and order. The abundance and variety of the commodities brought to market, and the order preſerved by ſuch multitudes, amazed the Spaniards; a ſpectacle deſerving admiration, as a teſtimony of the grandeur and good government of that extenſive empire.

The fine arts were not unknown in Mexico. Their goldſmiths were excellent workmen, particularly in moulding gold and ſilver into the form of animals. Their painters made landſcapes and other imitations of nature with feathers, ſo artfully mixed as to beſtow both life and colouring; of which ſort of work, there were inſtances no leſs extraordinary for patience than for ſkill. Their drinking-cups were of the fineſt earth exquiſitely made, differing from each other in colour, and even in ſmell. Of the ſame materials, they made great variety of veſſels both for uſe and ornament.

They were not ignorant either of muſic or of poetry; and one of their capital amuſements was ſongs ſet to muſic upon the atchievements of their kings and anceſtors.

With ſuch a progreſs both in the uſeful and fine arts, is it not ſurpriſing, that tho' they had meaſures, they knew nothing of weights?

As to the art of writing, a capital article in the conduct of govenment, they were extremely deficient. That art, as mentioned above, was no farther advanced than the uſing figures compoſed of painted feathers, by which they made a ſhift to communicate ſome ſimple thoughts; and in that manner was Montezuma informed of the Spaniſh invaſion.

There

There was great ingenuity ſhewn in regulating the calendar: the Mexican year was divided into 365 days; and into 18 months, containing 20 days each, which made 360; the remaining five intercalary days were added at the end of the year, for making it correſpond to the courſe of the ſun. They religiouſly employ'd theſe five days upon diverſions, being of opinion that they were appropriated to that end by their anceſtors.

Murder, theft, and corruption in officers of ſtate, were capital crimes. Adultery alſo was capital; for female chaſtity was in high eſtimation. At the ſame time, conſent was deemed a ſufficient cauſe of divorce, the law leaving it to the parties concerned, who ought to be the beſt judges. In caſe of a divorce, the father took care of the male children, leaving the female children with the mother. But to prevent raſh ſeparations, it was capital for them to unite again.

It may be gathered from what has been ſaid, that there was a diſtinction of rank among the Mexicans. So religiouſly was it obſerved, as to be diſplay'd even in their buildings: the city of Mexico was divided into two parts, one appropriated to the Emperor and nobility, and one left to plebeians.

Education of children was an important article in the Mexican police. Public ſchools were allotted for plebeian children; and colleges well endowed for the ſons of the nobility, where they continued till they were fit for buſineſs. The maſters were conſidered as officers of ſtate; not without reaſon, as their office was to qualify young men for ſerving their king and country. Such of the young nobles as made choice of a military life, were ſent to the army, and made to ſuffer great hardſhips before they could be inliſted. They had indeed a powerful motive for perſeverance, the moſt honourable of all employments being that of a ſoldier. Young women of quality were educated with no leſs care, by proper matrons choſen with the utmoſt circumſpection.

As

As hereditary nobility, especially in an extenſive empire, leads to monarchy, the government of Mexico was monarchical; and as the progreſs of monarchy is from being elective to be hereditary, Mexico had advanced no farther than to be an elective monarchy, of which Montezuma was the eleventh king. It would in time have become hereditary, had it not been ſubdued by the Spaniards. And it was an example of an elective monarchy that approaches the neareſt to hereditary; for the power of election, as well as the privilege of being elected, were confined to the princes of the blood-royal. As a talent for war was chiefly regarded in chuſing a ſucceſſor to the throne, the Mexican kings always commanded their own armies: The Emperor-elect, before his coronation, was obliged to make ſome conqueſt, or perform ſome warlike exploit; a cuſtom that ſupported the military ſpirit, and enlarged the kingdom. From every king was exacted a coronation-oath, to adhere to the religion of his anceſtors, to maintain the laws and cuſtoms of the empire, and to be a father to his people.

The various affairs of government were diſtributed among different boards with great propriety. The management of the royal patrimony was allotted to one board; appeals from inferior tribunals, to another; the levying of troops, and the providing of magazines, to a third: matters of ſupreme importance were reſerved to a council of ſtate, held generally in the King's preſence. Theſe boards, all of them, were compoſed of men experienced in the arts of war and of peace: the council of ſtate was compoſed of thoſe who elected the Emperor.

Concerning the patrimony of the crown, mines of gold and ſilver belonged to the Emperor; and the duty on ſalt brought in a great revenue. But the capital duty was, a third of the land-rents, the eſtates of the nobles excepted; upon whom no tribute was impoſed, but to ſerve in the army with a number of their vaſſals, and

and to guard the Emperor's perſon. Goods manufactured and ſold were ſubjected to a duty; which was not prejudicial to their manufactures, becauſe there was no rival nation within reach.

Montezuma introduced a multitude of ceremonies into his court, tending to inſpire veneration for his perſon; an excellent politic in rude times, of however little ſignificancy among nations enlightened and rational. Veneration and humility were ſo much the tone of the court, that it was even thought indecent in the Mexican lords, to appear before the King in their richeſt habits. Veſſels of gold and ſilver were appropriated to his table, and not permitted even to the princes of the blood. The table-cloths and napkins, made of the fineſt cotton, with the earthen ware, never made a ſecond appearance at the Emperor's table, but were diſtributed among the ſervants.

In war, their offenſive weapons were bows and arrows; and as iron was not known in America, their arrows were headed with bones ſharpened at the point. They uſed alſo darts, and long wooden ſwords, in which were fixed ſharp flints; and men of more than ordinary ſtrength fought with clubs. They beſide had ſlingers, who threw ſtones with great force and dexterity. Their defenſive arms, uſed only by commanders and perſons of diſtinction, were a coat of quilted cotton, a ſort of breaſt-plate, and a ſhield of wood or tortoiſe-ſhell, adorned with plates of ſuch metal as they could procure. The private men fought naked; their faces and bodies being deformed with paint, in order to terrify the enemy. They had warlike inſtruments of muſic, ſuch as ſea-ſhells, flutes made of large canes, and a ſort of drum made of the trunk of a tree hollow'd. Their battalions conſiſted of great numbers crouded together, without even the appearance of order. They attacked with fury, and terrible outcries, in order to intimidate the enemy; a practice prompted by nature, and formerly uſed by many nations. It was not deſpiſed even by the Romans;

for Cato the elder was wont to ſay, that he had obtained more victories by the throats of his ſoldiers, than by their ſwords; and Cæſar applauds his own ſoldiers, above thoſe of Pompey, for their warlike ſhouts. Eagerneſs to engage is vented in loud cries: and the effects are excellent: they redouble the ardor of thoſe who attack, at the ſame time that they ſtrike terror into the enemy.

Their armies were formed with eaſe: the princes of the empire, with the cacics or governors of provinces, were obliged to repair to the general rendezvous, each with his quota of men.

Their fortifications were trunks of large trees, fixed in the ground like palliſades, leaving no intervals but what were barely ſufficient for diſcharging their arrows upon the enemy.

Military orders were inſtituted, with peculiar habits, as marks of diſtinction and honour; and each cavalier bore the device of his order, painted upon his robe, or fixed to it. Montezuma founded a new order of knighthood, into which princes only were admitted, or nobles deſcended from the royal ſtock; and as a token of its ſuperiority, he became one of its members. The knights of that order had part of their hair bound with a red ribbon, to which a taſſel was fixed hanging down to the ſhoulder. Every new exploit was honoured with an additional taſſel; which made the knights with ardor embrace every opportunity to ſignalize themſelves. As nothing can be better contrived than ſuch a regulation for ſupporting a military ſpirit, the Mexicans would have been invincible had they underſtood the order of battle: for want of which that potent empire fell a prey to a handful of ſtrangers. I differ from thoſe who aſcribe that event to the fire-arms of the Spaniards, and to their horſes. Theſe could not be more terrible to the Mexicans, than elephants were at firſt to the Romans: but familiarity with theſe unwieldy animals, reſtored to the Romans their wonted courage; and the Mexicans probably would have

have behaved like the Romans, had they equalled the Romans in the art of war.

When that illuſtrious people, by their own genius, without borrowing from others, had made ſuch proficiency in the arts of peace, as well as of war; is it not ſtrange, that with reſpect to religion they were no better than ſavages? They not only practiſed human ſacrifices, but dreſſed and eat the fleſh of thoſe that were ſacrificed. Their great temple was contrived to raiſe horror: upon the walls were multiplied the figures of noxious ſerpents: the heads of perſons ſacrificed were ſtuck up in different places, and carefully renewed when waſted by time. There were eight temples in the city, nearly of the ſame architecture; 2000 of a ſmaller ſize, dedicated to different idols; ſcarce a ſtreet without a tutelar deity; nor a calamity that had not an altar, to which the diſtreſſed might have recourſe for a remedy. Unparallelled ignorance and ſtupidity, obliged every Emperor, at his coronation, to ſwear, that there ſhould be no unſeaſonable rains, no overflowing of rivers, no fields affected with ſterility, nor any man hurt with the bad influences of the ſun. In ſhort, it was a ſlaviſh religion, built upon fear, not love. At the ſame time, they believed the immortality of the ſoul, and rewards and puniſhments in a future ſtate; which made them bury with their dead, quantities of gold and ſilver, for defraying the expence of their journey; and alſo made them put to death ſome of their ſervants to attend them. Women ſometimes, actuated with the ſame belief, were authors of their own death, in order to accompany their huſbands.

The author that we muſt chiefly rely on for an account of Peru is Garcilaſſo de la Vega: tho' he may be juſtly ſuſpected of partiality; for being of the Inca race, he beſtows on the Peruvian government, improvements of later times. The articles that appear the leaſt ſuſpicious are what follow.

The principle of the Peruvian conſtitution ſeems to have been

an Agrarian law, of the ſtricteſt kind. To the ſovereign was firſt allotted a large proportion of land, for defraying the expences of government; and the remainder was divided among his ſubjects, in proportion to the number of each family. Theſe portions were not alienable: the ſovereign was held proprietor of the whole, as in the feudal ſyſtem; and from time to time the diſtribution was varied according to the circumſtances of families. This Agrarian law contributed undoubtedly to the populouſneſs of the kingdom of Peru.

It is a ſure ſign of improved agriculture, that aqueducts were made by the Peruvians for watering their land. Their plough was of wood, a yard long, flat before, round behind, and pointed at the end for piercing the ground. Agriculture ſeems to have been carried on by united labour: lands appropriated for maintaining the poor were firſt ploughed; next the portion allotted to ſoldiers performing duty in the field: then every man ſeparately ploughed his own field; after which he aſſiſted his neighbour: they proceeded to the portion of the curaca or lord: and laſtly to the King's portion. In the month of March they reaped their maize, and celebrated the harveſt with joy and feaſting.

There being no artiſt nor manufacturer by profeſſion, individuals were taught to do every thing for themſelves. Every one knew how to plough and manure the land: every one was a carpenter, a maſon, a ſhoemaker, a weaver, &c.; and the women were the moſt ingenious and diligent of all. Blas Valera mentions a law, named *the law of brotherhood*, which, without the proſpect of reward, obliged them to be mutually aiding and aſſiſting in ploughing, ſowing, and reaping, in building their houſes, and in every ſort of occupation.

As the art was unknown of melting down metals by means of bellows, long copper pipes were contrived, contracted at the fur-

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ther'end, that the breath might act the more forcibly on the fire; and they uſed ten or twelve of theſe pipes together, when they wanted a very hot fire. Having no iron, their hatchets and pick-axes were of copper, and they had neither ſaw nor augre, nor any inſtrument of iron: ignorant of the uſe of nails, they tied their timber with cords of hemp. The tool they had for cutting ſtone, was a ſharp flint; and with that tool they ſhaped the ſtone by continual rubbing, more than by cutting. Having no engines for raiſing ſtones, they did all by ſtrength of arm. Theſe defects notwithſtanding, they erected great edifices; witneſs the fortreſs of Cuſco, a ſtupenduous fabric. It paſſes all underſtanding, by what means the ſtones, or rather the great rocks, employ'd in that building, were brought from the quarry. One of theſe ſtones, meaſured by Acoſta, was thirty feet in length, eighteen in breadth, and ſix in thickneſs.

Having neither ſciſſars nor needles of metal, they uſed a certain long thorn for a needle. The mirrors uſed by ladies of quality were of burniſhed copper: but ſuch implements of dreſs were reckoned too effeminate for the men.

With reſpect to muſic, they had an inſtrument of hollow canes glew'd together, the notes of which were like thoſe of an organ. They had love-ſongs accompanied with a pipe; and war-ſongs, which were their feſtival entertainment. They compoſed and acted comedies and tragedies. The art of writing properly ſo called, was unknown: but ſilken threads, with knots caſt upon them of divers colours, enabled them to keep exact accounts, and to ſum them up with a readineſs that would have rivalled an expert European arithmetician. They had alſo attained to as much geometry as to meaſure their fields.

In war, their offenſive arms were the bow and arrow, lance, dart, club, and bill. Their defenſive arms, were the helmet and target.

target. The army was provided from the King's ſtores, and was no burden upon the people.

In philoſophy, they had made no progreſs. An eclipſe of the moon was attributed to her being ſick; and they fancied the milky way to be a ewe giving ſuck to a lamb. With regard to the ſetting ſun, they ſaid, that he was a good ſwimmer, and that he pierced through the waves, to riſe next morning in the eaſt. But ſuch ignorance is not wonderful; for no branch of ſcience can make a progreſs without writing.

The people were divided into ſmall bodies of ten families each: every diviſion had a head, and a regiſter was kept of the whole; a branch of public police, that very much reſembles the Engliſh decennaries.

They made but two meals, one between eight and nine in the morning, the other before ſunſet. Idleneſs was puniſhed with infamy: even children were employ'd according to their capacity. public viſitors or monitors were appointed, having acceſs to every houſe, for inſpecting the manners of the inhabitants; who were rewarded or puniſhed according to their behaviour. Moderation and induſtry were ſo effectually enforc'd by this article of police, that few were reduced to indigence; and theſe got their food and cloathing out of the King's ſtores.

With reſpect to their laws and cuſtoms, children were bound to ſerve their parents until the age of twenty-five; and marriage contracted before that time, without conſent of parents, was null. Polygamy was prohibited, and perſons were confined to marry within their own tribe. The tradition, that the Inca family were children of the ſun, introduced inceſt among them; for it was a matter of religion to preſerve their divine blood pure and unmixed.

It was the chief article of the Peruvian creed, upon which every other article of their religion depended, that the Inca family were

were children of their great god the ſun, and ſent by him to ſpread his worſhip and his laws among them. Nothing could have a greater influence upon an ignorant and credulous people, than ſuch a doctrine. The ſanctity of the Inca family was ſo deeply rooted in the hearts of the Peruvians, that no perſon of that family was thought capable of committing a crime. Such blind veneration for a family, makes it probable, that the government of Peru under the Incas had not ſubſiſted many years; for a government founded upon deceit and ſuperſtition, cannot long continue its authority. However that be, ſuch belief of the origin of the Incas, is evidence of great virtue and moderation in that family; for any groſs act of tyranny or injuſtice, would have opened the eyes of the people to ſee their error. Moderation in the ſovereign, and in the ſubjects obedience without reſerve, cannot fail to produce a government mild and gentle; which was verified in that of Peru, ſo mild and gentle, that to manure and cultivate the lands of the Inca, and to lay up the produce in ſtore-houſes, were the only burdens impoſed upon the people, if it was not ſometimes to make cloaths and weapons for the army. At the ſame time their kings were ſo revered, that theſe articles of labour were performed with great alacrity.

The government was equally gentle with regard to puniſhments. Indeed very few crimes were committed, being conſidered as a ſort of rebellion againſt their great god the ſun. The only crime that ſeems to have been puniſhed with ſeverity, is the marauding of ſoldiers; for death was inflicted, however inconſiderable the damage.

In this empire, there appears to have been the moſt perfect union between law and religion; which could not fail to produce obedience, order, and tranquillity, among that people, tho' extremely numerous. The Inca family was fam'd for moderation: they made conqueſts in order to civilize their neighbours; and as they

they ſeldom if ever tranſgreſſed the bounds of morality, no other art was neceſſary to preſerve the government entire, but to keep the people ignorant of true religion. They had virgins dedicated to the ſun, who, like the veſtal virgins in Rome, were under a vow of perpetual chaſtity.

This ſubject ſhall be concluded with ſome ſlight obſervations on the two governments I have been deſcribing. Comparing them together, the Mexican government ſeems to have been ſupported by arms; that of Peru by religion.

The kings of Peru were hereditary and abſolute: thoſe of Mexico elective. In contradiction however to political principles, the government of Peru was by far the milder. It is mentioned above, that the electors of the Mexican kings were hereditary princes; and the ſame electors compoſed the great council of ſtate. Monteſquieu therefore has been miſinformed when he terms this a deſpotic monarchy (*a*): a monarchy can never be deſpotic, where the ſovereign is limited by a great council, the members of which are independent of him. As little reaſon has he to term Peru deſpotic. An abſolute monarchy it was, but the fartheſt in the world from being deſpotic: on the contrary, we find not in hiſtory any government ſo well contrived for the good of the people. An Agrarian law, firmly rooted, prevented that great inequality of rank and riches which lead to luxury, and diſſolution of manners: a commonwealth was naturally the reſult of ſuch a conſtitution; and probably would have taken place, had it not been for a government no leſs ſuitable, and ſtill more mild, viz. a theocracy under a family ſent from heaven to make them happy. This wild opinion, ſupported by ignorance and ſuperſtition, proved an effectual bar againſt tyranny in the monarch; a moſt exemplary conduct on his part being neceſſary for ſupporting the o-

(*a*) L'Eſprit des loix, liv. 17. ch. 2.

pinion

pinion of his divinity. Upon the whole, comprehending king and ſubject, there perhaps never exiſted more virtue in any other government, whether monarchical or republican.

In Peru there are traces of ſome diſtinction of ranks, ariſing probably from office merely, which, as in France, were a bulwark to the monarch againſt the peaſants. The great ſuperiority of the Peruvian Incas, as demi-gods, did not admit a hereditary nobility.

With reſpect to the progreſs of arts and manufactures, the two nations differed widely: in Mexico, arts and manufactures were carried to a ſurpriſing height, conſidering the tools they had to work with: in Peru, they had made no progreſs, every man, as among mere ſavages, providing the neceſſaries of life for himſelf. As the world goes at preſent, ſuch numbers are employ'd upon our multiplied wants, that not above one of a hundred can be ſpared for war. In ancient times, when theſe wants were few, and not much enlarged beyond nature, it is computed that an eighth part could be ſpared for war: and hence the numerous armies we read of in the hiſtory of ancient nations. The Peruvians had it in their power to go ſtill farther: it was poſſible to arm the whole males capable of ſervice: leaving the women to ſupply the few neceſſaries that might be wanted during a ſhort campaign; and accordingly we find that the Incas were great conquerors.

The religion of the Peruvians, conſidered in a political light, was excellent. The veneration they paid their ſovereign upon a falſe religious principle, was their only ſuperſtition; and that ſuperſtition contributed greatly to improve their morals and their manners: on the other hand, the religion of Mexico was abominable.

Upon the whole, there never was a country deſtitute of iron, where arts ſeem to have been carried higher than in Mexico; and,

bating their religion, there never was a country deſtitute of writing, where government ſeems to have been more perfect. I except not the government of Peru, which, not being founded on political principles, but on ſuperſtition, might be more mild, but was far from being ſo ſolidly founded.

SKETCHES

SKETCHES

OF THE

HISTORY OF MAN.

BOOK III.

Progreſs of SCIENCES.

PREFACE.

MOrality, theology, and the art of reaſoning, are three great branches of a learned education; and are juſtly held to be ſo, becauſe they are our only ſure guides in paſſing through the intricate paths of life. They are indeed not eſſential to thoſe termed men of the world: *the moſt profound philoſopher makes but an inſipid figure in faſhionable company; would be ſomewhat ridiculous at a court-ball; and an abſolute abſurdity among the gameſters at Arthur's, or jockeys at*

Newmarket. But, theſe cogent objections notwithſtanding, I venture to pronounce ſuch ſtudies to be not altogether unſuitable to a gentleman. Man is a creature full of curioſity; and to gratify that appetite, many roam through the world, ſubmitting to heat and cold, nay to hunger and thirſt, without a ſigh. Could indeed that troubleſome gueſt be expelled, we might hug ourſelves in ignorance; and, like true men of the world, undervalue knowledge, that can neither procure money, nor a new ſenſual pleaſure. But, alas! the expulſion is not in the power of every one; and thoſe who have not that power, will probably think it not amiſs, to employ their curioſity upon ſtudies that make them good members of ſociety, and endear them to every perſon of virtue.

And were we even men of the world in ſuch perfection, as to regard nothing but our own intereſt; yet does not ignorance lay us open to the crafty and deſigning? and does not the art of reaſoning guard many an honeſt man from being miſled by ſubtle ſophiſms? With reſpect to right and wrong, not even paſſion is more dangerous than error. And as to religion, better it were to ſettle in a conviction that there is no God, than to be in a ſtate of wavering and fluctuation; ſometimes indulging every looſe deſire, as if we were not accountable beings; and ſometimes yielding to ſuperſtitious fears, as if there were no god but the devil. To a well-diſpoſed mind, the exiſtence of a ſupreme benevolent Deity, appears highly probable: and if happily the ſtudy of theology lead us to a conviction that there really is ſuch a being; the conviction will be a ſource of conſtant enjoyment, which I boldly ſet above the titillating pleaſures of external ſenſe. Poſſibly there may be leſs preſent amuſement in abſtract ſtudies, than in news-papers, in party-pamphlets, or in Hoyl upon Whiſt: but let us for a moment anticipate futurity, and imagine that we are reviewing paſt tranſactions, — how pleaſant the retroſpect of thoſe who have maintained the dignity of their nature, and employ'd their talents to the beſt purpoſes!

Contradictory opinions that have influence on practice, will be regretted by every perſon of a ſound heart; and as erroneous opinions are commonly

monly the reſult of imperfect education, I would gladly hope, that a remedy is not altogether out of reach. At the rivival of arts and ſciences, the learned languages were our ſole ſtudy, becauſe in them were locked up all the treaſures of uſeful knowledge. This ſtudy has long ago ceaſed to be the chief object of education; and yet the original plan is handed down to us with very little variation. Wiſhing to contribute to a more perfect ſyſtem of education, I preſent to the public the following ſketches. The books that have been publiſhed upon morality, theology, and the art of reaſoning, are not eminent either for ſimplicity, or for clear ideas. To introduce theſe into the ſubjects mentioned, is my aim; with what ſucceſs, is chearfully ſubmitted to the judgement of others. The hiſtorical part, hitherto much neglected, is neceſſary as a branch of my general plan; and I am hopeful, that beſide inſtruction, it will contribute to recreation, which, in abſtract ſtudies, is no leſs neceſſary than pleaſant.

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SKETCH I.

Principles and Progreſs of REASON.

SECTION I.

PRINCIPLES OF REASON.

EVery affirmation, whatever be the ſubject, is termed a *propoſition.*

Truth and error are qualities of propoſitions. A propoſition that ſays a thing is what it is in reality, is termed a *true propoſition.* A propoſition that ſays a thing is what it is not in reality, is termed an *erroneous propoſition.*

Our knowledge of what is agreeable and diſagreeable in objects is derived from the ſenſe of beauty, handled in Elements of Criticiſm. Our knowledge of right and wrong in actions, is derived from the moral ſenſe, to be handled in the ſketch immediately following. Our knowledge of truth and error is derived from various ſources.

Our external ſenſes are one ſource of knowledge: they lay open to us external ſubjects, their qualities, their actions, with events produced by theſe actions. The internal ſenſes are another ſource of knowledge: they lay open to us things paſſing in the mind; thinking,

thinking, for example, deliberating, inclining, reſolving, willing, conſenting, and other actions; and they alſo lay open to us our emotions and paſſions. There is a ſenſe by which we perceive the truth of many propoſitions; ſuch as, That every thing which begins to exiſt, muſt have a cauſe; That every effect adapted to ſome end or purpoſe, proceeds from a deſigning cauſe; and, That every effect adapted to a good end or purpoſe, proceeds from a deſigning and benevolent cauſe. A multitude of axioms in every ſcience, particularly in mathematics, are perceived to be equally true. By a peculiar ſenſe, of which afterward, we know that there is a Deity. By another ſenſe we know, that the external ſigns of paſſion are the ſame in all men; that animals of the ſame external appearance, are of the ſame ſpecies; and that animals of the ſame ſpecies, have the ſame properties (*a*). By another ſenſe we ſee into futurity: we know that the ſun will riſe to-morrow; that the earth will perform its wonted courſe round the ſun; that winter and ſummer will follow each other in ſucceſſion; that a ſtone dropt from the hand will fall to the ground; and a thouſand other ſuch propoſitions.

There are many propoſitions, the truth of which is not ſo apparent: a proceſs of reaſoning is neceſſary, of which afterward.

Human teſtimony is another ſource of knowledge. So framed are we by nature, as to rely on human teſtimony; by which we are informed of beings, attributes, and events, that never came under any of our ſenſes.

The knowledge that is derived from the ſources mentioned, is of different kinds. In ſome caſes, our knowledge includes abſolute certainty, and produces the higheſt degree of conviction: in other caſes, probability comes in place of certainty, and the conviction is inferior in degree. Knowledge of the latter kind is diſtinguiſhed

(*a*) Book 1. ſketch 1.

into

into belief, which concerns facts; and opinion, which concerns relations, and other things that fall not under the denomination of facts. In contradiſtinction to opinion and belief, that ſort of knowledge which includes abſolute certainty, and produces the higheſt degree of conviction, retains its proper name. To explain what is here ſaid, I enter into particulars.

The ſenſe of ſeeing, with very few exceptions, affords knowledge in its proper ſenſe. It is not in our power to doubt of the exiſtence of a perſon we ſee, touch, and converſe with; and when ſuch is our conſtitution, it is a vain attempt to call in queſtion the authority of our ſenſe of ſeeing, as ſome writers pretend to do. No one ever called in queſtion the exiſtence of internal actions and paſſions, laid open to us by internal ſenſe; and there is as little ground for doubting of what we ſee. The ſenſe of ſeeing, it is true, is not always correct: through different mediums the ſame object is ſeen differently: to a jaundic'd eye every thing appears yellow; and to one intoxicated with liquor, two candles ſometimes appear four. But we are never left without remedy in ſuch a caſe: it is the province of the reaſoning faculty, to correct every error of that kind.

An object of ſight, when recalled to mind by the power of memory, is termed an *idea* or ſecondary perception. An original perception, as ſaid above, affords knowledge in its proper ſenſe; but a ſecondary perception affords belief only. And Nature in this, as in all other inſtances, is faithful to truth; for it is evident, that we cannot be ſo certain of the exiſtence of an object in its abſence, as when preſent.

With reſpect to many abſtract propoſitions, of which inſtances are above given, we have an abſolute certainty and conviction of their truth, derived to us from various ſenſes. We can, for example, entertain as little doubt, that every thing which begins to exiſt, muſt have a cauſe, as that the ſun is in the firmament; and

as

as little doubt that he will riſe to-morrow, as that he is now ſet. There are many other propoſitions, the truth of which is probable only, not abſolutely certain; as, for example, that things will continue in their ordinary ſtate. That natural operations are performed in the ſimpleſt manner, is an axiom of natural philoſophy: it may be probable, but is far from being certain *.

In every one of the inſtances given, conviction ariſes from a ſingle act of perception: for which reaſon, knowledge acquired by means of that perception, not only knowledge in its proper ſenſe, but alſo opinion and belief, are termed *intuitive knowledge*. But there are many things, the knowledge of which is not obtained with ſo much facility. Propoſitions for the moſt part require a proceſs or operation in the mind, termed *reaſoning*; leading, by certain intermediate ſteps, to the propoſition that is to be demonſtrated or made evident; which, in oppoſition to intuitive knowledge, is termed *diſcurſive knowledge*. This proceſs or operation muſt be explained, in order to underſtand the nature of reaſoning. And as reaſoning is moſtly employ'd in diſcovering relations, I ſhall draw my examples from them. Every propoſition concerning relations, is an affirmation of a certain relation between two ſubjects. If the relation affirmed appear not intuitively, we muſt ſearch for a third ſubject, that appears intuitively to be connected with each of the others, by the relation affirmed: and if ſuch a ſubject be found, the propoſition is demonſtrated; for it is

* I have given this propoſition a place, becauſe it is aſſumed as an axiom by all writers on natural philoſophy. And yet there appears ſome room for doubting, whether the conviction we have of it do not proceed from a bias in our nature, rather than from an original ſenſe. Our taſte for ſimplicity, which undoubtedly is natural, renders ſimple operations more agreeable than what are complex, and conſequently makes them appear more natural. It deſerves a moſt ſerious diſcuſſion, whether the operations of nature be always carried on with the greateſt ſimplicity, or whether we be not miſled by our taſte for ſimplicity, to be of that opinion.

intuitively certain, that two ſubjects, connected with a third by any particular relation, muſt be connected together by the ſame relation. The longeſt chain of reaſoning may be linked together in this manner. Running over ſuch a chain, every one of the ſubjects muſt appear intuitively to be connected with that immediately preceding, and with that immediately ſubſequent, by the relation affirmed in the propoſition; and from the whole united, the propoſition, as above mentioned, muſt appear intuitively certain. The laſt ſtep of the proceſs is termed *a concluſion*, being the laſt or concluding perception.

No ſort of reaſoning affords ſo clear a notion of the foregoing proceſs, as that which is mathematical. Equality is the only mathematical relation; and compariſon therefore is the only means by which mathematical propoſitions are aſcertained. To that ſcience belong a ſet of intuitive propoſitions, termed *axioms*, which are all founded on equality. For example: Divide two equal lines, each of them, into a thouſand equal parts, a ſingle part of the one line muſt be equal to a ſingle part of the other. Second: Take ten of theſe parts from the one line, and as many from the other, and the remaining parts muſt be equal: which is more ſhortly expreſſed thus: From two equal lines take equal parts, and the remainders will be equal; or add equal parts, and the ſums will be equal. Third: If two things be, in the ſame reſpect, equal to a third, the one is equal to the other in the ſame reſpect. I proceed to ſhow the uſe of theſe axioms. Two things may be equal without being intuitively ſo; which is the caſe of the equality between the three angles of a triangle and two right angles. To demonſtrate that truth, it is neceſſary to ſearch for ſome other angles, which appear by intuition to be equal to both. If this property cannot be diſcovered in any one ſet of angles, we muſt go more leiſurely to work, by trying to find angles that are equal to the three angles of a triangle. Theſe being diſcovered, we next try to find other angles equal to the

angles

angles now diſcovered; and ſo on in the compariſon, till at laſt we diſcover a ſet of angles, equal not only to thoſe thus introduced, but alſo to two right angles. We thus connect the two parts of the original propoſition, by a number of intermediate equalities; and by that means perceive, that theſe two parts are equal among themſelves; it being an intuitive propoſition, as mentioned above, That two things are equal, each of which, in the ſame reſpect, is equal to a third.

I proceed to a different example, which concerns the relation between cauſe and effect. The propoſition to be demonſtrated is, "That there exiſts a good and intelligent Being, who is the cauſe "of all the wiſe and benevolent effects that are produced in the "government of this world." That there are ſuch effects, is in the preſent example the fundamental propoſition, which is taken for granted, becauſe it is verified by experience. In order to diſcover the cauſe of theſe effects, I begin with an intuitive propoſition mentioned above, "That every effect adapted to a good end "or purpoſe, proceeds from a deſigning and benevolent cauſe." The next ſtep is, to examine whether man can be the cauſe: he is provided indeed with ſome ſhare of wiſdom and benevolence; but the effects mentioned are far above his power, and no leſs above his wiſdom. Neither can this earth be the cauſe, nor the ſun, the moon, the ſtars; for, far from being wiſe and benevolent, they are not even ſenſible. If theſe be excluded, we are unavoidably led to an inviſible being, endowed with boundleſs power, goodneſs, and intelligence; and that inviſible being is termed *God*.

Reaſoning requires two mental powers, namely, the powers of invention, and of perceiving relations. By the former are diſcovered intermediate propoſitions, equally related to the fundamental propoſition, and to the concluſion: and by the latter we perceive, that the different links which compoſe the chain of reaſoning, are all connected together by the ſame relation.

We can reaſon about matters of opinion and belief, as well as about matters of knowledge, properly ſo termed. Hence reaſoning is diſtinguiſhed into two kinds; demonſtrative, and probable. Demonſtrative reaſoning is alſo of two kinds: in the firſt, the concluſion is drawn from the nature and inherent properties of the ſubject: in the other, the concluſion is drawn from ſome principle, of which we are certain by intuition. With reſpect to the firſt, we have no ſuch knowledge of the nature or inherent properties of any being, material or immaterial, as to draw concluſions from it with certainty. I except not even figure conſidered as a quality of matter, tho' it is the object of mathematical reaſoning. As we have no ſtandard for determining with preciſion the figure of any portion of matter, we cannot with preciſion reaſon upon it: what appears to us a ſtraight line may be a curve, and what appears a rectilinear angle may be curvilinear. How then comes mathematical reaſoning to be demonſtrative? This queſtion may appear at firſt ſight puzzling; and I know not that it has any where been diſtinctly explained. Perhaps what follows may be ſatisfactory.

The ſubjects of arithmetical reaſoning are numbers. The ſubjects of mathematical reaſoning are figures. But what figures are ſubjects of mathematical reaſoning? Not ſuch as I ſee; but ſuch as I form an idea of, abſtracting from every imperfection. I explain myſelf. There is a power in man to form images of things that never exiſted; a golden mountain, for example, or a river running upward. This power operates upon figures. There is perhaps no figure exiſting the ſides of which are ſtraight lines. But it is eaſy to form an idea of a line, that has no waving or crookedneſs in it; and it is eaſy to form an idea of a figure bounded by ſuch lines. Such ideal figures are the ſubjects of mathematical reaſoning; and theſe being perfectly clear and diſtinct, are proper ſubjects for demonſtrative reaſoning of the firſt kind. Mathematical

thematical reaſoning however is not merely a mental entertainment: it is of real uſe in life, by directing the powers and properties of matter. There poſſibly may not be found any where a perfect globe, to anſwer the idea we form of that figure: but a globe may be made ſo near perfection, as that the properties demonſtrated to belong to the idea of a perfect globe will be nearly applicable to that figure. In a word, tho' ideas are, properly ſpeaking, the ſubject of mathematical evidence; yet the end and purpoſe of that evidence is, to direct us with reſpect to figures as they really exiſt; and the nearer any real figure approaches to the idea we form of it, with the greater accuracy will the mathematical truth be applicable.

The component parts of figures, viz. lines and angles, are extremely ſimple, requiring no definition. Place before a child a crooked line, and one that has no appearance of being crooked; call the former a *crooked line*, the latter a *ſtraight line*; and the child will uſe theſe terms familiarly, without hazard of a miſtake. Draw a perpendicular upon paper; let the child advert, that the upward line leans neither to the right nor the left, and for that reaſon is termed *a perpendicular:* the child will apply that term familiarily to a tree, to the wall of a houſe, or to any other perpendicular. In the ſame manner, place before the child two lines diverging from each other, and two that have no appearance of diverging: call the latter *parallel lines*, and the child will have no difficulty of applying the ſame term to the ſides of a door or of a window. Yet ſo accuſtomed are we to definitions, that even theſe ſimple ideas are not ſuffered to eſcape. A ſtraight line, for example, is defined to be the ſhorteſt that can be drawn between two given points. The fact is certain; but ſo far from a definition, that it is an inference drawn from the idea of a ſtraight line: and had I not beforehand a clear idea of a ſtraight line, I could not infer that it is the ſhorteſt between two given points.

D'Alembert

D'Alembert ſtrains hard, but without ſucceſs, for a definition of a ſtraight line, and of the others mentioned. It is difficult to avoid ſmiling at his definition of parallel lines. Draw, ſays he, a ſtraight line: erect upon it two perpendiculars of the ſame length: upon their two extremities draw another ſtraight line; and that line is ſaid to be parallel to the firſt mentioned: as if, to underſtand what is meant by the expreſſion *two parallel lines*, we muſt firſt underſtand what is meant by a ſtraight line, by a perpendicular, and by two lines equal in length. A very ſlight reflection upon the operations of his own mind, would have taught this author, that he could form the idea of parallel lines without running through ſo many intermediate ſteps: ſight alone is ſufficient to explain the term to a boy, and even to a girl. At any rate, where is the neceſſity of introducing the line laſt mentioned? If the idea of parallels cannot be obtained from the two perpendiculars alone, the additional line drawn through their extremities will certainly not make it more clear.

Mathematical figures being in their nature complex, are capable of being defined; and from the foregoing ſimple ideas, it is eaſy to define every one of them. For example, a circle is a figure having a point within it, named the *centre*, through which all the ſtraight lines that can be drawn, and extended to the circumference, are equal; a ſurface bounded by four equal ſtraight lines, and having four right angles, is termed a *ſquare*; and a cube is a ſolid, of which all the ſix ſurfaces are ſquares.

In the inveſtigation of mathematical truths, we aſſiſt the imagination, by drawing figures upon paper that reſemble our ideas. There is no neceſſity for a perfect reſemblance: a black ſpot, which in reality is a ſmall round ſurface, ſerves to repreſent a mathematical point; and a black line, which in reality is a long narrow ſurface, ſerves to repreſent a mathematical line. When we reaſon about the figures compoſed of ſuch lines, it is ſufficient that

that theſe figures have ſome appearance of regularity: leſs or more is of no importance; becauſe our reaſoning is not founded upon them, but upon our ideas. Thus, to demonſtrate that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, a triangle is drawn upon paper, in order to keep the mind ſteady to its object, and to prevent wandering. After tracing the ſteps that lead to the concluſion, we are ſatisfied that the propoſition is true; being conſcious that the reaſoning is built upon the ideal figure, not upon that which is drawn upon the paper. And being alſo conſcious that the enquiry is carried on independent of any particular length of the ſides, we are ſatisfied of the univerſality of the propoſition, and of its being applicable to all triangles whatever.

Numbers conſidered by themſelves, abſtractedly from things, make the ſubject of arithmetic. And with reſpect both to mathematical and arithmetical reaſonings, which frequently conſiſt of many ſteps, the proceſs is ſhortened by the invention of ſigns, which, by a ſingle daſh of the pen, expreſs clearly what would require many words. By that means, a very long chain of reaſoning is expreſſed by a few ſymbols; a method that contributes greatly to readineſs of comprehenſion. If in ſuch reaſonings words were neceſſary, the mind, embarraſſed with their multiplicity, would have great difficulty to follow any long chain of reaſoning. A line drawn upon paper repreſents an ideal line, and a few ſimple characters repreſent the abſtract ideas of number.

Arithmetical reaſoning, like mathematical, depends entirely upon the relation of equality, which can be aſcertained with the greateſt certainty among many ideas. Hence, reaſonings upon ſuch ideas afford the higheſt degree of conviction. I do not ſay, however, that this is always the caſe; for a man who is conſcious of his own fallibility, is ſeldom without ſome degree of diffidence, where

where the reaſoning conſiſts of many ſteps. And tho' on a review no error is diſcovered, yet he is conſcious that there may be errors, tho' they have eſcaped him.

As to the other kind of demonſtrative reaſoning, founded on ſome propoſition of which we are intuitively certain; I juſtly call it *demonſtrative*, becauſe it affords the ſame conviction that ariſes from mathematical reaſoning. In both, the means of conviction are the ſame, viz. a clear perception of the relation between two ideas: and there are many relations of which we have ideas no leſs clear than of equality; witneſs ſubſtance and quality, the whole and its parts, cauſe and effect, and many others. From the intuitive propoſition, for example, That nothing which begins to exiſt can exiſt without a cauſe, I can conclude, that ſome one being muſt have exiſted from all eternity, with no leſs certainty, than that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.

What falls next in order, is that inferior kind of knowledge which is termed *opinion;* and which, like knowledge properly ſo termed, is founded in ſome inſtances upon intuition, and in ſome upon reaſoning. But it differs from knowledge in the following particular, that it produces different degrees of conviction, ſometimes approaching to certainty, and ſometimes ſinking toward the verge of improbability. The conſtancy and uniformity of natural operations, is a fit ſubject for illuſtrating that difference. The future ſucceſſive changes of day and night, of winter and ſummer, and of other ſucceſſions which have hitherto been regular and uniform, fall under intuitive knowledge, becauſe of theſe we have the higheſt conviction. As the conviction is inferior of ſucceſſions that hitherto have been varied in any degree, theſe fall under intuitive opinion. We expect ſummer after winter with the utmoſt confidence; but we have not the ſame confidence in expecting a hot ſummer or a cold winter. And yet the probability

lity approaches much nearer to certainty, than the intuitive opinion we have, that the operations of nature are extremely ſimple, a propoſition that is very little rely'd on.

As to opinion founded on reaſoning, it is obvious, that the conviction produced by the reaſoning, can never riſe above what is produced by the intuitive propoſition upon which the reaſoning is founded. And that it may be weaker, will appear from conſidering, that even where the fundamental propoſition is certain, it may lead to the concluſive opinion by intermediate propoſitions, that are probable only, not certain. In a word, it holds in general with reſpect to *every ſort* of reaſoning, that the concluſive propoſition can never riſe higher in point of conviction, than the very loweſt of the intuitive propoſitions employ'd as ſteps in the reaſoning.

The perception we have of the contingency of future events, opens a wide field to our reaſoning about probabilities. That perception involves more or leſs doubt according to its ſubject. In ſome inſtances, the event is perceived to be extremely doubtful; in others it is perceived to be leſs doubtful. It appears altogether doubtful, in throwing a dye, which of the ſix ſides will turn up; and for that reaſon, we cannot juſtly conclude for one rather than another. If one only of the ſix ſides be marked with a figure, we conclude, that a blank will turn up; and five to one is an equal wager that ſuch will be the effect. In judging of the future behaviour of a man who has hitherto been governed by intereſt, we may conclude with a probability approaching to certainty, that intereſt will continue to prevail.

Belief comes laſt in order, which, as defined above, is knowledge of the truth of facts that falls below certainty, and involves in its nature ſome degree of doubt. It is alſo of two kinds; one founded upon intuition, and one upon reaſoning. Thus, knowledge, opinion, belief, are all of them equally diſtinguiſhable in-

to intuitive and diſcurſive. Of intuitive belief, I diſcover three different ſources or cauſes. Firſt, A preſent object. Secondly, An object formerly preſent. Thirdly, The teſtimony of others.

To have a clear conception of the firſt cauſe, it muſt be obſerved, that among the ſimple perceptions that compoſe the complex perception of a preſent object, a perception of real and preſent exiſtence is one. This perception riſes commonly to certainty; in which caſe it is a branch of knowledge properly ſo termed; and is handled as ſuch above. But this perception falls below certainty in ſome inſtances; as when an object, ſeen at a great diſtance, or in a fog, is perceived to be a horſe, but ſo indiſtinctly as to make it a probability only. The perception in ſuch a caſe is termed *belief*. Both perceptions are fundamentally of the ſame nature; being ſimple perceptions of real exiſtence. They differ only in point of accuracy: the perception of reality that makes a branch of knowledge, is ſo clear and diſtinct as to exclude all doubt or heſitation: the perception of reality that occaſions belief, being leſs clear and diſtinct, makes not the exiſtence of the object certain to us, but only probable.

With reſpect to the ſecond cauſe; the exiſtence of an abſent object, formerly ſeen, amounts not to a certainty; and therefore is the ſubject of belief only, not of knowledge. Things are in a continual flux from production to diſſolution; and our ſenſes are accommodated to that variable ſcene: a preſent object admits no doubt of its exiſtence; but after it is removed, its exiſtence becomes leſs certain, and in time ſinks down to a ſlight degree of probability.

Human teſtimony, the third cauſe, produces belief, more or leſs ſtrong, according to circumſtances. In general, nature leads us to rely upon the veracity of each other; and commonly the degree of reliance is proportioned to the degree of veracity. Sometimes belief approaches to certainty, as when it is founded on the evidence

evidence of perſons above all exception. Sometimes it ſinks to the loweſt degree of probability, as when a fact is told by one who has no great reputation for truth. The nature of the fact, common or uncommon, has likewiſe an influence: an ordinary incident gains credit upon very ſlight evidence; but it requires the ſtrongeſt evidence to overcome the improbability of an event that deviates from the ordinary courſe of nature. At the ſame time, it muſt be obſerved, that belief is not always founded upon rational principles. There are biaſſes and weakneſſes in human nature that ſometimes diſturb the operation, and produce belief without ſufficient or proper evidence: we are diſpoſed to believe on very ſlight evidence, an intereſting event, however rare or ſingular, that alarms and agitates the mind; becauſe the mind, in agitation, is remarkably ſuſceptible of impreſſions: for which reaſon, ſtories of ghoſts and apparitions paſs current with the vulgar. Eloquence alſo has great power over the mind; and, by making deep impreſſions, enforces the belief of facts upon evidence that would not be regarded in a cool moment.

The dependence that our perception of real exiſtence, and conſequently belief, hath upon oral evidence, enlivens ſocial intercourſe, and promotes ſociety. But the perception of real exiſtence has a ſtill more extenſive influence; for from that perception is derived a great part of the entertainment we find in hiſtory, and in hiſtorical fables (*a*). At the ſame time, a perception that may be raiſed by fiction as well as by truth, would often miſlead, were we abandoned to its impulſe: but the God of nature hath provided a remedy for that evil, by erecting within the mind a tribunal, to which there lies an appeal from the raſh impreſſions of ſenſe. When the deluſion of eloquence or of dread

(*a*) Elements of Criticiſm, ch. 2. part 1. § 7.

ſubſides, the perplexed mind is uncertain what to believe. A regular proceſs commences, counſel is heard, evidence produced, and a final judgement pronounced, ſometimes confirming, ſometimes varying, the belief impreſſed upon us by the lively perception of reality. Thus, by a wiſe appointment of nature, intuitive belief is ſubjected to rational diſcuſſion: when confirmed by reaſon, it turns more vigorous and authoritative: when contradicted by reaſon, it diſappears among ſenſible people. In ſome inſtances, it is too headſtrong for reaſon; as in the caſe of hobgoblins and apparitions, which paſs current among the vulgar in ſpite of reaſon.

We proceed to the other kind of belief, viz. that which is founded on reaſoning, to which, when intuition fails us, we muſt have recourſe for aſcertaining certain facts. Thus, from known effects, we infer the exiſtence of unknown cauſes. That an effect muſt have a cauſe, is an intuitive propoſition; but to aſcertain what particular thing is the cauſe, requires commonly a proceſs of reaſoning. This is one of the means by which the Deity, the primary cauſe, is made known to us, as mentioned above. Reaſon, in tracing cauſes from known effects, produces different degrees of conviction. It ſometimes produces certainty, as in proving the exiſtence of the Deity; which on that account is handled above, under the head of knowledge. For the moſt part it produces belief only, which, according to the ſtrength of the reaſoning, ſometimes approaches to certainty, and ſometimes is ſo weak as barely to turn the ſcale on the ſide of probability. Take the following examples of different degrees of belief founded on probable reaſoning. When Inigo Jones flouriſhed, and was the only architect of note in England, let it be ſuppoſed that his model of the palace of Whitehall had been preſented to a ſtranger, without mentioning the author. The ſtranger, in the firſt place, would have been intuitively certain, that this was the work of

ſome

ſome being intelligent and ſkilful. Secondly, He would have had a conviction approaching to certainty, that the operator was a man. And, thirdly, He would have had a conviction that the man was Inigo Jones; but leſs firm than the former. Let us next ſuppoſe another Engliſh architect little inferior in reputation to Jones: the ſtranger would ſtill have pronounced in favour of the latter; but his belief would have been in the loweſt degree.

When we inveſtigate the cauſes of certain effects, the reaſoning is often founded upon the known nature of man. In the high country, for example, between Edinburgh and Glaſgow, the people lay their coals at the end of their houſes, without any fence to ſecure them from theft: whence it is rationally inferred, that coals are there in plenty. In the weſt of Scotland, the corn-ſtacks are covered with great care and nicety: whence it is inferred, that the climate is rainy. Placentia is the capital town of Biſcay; and the only town in Newfoundland bears the ſame name; from which circumſtance it is conjectured, that the Biſcayners were the firſt Europeans who made a ſettlement in that iſland.

Analogical reaſoning, founded upon the uniformity of nature, is frequently employ'd in the inveſtigation of facts; and we infer, that facts of which we are uncertain, muſt reſemble thoſe of the ſame kind that are known. The bulk of the reaſonings in natural philoſophy are of that kind. Take the following examples. We learn from experience, that proceeding from the humbleſt vegetable to man, there are numberleſs claſſes of beings riſing one above another, by differences ſcarce perceptible, and leaving no where a ſingle gap or interval: and from conviction of the uniformity of nature, we infer, that the line is not broken off here, but is carried on in other worlds, till it end in the Deity. I proceed to another example. Every man is conſcious of a ſelf-motive power in himſelf; and from the uniformity of nature, we infer

infer the ſame power in every one of our own ſpecies. The argument here from analogy carries great weight, becauſe we entertain no doubt of the uniformity of nature with reſpect to beings of our own kind. We apply the ſame argument to other animals, tho' their reſemblance to man appears not ſo certain, as that of one man to another. But why not alſo apply the ſame argument to infer a ſelf-motive power in matter? When we ſee matter in motion without an external mover, we naturally infer, that, like us, it moves itſelf. Another example is borrow'd from Maupertuis. "As there is no known ſpace of the earth covered with "water ſo large as the *Terra Auſtralis incognita*, we may reaſon-"ably infer, that ſo great a part of the earth is not altogether "ſea, but that there muſt be ſome proportion of land." The uniformity of nature with reſpect to the intermixture of ſea and land, is an argument that affords but a very ſlender degree of conviction. The following argument of the ſame kind, tho' it cannot be much rely'd on, ſeems however better founded. "The "inhabitants of the northern hemiſphere, have, in arts and ſcien-"ces, excelled ſuch of the ſouthern as we have any knowledge of: "and therefore, if inhabitants be found in the *Terra Auſtralis in-"cognita*, we ought not to expect among them many arts, nor "much cultivation."

After a fatiguing inveſtigation of numberleſs particulars which divide and ſcatter the thought, it may not be unpleaſant to bring all under one view by a ſuccinct recapitulation.

We have two means for diſcovering truth, and acquiring knowledge, viz. intuition and reaſoning. By intuition we diſcover ſubjects, and their attributes, paſſions, internal action, and in ſhort every thing that is matter of fact. By intuition we alſo diſcover ſeveral relations. There are ſome facts, and many relations, that cannot be diſcovered by a ſingle act of intuition, but

but require ſeveral ſuch acts linked together in a chain of reaſoning.

Knowledge acquired by intuition, includes for the moſt part certainty: in ſome inſtances it includes probability only. Knowledge acquired by reaſoning, frequently includes certainty; but more frequently includes probability only.

Probable knowledge, whether founded on intuition or on reaſoning, is termed *opinion* when it concerns relations; and is termed *belief* when it concerns facts. When knowledge includes certainty, it retains its proper name.

Reaſoning that produces certainty, is termed *demonſtrative*; and is termed *probable*, when it only produces probability.

Demonſtrative reaſoning is of two kinds. The firſt is, where the concluſion is derived from the nature and inherent properties of the ſubject: mathematical reaſoning is of that kind; and perhaps the only inſtance. The ſecond is, where the concluſion is derived from ſome propoſition, of which we are certain by intuition.

Probable reaſoning is endleſs in its varieties; and affords different degrees of conviction, depending on the nature of the ſubject upon which it is employ'd.

SECT.

SECT. II.

PROGRESS OF REASON.

A Progreſs from infancy to maturity in the mind of man, ſimilar to that in his body, has been often mentioned. The external ſenſes, being early neceſſary for ſelf-preſervation, arrive quickly at maturity. The internal ſenſes are of a ſlower growth, as well as every other mental power: their maturity would be of little or no uſe while the body is weak, and unfit for action. Reaſoning, as obſerved in the firſt ſection, requires two mental powers, viz. the power of invention, and that of perceiving relations. By the former power are diſcovered intermediate propoſitions, equally related to the fundamental propoſition and to the concluſion; and that relation is verified by the latter power. Both powers are neceſſary to the perſon who frames an argument, or a chain of reaſoning: the latter only to the perſon who judges of it. Savages are miſerably deficient in both. With reſpect to the former, a ſavage may have a pregnant talent for invention; but it will ſtand him in little ſtead without a ſtock of ideas enabling him to ſelect what may anſwer the purpoſe; and what opportunity has a ſavage to acquire ſuch a ſtock? With reſpect to the latter, he knows little of relations: and how ſhould he know, when both ſtudy and practice are neceſſary for diſtinguiſhing between relations, and for preventing the being impoſed on by the ſhadow of a relation inſtead of the ſubſtance? The underſtanding, at the ſame time, among the illiterate, is obſequious to paſſion and preposſeſſion;

poſſeſſion; and among them the imagination acts without controul, forming concluſions often no better than mere dreams. In ſhort, conſidering the many cauſes that miſlead from juſt reaſoning, in days eſpecially of ignorance, the erroneous and abſurd opinions that have prevailed in the world, and that continue in ſome meaſure to prevail, are far from being ſurpriſing. Were reaſon our only guide in the conduct of life, we ſhould have cauſe to complain; but our Maker has provided us with the moral ſenſe, a guide little ſubject to error in matters of importance. In the ſciences, reaſon is eſſential; but in the conduct of life, which is our chief concern, reaſon may be an uſeful aſſiſtant; but to be our director is not its province.

The national progreſs of reaſon has been ſlower in Europe, than that of any other art. Statuary, painting, architecture, and other fine arts, approach nearer perfection, as well as morality and natural hiſtory. Manners, it is true, and every art that appears externally, may in part be acquired by imitation and example: in reaſoning there is nothing external to be laid hold of. But there is beſide a particular cauſe that regards Europe, which is the blind deference that for many ages was paid to Ariſtotle; who has kept the reaſoning faculty in chains more than two thouſand years. In his logics, the plain and ſimple mode of reaſoning is rejected, that which Nature dictates; and in its ſtead is introduced an artificial mode, ſhowy but unſubſtantial: it is of no uſe in diſcovering truth, but nobly contrived for wrangling and diſputation. Conſidering that reaſon for ſo many ages has been locked up in the enchanted caſtle of ſyllogiſm, where empty phantoms paſs for realities, the ſlow progreſs of reaſon toward maturity is far from being ſurpriſing. The taking of Conſtantinople, ann. 1453, opened a new ſcene, which in time relieved the world from the uſurpation of Ariſtotle, and reſtored reaſon to her privileges. All the knowledge of Europe was centred in Conſtantinople;

ſtantinople; and the learned men of that city, abhorring the Turks and their government, took refuge in Italy. The Greek language was introduced among the weſtern nations of Europe; and the ſtudy of Greek and Roman claſſics became faſhionable. Men, having acquired new ideas, began to think for themſelves: they exerted their native faculty of reaſon: the futility of Ariſtotle's logics became apparent to the penetrating; and is now apparent to all. Yet ſo late as the year 1621, ſeveral perſons were baniſhed from Paris for contradicting that philoſopher, about matter and form, and about the number of the elements. And ſhortly after, the parliament of Paris prohibited, under pain of death, any thing to be taught contrary to the doctrines of Ariſtotle. Julius II. and Leo X. Roman Pontiffs, contributed zealouſly to the reformation of letters; but they did not foreſee that they were alſo contributing to the reformation of religion, and of every ſcience that depends on reaſoning. Tho' the fetters of ſyllogiſm have many years ago been ſhaken off, yet, like a limb long kept from motion, the reaſoning faculty has ſcarcely to this day attained its free and natural exerciſe. Mathematics is the only ſcience that never has been cramped by ſyllogiſm, and we find reaſoning there in great perfection at an early period. The very ſlow progreſs of reaſoning in other matters, will appear from the following induction.

To exemplify erroneous and abſurd reaſonings of every ſort, would be endleſs. The reader, I preſume, will be ſatisfied with a few inſtances; and I ſhall endeavour to ſelect what are amuſing. For the ſake of order, I divide them into three heads. Firſt, Inſtances ſhowing the imbecility of human reaſon during its nonage. Second, Erroneous reaſoning occaſioned by natural biaſſes. Third, Erroneous reaſoning occaſioned by acquired biaſſes. With reſpect to the firſt, inſtances are endleſs of reaſonings founded on erroneous premiſſes. It was an Epicurean doctrine, That the gods have

have all of them a human figure; moved by the following argument, that no being of any other figure has the uſe of reaſon. Plato, taking for granted the following erroneous propoſition, That every being which moves itſelf, muſt have a ſoul, concludes that the world muſt have a ſoul, becauſe it moves itſelf (*a*). Ariſtotle taking it for granted, without the leaſt evidence, and contrary to truth, that all heavy bodies tend to the centre of the univerſe, proves the earth to be the centre of the univerſe by the following argument. "Heavy bodies naturally tend to the centre "of the univerſe: we know by experience that heavy bodies "tend to the centre of the earth: therefore the centre of the earth "is the centre of the univerſe." Appion ridicules the Jews for adhering ſo literally to the precept of reſting on their ſabbath, as to ſuffer Jeruſalem to be taken that day by Ptolomy ſon of Lagus. Mark the anſwer of Joſephus: "Whoever paſſes a ſober judge-"ment on this matter, will find our practice agreeable to honour "and virtue; for what can be more honourable and virtuous, "than to poſtpone our country, and even life itſelf, to the ſer-"vice of God, and of his holy religion?" A ſtrange idea of religion, to put it in direct oppoſition to every moral principle! A ſuperſtitious and abſurd doctrine, That God will interpoſe by a miracle, to declare what is right in every matter of controverſy, has occaſioned much erroneous reaſoning and abſurd practice. The practice of determining controverſies by ſingle combat, commenced about the ſeventh century, when religion had degenerated into ſuperſtition, and courage was eſteemed the only moral virtue. The parliament of Paris, in the reign of Charles VI. appointed a ſingle combat between two gentlemen, in order to have the judgement of God, whether the one had committed a rape on

(*a*) Cicero, De natura Deorum, lib. 2. § 12.

the other's wife. In the 1454, John Picard being accuſed by his ſon-in-law for too great familiarity with his wife, a duel between them was appointed by the ſame parliament. Voltaire juſtly obſerves, that the parliament decreed a parricide to be committed, in order to try an accuſation of inceſt, which poſſibly was not committed. The trials by water and by fire, reſt on the ſame erroneous foundation. In the former, if the perſon accuſed ſunk to the bottom, it was a judgement pronounced by God, that he was innocent: if he kept above, it was a judgement that he was guilty. Fleury (*a*) remarks, that if ever the perſon accuſed was found guilty, it was his own fault. In Sicily, a woman accuſed of adultery, was compelled to ſwear to her innocence: the oath, taken down in writing, was laid on water; and if it did not ſink, the woman was innocent. We find the ſame practice in Japan, and in Malabar. One of the articles inſiſted on by the reformers in Scotland, was, That public prayers be made and the ſacraments adminiſtered in the vulgar tongue. The anſwer of a provincial council was in the following words: "That to conceive public "prayers, or adminiſter the ſacraments, in any language but La"tin, is contrary to the traditions and practice of the Catholic "church for many ages paſt; and that the demand cannot be "granted, without impiety to God, and diſobedience to the "church." Here it is taken for granted, that the practice of the church is always right; which is building an argument on a very rotten foundation. The Caribbeans abſtain from ſwines fleſh; taking it erroneouſly for granted, that ſuch food would make them have ſmall eyes, held by them a great deformity. They alſo abſtain from eating turtle; which they think would infect them with the lazineſs and ſtupidity of that animal. Upon the ſame er-

(*a*) Hiſtoire Eccleſiaſtique.

roneous

roneous notion, the Braſilians abſtain from the fleſh of ducks, and of every creature that moves ſlowly.

A talent for writing ſeems in Germany to be eſtimated by weight, as beauty is ſaid to be in Holland. Coccéius, for writing three weighty folio volumes on law, has obtained among his countrymen the epithet of *Great*. This author, handling the rules of ſucceſſion in land-eſtates, has with moſt profound erudition founded all of them upon a very ſimple propoſition, viz. That in a competition, that deſcendent is entitled to be preferred who has the greateſt quantity of the predeceſſor's blood in his veins. *Quæritur*, has a man any of his predeceſſor's blood in his veins, otherwiſe than metaphorically? Strange! to build an argument in law upon a pure metaphor.

Next of reaſonings where the concluſion follows not from the premiſſes, or fundamental propoſition. Plato endeavours to prove, that the world is endowed with wiſdom, by the following argument. "The world is greater than any of its parts: therefore it "is endowed with wiſdom; for otherwiſe a man who is endowed "with wiſdom would be greater than the world (*a*)." The concluſion here does not follow; for tho' man is endowed with wiſdom, it follows not, that he is greater than the world in point of ſize. Zeno endeavours to prove, that the world has the uſe of reaſon, by an argument of the ſame kind. Pope Gregory, writing in favour of the four councils, viz. Nice, Conſtantinople, Epheſus, and Calcedon, reaſons thus: "That as there are four e-"vangeliſts, there ought alſo to be four councils." What would he have ſaid, if he had lived 100 years later, when there were many more than four? In adminiſtering the ſacrament of the Lord's ſupper, it was ordered, that the hoſt ſhould be covered with a clean linen cloth; becauſe, ſays the Canon law, the body

(*a*) Cicero, De natura Deorum, lib. 2. § 12.

of

of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt was buried in a clean linen cloth. Joſephus, in his anſwer to Appion, urges the following argument for the temple of Jeruſalem: "As there is but one God, and one "world, it holds in analogy, that there ſhould be but one tem-"ple." At that rate, there ſhould be but one worſhipper. And why ſhould that one temple be at Jeruſalem rather than at Rome or at Pekin? The Syrians and Greeks did not for a long time eat fiſh. Two reaſons are aſſigned: one is, That fiſh is not ſacrificed to the gods; the other, That being immerſed in the ſea, they look not up to heaven (*a*). The firſt would afford a more plauſible argument for eating fiſh. And if the other have any weight, it would be an argument for ſacrificing men, and neither fiſh nor cattle. In juſtification of the Salic law, which prohibits female ſucceſſion, it was long held a concluſive argument, That in the ſcripture the lilies are ſaid neither to work nor to ſpin. Vieira, termed by his countrymen *the Luſitanian Cicero*, publiſhed ſermons, one of which begins thus, "Were the Supreme Being to ſhow himſelf "viſibly, he would chuſe the circle rather than the triangle, the "ſquare, the pentagon, the duodecagon, or any other figure." But why appear in any of theſe figures? And if he were obliged to appear in ſo mean a ſhape, a globe is undoubtedly more beautiful than a circle. Peter Hantz of Horn, who lived in the laſt century, imagined that Noah's ark is the true conſtruction of a ſhip; "which," ſaid he, "is the workmanſhip of God, and "therefore perfect;" as if a veſſel made merely for floating on the water, were the beſt alſo for ſailing. Sixty or ſeventy years ago, the faſhion prevailed, in imitation of birds, to ſwallow ſmall ſtones for the ſake of digeſtion; as if what is proper for birds, were equally proper for men. The Spaniards, who laid waſte a great part of the Weſt Indies, endeavoured to excuſe their cruel-

(*a*) Sir John Marſham, p. 221.

ties,

ties, by maintaining, that the natives were not men, but a ſpecies of the Ouran Outang; for no better reaſon, than that they were of a copper colour, ſpoke an unknown language, and had no beard. The Pope iſſued a bull, declaring, that it pleaſed him and the Holy Ghoſt to acknowledge the Americans to be of the human race. This bull was not received cordially. In the council of Lima, ann. 1583, it was violently diſputed, whether the Americans had ſo much underſtanding as to be admitted to the ſacraments of the church. In the 1440, the Portugueſe ſolicited the Pope's permiſſion to double the Cape of Good Hope, and to reduce to perpetual ſervitude the negroes, becauſe they had the colour of the damned, and never went to church. In the Frederician Code, a propoſition is laid down, That by the law of nature no man can make a teſtament. And in ſupport of that propoſition the following argument is urged, which is ſaid to be a demonſtration: "No deed can be a teſtament while a man is alive, becauſe "it is not neceſſarily his *ultima voluntas*; and no man can make "a teſtament after his death." Both premiſſes are true, but the negative concluſion does not follow. It is true a man's deed is not his *ultima voluntas*, while he is alive: but does it not become his *ultima voluntas*, when he dies without altering the deed?

Many reaſonings have paſſed current in the world as good coin, where premiſſes and concluſion are both of them falſe. Ariſtotle, who wrote a book upon mechanics, was much puzzled about the equilibrium of a balance, when unequal weights are hung upon it at different diſtances from the centre. Having obſerved, that the arms of the balance deſcribe portions of a circle, he accounted for the equilibrium by a notable argument: "All the "properties of the circle are wonderful: the equilibrium of the "two weights that deſcribe portions of a circle is wonderful. "*Ergo*, the equilibrium muſt be one of the properties of the "circle." What are we to think of Ariſtotle's logics, when we find

find him capable of ſuch childiſh reaſoning? And yet that work has been the admiration of all the world for centuries upon centuries. Nay, that fooliſh argument has been eſpouſed and commented upon by his diſciples, for the ſame length of time. To proceed to another inſtance: Marriage within the fourth degree of conſanguinity, as well as of affinity, is prohibited by the Lateran council; and the reaſon given is, That the body being made up of the four elements, has four different humours in it *. The Roman Catholics began with beheading heretics, hanging them, or ſtoning them to death. But ſuch puniſhments were diſcovered to be too ſlight, in matters of faith. It was demonſtrated, that heretics ought to be burnt in a ſlow fire: it was taken for granted, that God puniſhes them in the other world with a ſlow fire; and hence it was inferred, "That as every prince and every magi-"ſtrate is the image of God in this world, they ought to follow "his example." Here is a double error in reaſoning: firſt, the taking for granted the fundamental propoſition, which is ſurely not ſelf-evident; and next, the drawing a concluſion from it without any connection.

It once was a general opinion among thoſe who dwelt near the ſea, that people never die but during the ebb of the tide. And there were not wanting plauſible reaſons. The ſea, in flowing, carries with it vivifying particles that recruit the ſick. The ſea is ſalt, and ſalt preſerves from rottenneſs. When the ſea ſinks in

* The original is curious: "Quaternarius enim numerus bene congruit pro-"hibitioni conjugii corporalis; de quo dicit Apoſtolus, Quod vir non habet po-"teſtam ſui corporis, ſed mulier; neque mulier habet poteſtatem ſui corporis, ſed "vir; quia quatuor ſunt humores in corpore, quod conſtat ex quatuor elemen-"tis." Were men who could be guilty of ſuch nonſenſe, qualified to be our leaders in the moſt important of all concerns, that of eternal ſalvation?

ebbing,

ebbing, every thing ſinks with it: nature languiſhes: the ſick are not vivifyed: they die.

What ſhall be ſaid of a reaſoning where the concluſion is a flat contradiction to the premiſſes? If a man ſhooting at a wild pigeon happen unfortunately to kill his neighbour, it is in the Engliſh law excuſable homicide; becauſe the ſhooting an animal that is no man's property is a lawful act. If the aim be at a tame fowl for amuſement, which is a treſpaſs on the property of another, the death of the man will be manſlaughter. If the tame fowl be ſhot at in order to be ſtollen, it will be murder, by reaſon of the felonious intent. From this laſt the following conſequence is drawn, that if a man, endeavouring to kill another, miſſes his blow, and happeneth to kill himſelf, he is in judgement of law guilty *of wilful and deliberate ſelf-murder* (*a*). Strange reaſoning! to conſtrue an act to be wilful and deliberate ſelf-murder, contrary to the very thing that is ſuppoſed.

A plentiful ſource of inconcluſive reaſoning, which prevails greatly during the infancy of the rational faculty, is the making of no proper diſtinction between ſtrong and weak relations. Minutius Felix, in his apology for the Chriſtians, endeavours to prove the unity of the Deity from a moſt diſtant analogy or relation, viz. That there is but one king of the bees, and that more than one chief magiſtrate would breed confuſion. It is a proſtitution of reaſon to offer ſuch an argument for the unity of the Deity. But any argument paſſes current, in ſupport of a propoſition that we know beforehand to be true. Plutarch ſays, "that "it ſeemed to have happened by the peculiar direction of the "gods, that Numa was born on the 21ſt of April, the very day "in which Rome was founded by Romulus;" a very childiſh inference from a mere accident. Suppoſing Italy to have been tole-

(*a*) Hale, Pleas of the Crown, cap. 1. 413.

rably populous, as undoubtedly it was at that period, the 21ſt of April, or any day of April, might have given birth to thouſands. In many countries, the ſurgeons and barbers are claſſed together, as members of the ſame trade, from a very ſlight relation, that both of them operate upon the human body. The Jews enjoy'd the reputation for centuries, of being ſkilful phyſicians. Francis I. of France, having long laboured under a diſeaſe that eluded the art of his own phyſicians, apply'd to the Emperor Charles V. for a Jewiſh phyſician from Spain. Finding that the perſon ſent had been converted to Chriſtianity, the King refuſed to employ him; as if a Jew were to loſe his ſkill upon being converted to Chriſtianity. Why did not the King order one of his own phyſicians to be converted to Judaiſm? The following childiſh argument is built upon an extreme ſlight relation, that between our Saviour, and the wooden croſs he ſuffered on. "Believe me," ſays Julius Firmicus, "that the devil omits nothing to deſtroy "miſerable mortals; converting himſelf into every different form, "and employing every ſort of artifice. He appoints wood to be "uſed in ſacrificing to him, knowing that our Saviour, fixed to "the croſs, would beſtow immortality upon all his followers. A "pine-tree is cut down, and uſed in ſacrificing to the mother of "the gods. A wooden image of Oſiris is buried in ſacrificing to "Iſis. A wooden image of Proſerpina is bemoaned for forty "nights, and then thrown into the flames. Deluded mortals, "theſe flames can do you no ſervice. On the contrary, the fire "that is deſtined for your puniſhment rages without end. Learn "from me to know that divine wood which will ſet you free. A "wooden ark ſaved the human race from the univerſal deluge. "Abraham put wood upon the ſhoulders of his ſon Iſaac. The "wooden rod ſtretched out by Aaron brought the children of Iſ-"rael out of the land of Egypt. Wood ſweetened the bitter wa-"ters of Marah, and comforted the children of Iſrael after wan-

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" dering three days without water. A wooden rod ſtruck water " out of the rock. The rod of God in the hand of Moſes over- " came Amalek. The patriarch dreamed, that he ſaw angels de- " ſcending and aſcending upon a wooden ladder: and the law of " God was incloſed in a wooden ark. Theſe things were exhi- " bited, that, as if it were by certain ſteps, we might aſcend to " the wood of the croſs, which is our ſalvation. The wood of the " croſs ſuſtains the heavenly machine, ſupports the foundations " of the earth, and leads men to eternal life. The wood of the devil " burns and periſhes, and its aſhes carries down ſinners to the " loweſt pit of hell." The very ſlighteſt relations make an impreſſion on a weak underſtanding. It was a fancy of Antoninus Geta, in ordering his table, to have ſervices compoſed of diſhes beginning with the ſame letter; ſuch as lamb and lobſter; broth, beef, blood-pudding; pork, plumbcake, pigeons, potatoes. The name of John King of Scotland was changed into *Robert*, for no better reaſon, than that the Johns of France and of England had been unfortunate.

In reaſoning, inſtances are not rare, of miſtaking the cauſe for the effect, and the effect for the cauſe. When a ſtone is thrown from the hand, the continuance of its motion in the air, was once univerſally accounted for as follows: " That the air follows the " ſtone at the heels, and puſhes it on." The effect here is miſtaken for the cauſe: the air indeed follows the ſtone at the heels; but it only fills the vacuity made by the ſtone, and does not puſh it on. It has been ſlyly urged againſt the art of phyſic, that phyſicians are rare among temperate people, ſuch as have no wants but thoſe of nature; and that where phyſicians abound, diſeaſes abound. This is miſtaking the cauſe for the effect, and the effect for the cauſe: people in health have no occaſion for a phyſician; but indolence and luxury beget diſeaſes, and diſeaſes beget phyſicians.

During the nonage of reaſon, men are ſatisfied with words merely, inſtead of an argument. A ſea-proſpect bounded is charming; but we ſoon tire of an unbounded proſpect. It would not give ſatisfaction to ſay, that it is too extenſive; for why ſhould not a proſpect be reliſhed, however extenſive? But employ a foreign term and ſay, that it is *trop vaſte*, we enquire no farther: a term that is not familiar, makes an impreſſion, and captivates weak reaſon. This obſervation accounts for a mode of writing formerly in common uſe, that of ſtuffing our language with Latin words and phraſes. Theſe are now laid aſide as uſeleſs; becauſe a proper emphaſis in reading, makes an impreſſion deeper than any foreign term can do.

There is one proof of the imbecility of human reaſon in dark times, which would ſcarce be believed, were not the fact ſupported by inconteſtable evidence. Inſtead of explaining any natural appearance by ſearching for a cauſe, it has been common to account for it by inventing a fable, which gave ſatisfaction without enquiring farther. For example, inſtead of giving the true cauſe of the ſucceſſion of day and night, the ſacred book of the Scandinavians, termed *Edda*, accounts for that ſucceſſion by a tale: "The giant Nor had a daughter named "*Night*, of a dark complexion. She was wedded to Daglingar, "of the family of the gods. They had a male child, which "they named *Day*, beautiful and ſhining like all of his father's "family. The univerſal father took Night and Day, placed them "in heaven, and gave them two horſes and two cars, that they "might travel round the world, the one after the other. Night "goes firſt upon her horſe named *Rimfaxe*, [Froſty Mane], who "moiſtens the earth with the foam that drops from his bit, which "is the dew. The horſe belonging to Day is named *Skinfaxe*, "[Shining Mane], who by his radiant mane illuminates the air

"and

" and the earth." It is obſerved by the tranſlator of the Edda, that this way of accounting for things is well ſuited to the turn of the human mind, which is endowed with curioſity that is extremely keen, but eaſily ſatisfied, often with words inſtead of ideas. Zoroaſter, by a ſimilar fable, accounts for the growth of evil in this world. He invents a good and an evil principle named *Oromazes* and *Arimanes*, who are in continual conflict for preference. At the laſt day, Oromazes will be reunited to the ſupreme God, from whom he iſſued. Arimanes will be ſubdued, darkneſs deſtroyed; and the world, purified by an univerſal conflagration, will become a luminous and ſhining abode, from which evil will be excluded. I return to the Edda, which is ſtored with fables of this kind. The higheſt notion ſavages can form of the gods, is that of men endowed with extraordinary power and knowledge. The only puzzling circumſtance is, how they differ ſo much from man as to be immortal. The Edda accounts for this by the following fable. " The gods prevented the effect of old age and " decay, by continuing to eat certain apples, truſted to the care " of *Iduna*. *Loke*, the Momus of the Scandinavians, craftily con- " vey'd away *Iduna*, and concealed her in a wood, under the cu- " ſtody of a giant. The gods beginning to wax old and gray, " detected the author of the theft; and, by terrible menaces, " compelled him to employ his utmoſt cunning, for regaining I- " duna and her apples, in which he was ſucceſsful." The origin of poetry is thus accounted for in the ſame work: " The gods " formed *Cuaſer*, who traverſed the earth, teaching wiſdom to " men. He was treacherouſly ſlain by two dwarfs, who, mix- " ing honey with his blood, compoſed a liquor that renders all " who drink of it poets. Theſe dwarfs having incurred the re- " ſentment of a certain giant, were expoſed by him upon a rock, " ſurrounded on all ſides with the ſea. They gave for their ran-

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" ſom the ſaid liquor, which the giant delivered to his daughter " *Gunloda*. The precious potion was eagerly ſought for by the " gods; but how were they to come at it? *Odin*, in the ſhape " of a worm, crept through a crevice into the cavern where the " liquor was concealed. Then reſuming his natural ſhape, and " obtaining Gunloda's conſent to take three draughts, he ſucked " up the whole; and, transforming himſelf into an eagle, flew " away to *Aſgard*." The giant, who was a magician, flew with " all ſpeed after Odin, and came up with him near the gate of " *Aſgard*. The gods iſſued out of their palaces to aſſiſt their ma- " ſter; and preſented to him all the pitchers they could lay hands " on, which he inſtantly filled with the precious liquor. But in " the hurry of diſcharging his load, Odin poured only part of the " liquor through his beak, the reſt being emitted through a leſs " pure vent. The former is beſtow'd by the gods upon good " poets, to inſpire them with divine enthuſiaſm. The latter, " which is in much greater plenty, is beſtow'd liberally on all " who apply for it; by which means the world is peſtered with " an endleſs quantity of wretched verſes." Ignorance is equally credulous in all ages. Albert, ſurnamed *the Great*, flouriſhed in the thirteenth century, and was a man of real knowledge. During the courſe of his education he was remarkably dull; and ſome years before he died became a ſort of changeling. That ſingularity produced the following hiſtory: That the holy Virgin, appearing to him, demanded, whether he would excel in philoſophy or in theology; that upon his chuſing the former, ſhe promiſed, that he ſhould become an incomparable philoſopher; but added, that to puniſh him for not preferring theology, he ſhould become ſtupid again as at firſt.

Upon a ſlight view, it may appear unaccountable, that even the groſſeſt ſavages ſhould take a childiſh tale for a ſolid reaſon. But nature aids the deception: where things are related in a live-

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ly manner, and every circumſtance appears as paſſing in our ſight, we take all for granted as true (*a*). Can an ignorant ruſtic doubt of inſpiration, when he ſees as it were the poet ſipping the pure celeſtial liquor? And how can that poet fail to produce bad verſes, who feeds on the excrements that drop from the fundament even of a deity?

In accounting for natural appearances, even good writers have betray'd a weakneſs in reaſoning, little inferior to that above mentioned. They do not indeed put off their diſciples with a tale; but they put them off with a mere ſuppoſition, not more real than the tale. Deſcartes aſcribes the motion of the planets to a vortex of ether whirling round and round. He thought not of enquiring whether there really be ſuch a vortex, nor what makes it move. M. Buffon forms the earth out of a ſplinter of the ſun, ſtruck off by a comet. May not one be permitted humbly to enquire at that eminent philoſopher, what formed the comet? This paſſes for ſolid reaſoning; and yet we laugh at the poor Indian, who ſupports the earth from falling by an elephant, and the elephant by a tortoiſe.

It is ſtill more ridiculous to reaſon upon what is acknowledged to be a fiction, as if it were real. Such are the fictions admitted in the Roman law. A Roman taken captive in war, loſt his privilege of being a Roman citizen; for freedom was held eſſential to that privilege. But what if he made his eſcape, after perhaps an hour's detention? The hardſhip in that caſe ought to have ſuggeſted an alteration of the law, which was, to ſuſpend the privilege no longer than the captivity ſubſiſted. But the ancient Romans were not ſo ingenious. They remedied the hardſhip by a fiction, that the man never had been a captive. The Frederician code baniſhes from the law of Pruſſia an endleſs number of

(*a*) Elements of Criticiſm, vol. 1. p. 100. edit. 5.

fictions

fictions that are found in the Roman law (Preface, ſect. 28.). Yet afterward, treating of perſonal rights, it is laid down as a rule, That a child in the womb is feigned or ſuppoſed to be born when the fiction is for its advantage (part 1. b. 1. tit. 4. ſect. 4.). To a weak reaſoner a fiction is a happy contrivance for reſolving intricate queſtions. Such is the conſtitution of England, that the Engliſh law-courts are merely territorial; and that no fact happening abroad comes under their cogniſance. An Engliſhman, after murdering his fellow-traveller in France, returns to his native country. What is to be done? for guilt ought not to paſs unpuniſhed. The crime is feigned to have been committed in England.

Ancient hiſtories are full of incredible facts that paſſed current during the infancy of reaſon, which at preſent would be rejected with contempt. Every man who is converſant in the hiſtory of ancient nations, can recall inſtances without end. Does any one believe at preſent, tho' gravely reported by hiſtorians, that in old Rome there was a law, for cutting into pieces the body of a bankrupt, and diſtributing the parts among his creditors? The ſtory of Porſenna and Scevola is highly romantic; and the ſtory of Vampires in Hungary, ſhamefully abſurd. There is no reaſon to believe, that there ever was ſuch a ſtate as that of the Amazons; and the ſtory of Thaleſtris and Alexander the Great is undoubtedly a fiction. Scotch hiſtorians deſcribe gravely and circumſtantially the battle of Luncarty, as if they had been eye-witneſſes. A country-man and his two ſons, it is ſaid, were ploughing in an adjacent field, during the heat of the action. Enraged at their countrymen for turning their backs, they broke the plough in pieces; and each laying hold of a part, ruſhed into the midſt of the battle, and obtained a complete victory over the Danes. This ſtory has every mark of fiction: A man following out unconcernedly his ordinary occupation of ploughing, in

ſight

ſight of a battle, on which depended his wife and children, his goods, and perhaps his own life. More, Three men, without rank or figure, with only a ſtick in the hand of each, ſtemming the tide of victory, and turning the fate of battle. I mention not that a plough was unknown in Scotland for a century or two after that battle; for that circumſtance could not create a doubt in the hiſtorian, if he was ignorant of it.

Reaſon, with reſpect to its progreſs, is ſingular. Morals, manners, and every thing that appears externally, may in part be acquired by imitation and example, which have not the ſlighteſt influence upon the reaſoning faculty. The only means for advancing that faculty to maturity, are indefatigable ſtudy and practice; and even theſe will not carry a man one ſtep beyond the ſubjects he is converſant about: examples are not rare of men extremely expert in one ſcience, and groſsly deficient in others. Many able mathematicians are novices in politics, and even in the common arts of life: ſtudy and practice have ripened them in every relation of equality, while they remain ignorant, like the vulgar, about other relations. A man, in like manner, who has beſtow'd much time and thought in political matters, may be a child as to other branches of knowledge *.

I proceed to the ſecond article, containing erroneous reaſoning

* Paſcal, the celebrated author of *Lettres Provinciales*, in order to explain the infinity and indiviſibility of the Deity, has the following words. "I will ſhow "you a thing both infinite and indiviſible. It is a point moving with infinite cele- "rity: that point is in all places at once, and entire in every place." What an abſurdity, ſays Voltaire, to aſcribe motion to a mathematical point, that has no exiſtence but in the mind of the geometer! that it can be every where at the ſame inſtant, and that it can move with infinite celerity! as if infinite celerity could actually exiſt. Every word, adds he, is big with abſurdity; and yet he was a great man who uttered that ſtuff.

occaſioned by natural biaſſes. The firſt bias I ſhall mention has an extenſive influence. What is ſeen, makes a deeper impreſſion, than what is heard by report, or diſcovered by reflection. Hence it is, that in judging of right and wrong, the external act only draws the attention of the ignorant and illiterate, who cannot penetrate into will or intention; and hence it is, that in religion great weight is laid upon forms and ceremonies, without much regarding their purpoſe. Theſe particulars come in afterward, in the progreſs of morality and religion. What belongs to the preſent ſketch is to obſerve, that in judging of covenants, laws, vows, and other acts that are completed by words, the whole weight in days of ignorance is laid upon the external expreſſion, with no regard to the meaning of the ſpeaker or writer. The bleſſing beſtow'd by Iſaac upon his ſon Jacob, miſtaking him for Eſau, is an illuſtrious inſtance. Not only was the bleſſing intended for Eſau, but Jacob, by deceiving his father, had rendered himſelf unworthy of it (*a*); yet Iſaac had pronounced the ſounds, and it was not in his power to unſay them: *Neſcit vox emiſſa reverti.* Joſhuah, groſsly impoſed on by the Gibeonites denying that they were Canaanites, made a covenant with them; and yet, tho' he found them to be Canaanites, he held himſelf to be bound. Led by the ſame bias, people think it ſufficient to fulfil the words of a vow, however ſhort of intention. The Duke of Lancaſter, vexed at the obſtinate reſiſtance of Rennes, a town in Britany, vowed in wrath not to raiſe the ſiege till he had planted the Engliſh colours upon one of the gates. This proved a raſh vow. He found it neceſſary to raiſe the ſiege, but his vow ſtood in the way. The governor relieved him from his ſcruple, permitting him to plant his colours upon one of the gates; and he was ſatisfied that his vow was fulfilled. The following is an example of an abſurd

(*a*) Geneſis, chap. 27.

concluſion

concluſion deduced from a precept taken literally, againſt common ſenſe. We are ordered by the Apoſtle, to pray always; from which Jerom, one of the fathers, argues thus: "Conjugal enjoy-" ment is inconſiſtent with praying; *ergo*, conjugal enjoyment is " a ſin." By the ſame argument it may be proved, that eating and drinking are ſins; and that ſleeping is a great ſin, being a great interruption to praying. With reſpect to another text, viz. "That a biſhop muſt be blameleſs, the huſband of one wife," taken literally, a very different concluſion is drawn in Abyſſinia, viz. That no man can be ordained a preſbyter till he be married. Prohibitions have been interpreted in the ſame ſhallow manner. Clarendon gives two inſtances, both of them relative to the great fire of London. The mayor propoſing to pull down a houſe in order to ſtop the progreſs of the fire, was oppoſed by the lawyers, who declared the act to be unlawful; and the houſe was burnt without being pulled down. About the ſame time it was propoſed to break open ſome houſes in the temple for ſaving the furniture, the poſſeſſors being in the country; but it was declared burglary to force open a door without conſent of the poſſeſſor. Such literal interpretation, contrary to common ſenſe, has been extended even to inflict puniſhment. Iſadas was bathing when the alarm was given in Lacedemon, that Epaminondas was at hand with a numerous army. Naked as he was, he ruſhed againſt the enemy with a ſpear in one hand and a ſword in the other, bearing down all before him. The Ephori fined him for going to battle unarmed; but honoured him with a garland for his gallant behaviour. How abſurd to think that the law was intended for ſuch a caſe! and how much more abſurd to think, that the ſame act ought to be both puniſhed and rewarded! The King of Caſtile being carried off his horſe by a hunted hart, was ſaved by a perſon at hand, who cut his belt. The judges thought a pardon abſolutely requiſite, to relieve from capital puniſhment a

man who had lifted a ſword againſt his ſovereign *. It is a ſalutary regulation, that a man who is abſent cannot be tried for his life. Pope Formoſus died ſuddenly without ſuffering any puniſhment for his crimes. But this did not ſave his goods from confiſcation: he was dug out of his grave, dreſſed in his pontifical habit; and in that ſhape a criminal proceſs went on againſt him. Could it ſeriouſly be thought, that a rotten carcaſe brought into court was ſufficient to fulfil the law? The ſame abſurd farce was played in Scotland, upon the body of Logan of Reſtalrig, ſeveral years after his interment. The body of Tancred King of Sicily was raiſed from the grave, and the head cut off for ſuppoſed rebellion. Henry IV. of Caſtile was depoſed in abſence; but, for a colour of juſtice, the following ridiculous ſcene was acted. A wooden ſtatue dreſſed in a royal habit, was placed on a theatre; and the ſentence of depoſition was ſolemnly read to it, as if it had been the King himſelf. The Archbiſhop of Toledo ſeized the crown, another the ſceptre, a third the ſword; and the ceremony was concluded with proclaiming another king. How humbling are ſuch ſcenes to man, who values himſelf upon the faculty of reaſon as his prime attribute! An expedient of that kind would now be rejected with diſdain, as fit only to amuſe children; and yet it grieves me to obſerve that law-proceedings are not yet totally purged of ſuch droſs. By a law in Holland, the criminal's confeſſion is eſſential to a capital puniſhment, no meaner evidence being held ſufficient: and yet if he inſiſt on his innocence, he is tortured till he pronounce the words of confeſſion; as if ſounds merely were ſufficient, without will or intention. The practice of England in a ſimilar caſe, is no leſs abſurd. Confeſ-

* A perſon unacquainted with the hiſtory of law, will imagine that Swift has carried beyond all bounds his ſatire againſt lawyers, in ſaying, that Gulliver had incurred a capital puniſhment, for ſaving the Emperor's palace by piſſing out the fire; it being capital in any perſon of what quality ſoever, to make water within the precincts of the palace.

ſion

ſion is not there required; but it is required, that the perſon accuſed ſhould plead, and ſay whether he is innocent or guilty. But what if he ſtand mute? He is preſſed down by weights till he plead; and if he continue mute, he is preſſed till he give up the ghoſt, a torture known by the name of *Peine forte et dure* *. Further, law copying religion, has exalted ceremonies above the ſubſtantial part. In England, ſo ſtrictly has form been adhered to, as to make the moſt trivial defect in words fatal, however certain the meaning may be. *Murdredavit* for *murdravit*, *feloniter* for *felonice*, have been adjudged to vitiate an indictment. *Burgariter* for *burglariter* hath been a fatal objection; but *burgulariter* hath been holden good. Webſter being indicted for murder, and the the ſtroke being laid "ſiniſtro *bracio*" inſtead of "*brachio*," he was diſmiſſed. *A. B. alias dictus A. C. Butcher*, was found to vitiate the indictment; becauſe it ought to have been *A. B. Butcher, alias dictus A. C. Butcher.* So *gladium in dextra ſua*, without *manu.*

There is no bias in human nature more prevalent than an appetite to anticipate futurity, by being made acquainted beforehand with what will happen. That appetite was indulged without reſerve in dark times; and hence omens, auguries, dreams, judicial aſtrology, oracles, and prophecies, without end. It ſhows ſtrange weakneſs in the rational faculty, not to ſee, that ſuch foreknowledge would be a gift more pernicious to man than Pandora's box: it would deprive him of every motive to action; and leave no place for ſagacity, nor for contriving means to bring about a deſired event. Life is an enchanted caſtle, that gives play to paſſions, and exerciſe to reaſon: remove the veil that hides futurity—behold the enchanted caſtle gone, and in its ſtead a

* Since the above was written, an act of parliament has been paſſed, by which the legiſlature, ſenſible of the abſurdity of the old law, has enacted, That perſons arraigned for felony or piracy, who ſtand mute, or refuſe to anſwer directly to the indictment, ſhall be held as confeſſing, and judgement ſhall paſs againſt them, as if they had been convicted by verdict or confeſſion.

barren

barren and inſipid proſpect. Anxiety about futurity rouſes our ſagacity to prepare for what may happen; but an appetite to know what ſagacity cannot diſcover, is a weakneſs in nature inconſiſtent with every rational principle *.

An appetite for things rare and wonderful, is a natural bias no leſs univerſal than the former. Any ſtrange or unaccountable event rouſes the attention, and enflames the mind: we ſuck it in greedily, wiſh it to be true, and believe it to be true upon the ſlighteſt evidence; becauſe ſuch belief gratifies the appetite. A hart taken in the foreſt of Senlis by Charles VI. of France, bore a collar upon which was inſcribed, *Cæſar hoc me donavit* †. The appetite for wonder made every one believe, that a Roman Emperor was meant, and that the beaſt muſt have lived at leaſt a thouſand years; overlooking that the Emperor of Germany is alſo ſtyled *Cæſar*, and that it was not neceſſary to go back fifty years. This appetite diſplays itſelf even in childhood: ſtories of ghoſts and apparitions are anxiouſly liſtened to; and firmly believed, by means of the terror they occaſion: and the vulgar accordingly have been captivated with ſuch ſtories, upon evidence that would not be ſufficient to aſcertain the ſimpleſt fact (*a*). The abſurd and childiſh prodigies that are every where ſcattered through the hiſtory of Titus Livius, not to mention other ancient hiſtorians, would be unaccountable in a writer of ſenſe and gravity, were it not for the appetite mentioned. But human belief is not left at the mercy of every irregular bias. Our maker has ſubjected belief to the correction of the rational faculty; and accordingly, in proportion as reaſon advances toward maturity, wonders, prodi-

* Foreknowledge of future events, differs widely from a conviction, that all events are fixed and immutable: the latter leaves us free to activity; the former annihilates all activity.

† "Cæſar gave me this."

(*a*) Elements of Criticiſm, ch. 2. part 5.

gies,

gies, apparitions, incantations, witchcraft, and ſuch ſtuff, loſe their influence. That reformation however has been exceedingly ſlow, becauſe the appetite is exceedingly ſtrong. Such abſurdities found credit among wiſe men, even as late as the laſt age. I am ready to verify the charge, by introducing two men of the firſt rank for underſtanding: were a greater number neceſſary, there would be no difficulty of making a very bulky liſt. The celebrated Grotius ſhall lead the van. Procopius, in his Vandal hiſtory, relates, that ſome orthodox Chriſtians, whoſe tongues were cut out by the Arians, continued miraculouſly to ſpeak as formerly. And to vouch the fact, he appeals to ſome of thoſe miraculous perſons, alive in Conſtantinople at the time of his writing. In the dark ages of Chriſtianity, when different ſects were violently enflamed againſt each other, it is not ſurpriſing, that groſs abſurdities were ſwallowed as real miracles: but is it not ſurpriſing, and equally mortifying, to find Grotius, the greateſt genius of the age he lived in, adopting ſuch abſurdities? For the truth of the foregoing miracle, he appeals not only to Procopius, but to ſeveral other writers (*a*); as if the hearſay of a few writers were ſufficient to make us believe an impoſſibility. Could it ſeriouſly be his opinion, that the great God, who governs by general laws, permitting the ſun to ſhine alike upon men of every religion, would miraculouſly ſuſpend the laws of nature, in order to teſtify his diſpleaſure at an honeſt ſect of Chriſtians, however erroneous their tenets may be? Did he alſo believe what Procopius adds, that two of theſe orthodox Chriſtians were again deprived of ſpeech, as a puniſhment inflicted by the Almighty for cohabiting with proſtitutes?

I proceed to our famous hiſtorian, the Earl of Clarendon, the other perſon I had in view. A man long in public buſineſs, a

(*a*) Prolegomena to his Hiſtory of the Goths.

conſummate

conſummate politician, and well ſtored with knowledge from books as well as from experience, might be fortified againſt fooliſh miracles, if any man can be fortified: and yet behold his ſuperſtitious credulity in childiſh ſtories; no leſs weak in that particular, than was his cotemporary Grotius. He gravely relates an incident regarding the aſſaſſination of the Duke of Buckingham, the ſum of which follows. "There were many ſtories ſcattered a-"broad at that time, of prophecies and predictions of the Duke's "untimely and violent death; one of which was upon a better "foundation of credit, than uſually ſuch diſcourſes are founded "upon. There was an officer in the King's wardrobe in Wind-"ſor caſtle, of reputation for honeſty and diſcretion, and at that "time about the age of fifty. About ſix months before the mi-"ſerable end of the Duke, this man being in bed, and in good "health, there appeared to him at midnight a man of a venerable "aſpect, who drawing the curtains, and fixing his eye upon him, "ſaid, Do you know me, Sir. The poor man, half dead with "fear, anſwered, That he thought him to be Sir George Villiers, "father to the Duke. Upon which he was ordered by the appa-"rition, to go to the Duke, and tell him, that if he did not ſome-"what to ingratiate himſelf with the people, he would be ſuffered "to live but a ſhort time. The ſame perſon appeared to him a ſecond "and a third time, reproaching him bitterly for not performing "his promiſe. The poor man pluck'd up as much courage as to "excuſe himſelf, that it was difficult to find acceſs to the Duke, "and that he would be thought a madman. The apparition im-"parted to him ſome ſecrets, which he ſaid would be his cre-"dentials to the Duke. The officer, introduced to the Duke by "Sir Ralph Freeman, was received courteouſly. They walked "together near an hour; and the Duke ſometimes ſpoke with "great commotion, tho' his ſervants, with Sir Ralph, were at "ſuch a diſtance that they could not hear a word. The officer,

"returning

" returning from the Duke, told Sir Ralph, that when he men-
" tioned the particulars that were to gain him credit, the Duke's
" colour changed; and he ſwore the officer could come to that
" knowledge only by the devil; for that theſe particulars were
" known only to himſelf, and to one perſon more, of whoſe fide-
" lity he was ſecure. The Duke, who went to accompany the
" King at hunting, was obſerved to ride all the morning in deep
" thought; and before the morning was ſpent, left the field, and
" alighted at his mother's houſe, with whom he was ſhut up for
" two or three hours. When the Duke left her, his countenance
" appeared full of trouble, with a mixture of anger, which never
" appeared before in converſing with her: and ſhe was found o-
" verwhelmed with tears, and in great agony. Whatever there
" was of all this, it is a notorious truth, that when ſhe heard of
" the Duke's murder, ſhe ſeemed not in the leaſt ſurpriſed, nor
" did expreſs much ſorrow."

The name of Lord Clarendon calls for more attention to the foregoing incident than otherwiſe it would deſerve. It is no article of the Chriſtian faith, that the dead preſerve their connection with the living, or are ever ſuffered to return to this world: we have no ſolid evidence for ſuch a fact; nor ever hear of it, except in tales for amuſing or terrifying children. Secondly, The ſtory is inconſiſtent with the courſe of Providence, which, for the beſt purpoſes, has drawn an impenetrable veil between us and futurity. Thirdly, This apparition, tho' ſuppoſed to be endowed with a miraculous knowledge of future events, is however deficient in the ſagacity that belongs to a perſon of ordinary underſtanding. It appears twice to the officer, without thinking of giving him proper credentials; nor does it at all think of them till ſuggeſted by the officer. Fourthly, Why did not the apparition go directly to the Duke himſelf; where could be the neceſſity of employing a third perſon? The Duke muſt have been much more affected

with an apparition to himſelf, than by hearing it at ſecond hand. The officer was afraid of being taken for a madman; and the Duke had ſome reaſon to think him ſuch. Laſtly, The apparition happened above three months before the Duke's death; and yet we hear not of a ſingle ſtep taken by him, in purſuance of the advice given him. The authority of the hiſtorian, and the regard we owe him, have drawn from me the foregoing reflections; which with reſpect to the ſtory itſelf are very little neceſſary; for the evidence is really not ſuch as to verify any ordinary occurrence. His Lordſhip acknowledges, that he had no evidence but common report, ſaying, that it was one of the many ſtories ſcattered about at that time. He does not ſay, that the ſtory was related to him by the officer, whoſe name he does not even mention, or by Sir Ralph Freeman, or by the Duke's mother, or by the Duke himſelf. If ever any thing happened like the ſtory in queſtion, it may with good reaſon be ſuppoſed, that the officer was crazy, or enthuſiaſtically mad: nor have we any evidence beyond common report, that he communicated any ſecrets to the Duke. I ſhall only add upon this article, that here are two remarkable inſtances of an obſervation made above, that a man may be high in one ſcience and very low in another. Had Grotius, or had Clarendon, ſtudied the fundamentals of reaſon and religion coolly and impartially, as they did other ſciences, they would never have given faith to reports ſo ill vouched, and ſo contradictory to every ſound principle of theology.

Another ſource of erroneous reaſoning is, a ſingular tendency in the mind of man to myſteries and hidden meanings. The buſy mind is ſeldom ſatisfied with the ſimple and obvious intendment, where the object makes a deep impreſſion: invention is rouſed to allegorize, and to pierce into hidden views and purpoſes. I have a notable example at hand, with reſpect to forms and ceremonies

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in religious worſhip. Joſephus (*a*), talking of the tabernacle, has the following paſſage. "Let any man conſider the ſtructure of "the tabernacle, the ſacerdotal veſtments, the veſſels dedicated to "the ſervice of the altar; and he muſt of neceſſity be convinced, "that our lawgiver was a pious man, and that all the clamours "againſt us and our profeſſion, are mere calumny. For what "are all of theſe but the image of the whole world? This will "appear to any man who ſoberly and impartially examines the "matter. The tabernacle of thirty cubits is divided into three "parts; two for the prieſts in general, and as free to them as the "earth and the ſea; the third, where no mortal muſt be admit-"ted, is as the heaven, reſerved for God himſelf. The twelve "loaves of ſhew-bread ſignify the twelve months of the year. "The candleſtick, compoſed of ſeven branches, refers to the "twelve ſigns of the zodiac, through which the ſeven planets "ſhape their courſe; and the ſeven lamps on the top of the ſeven "branches bear an analogy to the planets themſelves. The cur-"tains of four colours repreſent the four elements. The fine li-"nen ſignifies the earth, as flax is raiſed there. By the purple is "underſtood the ſea, from the blood of the murex, which dies "that colour. The violet colour is a ſymbol of the air; and the "ſcarlet of the fire. By the linen garment of the high-prieſt, is "deſigned the whole body of the earth: by the violet colour the "heavens. The pomegranates ſignify lightning: the bells toll-"ing ſignify thunder. The four-coloured ephod bears a reſem-"blance to the very nature of the univerſe, and the interweaving "it with gold has a regard to the rays of light. The girdle about "the body of the prieſt is as the ſea about the globe of the earth. "The two ſardonyx ſtones are a kind of figure of the ſun and "moon; and the twelve other ſtones may be underſtood, either

(*a*) Jewiſh Antiquities, book 3.

" of the twelve months, or of the twelve ſigns in the zodiac. The " violet-coloured tiara is a reſemblance of heaven; and it would " be irreverent to have written the ſacred name of God upon any " other colour. The triple crown and plate of gold give us to " underſtand the glory and majeſty of Almighty God. This is a " plain illuſtration of theſe matters; and I would not loſe any " opportunity of doing juſtice to the honour and wiſdom of our " incomparable lawgiver." How much wire-drawn, and how remote from any appearance of truth, are the foregoing alluſions and imagined reſemblances! But religious forms and ceremonies, however arbitrary, are never held to be ſo. If an uſeful purpoſe do not appear, it is taken for granted, that there muſt be a hidden meaning; and any meaning, however childiſh, will ſerve at a pinch. Such propenſity there is in dark ages for allegorizing, that even our Saviour's miracles have not eſcaped. Where-ever any ſeeming difficulty occurs in the plain ſenſe, the fathers of the church, Origen, Auguſtine, and Hilary, are never at a loſs for a myſtic meaning. " Sacrifice to the celeſtial gods with an odd " number, and to the terreſtrial gods with an even number," is a precept of Pythagoras. Another is, " Turn round in adoring the " gods, and ſit down when thou haſt worſhipped." The learned make a ſtrange buſtle about the hidden meaning of theſe precepts. But, after all, have they any hidden meaning? Forms and ceremonies are uſeful in external worſhip, for occupying the vulgar; and it is of no importance what they are, provided they prevent the mind from wandering. Why ſuch partiality to ancient ceremonies, when no hidden meaning is ſuppoſed in thoſe of Chriſtians, ſuch as bowing to the eaſt, or the prieſt performing the liturgy, partly in a black upper garment, partly in a white. No ideas are more ſimple than of numbers, nor leſs ſuſceptible of any hidden meaning; and yet the profound Pythagoras has imagined many ſuch meanings. The number *one*, ſays he, having

no

no parts, repreſents the Deity: it repreſents alſo order, peace, and tranquillity, which reſult from unity of ſentiment. The number *two* repreſents diſorder, confuſion, and change. He diſcovered in the number *three* the moſt ſublime myſteries: all things are compoſed, ſays he, of three ſubſtances. The number *four* is holy in its nature, and conſtitutes the divine eſſence, which conſiſts in unity, power, benevolence, and wiſdom. Would one believe, that the great philoſopher, who demonſtrated the 47th propoſition of the firſt book of Euclid, was the inventor of ſuch childiſh conceits? Perhaps Pythagoras meant only to divert himſelf with them. Whether ſo or not, it ſeems difficult to be explained, how ſuch trifles were preſerved in memory, and handed down to us through ſo many generations. All that can be ſaid is, that during the infancy of knowledge, every novelty makes a figure, and that it requires a long courſe of time to ſeparate the corn from the chaff *. A certain writer, ſmitten with the conceit of hidden meanings, has applied his talent to the conſtellations of the zodiac. The *lion* typifies the force or heat of the ſun in the month of July, when he enters that conſtellation. The conſtellation where the ſun is in the month of Auguſt is termed the *virgin*, ſignifying the time of harveſt. He enters the *balance* in September, denoting the equality of day and night. The *ſcorpion*, where he is found in October, is an emblem of the diſeaſes that are frequent during that month, &c. The *balance*, I acknowledge, is well hit

* The following precepts of the ſame philoſopher, tho' now only fit for the *Child's Guide*, were originally cheriſhed, and preſerved in memory, as emanations of ſuperior wiſdom. "Do not enter a temple for worſhip, but with a decent air. "Render not life painful by undertaking too many affairs. Be always ready for "what may happen. Never bind yourſelf by a vow, nor by an oath. Irritate "not a man who is angry." The ſeven wiſe men of Greece made a figure in their time; but it would be unſeaſonable to expect, that what they taught during the infancy of knowledge, ſhould make a figure in its maturity.

off;

off; but I ſee not clearly the reſemblance of the force of a lion to the heat of the ſun; and ſtill leſs that of harveſt to a virgin: the ſpring would be more happily repreſented by a virgin, and the harveſt by a woman in the act of delivery.

The tendency in the mind of man to myſteries and allegories, diſplays itſelf with great vigour upon our forefathers, and upon the ancients in general, by means of the great veneration that is paid them. Before writing was known, ancient hiſtory is made up of traditional fables. A Trojan Brutus peopled England; and the Scots are deſcended from Scota, daughter to an Egyptian king. What reaſon have we to doubt but that hiſtories of the heathen gods are equally involved in fable? We pretend not to draw any hidden meaning from the former: why ſhould we ſuſpect any ſuch meaning in the latter? Allegory is a ſpecies of writing too refined for a ſavage or barbarian: it is the fruit of a cultivated imagination; and was a late invention even in Greece. The allegories of Eſop are of the ſimpleſt kind, and yet they were compoſed after learning began to flouriſh; and Cebes, whoſe allegory about the life of man is juſtly celebrated, was a diſciple of Socrates. Prepoſſeſſion however in favour of the ancients makes us conclude, that there muſt be ſome hidden meaning or allegory in their hiſtorical fables; for no better reaſon than that they are deſtitute of common ſenſe. In the Greek mythology, there are numberleſs fables related as hiſtorical facts merely; witneſs the fable of gods mixing with women, and procreating giants, like what we find in the fabulous hiſtories of many other nations; theſe giants attempting to dethrone Jupiter; Apollo keeping the ſheep of Admetus; Minerva ſpringing from the head of Jove *; Bacchus

* However eaſy it may be to draw an allegorical meaning out of that fable, I cannot admit any ſuch meaning to have been intended. An allegory is a fable contrived

Bacchus cut out of his thigh; Orpheus going to hell for his wife; Mars and Venus caught by Vulcan in a net; and a thouſand other ſuch childiſh ſtories. But the Greeks, many centuries after the invention of ſuch fooliſh fables, becoming illuſtrious for arts and ſciences, nothing would ſatisfy writers in later times, but to dub them profound philoſophers even in their cradle, when mere ſavages; and hence endleſs attempts to detect myſteries and hidden meanings in their fables. Let other interpreters of that kind paſs; they give me no concern: but I cannot, without the deepeſt concern, behold our illuſtrious philoſopher Bacon employing his talents ſo abſurdly. What imbecility muſt there be in human nature, when ſo great a genius is capable of ſuch puerilities! As a ſubject ſo humbling is far from being agreeable, I confine myſelf to a few inſtances. In an ancient fable, Prometheus formed man out of clay; and kindling a bundle of birch rods at the chariot of the ſun, brought down fire to the earth for the uſe of his creature man. And tho' ungrateful man complained to Jupiter of that theft, yet the god, pleaſed with the ingenuity of Prometheus, not only confirmed to man the uſe of fire, but conferred on him a gift much more conſiderable: the gift was perpetual youth, which was laid upon an aſs to be carried to the earth. The aſs, wanting to drink at a brook, was oppoſed by a ſerpent, who inſiſted to have the burden, without which, no drink for the poor aſs. And thus, for a draught of plain water, was perpetual youth transferred from man to the ſerpent. This fable has a ſtriking reſemblance to many in the Edda; and, in the

trived to illuſtrate ſome acknowledged truth, by making a deeper impreſſion than the truth would make in plain words; of which we have ſeveral beautiful inſtances in the Spectator (Elements of Criticiſm, chap. 20. § 6.). But the fable here was underſtood to be a matter of fact, Minerva being worſhipped by the Greeks as a real goddeſs, the daughter of Jupiter without a mother.

manner

manner of the Edda, accounts for the invention of fire, and for the mortality of man. Nor is there in all the Edda one more childiſh, or more diſtant from any appearance of a rational meaning. It is handled however by our philoſopher, with much ſolemn gravity, as if every ſource of wiſdom were locked up in it. The explanation he gives, being too long to be copied here, ſhall be reduced to a few particulars. After an elogium upon fire, his Lordſhip proceeds thus. "The manner wherein Prometheus "ſtole his fire, is properly deſcribed from the nature of the "thing; he being ſaid to have done it by applying a rod of "birch to the chariot of the ſun: for birch is uſed in ſtriking "and beating; which clearly denotes fire to proceed from vio-"lent percuſſions and colliſions of bodies, whereby the matters "ſtruck are ſubtilized, rarefied, put into motion, and ſo prepa-"red to receive the heat of the celeſtial bodies. And according-"ly they, in a clandeſtine and ſecret manner, ſnatch fire, as it "were by ſtealth, from the chariot of the ſun." He goes on as follows. "The next is a remarkable part of the fable; which "repreſents, that men, inſtead of gratitude, accuſed both Pro-"metheus and his fire to Jupiter: and yet the accuſation proved "ſo pleaſant to Jupiter, that he not only indulged mankind the "uſe of fire, but conferred upon them perpetual youth. Here it "may ſeem ſtrange, that the ſin of ingratitude ſhould meet with "approbation or reward. But the allegory has another view; "and denotes, that the accuſation both of human nature and hu-"man art, proceeds from a noble and laudable temper of mind, "viz. modeſty; and alſo tends to a very good purpoſe, viz. to "ſtir up freſh induſtry and new diſcoveries." Can any thing be more wire-drawn?

Vulcan, attempting the chaſtity of Minerva, had recourſe to force. In the ſtruggle, his *ſemen*, falling upon the ground, produced Erichthonius; whoſe body from the middle upward was comely

comely and well proportioned, his thighs and legs ſmall and deformed like an eel. Conſcious of that defect, he was the inventer of chariots; which ſhowed the graceful part of his body, and concealed what was deformed. Liſten to the explanation of this ridiculous fable. "Art, by the various uſes it makes of fire, is "here repreſented by Vulcan: and Nature is repreſented by Mi-"nerva, becauſe of the induſtry employ'd in her works. Art, "when it offers violence to Nature in order to bend her to its "purpoſe, ſeldom attains the end propoſed. Yet, upon great "ſtruggle and application, there proceed certain imperfect births, "or lame abortive works; which however, with great pomp and "deceitful appearances, are triumphantly carried about, and "ſhown by impoſtors." I admit the ingenuity of that forc'd meaning; but had the inventer of that fable any latent meaning? If he had, why did he conceal it? The ingenious meaning would have merited praiſe; the fable itſelf none at all.

I ſhall add but one other inſtance, for they grow tireſome. Sphinx was a monſter, having the face and voice of a virgin, the wings of a bird, and the talons of a gryphin. She reſided on the ſummit of a mountain, near the city Thebes. Her manner was, to lie in ambuſh for travellers, to propoſe dark riddles which ſhe received from the Muſes, and to tear thoſe to pieces who could not ſolve them. The Thebans having offered their kingdom to the man who ſhould interpret theſe riddles, Oedipus preſented himſelf before the monſter, and he was required to explain the following riddle, viz. What creature is that, which being born four-footed, becomes afterwards two-footed, then three-footed, and laſtly four-footed again. Oedipus anſwered, It was man, who in his infancy crawls upon his hands and feet, then walks upright upon his two feet, walks in old age with a ſtick, and at laſt lies four-footed in bed. Oedipus having thus obtained the victory, ſlew the monſter; and laying the carcaſe upon an aſs,

carried it off in triumph. Now for the explanation. "This is "an elegant and inſtructive fable, invented to repreſent ſcience: "for Science may be called a monſter, being ſtrangely gazed at "and admired by the ignorant. Her figure and form is various, "by reaſon of the vaſt variety of ſubjects that ſcience conſiders. "Her voice and countenance are repreſented female, by reaſon "of her gay appearance, and volubility of ſpeech. Wings are "added, becauſe the ſciences and their inventions fly about in "a moment; for knowledge, like light communicated from "torch to torch, is preſently catched, and copiouſly diffuſed. "Sharp and hooked talons are elegantly attributed to her; be-"cauſe the axioms and arguments of ſcience fix down the "mind, and keep it from moving or ſlipping away." Again: "All ſcience ſeems placed on high, as it were on the tops of "mountains that are hard to climb; for ſcience is juſtly imagi-"ned a ſublime and lofty thing, looking down upon ignorance, "and at the ſame time taking an extenſive view on all ſides, as "is uſual on the tops of mountains. Sphinx is ſaid to propoſe "difficult queſtions and riddles, which ſhe received from the "Muſes. Theſe queſtions, while they remain with the Muſes, "may be pleaſant, as contemplation and enquiry are when know-"ledge is their only aim: but after they are delivered to Sphinx, "that is, to practice, which impels to action, choice, and deter-"mination; then it is that they become ſevere and torturing; "and unleſs ſolved, ſtrangely perplex the human mind, and tear "it to pieces. It is with the utmoſt elegance added in the fable, "that the carcaſs of Sphinx was laid upon an aſs; for there is "nothing ſo ſubtile and abſtruſe, but after being made plain, may "be conceived by the ſloweſt capacity." According to ſuch latitude of interpretation, there is nothing more eaſy than to make *quidlibet ex quolibet*.

"Who

" Who would not laugh if ſuch a man there be?
" Who would not weep if Atticus were he?"

I will detain the reader but a moment longer, to hear what our author ſays in juſtification of ſuch myſterious meaning. Out of many reaſons, I ſelect the two following. " It may paſs for a " farther indication of a concealed and ſecret meaning, that ſome " of theſe fables are ſo abſurd and idle in their narration, as to " proclaim an allegory even afar off. A fable that carries proba- " bility with it, may be ſuppoſed invented for pleaſure, or in " imitation of hiſtory; but what could never be conceived or re- " lated in this way, muſt ſurely have a different uſe. For ex- " ample, what a monſtrous fiction is this, That Jupiter ſhould " take *Metis* to wife; and as ſoon as he found her pregnant eat " her up; whereby he alſo conceived, and out of his head brought " forth *Pallas* armed! Certainly no mortal could, but for the " ſake of the moral it couches, invent ſuch an abſurd dream as " this, ſo much out of the road of thought." At that rate, the more ridiculous or abſurd a fable is, the more inſtructive it muſt be. This opinion reſembles that of the ancient Germans with reſpect to mad women, who were held to be ſo wiſe, as that every thing they uttered was prophetic. Did it never once occur to our author, that in the infancy of the reaſoning faculty, the imagination is ſuffered to range without control, as in a dream; and that the vulgar in all ages are delighted with wonderful ſtories; the more out of nature, the more to their taſte?

We proceed to the other reaſon. " The argument of moſt " weight with me is, That many of theſe fables appear not to " have been invented by the perſons who relate and divulge " them, whether Homer, Heſiod, or others; for if I were aſſu- " red they firſt flowed from thoſe later times and authors, I ſhould " never expect any thing ſingularly great or noble from ſuch an

" origin. But whoever attentively conſiders the thing, will find, " that theſe fables are delivered down by thoſe writers, not as " matters then firſt invented, but as received and embraced in " earlier ages. And this principally raiſes my eſteem of thoſe " fables; which I receive, not as the product of the age, or in- " vention of the poets, but as ſacred relics, gentle whiſpers, and " the breath of better times, that from the traditions of more " ancient nations, came at length into the flutes and trumpets " of the Greeks." Was it our author's real opinion, that the farther back we trace the hiſtory of man, the more of ſcience and knowledge is found; and conſequently that ſavages are the moſt learned of all men?

The following fable of the ſavage Canadians ought to be myſterious, if either of the reaſons urged above be concluſive. " There " were in the beginning but ſix men in the world, (from whence " ſprung is not ſaid): one of theſe aſcended to heaven in queſt of " a woman named *Atahentſic*, and had carnal knowledge of her. " She being thrown headlong from the height of the empyrean, " was received on the back of a tortoiſe, and delivered of two " children, one of whom ſlew the other." This fable is ſo abſurd, that it muſt have a latent meaning; and one needs but copy our author to pump a deep myſtery out of it, however little intended by the inventer of the fable. And if either abſurdity or antiquity entitle fables to be held ſacred relics, gentle whiſpers, and the breath of better times, the following Japaneſe fables are well entitled to theſe diſtinguiſhing epithets. " Bunſio, in wedlock, having had no children for many years, addreſſed her prayers to the gods, was heard, and was delivered of 500 eggs. Fearing that the eggs might produce monſters, ſhe packed them up in a box, and threw them into the river. An old fiſherman finding the box, hatched the eggs in an oven, every one of which produced a child. The children were fed with boiled rice and mugwort-

leaves;

Theaves; and being at laſt left to ſhift for themſelves, they fell a-robbing on the highway. Hearing of a man famous for great wealth, they told their ſtory at his gate, and begged ſome food. This happening to be the houſe of their mother, ſhe own'd them for her children, and gave a great entertainment to her friends and neighbours. She was afterward inliſted among the goddeſſes by the name of *Benſaiten:* her 500 ſons were appointed to be her attendants; and to this day ſhe is worſhipped in Japan as the goddeſs of riches." Take another fable of the ſame ſtamp. The Japaneſe have a table of lucky and unlucky days, which they believe to have been compoſed by Abino Seimei, a famous aſtrologer, and a ſort of demi-god. They have the following tradition of him. "A young fox, purſued by hunters, fled into a temple, and took ſhelter in the boſom of Abino Jaſſima, ſon and heir to the king of the country. Refuſing to yield the poor creature to the unmerciful hunters, he defended himſelf with great bravery, and ſet the fox at liberty. The hunters, through reſentment againſt the young prince, murdered his royal father; but Jaſſima revenged his father's death, killing the traitors with his own hand. Upon this ſignal victory, a lady of incomparable beauty appeared to him, and made ſuch an impreſſion on his heart, that he took her to wife. Abino Seimei, procreated of that marriage, was endowed with divine wiſdom, and with the precious gift of prophecy. Jaſſima was ignorant that his wife was the very fox whoſe life he had ſaved, till ſhe reſumed by degrees her former ſhape." If there be any hidden myſtery in this tale, I ſhall not deſpair of finding a myſtery in every fairy-tale invented by Madam Gomez.

It is lamentable, how ſlowly human underſtanding, and the faculty of reaſon, creep toward maturity. If this reflection be verified in our celebrated philoſopher Bacon, how much more in the bulk of mankind? It is comfortable, however, that human underſtanding

underſtanding is in a progreſs toward maturity, however ſlow. The fancy of allegorizing ancient fables, is now out of faſhion: enlightened reaſon has unmaſked theſe fables, and left them in their nakedneſs, as the invention of illiterate ages, when wonder was the prevailing paſſion.

Having diſcuſſed the firſt two heads, I proceed to the third, viz. Erroneous reaſoning, occaſioned by acquired biaſſes. And one of theſe that has the greateſt influence in perverting the rational faculty, is blind religious zeal. There is not in nature a ſyſtem more ſimple or perſpicuous than that of pure religion; and yet what a compoſition hath it been rendered of metaphyſical ſubtilties, and unintelligible jargon! That ſubject being too well known to need illuſtration, I ſhall confine myſelf to a few inſtances of the influence that religious ſuperſtition has on other ſubjects.

A hiſtory-painter and a player require the ſame ſort of genius. The one by colours, the other by looks and geſtures, expreſſes various modifications of paſſion, even what are beyond the reach of words; and to accompliſh theſe ends, great ſenſibility is requiſite, as well as judgement. Why then is not a player equally reſpected with a hiſtory-painter? It was thought by zealots, that a play is an entertainment too ſplendid for a mortified Chriſtian; upon which account players fell under church-cenſure, and were held unworthy of Chriſtian burial. A hiſtory-painter, on the contrary, being employ'd in painting for the church, was always in high eſteem. It is only among Proteſtants that players are beginning to be reſtored to their privileges as free citizens; and there perhaps never exiſted a hiſtory-painter more juſtly eſteemed, than Garrick, a player, is in Great Britain. Ariſtarchus having taught, that the earth moves round the ſun, was accuſed by the Heathen prieſts, for troubling the repoſe of their houſehold-gods. Copernicus, for the ſame doctrine, was accuſed by Chriſtian prieſts, as contradicting the

the ſcriptures, which talk of the ſun's moving. And Galileo, for adhering to Copernicus, was condemned to priſon and penance: he found it neceſſary to recant upon his knees in a ſolemn manner. A bias acquired from Ariſtotle, kept reaſon in chains for centuries. Scholaſtic divinity in particular, founded on the philoſophy of that author, was more hurtful to the reaſoning faculty than the Goths and Huns. Tycho Brahé ſuffered great perſecution for maintaining, that the heavens were ſo far empty of matter as to give free courſe to the comets; contrary to Ariſtotle, who taught, that the heavens are harder than a diamond: it was extremely ill taken, that a ſimple mortal ſhould pretend to give Ariſtotle the lie. During the infancy of reaſon, authority is the prevailing argument *.

Reaſon is extremely apt to be warped by habit. In the diſputes among the Athenians, about adjuſting the form of their government, it is obſervable, that thoſe who lived in the high country were for democracy; that the inhabitants of the plains were for oligarchy; and the ſeamen for monarchy. Shepherds are all equal: in a corn-country, there are a few maſters and many ſervants: on ſhipboard, there is one commander, and all the reſt ſubjects. Habit was their adviſer: none of them thought of conſulting reaſon in order to judge what was the beſt form upon the whole. Habit of a different kind has an influence no leſs powerful. Perſons who are in the habit of reaſoning, require demon-

* Ariſtotle, it would appear, was leſs regarded by his cotemporaries than by the moderns. Some perſons having travelled from Macedon all the way to Perſia with complaints againſt Antipater, Alexander obſerved, that they would not have made ſo long a journey had they received no injury. And Caſſander, ſon of Antipater, replying, that their long journey was an argument againſt them, truſting that witneſſes would not be brought from ſuch a diſtance to give evidence of their calumny: Alexander, ſmiling, ſaid, "Your argument is one of Ariſtotle's ſo-"phiſms, which will ſerve either ſide equally."

ſtration

ſtration for every thing: even a ſelf-evident propoſition is not ſuffered to eſcape. Theſe ſuperfluous proofs occur more than once in the Elements of Euclid. Nor has Ariſtotle, with all his ſkill in logics, entirely avoided them. Can any thing be more ſelf-evident, than the difference between pleaſure and motion? Yet Ariſtotle attempts to demonſtrate, that they are different. "No motion," ſays he, "except circular motion, is perfect in any one point of time: there is always ſomething wanting during its courſe, and it is not perfected till it arrive at its end. But pleaſure is perfect in every point of time; being the ſame from the beginning to the end." The difference is clear from perception merely; but is far from being clear from this demonſtration. Plato alſo attempts to demonſtrate a ſelf-evident propoſition, viz. That a quality is not a body. "Every body," ſays he, "is a ſubject: quality is not a ſubject, but an accident; *ergo*, quality is not a body. Again, A body cannot be in a ſubject: every quality is in a ſubject; *ergo*, quality is not a body." But Deſcartes affords the moſt illuſtrious inſtance of the kind. He was the greateſt geometer of the age he lived in, and one of the greateſt of any age; which inſenſibly led him to overlook intuitive knowledge, and to admit no propoſition but what is demonſtrated or proved in the regular form of ſyllogiſm. He took a fancy to doubt even of his own exiſtence, till he was convinced of it by the following argument. *Cogito, ergo ſum: I think, therefore I exiſt.* And what ſort of a demonſtration is this after all? In the very fundamental propoſition he acknowledges his exiſtence by the term *I*; and how abſurd is it, to imagine a proof neceſſary of what is admitted to be true in the fundamental propoſition? In the next place, How does our author know that he thinks? If nothing is to be taken for granted, an argument is no leſs neceſſary to prove that he thinks, than to prove that he exiſts. It is true, that he has intuitive knowledge of his thinking; but has he not the ſame of his

his exiſting? Would not a man deſerve to be laughed at, who, after warming himſelf at a fire, ſhould imagine the following argument neceſſary to prove its exiſtence, "The fire burns, *ergo* it "exiſts?" Liſten to an author of high reputation attempting to demonſtrate a ſelf-evident propoſition. "The *labour* of B, can- "not be the labour of C; becauſe it is the application of the or- "gans and powers of B, not of C, to the effecting of ſomething; "and therefore the labour is as much B's, as the *limbs* and *facul-* "*ties* made uſe of are his. Again, the *effect* or *produce* of the la- "bour of B, is not the effect of the labour of C: and therefore "this effect or produce is B's, not C's; as much B's, as the *labour* "was B's, and not C's: Becauſe, what the labour of B cauſes or "produces, B produces by his labour; or it is the product of B "by his labour: that is, it is B's product, not C's, or any other's. "And if C ſhould pretend to any *property* in that which B can "truly call *his*, he would act contrary to truth (*a*)."

In every ſubject of reaſoning, to define terms is neceſſary in order to avoid miſtakes. But there muſt be words that admit not of a definition, otherwiſe definitions would follow definitions without end: and ſuch words are what ſignify ſimple ideas, which have no parts nor compoſition. The habit however of defining is ſo inveterate in ſome men, as to make them attempt to define words ſignifying ſimple ideas. Is there any neceſſity to define motion: do not children underſtand the meaning of the word? And how is it poſſible to define it, when there are not words more ſimple to define it by? Yet Worſter (*b*) attempts that bold taſk. "A continual change of place," ſays he, "or "leaving one place for another, without remaining for any ſpace "of time in the ſame place, is called *motion*." That every body

(*a*) Religion of Nature delineated, ſect. 6. paragr. 2.

(*b*) Natural Philoſophy, p. 31.

in motion is continually changing place, is true: but change of place is not motion; it is the effect of motion. Graveſend (*a*) defines motion thus, " Motus eſt tranſlatio de loco in lo-" cum, ſive continua loci mutatio *;" which is the ſame with the former. Yet this very author admits *locus* or *place* to ſignify a ſimple idea, incapable of a definition. Is it more ſimple or more intelligible than motion? But, of all, the moſt remarkable definition of motion is that of Ariſtotle, famous for its impenetrability, or rather abſurdity, viz. " Actus entis in potentia, quatenus in " potentia †."

Extenſion enters into the conception of every particle of matter; becauſe every particle of matter has length, breadth, and thickneſs. Figure in the ſame manner enters into the conception of every particle of matter; becauſe every particle of matter is bounded. By the power of abſtraction, figure may be conceived independent of the body that is figured; and extenſion may be conceived independent of the body that is extended. Theſe particulars are abundantly plain and obvious; and yet obſerve what a heap of jargon is employ'd by the followers of Leibnitz, in their fruitleſs endeavours to define extenſion. In order to that end, they begin with *ſimple exiſtences*, which they ſay are unextended, and without parts. According to that definition, ſimple exiſtences cannot belong to matter, becauſe the ſmalleſt particle of matter has both parts and extenſion. But to let that paſs, they endeavour to ſhow as follows, how the idea of extenſion ariſes from theſe ſimple exiſtences. " We may look upon ſimple exiſtences, as having mutual

(*a*) Elements of Phyſics, p. 28.

* " Motion is, the removing from one place to another, or a continual change " of place."

† " The action of a being in power, ſo far as it is in power."

" relations

" relations with reſpect to their internal ſtate; relations that form a " certain order in their manner of exiſtence. And this order or ar- " rangement of things, coexiſting and linked together, but ſo as " we do not diſtinctly underſtand how, cauſes in us a confuſed " idea, from whence ariſes the appearance of extenſion." A Peripatetic philoſopher being aſked, What ſort of things the ſenſible ſpecies of Ariſtotle are? anſwered, That they are neither entities nor nonentities, but ſomething intermediate between the two. The famous aſtronomer Iſmael Bulialdus lays down the following propoſition, and attempts a mathematical demonſtration of it, " That " light is a mean-proportional between corporeal ſubſtance and " incorporeal."

I cloſe with a curious ſort of reaſoning, ſo ſingular indeed as not to come under any of the foregoing heads. The firſt editions of the lateſt verſion of the Bible into Engliſh have a preface, in which the tranſlators make the following apology for not keeping cloſe to the words of the original. " Another thing we think good " to admoniſh thee of, gentle reader, that we have not tied our- " ſelves to an uniformity of phraſing, or to an identity of words, " as ſome peradventure would wiſh that we had done, becauſe " they obſerve, that ſome learned men ſomewhere have been as " exact as they could be that way. Truly, that we might not " vary from the ſenſe of that which we have tranſlated before, if " the word ſignified the ſame in both places, (for there be ſome " words that be not of the ſame ſenſe every where), we were e- " ſpecially careful, and made a conſcience according to our duty. " But that we ſhould expreſs the ſame notion in the ſame parti- " cular word; as, for example, if we tranſlate the Hebrew or " Greek word once by *purpoſe*, never to call it *intent*; if one where " *journeying*, never *travelling*; if one where *think*, never *ſuppoſe*; " if one where *pain*, never *ache*; if one where *joy*, never *gladneſs*, " &c.; thus to mince the matter, we thought to ſavour more

" of curioſity than wiſdom, and that rather it would breed ſcorn
" in the Atheiſt, than bring profit to the godly reader. For is the
" kingdom of God become words or ſyllables? Why ſhould we
" be in bondage to them, if we may be free; uſe one preciſely,
" when we may uſe another, no leſs fit, as commodiouſly? We
" might alſo be charged by ſcoffers, with ſome unequal dealing
" toward a great number of good Engliſh words. For as it is
" written by a certain great philoſopher, that he ſhould ſay, that
" thoſe logs were happy that were made images to be worſhip-
" ped; for their fellows, as good as they, lay for blocks behind
" the fire: ſo if we ſhould ſay, as it were, unto certain words,
" Stand up higher, have a place in the Bible always; and to o-
" thers of like quality, Get ye hence, be baniſhed for ever, we
" might be taxed peradventure with St James his words, name-
" ly, to be partial in ourſelves, and judges of evil thoughts."
Quæritur, Can this tranſlation be ſafely rely'd on, as the rule of faith, when ſuch are the tranſlators?

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APPENDIX.

IN reviewing the foregoing ſketch, it occurred, that a fair analyſis of Ariſtotle's logics, would be a valuable addition to the hiſtorical branch. A diſtinct and candid account of a ſyſtem that for many ages governed the reaſoning part of mankind, cannot but be acceptable to the public. Curioſity will be gratified, in ſeeing a phantom delineated, that ſo long faſcinated the learned world; a phantom, which, like the pyramids of Egypt, or hanging gardens of Babylon, is a ſtructure of infinite genius, but abſolutely uſeleſs, unleſs for raiſing wonder. Dr Reid, profeſſor of moral philoſophy in the college of Glaſgow, reliſhed the thought; and his friendſhip to me prevailed on him, after much ſolicitation, to undertake the laborious taſk. No man is better acquainted with Ariſtotle's writings; and, without any enthuſiaſtic attachment, he holds that philoſopher to be a firſt-rate genius.

The logics of Ariſtotle have been on the decline more than a century; and are at preſent relegated to ſchools and colleges. They have occaſionally been criticiſed by different writers; but this is the firſt attempt to draw them out of their obſcurity into day-light. By what follows, one will be enabled to paſs a true judgement on them, and to determine, whether they ought, or ought not, to make a branch of education. The Doctor's eſſay, as a capital article in the progreſs and hiſtory of the ſciences, will, I hope, be made welcome, even with the fatigue of ſqueezing through many thorny paths, before a proper view can be obtained of that ancient and ſtupendous fabric.

It will at the ſame time ſhow the hurt that Ariſtotle has done to the reaſoning faculty, by drawing it out of its natural courſe into devious paths. His artificial mode of reaſoning, is no leſs ſuperficial than intricate. I ſay, ſuperficial; for in none of his logical works, is a ſingle truth attempted to be proved by ſyllogiſm that requires a proof: the propoſitions he undertakes to prove by ſyllogiſm, are all of them ſelf-evident. Take for inſtance the following propoſition, That man has a power of ſelf-motion. To prove this, he aſſumes the following axiom, upon which indeed every one of his ſyllogiſms are founded, viz. That whatever is true of a number of particulars joined together, holds true of every one ſeparately; which is thus expreſſed in logical terms, Whatever is true of the genus, holds true of every ſpecies. Founding upon that axiom, he reaſons thus: "All animals have a power "of ſelf-motion: man is an animal: *ergo*, man has a power "of ſelf-motion." Now if all animals have a power of ſelf-motion, it requires no argument to prove, that man, an animal, has that power: and therefore, what he gives as a concluſion or conſequence, is not really ſo; it is not *inferred* from the fundamental propoſition, but is *included* in it. At the ſame time, the ſelf-motive power of man, is a fact that cannot be known but from experience. I add, that the ſelf-motive power of man, is more clearly aſcertained by experience, than that of any other animal: and in attempting to prove man to be a ſelf-motive animal, is it not abſurd, to found the argument on a propoſition leſs certain than that undertaken to be demonſtrated? What is here obſerved, will be found applicable to the bulk, if not the whole, of his ſyllogiſms.

It appears ſingular, that Ariſtotle himſelf never attempts to apply his ſyllogiſtic mode of reaſoning, to any ſubject handled by him: on ethics, on rhetoric, and on poetry, he argues like a rational being, without once putting in practice any of his own rules.

But

But how is it poſſible, that a man of his capacity could long remain ignorant, how inſufficient a ſyllogiſm is for diſcovering any latent truth? He certainly intended his ſyſtem of logics, chiefly, if not ſolely, for diſputation: and if ſuch was his purpoſe, he has been wonderfully ſucceſsful; for nothing can be better contrived than that ſyſtem, for wrangling and diſputing without end. He indeed in a manner profeſſes this to be his aim, in his books *De Sophiſticis elenchis*.

Some ages hence, when the goodly fabric of the Romiſh ſpiritual power ſhall be laid low in the duſt, and ſcarce a veſtige remain, it will among antiquaries be a curious enquiry, What was the nature and extent of a tyranny, more oppreſſive to the minds of men, than the tyranny of ancient Rome was to their perſons. During every ſtep of the enquiry, poſterity will rejoice over mental liberty, no leſs precious in their eyes than perſonal liberty. The deſpotiſm of Ariſtotle with reſpect to the faculty of reaſon, was no leſs complete, than that of the Biſhop of Rome with reſpect to religion; and it has now become a proper ſubject of curioſity, to enquire into the nature and extent of that deſpotiſm, from which men are at laſt ſet happily free. One cannot peruſe the following ſheets, without ſympathetic pain for the weakneſs of man with reſpect to his nobleſt faculty; but that pain will redouble his ſatisfaction, in now being left free to the dictates of reaſon and common ſenſe.

In my reveries, I have more than once compared Ariſtotle's logics to a bubble made of ſoap-water for amuſing children; a beautiful figure with ſplendid colours; fair on the outſide, empty within. It has for more than two thouſand years been the hard fate of Ariſtotle's followers, Ixion like, to embrace a cloud for a goddeſs.—But this is more than ſufficient for a preface: and I had almoſt forgot, that I am detaining my readers from better entertainment, in liſtening to Dr Reid.

A Brief Account of ARISTOTLE'S LOGIC. With REMARKS.

CHAP. I.

Of the Firſt Three Treatiſes.

SECT. I. *Of the Author.*

ARiſtotle had very uncommon advantages: born in an age when the philoſophical ſpirit in Greece had long flouriſhed, and was in its greateſt vigour; brought up in the court of Macedon, where his father was the King's phyſician; twenty years a favourite ſcholar of Plato, and tutor to Alexander the Great; who both honoured him with his friendſhip, and ſupplied him with every thing neceſſary for the proſecution of his enquiries.

Theſe advantages he improved by indefatigable ſtudy, and immenſe reading. He was the firſt we know, ſays Strabo, who compoſed a library. And in this the Egyptian and Pergamenian kings, copied his example. As to his genius, it would be diſreſpectful to mankind, not to allow an uncommon ſhare to a man who governed the opinions of the moſt enlightened part of the ſpecies near two thouſand years.

If his talents had been laid out ſolely for the diſcovery of truth, and the good of mankind, his laurels would have remained for ever freſh: but he ſeems to have had a greater paſſion for fame than

than for truth, and to have wanted rather to be admired as the prince of philoſophers, than to be uſeful: ſo that it is dubious whether there be in his character moſt of the philoſopher, or of the ſophiſt. The opinion of Lord Bacon is not without probability, That his ambition was as boundleſs as that of his royal pupil, the one aſpiring at univerſal monarchy over the bodies and fortunes of men, the other over their opinions. If this was the caſe, it cannot be ſaid, that the philoſopher purſued his aim with leſs induſtry, leſs ability, or leſs ſucceſs, than the hero.

His writings carry too evident marks of that philoſophical pride, vanity, and envy, which have often ſullied the character of the learned. He determines boldly things above all human knowledge; and enters upon the moſt difficult queſtions, as his pupil entered on a battle, with full aſſurance of ſucceſs. He delivers his deciſions oracularly, and without any fear of miſtake. Rather than confeſs his ignorance, he hides it under hard words and ambiguous expreſſions, of which his interpreters can make what pleaſes them. There is even reaſon to ſuſpect, that he wrote often with affected obſcurity, either that the air of myſtery might procure greater veneration, or that his books might be underſtood only by the adepts who had been initiated in his philoſophy.

His conduct towards the writers that went before him has been much cenſured. After the manner of the Ottoman princes, ſays Lord Verulam, he thought his throne could not be ſecure unleſs he killed all his brethren. Ludovicus Vives charges him with detracting from all philoſophers, that he might derive that glory to himſelf, of which he robbed them. He rarely quotes an author but with a view to cenſure, and is not very fair in repreſenting the opinions which he cenſures.

The faults we have mentioned are ſuch as might be expected in a man, who had the daring ambition to be tranſmitted to all future ages, as the prince of philoſophers, as one who had carried

every branch of human knowledge to its utmoſt limit; and who was not very ſcrupulous about the means he took to obtain his end.

We ought, however, to do him the juſtice to obſerve, that although the pride and vanity of the ſophiſt appear too much in his writings in abſtract philoſophy, yet in natural hiſtory the fidelity of his narrations ſeems to be equal to his induſtry; and he always diſtinguiſhes between what he knew and what he had by report. And even in abſtract philoſophy, it would be unfair to impute to Ariſtotle all the faults, all the obſcurities, and all the contradictions that are to be found in his writings. The greateſt part, and perhaps the beſt part, of his writings is loſt. There is reaſon to doubt whether ſome of thoſe we aſcribe to him be really his; and whether what are his be not much vitiated and interpolated. Theſe ſuſpicions are juſtified by the fate of Ariſtotle's writings, which is judiciouſly related, from the beſt authorities, in Bayle's dictionary, under the article *Tyrannion*, to which I refer.

His books in logic which remain, are, 1. One book of the Categories. 2. One of Interpretation. 3. Firſt Analytics, two books. 4. Laſt Analytics, two books. 5. Topics, eight books. 6. Of Sophiſms, one book. Diogenes Laertius mentions many others that are loſt. Thoſe I have mentioned have commonly been publiſhed together, under the name of *Ariſtotle's Organon*, or *his Logic*; and for many ages, Porphyry's Introduction to the Categories has been prefixed to them.

Sect. 2. *Of Porphyry's Introduction.*

In this Introduction, which is addreſſed to Chryſoarius, the author obſerves, That in order to underſtand Ariſtotle's doctrine concerning the categories, it is neceſſary to know what a *genus* is,

is, what a *ſpecies*, what a *ſpecific difference*, what a *property*, and what an *accident*; that the knowledge of theſe is alſo very uſeful in definition, in diviſion, and even in demonſtration: therefore he propoſes, in this little tract, to deliver ſhortly and ſimply the doctrine of the ancients, and chiefly of the Peripatetics, concerning theſe five *predicables*; avoiding the more intricate queſtions concerning them; ſuch as, Whether *genera* and *ſpecies* do really exiſt in nature? or, Whether they are only conceptions of the human mind? If they exiſt in nature, Whether they are corporeal or incorporeal? and, Whether they are inherent in the objects of ſenſe, or disjoined from them? Theſe, he ſays, are very difficult queſtions, and require accurate diſcuſſion; but that he is not to meddle with them.

After this preface, he explains very minutely each of the five words above mentioned, divides and ſubdivides each of them, and then purſues all the agreements and differences between one and another through ſixteen chapters.

SECT. 3. *Of the Categories.*

The book begins with an explication of what is meant by univocal words, what by equivocal, and what by denominative. Then it is obſerved, that what we ſay is either ſimple, without compoſition or ſtructure, as *man*, *horſe*; or, it has compoſition and ſtructure, as, *a man fights*, *the horſe runs*. Next comes a diſtinction between a ſubject of predication; that is, a ſubject of which any thing is affirmed or denied, and a ſubject of inheſion. Theſe things are ſaid to be inherent in a ſubject, which although they are not a part of the ſubject, cannot poſſibly exiſt without it, as figure in the thing figured. Of things that are, ſays Ariſtotle, ſome may be predicated of a ſubject, but are in no ſubject; as,

man may be predicated of James or John, but is not in any ſubject. Some again are in a ſubject, but can be predicated of no ſubject. Thus, my knowledge in grammar is in me as its ſubject, but it can be predicated of no ſubject; becauſe it is an individual thing. Some are both in a ſubject, and may be predicated of a ſubject, as ſcience; which is in the mind as its ſubject, and may be predicated of geometry. Laſtly, Some things can neither be in a ſubject, nor be predicated of any ſubject. Such are all individual ſubſtances, which cannot be predicated, becauſe they are individuals; and cannot be in a ſubject, becauſe they are ſubſtances. After ſome other ſubtilties about predicates and ſubjects, we come to the categories themſelves; the things above mentioned being called by the ſchoolmen the *antepræ dicamenta*. It may be obſerved, however, that notwithſtanding the diſtinction now explained, the *being in a ſubject*, and the *being predicated truly of a ſubject*, are in the Analytics uſed as ſynonymous phraſes; and this variation of ſtyle has led ſome perſons to think that the Categories were not wrote by Ariſtotle.

Things which may be expreſſed without compoſition or ſtructure, are, ſays the author, reducible to the following heads. They are either *ſubſtance*, or *quantity*, or *quality*, or *relatives*, or *place*, or *time*, or *having*, or *doing*, or *ſuffering*. Theſe are the predicaments or categories. The firſt four are largely treated of in four chapters; the others are ſlightly paſſed over, as ſufficiently clear of themſelves. As a ſpecimen, I ſhall give a ſummary of what he ſays on the category of ſubſtance.

Subſtances are either primary, to wit, individual ſubſtances, or ſecondary, to wit, the genera and ſpecies of ſubſtances. Primary ſubſtances neither are in a ſubject, nor can be predicated of a ſubject; but all other things that exiſt, either are in primary ſubſtances, or may be predicated of them. For whatever can be predicated of that which is in a ſubject, may alſo be predicated of the

ſubject

ſubject itſelf. Primary ſubſtances are more ſubſtances than the ſecondary; and of the ſecondary, the ſpecies is more a ſubſtance than the genus. If there were no primary, there could be no ſecondary ſubſtances.

The properties of ſubſtance are theſe: 1. No ſubſtance is capable of intenſion or remiſſion. 2. No ſubſtance can be in any other thing as its ſubject of inheſion. 3. No ſubſtance has a contrary; for one ſubſtance cannot be contrary to another; nor can there be contrariety between a ſubſtance and that which is no ſubſtance. 4. The moſt remarkable property of ſubſtance, is, that one and the ſame ſubſtance may, by ſome change in itſelf, become the ſubject of things that are contrary. Thus, the ſame body may be at one time hot, at another cold.

Let this ſerve as a ſpecimen of Ariſtotle's manner of treating the categories. After them, we have ſome chapters, which the ſchoolmen call *poſtprædicamenta*; wherein, firſt, the four kinds of oppoſition of terms are explained; to wit, *relative*, *privative*, of *contrariety*, and of *contradiction*. This is repeated in all ſyſtems of logic. Laſt of all we have diſtinctions of the four Greek words which anſwer to the Latin ones, *prius*, *ſimul*, *motus*, and *habere*.

SECT. 4. *Of the book concerning Interpretation.*

We are to conſider, ſays Ariſtotle, what a noun is, what a verb, what affirmation, what negation, what ſpeech. Words are the ſigns of what paſſeth in the mind; writing is the ſign of words. The ſigns both of writing and of words are different in different nations, but the operations of mind ſignified by them are the ſame. There are ſome operations of thought which are neither true nor falſe. Theſe are expreſſed by nouns or verbs ſingly, and without compoſition.

A noun is a ſound which by compact ſignifies ſomething without reſpect to time, and of which no part has ſignification by itſelf. The cries of beaſts may have a natural ſignification, but they are not nouns. We give that name only to ſounds which have their ſignification by compact. The caſes of a noun, as the genitive, dative, are not nouns. *Non homo* is not a noun, but, for diſtinction's ſake, may be called a *nomen infinitum.*

A verb ſignifies ſomething by compact with relation to time. Thus, *valet* is a verb; but *valetudo* is a noun, becauſe its ſignification has no relation to time. It is only the preſent tenſe of the indicative that is properly called a verb; the other tenſes and moods are variations of the verb. *Non valet* may be called a *verbum infinitum.*

Speech is ſound ſignificant by compact, of which ſome part is alſo ſignificant. And it is either enunciative, or not enunciative. Enunciative ſpeech is that which affirms or denies. As to ſpeech which is not enunciative, ſuch as a prayer or wiſh, the conſideration of it belongs to oratory, or poetry. Every enunciative ſpeech muſt have a verb, or ſome variation of a verb. Affirmation is the enunciation of one thing concerning another. Negation is the enunciation of one thing from another. Contradiction is an affirmation and negation that are oppoſite. This is a ſummary of the firſt ſix chapters.

The ſeventh and eighth treat of the various kinds of enunciations or propoſitions, univerſal, particular, indefinite, and ſingular; and of the various kinds of oppoſition in propoſitions, and the axioms concerning them. Theſe things are repeated in every ſyſtem of logic. In the ninth chapter he endeavours to prove, by a long metaphyſical reaſoning, that propoſitions reſpecting future contingencies are not, determinately, either true or falſe; and that if they were, it would follow, that all things happen neceſſarily,

ſarily, and could not have been otherwiſe than as they are. The remaining chapters contain many minute obſervations concerning the equipollency of propoſitions both pure and modal.

CHAP. II.

Remarks.

SECT. I. *On the Five Predicables.*

THE writers on logic have borrowed their materials almoſt entirely from Ariſtotle's Organon, and Porphyry's Introduction. The Organon however was not wrote by Ariſtotle as one work. It comprehends various tracts, wrote without the view of making them parts of one whole, and afterwards thrown together by his editors under one name on account of their affinity. Many of his books that are loſt would have made a part of the Organon, if they had been ſaved.

The three treatiſes of which we have given a brief account, are unconnected with each other, and with thoſe that follow. And although the firſt was undoubtedly compiled by Porphyry, and the two laſt probably by Ariſtotle, yet I conſider them as the venerable remains of a philoſophy more ancient than Ariſtotle. Archytas of Tarentum, an eminent mathematician and philoſopher of the Pythagorean ſchool, is ſaid to have wrote upon the ten categories. And the five predicables probably had their origin in the ſame ſchool. Ariſtotle, tho' abundantly careful to do juſtice to himſelf, does not claim the invention of either. And Porphyry, without

without aſcribing the latter to Ariſtotle, profeſſes only to deliver the doctrine of the ancients, and chiefly of the Peripatetics, concerning them.

The writers on logic having divided that ſcience into three parts; the firſt treating of ſimple apprehenſion, and of terms; the ſecond, of judgement, and of propoſitions; and the third, of reaſoning, and of ſyllogiſms. The materials of the firſt part are taken from Porphyry's Introduction, and the Categories; and thoſe of the ſecond from the book of Interpretation.

A predicable, according to the grammatical form of the word, might ſeem to ſignify, whatever may be predicated, that is, affirmed or denied, of ſome ſubject. And in this ſenſe every predicate would be a predicable. But the logicians give a different meaning to the word. They divide propoſitions into certain claſſes, according to the relation which the predicate of the propoſition bears to the ſubject. The firſt claſs is that wherein the predicate is the *genus* of the ſubject; as when we ſay, *This is a triangle*, *Jupiter is a planet*. In the ſecond claſs, the predicate is a *ſpecies* of the ſubject; as when we ſay, *This triangle is right-angled*. A third claſs is when the predicate is the ſpecific difference of the ſubject; as when we ſay, *Every triangle has three ſides and three angles*. A fourth when the predicate is a property of the ſubject; as when we ſay, *The angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles*. And a fifth claſs is when the predicate is ſomething accidental to the ſubject; as when we ſay, *This triangle is neatly drawn*.

Each of theſe claſſes comprehends a great variety of propoſitions, having different ſubjects, and different predicates; but in each claſs the relation between the predicate and the ſubject is the ſame. Now it is to this relation that logicians have given the name of *a predicable*. Hence it is, that altho' the number of predicates be infinite, yet the number of predicables can be no greater than

that

that of the different relations which may be in propoſitions between the predicate and the ſubject. And if all propoſitions belong to one or other of the five claſſes above mentioned, there can be but five predicables, to wit, *genus*, *ſpecies*, *differentia*, *proprium*, and *accidens*. Theſe might, with more propriety perhaps, have been called *the five claſſes of predicates*; but uſe has determined them to be called *the five predicables*.

It may alſo be obſerved, that as ſome objects of thought are individuals, ſuch as, *Julius Cæſar*, *the city Rome*; ſo others are common to many individuals, as *good*, *great*, *virtuous*, *vicious*. Of this laſt kind are all things expreſſed by adjectives. Things common to many individuals were by the ancients called *univerſals*. All predicates are univerſals, for they all have the nature of adjectives; and, on the other hand, all univerſals may be predicates. On this account univerſals may be divided into the ſame claſſes as predicates; and as the five claſſes of predicates above mentioned have been called the five predicables, ſo by the ſame kind of phraſeology they have been called *the five univerſals*; altho' they may more properly be called *the five claſſes of univerſals*.

The doctrine of the five univerſals or predicables makes an eſſential part of every ſyſtem of logic, and has been handed down without any change to this day. The very name of *predicables* ſhews, that the author of this diviſion, whoever he was, intended it as a complete enumeration of all the kinds of things that can be affirmed of any ſubject; and ſo it has always been underſtood. So that it is implied in this diviſion, that all that can be affirmed of any thing whatſoever, is either the *genus* of the thing, or its *ſpecies*, or its *ſpecific difference*, or ſome *property* or *accident* belonging to it.

Burgerſdick, a very acute writer in logic, ſeems to have been aware, that ſtrong objections might be made to the five predicables, conſidered as a complete enumeration; but unwilling to al-

low any imperfection in this ancient diviſion, he endeavours to reſtrain the meaning of the word *predicable*, ſo as to obviate objections. Thoſe things only, ſays he, are to be accounted predicables, which may be affirmed of *many individuals*, *truly*, *properly*, and *immediately*. The conſequence of putting ſuch limitations upon the word *predicable* is, that in many propoſitions, perhaps in moſt, the predicate is not a predicable. But admitting all his limitations, the enumeration will ſtill be very incomplete: for of many things we may affirm truly, properly, and immediately, their exiſtence, their end, their cauſe, their effect, and various relations which they bear to other things. Theſe, and perhaps many more, are predicables in the ſtrict ſenſe of the word, no leſs than the five which have been ſo long famous.

Altho' Porphyry, and all ſubſequent writers, make the predicables to be, in number, five; yet Ariſtotle himſelf, in the beginning of the Topics, reduces them to four; and demonſtrates, that they can be no more. We ſhall give his demonſtration when we come to the Topics; and ſhall only here obſerve, that as Burgerſdick juſtifies the fivefold diviſion, by reſtraining the meaning of the word *predicable*; ſo Ariſtotle juſtifies the fourfold diviſion, by enlarging the meaning of the words *property* and *accident*.

After all, I apprehend, that this ancient diviſion of predicables, with all its imperfections, will bear a compariſon with thoſe which have been ſubſtituted in its ſtead by the moſt celebrated modern philoſophers.

Locke, in his Eſſay on the Human Underſtanding, having laid it down as a principle, That all our knowledge conſiſts in perceiving certain agreements and diſagreements between our ideas, reduces theſe agreements and diſagreements to four heads: to wit, 1. Identity and Diverſity; 2. Relation; 3. Coexiſtence; 4. Real Exiſtence (*a*). Here are four predicables given as a complete e-

(*a*) Book 4. chap. 1.

numeration,

numeration, and yet not one of the ancient predicables is included in the number.

The author of the Treatiſe of Human Nature, proceeding upon the ſame principle, That all our knowledge is only a perception of the relations of our ideas, obſerves, "That it may perhaps be "eſteemed an endleſs taſk, to enumerate all thoſe qualities which "admit of compariſon, and by which the ideas of philoſophical "relation are produced: but if we diligently conſider them, we "ſhall find, that without difficulty they may be compriſed under "ſeven general heads: 1. Reſemblance; 2. Identity; 3. Rela-"tions of Space and Time; 4. Relations of Quantity and Num-"ber; 5. Degrees of Quality; 6. Contrariety; 7. Cauſation (*a*)." Here again are ſeven predicables given as a complete enumeration, wherein all the predicables of the ancients, as well as two of Locke's, are left out.

The ancients in their diviſion attended only to categorical propoſitions which have one ſubject and one predicate; and of theſe, only to ſuch as have a general term for their ſubject. The moderns, by their definition of knowledge, have been led to attend only to relative propoſitions, which expreſs a relation between two ſubjects, and thoſe ſubjects they ſuppoſe to be always ideas.

SECT. 2. *On the Ten Categories, and on Diviſions in general.*

The intention of the categories or predicaments is, to muſter every object of human apprehenſion under ten heads: for the categories are given as a complete enumeration of every thing which can be expreſſed without *compoſition* and *ſtructure*; that is,

(*a*) Vol. 1. p. 33. and 125.

of every thing which can be either the ſubject or the predicate of a propoſition. So that as every ſoldier belongs to ſome company, and every company to ſome regiment; in like manner every thing that can be the object of human thought, has its place in one or other of the ten categories; and by dividing and ſubdividing properly the ſeveral categories, all the notions that enter into the human mind may be muſtered in rank and file, like an army in the day of battle.

The perfection of the diviſion of categories into ten heads, has been ſtrenuouſly defended by the followers of Ariſtotle, as well as that of the five predicables. They are indeed of kin to each other. They breathe the ſame ſpirit, and probably had the ſame origin. By the one we are taught to marſhal every term that can enter into a propoſition, either as ſubject or predicate; and by the other, we are taught all the poſſible relations which the ſubject can have to the predicate. Thus, the whole furniture of the human mind is preſented to us at one view, and contracted, as it were, into a nut-ſhell. To attempt, in ſo early a period, a methodical delineation of the vaſt region of human knowledge, actual and poſſible, and to point out the limits of every diſtrict, was indeed magnanimous in a high degree, and deſerves our admiration, while we lament that the human powers are unequal to ſo bold a flight.

A regular diſtribution of things under proper claſſes or heads, is, without doubt, a great help both to memory and judgement. And as the philoſopher's province includes all things human and divine that can be objects of enquiry, he is naturally led to attempt ſome general diviſion, like that of the categories. And the invention of a diviſion of this kind, which the ſpeculative part of mankind acquieſced in for two thouſand years, marks a ſuperiority of genius in the inventer, whoever he was. Nor does it appear, that the general diviſions which, ſince the decline of the Peripatetic

tic philoſophy, have been ſubſtituted in place of the ten categories, are more perfect.

Locke has reduced all things to three categories; to wit, ſubſtances, modes, and relations. In this diviſion, time, ſpace, and number, three great objects of human thought, are omitted.

The author of the Treatiſe of Human Nature has reduced all things to two categories; to wit, ideas, and impreſſions: a diviſion which is very well adapted to his ſyſtem; and which puts me in mind of another made by an excellent mathematician in a printed theſis I have ſeen. In it the author, after a ſevere cenſure of the ten categories of the Peripatetics, maintains, that there neither are nor can be more than two categories of things; to wit, *data*, and *quæſita*.

There are two ends that may be propoſed by ſuch diviſions. The firſt is, to methodize or digeſt in order what a man actually knows. This is neither unimportant nor impracticable; and in proportion to the ſolidity and accuracy of a man's judgement, his diviſions of things which he knows, will be elegant and uſeful. The ſame ſubject may admit, and even require, various diviſions, according to the different points of view from which we contemplate it: nor does it follow, that becauſe one diviſion is good, therefore another is naught. To be acquainted with the diviſions of the logicians and metaphyſicians, without a ſuperſtitious attachment to them, may be of uſe in dividing the ſame ſubjects, or even thoſe of a different nature. Thus, Quintilian borrows from the ten categories his diviſion of the topics of rhetorical argumentation. Of all methods of arrangement, the moſt antiphiloſophical ſeems to be the invention of this age; I mean, the arranging the arts and ſciences by the letters of the alphabet, in dictionaries and encyclopedies. With theſe authors the categories are, A, B, C, &c.

Another end commonly propoſed by ſuch diviſions, but very rarely

rarely attained, is, to exhauſt the ſubject divided; ſo that nothing that belongs to it ſhall be omitted. It is one of the general rules of diviſion in all ſyſtems of logic, That the diviſion ſhould be adequate to the ſubject divided: a good rule, without doubt; but very often beyond the reach of human power. To make a perfect diviſion, a man muſt have a perfect comprehenſion of the whole ſubject at one view. When our knowledge of the ſubject is imperfect, any diviſion we can make of it, muſt be like the firſt ſketch of a painter, to be extended, contracted, or mended, as the ſubject ſhall be found to require. Yet nothing is more common, not only among the ancient, but even among modern philoſophers, than to draw, from their incomplete diviſions, concluſions which ſuppoſe them to be perfect.

A diviſion is a repoſitory which the philoſopher frames for holding his ware in convenient order. The philoſopher maintains, that ſuch or ſuch a thing is not good ware, becauſe there is no place in his ware-room that fits it. We are apt to yield to this argument in philoſophy, but it would appear ridiculous in any other traffic.

Peter Ramus, who had the ſpirit of a reformer in philoſophy, and who had a force of genius ſufficient to ſhake the Ariſtotelian fabric in many parts, but inſufficient to erect any thing more ſolid in its place, tried to remedy the imperfection of philoſophical diviſions, by introducing a new manner of dividing. His diviſions always conſiſted of two members, one of which was contradictory of the other; as if one ſhould divide England into Middleſex and what is not Middleſex. It is evident that theſe two members comprehend all England: for the logicians obſerve, that a term, along with its contradictory, comprehend all things. In the ſame manner, we may divide what is not Middleſex into Kent and what is not Kent. Thus one may go on by diviſions and ſubdiviſions that are abſolutely complete. This example may

ſerve

ſerve to give an idea of the ſpirit of Ramean diviſions, which were in no ſmall reputation about two hundred years ago.

Ariſtotle was not ignorant of this kind of diviſion. But he uſed it only as a touchſtone to prove by induction the perfection of ſome other diviſion, which indeed is the beſt uſe that can be made of it; when applied to the common purpoſe of diviſion, it is both inelegant, and burdenſome to the memory; and, after it has put one out of breath by endleſs ſubdiviſions, there is ſtill a negative term left behind, which ſhows that you are no nearer the end of your journey than when you began.

Until ſome more effectual remedy be found for the imperfection of diviſions, I beg leave to propoſe one more ſimple than that of Ramus. It is this: When you meet with a diviſion of any ſubject imperfectly comprehended, add to the laſt member an *et cætera*. That this *et cætera* makes the diviſion complete, is undeniable; and therefore it ought to hold its place as a member, and to be always underſtood, whether expreſſed or not, until clear and poſitive proof be brought, that the diviſion is complete without it. And this ſame *et cætera* ſhall be the repoſitory of all members that ſhall in any future time ſhew a good and valid right to a property in the ſubject.

SECT. 3. *On Diſtinctions.*

Having ſaid ſo much of logical diviſions, we ſhall next make ſome remarks upon diſtinctions.

Since the philoſophy of Ariſtotle fell into diſrepute, it has been a common topic of wit and raillery, to enveigh againſt metaphyſical diſtinctions. Indeed the abuſe of them in the ſcholaſtic ages, ſeems to juſtify a general prejudice againſt them: and ſhallow thinkers and writers have good reaſon to be jealous of diſtinctions,

tinctions, becauſe they make ſad work when applied to their flimſy compoſitions. But every man of true judgement, while he condemns diſtinctions that have no foundation in the nature of things, muſt perceive, that indiſcriminately to decry diſtinctions, is, to renounce all pretenſions to juſt reaſoning: for as falſe reaſoning commonly proceeds from confounding things that are different, ſo without diſtinguiſhing ſuch things, it is impoſſible to avoid error, or detect ſophiſtry. The authority of Aquinas, or Suarez, or even of Ariſtotle, can neither ſtamp a real value upon diſtinctions of baſe metal, nor ought it to hinder the currency of thoſe that have intrinſic value.

Some diſtinctions are verbal, others are real. The firſt kind diſtinguiſh the various meanings of a word; ſome of which may be proper, others metaphorical. Diſtinctions of this kind make a part of the grammar of a language, and are often abſurd when tranſlated into another language. Real diſtinctions are equally good in all languages, and ſuffer no hurt by tranſlation. They diſtinguiſh the different ſpecies contained under ſome general notion, or the different parts contained in one whole.

Many of Ariſtotle's diſtinctions are verbal merely; and therefore more proper materials for a dictionary of the Greek language than for a philoſophical treatiſe. At leaſt, they ought never to have been tranſlated into other languages, when the idiom of the language will not juſtify them: for this is to adulterate the language, to introduce foreign idioms into it without neceſſity or uſe, and to make it ambiguous where it was not. The diſtinctions in the end of the Categories of the four words *prius*, *ſimul*, *motus*, and *habere*, are all verbal.

The modes or ſpecies of *prius*, according to Ariſtotle, are five. One thing may be prior to another; firſt, in point of time; ſecondly, in point of dignity; thirdly, in point of order; and ſo forth. The modes of *ſimul* are only three. It ſeems this word was not

not uſed in the Greek with ſo great latitude as the other, although they are relative terms.

The modes or ſpecies of motion he makes to be ſix, to wit, generation, corruption, increaſe, decreaſe, alteration, and change of place.

The modes or ſpecies of *having* are eight. 1. Having a quality or habit, as having wiſdom. 2. Having quantity or magnitude. 3. Having things adjacent, as having a ſword. 4. Having things as parts, as having hands or feet. 5. Having in a part or on a part, as having a ring on one's finger. 6. Containing, as a caſk is ſaid to have wine. 7. Poſſeſſing, as having lands or houſes. 8. Having a wife.

Another diſtinction of this kind is Ariſtotle's diſtinction of cauſes; of which he makes four kinds, efficient, material, formal, and final. Theſe diſtinctions may deſerve a place in a dictionary of the Greek language; but in Engliſh or Latin they adulterate the language. Yet ſo fond were the ſchoolmen of diſtinctions of this kind, that they added to Ariſtotle's enumeration, an impulſive cauſe, an exemplary cauſe, and I don't know how many more. We ſeem to have adopted into Engliſh a final cauſe; but it is merely a term of art, borrowed from the Peripatetic philoſophy, without neceſſity or uſe: for the Engliſh word *end* is as good as *final cauſe*, though not ſo long nor ſo learned.

SECT. 4. *On Definitions.*

It remains that we make ſome remarks on Ariſtotle's definitions, which have expoſed him to much cenſure and ridicule. Yet I think it muſt be allowed, that in things which need definition, and admit of it, his definitions are commonly judicious and accurate; and had he attempted to define ſuch things only, his ene-

mies had wanted great matter of triumph. I believe it may likewiſe be ſaid in his favour, that until Locke's eſſay was wrote, there was nothing of importance delivered by philoſophers with regard to definition, beyond what Ariſtotle has ſaid upon that ſubject.

He conſiders a definition as a ſpeech declaring what a thing is. Every thing eſſential to the thing defined, and nothing more, muſt be contained in the definition. Now the eſſence of a thing conſiſts of theſe two parts: Firſt, What is common to it with other things of the ſame kind; and, ſecondly, What diſtinguiſhes it from other things of the ſame kind. The firſt is called the *genus* of the thing, the ſecond its *ſpecific difference*. The definition therefore conſiſts of theſe two parts. And for finding them, we muſt have recourſe to the ten categories; in one or other of which every thing in nature is to be found. Each category is a *genus*, and is divided into ſo many ſpecies, which are diſtinguiſhed by their ſpecific differences. Each of theſe ſpecies is again ſubdivided into ſo many ſpecies, with regard to which it is a genus. This diviſion and ſubdiviſion continues until we come to the loweſt ſpecies, which can only be divided into individuals, diſtinguiſhed from one another, not by any ſpecific difference, but by accidental differences of time, place, and other circumſtances.

The category itſelf being the higheſt genus, is in no reſpect a ſpecies, and the loweſt *ſpecies* is in no reſpect a *genus*; but every intermediate order is a genus compared with thoſe that are below it, and a ſpecies compared with thoſe above it. To find the definition of any thing, therefore, you muſt take the genus which is immediately above its place in the category, and the ſpecific *difference*, by which it is diſtinguiſhed from other ſpecies of the ſame *genus*. Theſe two make a perfect definition. This I take to be the ſubſtance of Ariſtotle's ſyſtem; and probably the ſyſtem of the Pythagorean ſchool before Ariſtotle, concerning definition.

But

But notwithſtanding the ſpecious appearance of this ſyſtem, it has its defects. Not to repeat what was before ſaid, of the imperfection of the diviſion of things into ten categories, the ſubdiviſions of each category are no leſs imperfect. Ariſtotle has given ſome ſubdiviſions of a few of them; and as far as he goes, his followers pretty unanimouſly take the ſame road. But when they attempt to go farther, they take very different roads. It is evident, that if the ſeries of each category could be completed, and the diviſion of things into categories could be made perfect, ſtill the higheſt genus in each category could not be defined, becauſe it is not a ſpecies; nor could individuals be defined, becauſe they have no ſpecific difference. There are alſo many ſpecies of things, whoſe ſpecific difference cannot be expreſſed in language, even when it is evident to ſenſe, or to the underſtanding. Thus, green, red, and blue, are very diſtinct ſpecies of colour; but who can expreſs in words wherein green differs from red or blue?

Without borrowing light from the ancient ſyſtem, we may perceive, that every definition muſt conſiſt of words that need no definition; and that to define the common words of a language that have no ambiguity, is trifling, if it could be done; the only uſe of a definition being to give a clear and adequate conception of the meaning of a word.

The logicians indeed diſtinguiſh between the definition of a word, and the definition of a thing; conſidering the former as the mean office of a lexicographer, but the laſt as the grand work of a philoſopher. But what they have ſaid about the definition of a thing, if it has a meaning, is beyond my comprehenſion. All the rules of definition agree to the definition of a word: and if they mean by the definition of a thing, the giving an adequate conception of the nature and eſſence of any thing that exiſts; this is impoſſible, and is the vain boaſt of men unconſcious of the weakneſs of human underſtanding.

The works of God are all imperfectly known by us. We ſee their outſide, or perhaps we diſcover ſome of their qualities and relations, by obſervation and experiment, aſſiſted by reaſoning; but we can give no definition of the meaneſt of them which comprehends its real eſſence. It is juſtly obſerved by Locke, that nominal eſſences only, which are the creatures of our own minds, are perfectly comprehended by us, or can be properly defined; and even of theſe there are many too ſimple in their nature to admit of definition. When we cannot give preciſion to our notions by a definition, we muſt endeavour to do it by attentive reflection upon them, by obſerving minutely their agreements and differences, and eſpecially by a right underſtanding of the powers of our own minds by which ſuch notions are formed.

The principles laid down by Locke with regard to definition, and with regard to the abuſe of words, carry conviction along with them; and I take them to be one of the moſt important improvements made in logic ſince the days of Ariſtotle; not ſo much becauſe they enlarge our knowledge, as becauſe they make us ſenſible of our ignorance, and ſhew that a great part of what ſpeculative men have admired as profound philoſophy, is only a darkening of knowledge by words without underſtanding.

If Ariſtotle had underſtood thoſe principles, many of his definitions, which furniſh matter of triumph to his enemies, had never ſeen the light: let us impute them to the times rather than to the man. The ſublime Plato, it is ſaid, thought it neceſſary to have the definition of a man, and could find none better than *Animal implume bipes*; upon which Diogenes ſent to his ſchool a cock with his feathers plucked off, deſiring to know whether it was a man or not.

SECT.

SECT. 5. *On the Structure of Speech.*

The few hints contained in the beginning of the book concerning Interpretation, relating to the ſtructure of ſpeech, have been left out in treatiſes of logic, as belonging rather to grammar; yet I apprehend this is a rich field of philoſophical ſpeculation. Language being the expreſs image of human thought, the analyſis of the one muſt correſpond to that of the other. Nouns adjective and ſubſtantive, verbs active and paſſive, with their various moods, tenſes, and perſons, muſt be expreſſive of a like variety in the modes of thought. Things which are diſtinguiſhed in all languages, ſuch as ſubſtance and quality, action and paſſion, cauſe and effect, muſt be diſtinguiſhed by the natural powers of the human mind. The philoſophy of grammar, and that of the human underſtanding, are more nearly allied than is commonly imagined.

The ſtructure of language was purſued to a conſiderable extent, by the ancient commentators upon this book of Ariſtotle. Their ſpeculations upon this ſubject, which are neither the leaſt ingenious nor the leaſt uſeful part of the Peripatetic philoſophy, were neglected for many ages, and lay buried in ancient manuſcripts, or in books little known, till they were lately brought to light by the learned Mr Harris in his Hermes.

The definitions given by Ariſtotle, of a noun, of a verb, and of ſpeech, will hardly bear examination. It is eaſy in practice to diſtinguiſh the various parts of ſpeech; but very difficult, if at all poſſible, to give accurate definitions of them.

He obſerves juſtly, that beſides that kind of ſpeech called *a propoſition*, which is always either true or falſe, there are other kinds which are neither true nor falſe; ſuch as, a prayer, or wiſh; to which

which we may add, a queſtion, a command, a promiſe, a contract, and many others. Theſe Ariſtotle pronounces to have nothing to do with his ſubject, and remits them to oratory, or poetry; and ſo they have remained baniſhed from the regions of philoſophy to this day: yet I apprehend, that an analyſis of ſuch ſpeeches, and of the operations of mind which they expreſs, would be of real uſe, and perhaps would diſcover how imperfect an enumeration the logicians have given of the powers of human underſtanding, when they reduce them to ſimple apprehenſion, judgement, and reaſoning.

SECT. 6. *On Propoſitions.*

Mathematicians uſe the word *propoſition* in a larger ſenſe than logicians. A problem is called a *propoſition* in mathematics, but in logic it is not a propoſition: it is one of thoſe ſpeeches which are not enunciative, and which Ariſtotle remits to oratory or poetry.

A propoſition, according to Ariſtotle, is a ſpeech wherein one thing is affirmed or denied of another. Hence it is eaſy to diſtinguiſh the thing affirmed or denied, which is called *the predicate*, from the thing of which it is affirmed or denied, which is called *the ſubject*; and theſe two are called *the terms of the propoſition*. Hence likewiſe it appears, that propoſitions are either affirmative or negative; and this is called *their quality*. All affirmative propoſitions have the ſame quality, ſo likewiſe have all the negative; but an affirmative and a negative are contrary in their quality.

When the ſubject of a propoſition is a general term, the predicate is affirmed or denied, either of the whole, or of a part. Hence propoſitions are diſtinguiſhed into univerſal and particular. *All men are mortal*, is an univerſal propoſition; *Some men are learned*,

ed, is a particular, and this is called *the quantity of the propoſition*. All univerſal propoſitions agree in quantity, as alſo all particular: while an univerſal and a particular are ſaid to differ in quantity. A propoſition is called *indefinite*, when there is no mark either of univerſality or particularity annexed to the ſubject: thus, *Man is of few days*, is an indefinite propoſition; but it muſt be underſtood either as univerſal or as particular, and therefore is not a third ſpecies, but by interpretation is brought under one of the other two.

There are alſo ſingular propoſitions, which have not a general term but an individual for their ſubject; as, *Alexander was a great conqueror*. Theſe are conſidered by logicians as univerſal, becauſe, the ſubject being indiviſible, the predicate is affirmed or denied of the whole, and not of a part only. Thus all propoſitions, with regard to quality, are either affirmative or negative; and with regard to quantity, are univerſal or particular; and taking in both quantity and quality, they are univerſal affirmatives, or univerſal negatives, or particular affirmatives, or particular negatives. Theſe four kinds, after the days of Ariſtotle, came to be named by the names of the four firſt vowels, A, E, I, O, according to the following diſtich:

Aſſerit A, negat E, ſed univerſaliter ambæ;
Aſſerit I, negat O, ſed particulariter ambo.

When the young logician is thus far inſtructed in the nature of propoſitions, he is apt to think there is no difficulty in analyſing any propoſition, and ſhewing its ſubject and predicate, its quantity and quality; and indeed, unleſs he can do this, he will be unable to apply the rules of logic to uſe. Yet he will find, there are ſome difficulties in this analyſis, which are overlooked by Ariſtotle altogether; and altho' they are ſometimes touched, they are not removed

removed by his followers. For, 1. There are propoſitions in which it is difficult to find a ſubject and a predicate; as in theſe, *It rains, It ſnows.* 2. In ſome propoſitions either term may be made the ſubject or the predicate as you like beſt; as in this, *Virtue is the road to happineſs.* 3. The ſame example may ſerve to ſhew, that it is ſometimes difficult to ſay, whether a propoſition be univerſal or particular. 4. The quality of ſome propoſitions is ſo dubious, that logicians have never been able to agree whether they be affirmative or negative; as in this propoſition, *Whatever is inſentient is not an animal.* 5. As there is one claſs of propoſitions which have only two terms, to wit, one ſubject and one predicate, which are called *categorical propoſitions*; ſo there are many claſſes that have more than two terms. What Ariſtotle delivers in this book is applicable only to categorical propoſitions; and to them only the rules concerning the converſion of propoſitions, and concerning the figures and modes of ſyllogiſms, are accommodated. The ſubſequent writers of logic have taken notice of ſome of the many claſſes of complex propoſitions, and have given rules adapted to them; but finding this work endleſs, they have left us to manage the reſt by the rules of common ſenſe.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Account of the Firſt Analytics.

SECT. I. *Of the Converſion of Propoſitions.*

IN attempting to give ſome account of the Analytics and of the Topics of Ariſtotle, ingenuity requires me to confeſs, that tho' I have often purpoſed to read the whole with care, and to underſtand what is intelligible, yet my courage and patience always failed before I had done. Why ſhould I throw away ſo much time and painful attention upon a thing of ſo little real uſe? If I had lived in thoſe ages when the knowledge of Ariſtotle's Organon intitled a man to the higheſt rank in philoſophy, ambition might have induced me to employ upon it ſome years painful ſtudy; and leſs, I conceive, would not be ſufficient. Such reflections as theſe, always got the better of my reſolution, when the firſt ardor began to cool. All I can ſay is, that I have read ſome parts of the different books with care, ſome ſlightly, and ſome perhaps not at all. I have glanced over the whole often, and when any thing attracted my attention, have dipped into it till my appetite was ſatisfied. Of all reading it is the moſt dry and the moſt painful, employing an infinite labour of demonſtration, about things of the moſt abſtract nature, delivered in a laconic ſtyle, and often, I think, with affected obſcurity; and all to prove general propoſitions, which when applied to particular inſtances appear ſelf-evident.

There is probably but little in the Categories, or in the book of Interpretation, which Ariſtotle could claim as his own invention: but the whole theory of ſyllogiſms he claims as his own, and as the fruit of much time and labour. And indeed it is a ſtately fabrick, a monument of a great genius, which we could wiſh to have been more uſefully employed. There muſt be ſomething however adapted to pleaſe the human underſtanding, or to flatter human pride, in a work which occupied men of ſpeculation for more than a thouſand years. Theſe books are called *Analytics*, becauſe the intention of them is to reſolve all reaſoning into its ſimple ingredients.

The firſt book of the Firſt Analytics, conſiſting of forty-ſix chapters, may be divided into four parts; the firſt treating of the converſion of propoſitions; the ſecond, of the ſtructure of ſyllogiſms in all the different figures and modes; the third, of the invention of a middle term; and the laſt, of the reſolution of ſyllogiſms. We ſhall give a brief account of each.

To convert a propoſition, is to infer from it another propoſition, whoſe ſubject is the predicate of the firſt, and whoſe predicate is the ſubject of the firſt. This is reduced by Ariſtotle to three rules. 1. An univerſal negative may be converted into an univerſal negative: thus, *No man is a quadruped*; therefore, *No quadruped is a man.* 2. An univerſal affirmative can be converted only into a particular affirmative: thus, *All men are mortal*; therefore, *Some mortal beings are men.* 3. A particular affirmative may be converted into a particular affirmative: as, *Some men are juſt*; therefore, *Some juſt perſons are men.* When a propoſition may be converted without changing its quantity, this is called *ſimple converſion*; but when the quantity is diminiſhed, as in the univerſal affirmative, it is called converſion *per accidens*.

There is another kind of converſion, omitted in this place by Ariſtotle, but ſupplied by his followers, called *converſion by contra-*

poſition,

poſition, in which the term which is contradictory to the predicate is put for the ſubject, and the quality of the propoſition is changed; as, *All animals are ſentient*; therefore, *What is inſentient is not an animal.* A fourth rule of converſion therefore is, That an univerſal affirmative, and a particular negative, may be converted by contrapoſition.

SECT. 2. *Of the Figures and Modes of pure Syllogiſms.*

A ſyllogiſm is an argument, or reaſoning, conſiſting of three propoſitions, the laſt of which, called *the concluſion*, is inferred from the two preceding, which are called *the premiſes*. The concluſion having two terms, a ſubject and a predicate, its predicate is called the *major* term, and its ſubject the *minor* term. In order to prove the concluſion, each of its terms is in the premiſes compared with a third term, called the *middle* term. By this means one of the premiſes will have for its two terms the major term and the middle term; and this premiſe is called the *major* premiſe, or the *major* propoſition of the ſyllogiſm. The other premiſe muſt have for its two terms the minor term and the middle term, and it is called the *minor* propoſition. Thus the ſyllogiſm conſiſts of three propoſitions, diſtinguiſhed by the names of the *major*, the *minor*, and the *concluſion*: and altho' each of theſe has two terms, a ſubject and a predicate, yet there are only three different terms in all. The major term is always the predicate of the concluſion, and is alſo either the ſubject or predicate of the major propoſition. The minor term is always the ſubject of the concluſion, and is alſo either the ſubject or predicate of the minor propoſition. The middle term never enters into the concluſion, but ſtands in both premiſes, either in the poſition of ſubject or of predicate.

According to the various poſitions which the middle term may

have in the premiſes, ſyllogiſms are ſaid to be of various figures. Now all the poſſible poſitions of the middle term are only four: for, firſt, it may be the ſubject of the major propoſition, and the predicate of the minor, and then the ſyllogiſm is of the firſt figure; or it may be the predicate of both premiſes, and then the ſyllogiſm is of the ſecond figure; or it may be the ſubject of both, which makes a ſyllogiſm of the third figure; or it may be the predicate of the major propoſition, and the ſubject of the minor, which makes the fourth figure. Ariſtotle takes no notice of the fourth figure. It was added by the famous Galen, and is often called *the Galenical figure*.

There is another diviſion of ſyllogiſms according to their modes. The mode of a ſyllogiſm is determined by the quality and quantity of the propoſitions of which it conſiſts. Each of the three propoſitions muſt be either an univerſal affirmative, or an univerſal negative, or a particular affirmative, or a particular negative. Theſe four kinds of propoſitions, as was before obſerved, have been named by the four vowels, A, E, I, O; by which means the mode of a ſyllogiſm is marked by any three of thoſe four vowels. Thus A, A, A, denotes that mode in which the major, minor, and concluſion, are all univerſal affirmatives; E, A, E, denotes that mode in which the major and concluſion are univerſal negatives, and the minor is an univerſal affirmative.

To know all the poſſible modes of ſyllogiſm, we muſt find how many different combinations may be made of three out of the four vowels, and from the art of combination the number is found to be ſixty-four. So many poſſible modes there are in every figure, conſequently in the three figures of Ariſtotle there are one hundred and ninety-two, and in all the four figures two hundred and fifty-ſix.

Now the theory of ſyllogiſm requires, that we ſhew what are the particular modes in each figure, which do, or do not, form a juſt

juſt and concluſive ſyllogiſm, that ſo the legitimate may be adopted, and the ſpurious rejected. This Ariſtotle has ſhewn in the firſt three figures, examining all the modes one by one, and paſſing ſentence upon each; and from this examination he collects ſome rules which may aid the memory in diſtinguiſhing the falſe from the true, and point out the properties of each figure.

The firſt figure has only four legitimate modes. The major propoſition in this figure muſt be univerſal, and the minor affirmative; and it has this property, that it yields concluſions of all kinds, affirmative and negative, univerſal and particular.

The ſecond figure has alſo four legitimate modes. Its major propoſition muſt be univerſal, and one of the premiſes muſt be negative. It yields concluſions both univerſal and particular, but all negative.

The third figure has ſix legitimate modes. Its minor muſt always be affirmative; and it yields concluſions both affirmative and negative, but all particular.

Beſides the rules that are proper to each figure, Ariſtotle has given ſome that are common to all, by which the legitimacy of ſyllogiſms may be tried. Theſe may, I think, be reduced to five. 1. There muſt be only three terms in a ſyllogiſm. As each term occurs in two of the propoſitions, it muſt be preciſely the ſame in both: if it be not, the ſyllogiſm is ſaid to have four terms, which makes a vitious ſyllogiſm. 2. The middle term muſt be taken univerſally in one of the premiſes. 3. Both premiſes muſt not be particular propoſitions, nor both negative. 4. The concluſion muſt be particular, if either of the premiſes be particular; and negative, if either of the premiſes be negative. 5. No term can be taken univerſally in the concluſion, if it be not taken univerſally in the premiſes.

For underſtanding the ſecond and fifth of theſe rules, it is neceſſary to obſerve, that a term is ſaid to be taken univerſally, not only

only when it is the ſubject of an univerſal propoſition, but when it is the predicate of a negative propoſition; on the other hand, a term is ſaid to be taken particularly, when it is either the ſubject of a particular, or the predicate of an affirmative propoſition.

Sect. 3. *Of the Invention of a Middle Term.*

The third part of this book contains rules general and ſpecial for the invention of a middle term; and this the author conceives to be of great utility. The general rules amount to this, That you are to conſider well both terms of the propoſition to be proved; their definition, their properties, the things which may be affirmed or denied of them, and thoſe of which they may be affirmed or denied: thoſe things collected together, are the materials from which your middle term is to be taken.

The ſpecial rules require you to conſider the quantity and quality of the propoſition to be proved, that you may diſcover in what mode and figure of ſyllogiſm the proof is to proceed. Then from the materials before collected, you muſt ſeek a middle term which has that relation to the ſubject and predicate of the propoſition to be proved, which the nature of the ſyllogiſm requires. Thus, ſuppoſe the propoſition I would prove is an univerſal affirmative, I know by the rules of ſyllogiſms, that there is only one legitimate mode in which an univerſal affirmative propoſition can be proved; and that is the firſt mode of the firſt figure. I know likewiſe, that in this mode both the premiſes muſt be univerſal affirmatives; and that the middle term muſt be the ſubject of the major, and the predicate of the minor. Therefore of the terms collected according to the general rule, I ſeek out one or more which have theſe two properties; firſt, That the predicate of the propoſition to be proved can be univerſally affirmed of it; and, ſecondly,

ſecondly, That it can be univerſally affirmed of the ſubject of the propoſition to be proved. Every term you can find which has thoſe two properties, will ſerve you as a middle term, but no other. In this way, the author gives ſpecial rules for all the various kinds of propoſitions to be proved; points out the various modes in which they may be proved, and the properties which the middle term muſt have to make it fit for anſwering that end. And the rules are illuſtrated, or rather, in my opinion, purpoſely darkened, by putting letters of the alphabet for the ſeveral terms.

SECT. 4. *Of the remaining part of the Firſt Book.*

The reſolution of ſyllogiſms requires no other principles but thoſe before laid down for conſtructing them. However it is treated of largely, and rules laid down for reducing reaſoning to ſyllogiſms, by ſupplying one of the premiſes when it is underſtood, by rectifying inverſions, and putting the propoſitions in the proper order.

Here he ſpeaks alſo of hypothetical ſyllogiſms; which, he acknowledges, cannot be reſolved into any of the figures, although there be many kinds of them which ought diligently to be obſerved; and which he promiſes to handle afterwards. But this promiſe is not fulfilled, as far as I know, in any of his works that are extant.

SECT. 5. *Of the Second Book of the Firſt Analytics.*

The ſecond book treats of the powers of ſyllogiſms, and ſhows, in twenty-ſeven chapters, how we may perform many feats by them,

them, and what figures and modes are adapted to each. Thus, in ſome ſyllogiſms ſeveral diſtinct concluſions may be drawn from the ſame premiſes: in ſome, true concluſions may be drawn from falſe premiſes: in ſome, by aſſuming the concluſion and one premiſe, you may prove the other; you may turn a direct ſyllogiſm into one leading to an abſurdity.

We have likewiſe precepts given in this book, both to the aſſailant in a ſyllogiſtical diſpute, how to carry on his attack with art, ſo as to obtain the victory; and to the defendant, how to keep the enemy at ſuch a diſtance as that he ſhall never be obliged to yield. From which we learn, that Ariſtotle introduced in his own ſchool, the practice of diſputing ſyllogiſtically, inſtead of the rhetorical diſputations which the ſophiſts were wont to uſe in more ancient times.

CHAP. IV.

Remarks.

SECT. I. *Of the Converſion of Propoſitions.*

WE have given a ſummary view of the theory of pure ſyllogiſms as delivered by Ariſtotle, a theory of which he claims the ſole invention. And I believe it will be difficult, in any ſcience, to find ſo large a ſyſtem of truths of ſo very abſtract and ſo general a nature, all fortified by demonſtration, and all invented and perfected by one man. It ſhows a force of genius, and labour of inveſtigation,

inveſtigation, equal to the moſt arduous attempts. I ſhall now make ſome remarks upon it.

As to the converſion of propoſitions, the writers on logic commonly ſatisfy themſelves with illuſtrating each of the rules by an example, conceiving them to be ſelf-evident when applied to particular caſes. But Ariſtotle has given demonſtrations of the rules he mentions. As a ſpecimen, I ſhall give his demonſtration of the firſt rule. "Let A B be an univerſal negative propoſition; I "ſay, that if A is in no B, it will follow that B is in no A. If "you deny this conſequence, let B be in ſome A, for example, "in C; then the firſt ſuppoſition will not be true; for C is of the "B's." In this demonſtration, if I underſtand it, the third rule of converſion is aſſumed, that if B is in ſome A, then A muſt be in ſome B, which indeed is contrary to the firſt ſuppoſition. If the third rule be aſſumed for proof of the firſt, the proof of all the three goes round in a circle; for the ſecond and third rules are proved by the firſt. This is a fault in reaſoning which Ariſtotle condemns, and which I would be very unwilling to charge him with, if I could find any better meaning in his demonſtration. But it is indeed a fault very difficult to be avoided, when men attempt to prove things that are ſelf-evident.

The rules of converſion cannot be applied to all propoſitions, but only to thoſe that are categorical; and we are left to the direction of common ſenſe in the converſion of other propoſitions. To give an example: Alexander was the ſon of Philip; therefore Philip was the father of Alexander: A is greater than B; therefore B is leſs than A. Theſe are converſions which, as far as I know, do not fall within any rule in logic; nor do we find any loſs for want of a rule in ſuch caſes.

Even in the converſion of categorical propoſitions, it is not enough to tranſpoſe the ſubject and predicate. Both muſt undergo ſome change, in order to fit them for their new ſtation: for in e-

very propoſition the ſubject muſt be a ſubſtantive, or have the force of a ſubſtantive; and the predicate muſt be an adjective, or have the force of an adjective. Hence it follows, that when the ſubject is an individual, the propoſition admits not of converſion. How, for inſtance, ſhall we convert this propoſition, God is omniſcient?

Theſe obſervations ſhow, that the doctrine of the converſion of propoſitions is not ſo complete as it appears. The rules are laid down without any limitation; yet they are fitted only to one claſs of propoſitions, to wit, the categorical; and of theſe only to ſuch as have a general term for their ſubject.

Sect. 2. *On Additions made to Ariſtotle's Theory.*

Although the logicians have enlarged the firſt and ſecond parts of logic, by explaining ſome technical words and diſtinctions which Ariſtotle had omitted, and by giving names to ſome kinds of propoſitions which he overlooks; yet in what concerns the theory of categorical ſyllogiſms, he is more full, more minute and particular, than any of them: ſo that they ſeem to have thought this capital part of the Organon rather redundant than deficient.

It is true, that Galen added a fourth figure to the three mentioned by Ariſtotle. But there is reaſon to think that Ariſtotle omitted the fourth figure, not through ignorance or inattention, but of deſign, as containing only ſome indirect modes, which, when properly expreſſed, fall into the firſt figure.

It is true alſo, that Peter Ramus, a profeſſed enemy of Ariſtotle, introduced ſome new modes that are adapted to ſingular propoſitions; and that Ariſtotle takes no notice of ſingular propoſitions, either in his rules of converſion, or in the modes of ſyllogiſm. But the friends of Ariſtotle have ſhewn, that this improvement

of

of Ramus is more ſpecious than uſeful. Singular propoſitions have the force of univerſal propoſitions, and are ſubject to the ſame rules. The definition given by Ariſtotle of an univerſal propoſition applies to them; and therefore he might think, that there was no occaſion to multiply the modes of ſyllogiſm upon their account.

Theſe attempts, therefore, ſhow rather inclination than power, to diſcover any material defect in Ariſtotle's theory.

The moſt valuable addition made to the theory of categorical ſyllogiſms, ſeems to be the invention of thoſe technical names given to the legitimate modes, by which they may be eaſily remembered, and which have been compriſed in theſe barbarous verſes.

Barbara, *Celarent*, *Darii*, *Ferio*, dato primæ;
Ceſare, *Cameſtris*, *Feſtino*, *Baroco*, ſecundæ;
Tertia grande ſonans recitat *Darapti*, *Felapton*;
Adjungens *Diſamis*, *Datiſi*, *Bocardo*, *Feriſon*.

In theſe verſes, every legitimate mode belonging to the three figures has a name given to it, by which it may be diſtinguiſhed and remembered. And this name is ſo contrived as to denote its nature: for the name has three vowels, which denote the kind of each of its propoſitions.

Thus, a ſyllogiſm in *Bocardo* muſt be made up of the propoſitions denoted by the three vowels, O, A, O; that is, its major and concluſion muſt be particular negative propoſitions, and its minor an univerſal affirmative; and being in the third figure, the middle term muſt be the ſubject of both premiſes.

This is the myſtery contained in the vowels of thoſe barbarous words. But there are other myſteries contained in their conſonants: for, by their means, a child may be taught to reduce any

ſyllogiſm of the ſecond or third figure to one of the firſt. So that the four modes of the firſt figure being directly proved to be concluſive, all the modes of the other two are proved at the ſame time, by means of this operation of reduction. For the rules and manner of this reduction, and the different ſpecies of it, called *oſtenſive* and *per impoſſibile*, I refer to the logicians, that I may not diſcloſe all their myſteries.

The invention contained in theſe verſes is ſo ingenious, and ſo great an adminicle to the dextrous management of ſyllogiſms, that I think it very probable that Ariſtotle had ſome contrivance of this kind, which was kept as one of the ſecret doctrines of his ſchool, and handed down by tradition, until ſome body brought it to light. This is offered only as a conjecture, leaving it to thoſe who are better acquainted with the moſt ancient commentators on the Analytics, either to refute or to confirm it.

SECT. 3. *On Examples uſed to illuſtrate this Theory.*

We may obſerve, that Ariſtotle hardly ever gives examples of real ſyllogiſms to illuſtrate his rules. In demonſtrating the legitimate modes, he takes A, B, C, for the terms of the ſyllogiſm. Thus, the firſt mode of the firſt figure is demonſtrated by him in this manner. "For," ſays he, "if A is attributed to every "B, and B to every C, it follows neceſſarily, that A may be at-"tributed to every C." For diſproving the illegitimate modes, he uſes the ſame manner; with this difference, that he commonly for an example gives three real terms, ſuch as, *bonum*, *habitus*, *prudentia*; of which three terms you are to make up a ſyllogiſm of the figure and mode in queſtion, which will appear to be inconcluſive.

The commentators, and ſyſtematical writers in logic, have ſup-

plied this defect; and given us real examples of every legitimate mode in all the figures. This we muſt acknowledge to be charitably done, to aſſiſt the imagination in the conception of matters ſo very abſtract; but whether it was prudently done for the honour of the art, may be doubted. I am afraid this was to uncover the nakedneſs of the theory; and has contributed much to bring it into contempt: for when one conſiders the ſilly and uninſtructive reaſonings that have been brought forth by this grand organ of ſcience, he can hardly forbear crying out, *Parturiunt montes, et naſcitur ridiculus mus.* Many of the writers of logic are acute and ingenious, and much practiſed in the ſyllogiſtical art; and there muſt be ſome reaſon why the examples they have given of ſyllogiſms are ſo lean.

We ſhall ſpeak of the reaſon afterwards; and ſhall now give a ſyllogiſm in each figure as an example.

No work of God is bad;

The natural paſſions and appetites of men are the work of God;

Therefore none of them is bad.

In this ſyllogiſm, the middle term, *work of God*, is the ſubject of the major and the predicate of the minor; ſo that the ſyllogiſm is of the firſt figure. The mode is that called *Celarent;* the major and concluſion being both univerſal negatives, and the minor an univerſal affirmative. It agrees to the rules of the figure, as the major is univerſal, and the minor affirmative; it is alſo agreeable to all the general rules; ſo that it maintains its character in every trial. And to ſhow of what ductile materials ſyllogiſms are made, we may, by converting ſimply the major propoſition, reduce it to a good ſyllogiſm of the ſecond figure, and of the mode *Ceſare*, thus:

Whatever is bad is not the work of God;

All the natural paſſions and appetites of men are the work of God;

Therefore they are not bad.

Another

Another example:

Every thing virtuous is praiſe-worthy;
Some pleaſures are not praiſe-worthy;
Therefore ſome pleaſures are not virtuous.

Here the middle term *praiſe-worthy* being the predicate of both premiſes, the ſyllogiſm is of the ſecond figure; and ſeeing it is made up of the propoſitions, A, O, O, the mode is *Baroco*. It will be found to agree both with the general and ſpecial rules: and it may be reduced into a good ſyllogiſm of the firſt figure upon converting the major by contrapoſition, thus:

What is not praiſe-worthy is not virtuous;
Some pleaſures are not praiſe-worthy;
Therefore ſome pleaſures are not virtuous.

That this ſyllogiſm is concluſive, common ſenſe pronounces, and all logicians muſt allow; but it is ſomewhat unpliable to rules, and requires a little ſtraining to make it tally with them.

That it is of the firſt figure is beyond diſpute; but to what mode of that figure ſhall we refer it? This is a queſtion of ſome difficulty. For, in the firſt place, the premiſes ſeem to be both negative, which contradicts the third general rule; and moreover, it is contrary to a ſpecial rule of the firſt figure, That the minor ſhould be negative. Theſe are the difficulties to be removed.

Some logicians think, that the two negative particles in the major are equivalent to an affirmative; and that therefore the major propoſition, *What is not praiſe-worthy, is not virtuous*, is to be accounted an affirmative propoſition. This, if granted, ſolves one difficulty; but the other remains. The moſt ingenious ſolution, therefore, is this: Let the middle term be *not praiſe-worthy*. Thus, making the negative particle a part of the middle term, the ſyllogiſm ſtands thus:

Whatever is *not praiſe-worthy* is not virtuous;
Some pleaſures are *not praiſe-worthy*;
Therefore ſome pleaſures are not virtuous.

By

By this analyſis, the major becomes an univerſal negative, the minor a particular affirmative, and the concluſion a particular negative, and ſo we have a juſt ſyllogiſm in *Ferio*.

We ſee, by this example, that the quality of propoſitions is not ſo invariable, but that, when occaſion requires, an affirmative may be degraded into a negative, or a negative exalted to an affirmative. Another example:

All Africans are black;
All Africans are men;
Therefore ſome men are black.

This is of the third figure, and of the mode *Darapti*; and it may be reduced to *Darii* in the firſt figure, by converting the minor.

All Africans are black;
Some men are Africans;
Therefore ſome men are black.

By this time I apprehend the reader has got as many examples of ſyllogiſms as will ſtay his appetite for that kind of entertainment.

SECT. 4. *On the Demonſtration of the Theory.*

Ariſtotle and all his followers have thought it neceſſary, in order to bring this theory of categorical ſyllogiſms to a ſcience, to demonſtrate, both that the fourteen authoriſed modes conclude juſtly, and that none of the reſt do. Let us now ſee how this has been executed.

As to the legitimate modes, Ariſtotle, and thoſe who follow him the moſt cloſely, demonſtrate the four modes of the firſt figure directly from an axiom called the *Dictum de omni et nullo*. The amount of the axiom is, That what is affirmed of a whole *genus*, may

may be affirmed of all the ſpecies and individuals belonging to that *genus*; and that what is denied of the whole genus, may be denied of its ſpecies and individuals. The four modes of the firſt figure are evidently included in this axiom. And as to the legitimate modes of the other figures, they are proved by reducing them to ſome mode of the firſt. Nor is there any other principle aſſumed in theſe reductions but the axioms concerning the converſion of propoſitions, and in ſome caſes the axioms concerning the oppoſition of propoſitions.

As to the illegitimate modes, Ariſtotle has taken the labour to try and condemn them one by one in all the three figures: but this is done in ſuch a manner that it is very painful to follow him. To give a ſpecimen. In order to prove, that thoſe modes of the firſt figure in which the major is particular, do not conclude, he proceeds thus: "If A is or is not in ſome B, and B in every C, "no concluſion follows. Take for the terms in the affirmative "caſe, *good*, *habit*, *prudence*, in the negative, *good*, *habit*, *igno-* "*rance*." This laconic ſtyle, the uſe of ſymbols not familiar, and, in place of giving an example, his leaving us to form one from three aſſigned terms, give ſuch embarraſſment to a reader, that he is like one reading a book of riddles.

Having thus aſcertained the true and falſe modes of a figure, he ſubjoins the particular rules of that figure, which ſeem to be deduced from the particular caſes before determined. The general rules come laſt of all, as a general corollary from what goes before.

I know not whether it is from a diffidence of Ariſtotle's demonſtrations, or from an apprehenſion of their obſcurity, or from a deſire of improving upon his method, that almoſt all the writers in logic I have met with, have inverted his order, beginning where he ends, and ending where he begins. They firſt demonſtrate the general rules, which belong to all the figures, from

three

three axioms; then from the general rules and the nature of each figure, they demonſtrate the ſpecial rules of each figure. When this is done, nothing remains but to apply theſe general and ſpecial rules, and to reject every mode which contradicts them.

This method has a very ſcientific appearance; and when we conſider, that by a few rules once demonſtrated, an hundred and ſeventy-eight falſe modes are deſtroyed at one blow, which Ariſtotle had the trouble to put to death one by one, it ſeems to be a great improvement. I have only one objection to the three axioms.

The three axioms are theſe: 1. Things which agree with the ſame third, agree with one another. 2. When one agrees with the third, and the other does not, they do not agree with one another. 3. When neither agrees with the third, you cannot thence conclude, either that they do, or do not agree with one another. If theſe axioms are applied to mathematical quantities, to which they ſeem to relate when taken literally, they have all the evidence which an axiom ought to have: but the logicians apply them in an analogical ſenſe to things of another nature. In order, therefore, to judge whether they are truly axioms, we ought to ſtrip them of their figurative dreſs, and to ſet them down in plain Engliſh, as the logicians underſtand them. They amount therefore to this. 1. If two things be affirmed of a third, or the third be affirmed of them; or if one be affirmed of the third, and the third affirmed of the other; then they may be affirmed one of the other. 2. If one is affirmed of the third, or the third of it, and the other denied of the third, or the third of it, they may be denied one of the other. 3. If both are denied of the third, or the third of them; or if one is denied of the third, and the third denied of the other; nothing can be inferred.

When the three axioms are thus put in plain Engliſh, they ſeem not to have that degree of evidence which axioms ought to have;

and if there is any defect of evidence in the axioms, this defect will be communicated to the whole edifice raiſed upon them.

It may even be ſuſpected, that an attempt, by any method, to demonſtrate, that a ſyllogiſm is concluſive, is an impropriety ſomewhat like that of attempting to demonſtrate an axiom. In a juſt ſyllogiſm, the connection between the premiſes and the concluſion is not only real, but immediate; ſo that no propoſition can come between them to make their connection more apparent. The very intention of a ſyllogiſm is, to leave nothing to be ſupplied that is neceſſary to a complete demonſtration. Therefore a man of common underſtanding, who has a perfect comprehenſion of the premiſes, finds himſelf under a neceſſity of admitting the concluſion, ſuppoſing the premiſes to be true; and the concluſion is connected with the premiſes with all the force of intuitive evidence. In a word, an immediate concluſion is ſeen in the premiſes, by the light of common ſenſe; and where that is wanting, no kind of reaſoning will ſupply its place.

SECT. 5. *On this Theory, conſidered as an Engine of Science.*

The ſlow progreſs of uſeful knowledge, during the many ages in which the ſyllogiſtic art was moſt highly cultivated as the only guide to ſcience, and its quick progreſs ſince that art was diſuſed, ſuggeſt a preſumption againſt it; and this preſumption is ſtrengthened by the puerility of the examples which have always been brought to illuſtrate its rules.

The ancients ſeem to have had too high notions, both of the force of the reaſoning power in man, and of the art of ſyllogiſm as its guide. Mere reaſoning can carry us but a very little way in moſt ſubjects. By obſervation, and experiments properly conducted, the ſtock of human knowledge may be enlarged without end; but the power

of

of reaſoning alone, applied with vigour through a long life, would only carry a man round, like a horſe in a mill, who labours hard, but makes no progreſs. There is indeed an exception to this obſervation in the mathematical ſciences. The relations of quantity are ſo various, and ſo ſuſceptible of exact menſuration, that long trains of accurate reaſoning on that ſubject may be formed, and concluſions drawn very remote from the firſt principles. It is in this ſcience, and thoſe which depend upon it, that the power of reaſoning triumphs: in other matters its trophies are inconſiderable. If any man doubt this, let him produce, in any ſubject unconnected with mathematics, a train of reaſoning of ſome length, leading to a concluſion, which without this train of reaſoning would never have been brought within human ſight. Every man acquainted with mathematics can produce thouſands of ſuch trains of reaſoning. I do not ſay, that none ſuch can be produced in other ſciences; but I believe they are few, and not eaſily found; and that if they are found, it will not be in ſubjects that can be expreſſed by categorical propoſitions, to which alone the theory of figure and mode extends.

In matters to which that theory extends, a man of good ſenſe, who can diſtinguiſh things that differ, and avoid the ſnares of ambiguous words, and is moderately practiſed in ſuch matters, ſees at once all that can be inferred from his premiſes; or finds, that there is but a very ſhort ſtep to the concluſion.

When the power of reaſoning is ſo feeble by nature, eſpecially in ſubjects to which this theory can be applied, it would be unreaſonable to expect great effects from it. And hence we ſee the reaſon why the examples brought to illuſtrate it by the moſt ingenious logicians, have rather tended to bring it into contempt.

If it ſhould be thought, that the ſyllogiſtic art may be an uſeful engine in mathematics, in which pure reaſoning has ample ſcope: Firſt, It may be obſerved, That facts are unfavourable to

this opinion: for it does not appear, that Euclid, or Apollonius, or Archimedes, or Hugens, or Newton, ever made the leaſt uſe of this art; and I am even of opinion, that no uſe can be made of it in mathematics. I would not wiſh to advance this raſhly, ſince Ariſtotle has ſaid, that mathematicians reaſon for the moſt part in the firſt figure. What led him to think ſo was, that the firſt figure only yields concluſions that are univerſal and affirmative, and the concluſions of mathematics are commonly of that kind. But it is to be obſerved, that the propoſitions of mathematics are not categorical propoſitions, conſiſting of one ſubject and one predicate. They expreſs ſome relation which one quantity bears to another, and on that account muſt have three terms. The quantities compared make two, and the relation between them is a third. Now to ſuch propoſitions we can neither apply the rules concerning the converſion of propoſitions, nor can they enter into a ſyllogiſm of any of the figures or modes. We obſerved before, that this converſion, *A is greater than B*, therefore *B is leſs than A*, does not fall within the rules of converſion given by Ariſtotle or the logicians; and we now add, that this ſimple reaſoning, *A is equal to B, and B to C*; therefore *A is equal to C*, cannot be brought into any ſyllogiſm in figure and mode. There are indeed ſyllogiſms into which mathematical propoſitions may enter, and of ſuch we ſhall afterwards ſpeak: but they have nothing to do with the ſyſtem of figure and mode.

When we go without the circle of the mathematical ſciences, I know nothing in which there ſeems to be ſo much demonſtration as in that part of logic which treats of the figures and modes of ſyllogiſm; but the few remarks we have made, ſhew, that it has ſome weak places: and beſides, this ſyſtem cannot be uſed as an engine to rear itſelf.

The compaſs of the ſyllogiſtic ſyſtem as an engine of ſcience, may be diſcerned by a compendious and general view of the concluſion

cluſion drawn, and the argument uſed to prove it, in each of the three figures.

In the firſt figure, the concluſion affirms or denies ſomething, of a certain ſpecies or individual; and the argument to prove this concluſion is, That the ſame thing may be affirmed or denied of the whole genus to which that ſpecies or individual belongs.

In the ſecond figure, the concluſion is, That ſome ſpecies or individual does not belong to ſuch a genus; and the argument is, That ſome attribute common to the whole genus does not belong to that ſpecies or individual.

In the third figure, the concluſion is, That ſuch an attribute belongs to part of a genus; and the argument is, That the attribute in queſtion belongs to a ſpecies or individual which is part of that genus.

I apprehend, that, in this ſhort view, every concluſion that falls within the compaſs of the three figures, as well as the mean of proof, is comprehended. The rules of all the figures might be eaſily deduced from it; and it appears, that there is only one principle of reaſoning in all the three; ſo that it is not ſtrange, that a ſyllogiſm of one figure ſhould be reduced to one of another figure.

The general principle in which the whole terminates, and of which every categorical ſyllogiſm is only a particular application, is this, That what is affirmed or denied of the whole genus, may be affirmed or denied of every ſpecies and individual belonging to it. This is a principle of undoubted certainty indeed, but of no great depth. Ariſtotle and all the logicians aſſume it as an axiom or firſt principle, from which the ſyllogiſtic ſyſtem, as it were, takes its departure: and after a tedious voyage, and great expence of demonſtration, it lands at laſt in this principle as its ultimate concluſion. *O curas hominum! O quantum eſt in rebus inane!*

SECT.

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Sect. 6. *On Modal Syllogiſms.*

Categorical propoſitions, beſides their quantity and quality, have another affection, by which they are divided into pure and modal. In a pure propoſition, the predicate is barely affirmed or denied of the ſubject; but in a modal propoſition, the affirmation or negation is modified, by being declared to be neceſſary or contingent, or poſſible or impoſſible. Theſe are the four modes obſerved by Ariſtotle, from which he denominates a propoſition modal. His genuine diſciples maintain, that theſe are all the modes that can affect an affirmation or negation, and that the enumeration is complete. Others maintain, that this enumeration is incomplete; and that when an affirmation or negation is ſaid to be certain or uncertain, probable or improbable, this makes a modal propoſition, no leſs than the four modes of Ariſtotle. We ſhall not enter into this diſpute; but proceed to obſerve, that the epithets of *pure* and *modal* are applied to ſyllogiſms as well as to propoſitions. A pure ſyllogiſm is that in which both premiſes are pure propoſitions. A modal ſyllogiſm is that in which either of the premiſes is a modal propoſition.

The ſyllogiſms of which we have already ſaid ſo much, are thoſe only which are pure as well as categorical. But when we conſider, that through all the figures and modes, a ſyllogiſm may have one premiſe modal of any of the four modes, while the other is pure, or it may have both premiſes modal, and that they may be either of the ſame mode or of different modes; what prodigious variety ariſes from all theſe combinations? Now it is the buſineſs of a logician, to ſhew how the concluſion is affected in all this variety of caſes. Ariſtotle has done this in his Firſt Analytics, with immenſe labour; and it will not be thought ſtrange,

that

that when he had employed only four chapters in diſcuſſing one hundred and ninety-two modes, true and falſe, of pure ſyllogiſms, he ſhould employ fifteen upon modal ſyllogiſms.

I am very willing to excuſe myſelf from entering upon this great branch of logic, by the judgement and example of thoſe who cannot be charged either with want of reſpect to Ariſtotle, or with a low eſteem of the ſyllogiſtic art.

Keckerman, a famous Dantzican profeſſor, who ſpent his life in teaching and writing logic, in his huge folio ſyſtem of that ſcience, publiſhed ann. 1600, calls the doctrine of the modals the *crux logicorum*. With regard to the ſcholaſtic doctors, among whom this was a proverb, *De modalibus non guſtabit aſinus*, he thinks it very dubious, whether they tortured moſt the modal ſyllogiſms, or were moſt tortured by them. But thoſe crabbed geniuſes, ſays he, made this doctrine ſo very thorny, that it is fitter to tear a man's wits in pieces than to give them ſolidity. He deſires it to be obſerved, that the doctrine of the modals is adapted to the Greek language. The modal terms were frequently uſed by the Greeks in their diſputations; and, on that account, are ſo fully handled by Ariſtotle: but in the Latin tongue you ſhall hardly ever meet with them. Nor do I remember, in all my experience, ſays he, to have obſerved any man in danger of being foiled in a diſpute, through his ignorance of the modals.

This author, however, out of reſpect to Ariſtotle, treats pretty fully of modal propoſitions, ſhewing how to diſtinguiſh their ſubject and predicate, their quantity and quality. But the modal ſyllogiſms he paſſes over altogether.

Ludovicus Vives, whom I mention, not as a devotee of Ariſtotle, but on account of his own judgement and learning, thinks that the doctrine of modals ought to be baniſhed out of logic, and remitted to grammar; and that if the grammar of the Greek tongue had been brought to a ſyſtem in the time of Ariſtotle, that moſt

moſt acute philoſopher would have ſaved the great labour he has beſtowed on this ſubject.

Burgerſdick, after enumerating five claſſes of modal ſyllogiſms, obſerves, that they require many rules and cautions, which Ariſtotle hath handled diligently; but as the uſe of them is not great, and their rules are very difficult, he thinks it not worth while to enter into the diſcuſſion of them; recommending to thoſe who would underſtand them, the moſt learned paraphraſe of Joannes Monlorius, upon the firſt book of the Firſt Analytics.

All the writers of logic for two hundred years back that have fallen into my hands, have paſſed over the rules of modal ſyllogiſms with as little ceremony. So that this great branch of the doctrine of ſyllogiſm, ſo diligently handled by Ariſtotle, fell into neglect, if not contempt, even while the doctrine of pure ſyllogiſms continued in the higheſt eſteem. Moved by theſe authorities, I ſhall let this doctrine reſt in peace, without giving the leaſt diſturbance to its aſhes.

SECT. 7. *On Syllogiſms that do not belong to Figure and Mode.*

Ariſtotle gives ſome obſervations upon imperfect ſyllogiſms: ſuch as, the Enthimema, in which one of the premiſes is not expreſſed but underſtood: Induction, wherein we collect an univerſal from a full enumeration of particulars: and Examples, which are an imperfect induction. The logicians have copied Ariſtotle upon theſe kinds of reaſoning, without any conſiderable improvement. But to compenſate the modal ſyllogiſms, which they have laid aſide, they have given rules for ſeveral kinds of ſyllogiſm, of which Ariſtotle takes no notice. Theſe may be reduced to two claſſes.

The firſt claſs comprehends the ſyllogiſms into which any exclu-

ſive,

ſive, reſtrictive, exceptive, or reduplicative propoſition enters. Such propoſitions are by ſome called *exponible*, by others *imperfectly modal*. The rules given with regard to theſe are obvious, from a juſt interpretation of the propoſitions.

The ſecond claſs is that of hypothetical ſyllogiſms, which take that denomination from having a hypothetical propoſition for one or both premiſes. Moſt logicians give the name of *hypothetical* to all complex propoſitions which have more terms than one ſubject and one predicate. I uſe the word in this large ſenſe; and mean by hypothetical ſyllogiſms, all thoſe in which either of the premiſes conſiſts of more terms than two. How many various kinds there may be of ſuch ſyllogiſms, has never been aſcertained. The logicians have given names to ſome; ſuch as, the copulative, the conditional, by ſome called hypothetical, and the diſjunctive.

Such ſyllogiſms cannot be tried by the rules of figure and mode. Every kind would require rules peculiar to it. Logicians have given rules for ſome kinds; but there are many that have not ſo much as a name.

The Dilemma is conſidered by moſt logicians as a ſpecies of the disjunctive ſyllogiſm. A remarkable property of this kind is, that it may ſometimes be happily retorted: it is, it ſeems, like a hand-grenade, which, by dextrous management, may be thrown back, ſo as to ſpend its force upon the aſſailant. We ſhall conclude this tedious account of ſyllogiſms, with a dilemma mentioned by *A. Gellius*, and from him by many logicians, as inſoluble in any other way.

" Euathlus, a rich young man, deſirous of learning the art of " pleading, applied to Protagoras, a celebrated ſophiſt, to inſtruct " him, promiſing a great ſum of money as his reward; one half " of which was paid down; the other half he bound himſelf to " pay as ſoon as he ſhould plead a cauſe before the judges, and

" gain it. Protagoras found him a very apt ſcholar; but, after " he had made good progreſs, he was in no haſte to plead cau- " ſes. The maſter, conceiving that he intended by this means to " ſhift off his ſecond payment, took, as he thought, a ſure me- " thod to get the better of his delay. He ſued Euathlus before " the judges; and, having opened his cauſe at the bar, he pleaded " to this purpoſe. O moſt fooliſh young man, do you not ſee, " that, in any event, I muſt gain my point? for if the judges " give ſentence for me, you muſt pay by their ſentence; if a- " gainſt me, the condition of our bargain is fulfilled, and you " have no plea left for your delay, after having pleaded and gained " a cauſe. To which Euathlus anſwered. O moſt wiſe maſter, " I might have avoided the force of your argument, by not " pleading my own cauſe. But, giving up this advantage, do " you not ſee, that whatever ſentence the judges paſs, I am ſafe? " If they give ſentence for me, I am acquitted by their ſentence; " if againſt me, the condition of our bargain is not fulfilled, by " my pleading a cauſe, and loſing it. The judges, thinking the " arguments unanſwerable on both ſides, put off the cauſe to a " long day."

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Account of the remaining books of the Organon.

SECT. 1. *Of the Laſt Analytics.*

IN the Firſt Analytics, ſyllogiſms are conſidered in reſpect of their form; they are now to be conſidered in reſpect of their matter. The form lies in the neceſſary connection between the premiſes and the concluſion; and where ſuch a connection is wanting, they are ſaid to be informal, or vicious in point of form.

But where there is no fault in the form, there may be in the matter; that is, in the propoſitions of which they are compoſed, which may be true or falſe, probable or improbable.

When the premiſes are certain, and the concluſion drawn from them in due form, this is demonſtration, and produces ſcience. Such ſyllogiſms are called *apodictical*; and are handled in the two books of the Laſt Analytics. When the premiſes are not certain, but probable only, ſuch ſyllogiſms are called *dialectical*; and of them he treats in the eight books of the Topicks. But there are ſome ſyllogiſms which ſeem to be perfect both in matter and form, when they are not really ſo: as, a face may ſeem beautiful which is but painted. Theſe being apt to deceive, and produce a falſe opinion, are called *ſophiſtical*; and they are the ſubject of the book concerning Sophiſms.

To return to the Laſt Analytics, which treat of demonſtration

and of ſcience: We ſhall not pretend to abridge thoſe books; for Ariſtotle's writings do not admit of abridgement: no man can ſay what he ſays in fewer words; and he is not often guilty of repetition. We ſhall only give ſome of his capital concluſions, omitting his long reaſonings and nice diſtinctions, of which his genius was wonderfully productive.

All demonſtration muſt be built upon principles already known; and theſe upon others of the ſame kind; until we come at laſt to firſt principles, which neither can be demonſtrated, nor need to be, being evident of themſelves.

We cannot demonſtrate things in a circle, ſupporting the concluſion by the premiſes, and the premiſes again by the concluſion. Nor can there be an infinite number of middle terms between the firſt principle and the concluſion.

In all demonſtration, the firſt principles, the concluſion, and all the intermediate propoſitions, muſt be neceſſary, general, and eternal truths: for of things fortuitous, contingent, or mutable, or of individual things, there is no demonſtration.

Some demonſtrations prove only, that the thing is thus affected; others prove, why it is thus affected. The former may be drawn from a remote cauſe, or from an effect: but the latter muſt be drawn from an immediate cauſe; and are the moſt perfect.

The firſt figure is beſt adapted to demonſtration, becauſe it affords concluſions univerſally affirmative; and this figure is commonly uſed by the mathematicians.

The demonſtration of an affirmative propoſition is preferable to that of a negative; the demonſtration of an univerſal to that of a particular; and direct demonſtration to that *ad abſurdum*.

The principles are more certain than the concluſion.

There cannot be opinion and ſcience of the ſame thing at the ſame time.

In the ſecond book we are taught, that the queſtions that may be

be put, with regard to any thing, are four: 1. Whether the thing be thus affected. 2. Why it is thus affected. 3. Whether it exiſts. 4. What it is.

The laſt of theſe queſtions Ariſtotle, in good Greek, calls the *What is it* of a thing. The ſchoolmen, in very barbarous Latin, called this, the *quiddity* of a thing. This quiddity, he proves by many arguments, cannot be demonſtrated, but muſt be fixed by a definition. This gives occaſion to treat of definition, and how a right definition ſhould be formed. As an example he gives a definition of the number *three*, and defines it to be the firſt odd number.

In this book he treats alſo of the four kinds of cauſes; efficient, material, formal, and final.

Another thing treated of in this book is, the manner in which we acquire firſt principles, which are the foundation of all demonſtration. Theſe are not innate, becauſe we may be for a great part of life ignorant of them: nor can they be deduced demonſtratively from any antecedent knowledge, otherwiſe they would not be firſt principles. Therefore he concludes, that firſt principles are got by induction, from the informations of ſenſe. The ſenſes give us informations of individual things, and from theſe by induction we draw general concluſions: for it is a maxim with Ariſtotle, That there is nothing in the underſtanding which was not before in ſome ſenſe.

The knowledge of firſt principles, as it is not acquired by demonſtration, ought not to be called ſcience; and therefore he calls it *intelligence*.

SECT.

SECT. 2. *Of the Topics.*

The profeſſed deſign of the Topics is, to ſhew a method by which a man may be able to reaſon with probability and conſiſtency upon every queſtion that may occur.

Every queſtion is either about the genus of the ſubject, or its ſpecific difference, or ſome thing proper to it, or ſomething accidental.

To prove that this diviſion is complete, Ariſtotle reaſons thus: Whatever is attributed to a ſubject, it muſt either be, that the ſubject can be reciprocally attributed to it, or that it cannot. If the ſubject and attribute can be reciprocated, the attribute either declares what the ſubject is, and then it is a definition; or it does not declare what the ſubject is, and then it is a property. If the attribute cannot be reciprocated, it muſt be ſomething contained in the definition, or not. If it is contained in the definition of the ſubject, it muſt be the genus of the ſubject, or its ſpecific difference; for the definition conſiſts of theſe two. If it is not contained in the definition of the ſubject, it muſt be an accident.

The furniture proper to fit a man for arguing dialectically may be reduced to theſe four heads: 1. Probable propoſitions of all ſorts, which may on occaſion be aſſumed in an argument. 2. Diſtinctions of words which are nearly of the ſame ſignification. 3. Diſtinctions of things which are not ſo far aſunder but that they may be taken for one and the ſame. 4. Similitudes.

The ſecond and the five following books are taken up in enumerating the topics or heads of argument that may be uſed in queſtions about the genus, the definition, the properties, and the accidents of a thing; and occaſionally he introduces the topics for

proving

proving things to be the ſame, or different; and the topics for proving one thing to be better or worſe than another.

In this enumeration of topics, Ariſtotle has ſhewn more the fertility of his genius, than the accuracy of method. The writers of logic ſeem to be of this opinion: for I know none of them that has followed him cloſely upon this ſubject. They have conſidered the topics of argumentation as reducible to certain axioms. For inſtance, when the queſtion is about the genus of a thing, it muſt be determined by ſome axiom about genus and ſpecies; when it is about a definition, it muſt be determined by ſome axiom relating to definition, and things defined: and ſo of other queſtions. They have therefore reduced the doctrine of the topics to certain axioms or canons, and diſpoſed theſe axioms in order under certain heads.

This method ſeems to be more commodious and elegant than that of Ariſtotle. Yet it muſt be acknowledged, that Ariſtotle has furniſhed the materials from which all the logicians have borrowed their doctrine of topics: and even Cicero, Quintilian, and other rhetorical writers, have been much indebted to the topics of Ariſtotle.

He was the firſt, as far as I know, who made an attempt of this kind: and in this he acted up to the magnanimity of his own genius, and that of ancient philoſophy. Every ſubject of human thought had been reduced to ten categories; every thing that can be attributed to any ſubject, to five predicables: he attempted to reduce all the forms of reaſoning to fixed rules of figure and mode, and to reduce all the topics of argumentation under certain heads; and by that means to collect as it were into one ſtore all that can be ſaid on one ſide or the other of every queſtion, and provide a grand arſenal, from which all future combatants might be furniſhed with arms offenſive and defenſive in every cauſe, ſo as to leave no room to future generations to invent any thing new.

The

The laſt book of the Topics is a code of the laws, according to which a ſyllogiſtical diſputation ought to be managed, both on the part of the aſſailant and defendant. From which it is evident, that this philoſopher trained his diſciples to contend, not for the truth merely, but for victory.

SECT. 3. *Of the book concerning Sophiſms.*

A ſyllogiſm which leads to a falſe concluſion, muſt be vicious, either in matter or form: for from true principles nothing but truth can be juſtly deduced. If the matter be faulty, that is, if either of the premiſes be falſe, that premiſe muſt be denied by the defendant. If the form be faulty, ſome rule of ſyllogiſm is tranſgreſſed; and it is the part of the defendant to ſhew, what general or ſpecial rule it is that is tranſgreſſed. So that, if he is an able logician, he will be impregnable in the defence of truth, and may reſiſt all the attacks of the ſophiſt. But as there are ſyllogiſms which may ſeem to be perfect both in matter and form, when they are not really ſo, as a piece of money may ſeem to be good coin, when it is adulterate; ſuch fallacious ſyllogiſms are conſidered in this treatiſe, in order to make a defendant more expert in the uſe of his defenſive weapons.

And here the author, with his uſual magnanimity, attempts to bring all the fallacies that can enter into a ſyllogiſm under thirteen heads; of which ſix lie in the diction or language, and ſeven not in the diction.

The fallacies in diction are, 1. When an ambiguous word is taken at one time in one ſenſe, and at another time in another. 2. When an ambiguous phraſe is taken in the ſame manner. 3. and 4. are ambiguities in ſyntax; when words are conjoined in ſyntax that ought to be disjoined; or disjoined when they

ought

ought to be conjoined. 5. is an ambiguity in proſody, accent, or pronunciation. 6. An ambiguity ariſing from ſome figure of ſpeech.

When a ſophiſm of any of theſe kinds is tranſlated into another language, or even rendered into unambiguous expreſſions in the ſame language, the fallacy is evident, and the ſyllogiſm appears to have four terms.

The ſeven fallacies which are ſaid not to be in the diction, but in the thing, have their proper names in Greek and in Latin, by which they are diſtinguiſhed. Without minding their names, we ſhall give a brief account of their nature.

1. The firſt is, Taking an accidental conjunction of things for a natural or neceſſary connection: as, when from an accident we infer a property; when from an example we infer a rule; when from a ſingle act we infer a habit.

2. Taking that abſolutely which ought to be taken comparatively, or with a certain limitation. The conſtruction of language often leads into this fallacy: for in all languages it is common to uſe abſolute terms, to ſignify things which carry in them ſome ſecret compariſon; or to uſe unlimited terms, to ſignify what from its nature muſt be limited.

3. Taking that for the cauſe of a thing which was only an occaſion, or concomitant.

4. Begging the queſtion. This is done, when the thing to be proved, or ſome thing equivalent, is aſſumed in the premiſes.

5. Miſtaking the queſtion. When the concluſion of the ſyllogiſm is not the thing that ought to be proved, but ſomething elſe that is miſtaken for it.

6. When that which is not a conſequence is miſtaken for a conſequence; as if, becauſe all Africans are black, it were taken for granted that all blacks are Africans.

7. The laſt fallacy lies in propoſitions that are complex, and

imply two affimations, whereof one may be true, and the other falſe; ſo that whether you grant the propoſition, or deny it, you are intangled: as when it is affirmed, that ſuch a man has left off playing the fool. If it be granted, it implies, that he did play the fool formerly. If it be denied, it implies, or ſeems to imply, that he plays the fool ſtill.

In this enumeration, we ought, in juſtice to Ariſtotle, to expect only the fallacies incident to categorical ſyllogiſms. And I do not find, that the logicians have made any additions to it when taken in this view; altho' they have given ſome other fallacies that are incident to ſyllogiſms of the hypothetical kind, particularly the fallacy of an incomplete enumeration in disjunctive ſyllogiſms and dilemmas.

The different ſpecies of ſophiſms above mentioned are not ſo preciſely defined by Ariſtotle, or by ſubſequent logicians, but that they allow of great latitude in the application; and it is often dubious under what particular ſpecies a ſophiſtical ſyllogiſm ought to be claſſed. We even find the ſame example brought under one ſpecies by one author, and under another ſpecies by another. Nay, what is more ſtrange, Ariſtotle himſelf employs a long chapter in proving by a particular induction, that all the ſeven may be brought under that which we have called *miſtaking the queſtion*, and which is commonly called *ignoratio elenchi*. And indeed the proof of this is eaſy, without that laborious detail which Ariſtotle uſes for the purpoſe: for if you lop off from the concluſion of a ſophiſtical ſyllogiſm all that is not ſupported by the premiſes, the concluſion, in that caſe, will always be found different from that which ought to have been proved; and ſo it falls under the *ignoratio elenchi*.

It was probably Ariſtotle's aim, to reduce all the poſſible variety of ſophiſms, as he had attempted to do of juſt ſyllogiſms, to certain definite ſpecies: but he ſeems to be ſenſible that he had fallen

fallen ſhort in this laſt attempt. When a genus is properly divided into its ſpecies, the ſpecies ſhould not only, when taken together, exhauſt the whole genus; but every ſpecies ſhould have its own precinct ſo accurately defined, that one ſhall not encroach upon another. And when an individual can be ſaid to belong to two or three different ſpecies, the diviſion is imperfect; yet this is the caſe of Ariſtotle's diviſion of the ſophiſms, by his own acknowledgement. It ought not therefore to be taken for a diviſion ſtrictly logical. It may rather be compared to the ſeveral ſpecies or forms of action invented in law for the redreſs of wrongs. For every wrong there is a remedy in law by one action or another: but ſometimes a man may take his choice among ſeveral different actions. So every ſophiſtical ſyllogiſm may, by a little art, be brought under one or other of the ſpecies mentioned by Ariſtotle, and very often you may take your choice of two or three.

Beſides the enumeration of the various kinds of ſophiſms, there are many other things in this treatiſe concerning the art of managing a ſyllogiſtical diſpute with an antagoniſt. And indeed, if the paſſion for this kind of litigation, which reigned for ſo many ages, ſhould ever again lift up its head, we may predict, that the Organon of Ariſtotle will then become a faſhionable ſtudy: for it contains ſuch admirable materials and documents for this art, that it may be ſaid to have brought it to a ſcience.

The concluſion of this treatiſe ought not to be overlooked: it manifeſtly relates, not to the preſent treatiſe only, but alſo to the whole analytics and topics of the author. I ſhall therefore give the ſubſtance of it.

" Of thoſe who may be called inventers, ſome have made im-
" portant additions to things long before begun, and carried on
" through a courſe of ages; others have given a ſmall beginning
" to things which, in ſucceeding times, will be brought to greater
" perfection. The beginning of a thing, though ſmall, is the

" chief part of it, and requires the greateſt degree of invention;
" for it is eaſy to make additions to inventions once begun. Now
" with regard to the dialectical art, there was not ſomething done,
" and ſomething remaining to be done. There was abſolutely
" nothing done: for thoſe who profeſſed the art of diſputation,
" had only a ſet of orations compoſed, and of arguments, and
" of captious queſtions, which might ſuit many occaſions. Theſe
" their ſcholars ſoon learned, and fitted to the occaſion. This
" was not to teach you the art, but to furniſh you with the mate-
" rials produced by the art: as if a man profeſſing to teach you
" the art of making ſhoes, ſhould bring you a parcel of ſhoes of
" various ſizes and ſhapes, from which you may provide thoſe
" who want. This may have its uſe; but it is not to teach the
" art of making ſhoes. And indeed, with regard to rhetorical
" declamation, there are many precepts handed down from an-
" cient times; but with regard to the conſtruction of ſyllogiſms,
" not one.

" We have therefore employed much time and labour upon
" this ſubject; and if our ſyſtem appears to you not to be in the
" number of thoſe things, which, being before carried a certain
" length, were left to be perfected; we hope for your favourable
" acceptance of what is done, and your indulgence in what is left
" imperfect."

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Reflections on the Utility of Logic, and the Means of its Improvement.

SECT. I. *Of the Utility of Logic.*

MEN rarely leave one extreme without running into the contrary. It is no wonder, therefore, that the exceſſive admiration of Ariſtotle, which continued for ſo many ages, ſhould end in an undue contempt; and that the high eſteem of logic as the grand engine of ſcience, ſhould at laſt make way for too unfavourable an opinion, which ſeems now prevalent, of its being unworthy of a place in a liberal education. Thoſe who think according to the faſhion, as the greateſt part of men do, will be as prone to go into this extreme, as their grandfathers were to go into the contrary.

Laying aſide prejudice, whether faſhionable or unfaſhionable, let us conſider whether logic is, or may be made, ſubſervient to any good purpoſe. Its profeſſed end is, to teach men to think, to judge, and to reaſon, with preciſion and accuracy. No man will ſay that this is a matter of no importance; the only thing, therefore, that admits of doubt, is, whether it can be taught.

To reſolve this doubt, it may be obſerved, that our rational faculty is the gift of God, given to men in very different meaſure. Some have a larger portion, ſome a leſs; and where there is a remarkable defect of the natural power, it cannot be ſupplied by any

any culture whatſoever. But this natural power, even where it is ſtrongeſt, may lie dead for want of the means of improvement; and a ſavage may have been born with as good faculties as a Bacon or a Newton. The amazing difference that appears in advanced life, is owing to this, that the talent of one was buried, being never put to uſe, while that of the other was cultivated to the beſt advantage.

It may likewiſe be obſerved, that the chief mean of improving our rational power, is the vigorous exerciſe of it, in various ways, and in different ſubjects, by which the habit is acquired of exerciſing it properly. Without ſuch exerciſe, and good ſenſe over and above, a man who has ſtudied logic all his life may, after all, be only a petulant wrangler, without true judgement, or ſkill of reaſoning, in any ſcience.

I take this to be Locke's meaning, when, in his Thoughts on Education, he ſays, "If you would have your ſon to reaſon well, "let him read Chillingworth." The ſtate of things is much altered ſince Locke wrote. Logic has been much improved, chiefly by his writings; and yet much leſs ſtreſs is laid upon it, and leſs time conſumed in it. His counſel, therefore, was judicious and ſeaſonable; to wit, That the improvement of our reaſoning power is to be expected much more from an intimate acquaintance with the authors who reaſon beſt, than from ſtudying voluminous ſyſtems of logic. But if he had meant, that the ſtudy of logic was of no uſe, nor deſerved any attention, he ſurely would not have taken the pains to have made ſo conſiderable an addition to it, by his *Eſſay on the Human Underſtanding*, and by his *Thoughts on the Conduct of the Underſtanding*. Nor would he have remitted his pupil to Chillingworth, the acuteſt logician, as well as the beſt reaſoner, of his age; and one who, in innumerable places of his excellent book, without pedantry even in that pedantic age,

makes

makes the happieſt application of the rules of logic, for unraveling the ſophiſtical reaſoning of his antagoniſt.

Our reaſoning power makes no appearance in infancy; but as we grow up, it unfolds itſelf by degrees, like the bud of a tree. When a child firſt draws an inference, or perceives the force of an inference drawn by another perſon, we may call this *the birth of his reaſon:* but it is yet like a new-born babe, weak and tender; it muſt be cheriſhed, and carried in arms, and have food of eaſy digeſtion, till it gathers ſtrength.

I believe no man remembers this birth of his reaſon; but it is probable that his deciſions will at firſt be weak and wavering; and, compared with that ſteady conviction which he acquires in ripe years, will be like the dawn of the morning compared with noon-day. We ſee that the reaſon of children yields to authority, as a reed to the wind; nay, that it clings to it, and leans upon it, as if conſcious of its own weakneſs.

When reaſon acquires ſuch ſtrength as to ſtand on its own bottom, without the aid of authority, or even in oppoſition to authority, this may be called its *manly age.* But in moſt men, it hardly ever arrives at this period. Many, by their ſituation in life, have not the opportunity of cultivating their rational powers. Many, from the habit they have acquired, of ſubmitting their opinions to the authority of others, or from ſome other principle which operates more powerfully than the love of truth, ſuffer their judgement to be carried along, to the end of their days, either by the authority of a leader, or of a party, or of the multitude, or by their own paſſions. Such perſons, however learned, however acute, may be ſaid to be all their days children in underſtanding. They reaſon, they diſpute, and perhaps write; but it is not that they may find the truth; but that they may defend opinions which have deſcended to them by inheritance, or into which they have fallen by accident, or been led by affection.

I agree with Mr Locke, that there is no ſtudy better fitted to exerciſe and ſtrengthen the reaſoning powers, than that of the mathematical ſciences; for two reaſons; firſt, Becauſe there is no other branch of ſcience which gives ſuch ſcope to long and accurate trains of reaſoning; and, ſecondly, Becauſe in mathematics there is no room for authority, or for prejudice of any kind, which may give a falſe bias to the judgement.

When a youth of moderate parts begins to ſtudy Euclid, every thing at firſt is new to him. His apprehenſion is unſteady; his judgement is feeble; and reſts partly upon the evidence of the thing, and partly upon the authority of his teacher. But every time he goes over the definitions, the axioms, the elementary propoſitions, more light breaks in upon him; the language becomes familiar, and conveys clear and ſteady conceptions; the judgement is confirmed; he begins to ſee what demonſtration is; and it is impoſſible to ſee it without being charmed with it. He perceives it to be a kind of evidence which has no need of authority to ſtrengthen it. He finds himſelf emancipated from that bondage, and exults ſo much in this new ſtate of independence, that he ſpurns at authority, and would have demonſtration for every thing; until experience teaches him, that this is a kind of evidence which cannot be had in moſt things; and that in his moſt important concerns, he muſt reſt contented with probability.

As he goes on in mathematics, the road of demonſtration becomes ſmooth and eaſy; he can walk in it firmly, and take wider ſteps: and, at laſt, he acquires the habit, not only of underſtanding a demonſtration, but of diſcovering and demonſtrating mathematical truths.

Thus, a man without rules of logic, may acquire the habit of reaſoning juſtly in mathematics; and, I believe, he may, by like means, acquire the habit of reaſoning juſtly in mechanics, in juriſprudence,

riſprudence, in politics, or in any other ſcience. Good ſenſe, good examples, and aſſiduous exerciſe, may bring a man to reaſon juſtly and acutely in his own profeſſion, without rules.

But if any man think, that from this conceſſion he may infer the inutility of logic, he betrays a great want of that art by this inference: for it is no better reaſoning than this, That becauſe a man may go from Edinburgh to London by the way of Paris, therefore any other road is uſeleſs.

There is perhaps no practical art which may not be acquired, in a very conſiderable degree, by example and practice, without reducing it to rules. But practice, joined with rules, may carry a man on in his art farther and more quickly, than practice without rules. Every ingenious artiſt knows the utility of having his art reduced to rules, and by that means made a ſcience. He is thereby enlightened in his practice, and works with more aſſurance. By rules, he ſometimes corrects his own errors, and often detects the errors of others: he finds them of great uſe to confirm his judgement, to juſtify what is right, and to condemn what is wrong.

Is it of no uſe in reaſoning, to be well acquainted with the various powers of the human underſtanding, by which we reaſon? Is it of no uſe, to reſolve the various kinds of reaſoning into their ſimple elements; and to diſcover, as far as we are able, the rules by which thoſe elements are combined in judging and in reaſonning? Is it of no uſe, to mark the various fallacies in reaſoning, by which even the moſt ingenious men have been led into error? It muſt ſurely betray great want of underſtanding, to think theſe things uſeleſs or unimportant. Theſe are the things which logicians have attempted; and which they have executed; not indeed ſo completely as to leave no room for improvement, but in ſuch a manner as to give very conſiderable aid to our reaſoning powers. That the principles laid down with regard to definition

and diviſion, with regard to the converſion and oppoſition of propoſitions and the general rules of reaſoning, are not without uſe, is ſufficiently apparent from the blunders committed by thoſe who diſdain any acquaintance with them.

Although the art of categorical ſyllogiſm is better fitted for ſcholaſtic litigation, than for real improvement in knowledge, it is a venerable piece of antiquity, and a great effort of human genius. We admire the pyramids of Egypt, and the wall of China, tho' uſeleſs burdens upon the earth. We can bear the moſt minute deſcription of them, and travel hundreds of leagues to ſee them. If any perſon ſhould, with ſacrilegious hands, deſtroy or deface them, his memory would be had in abhorrence. The predicaments and predicables, the rules of ſyllogiſm, and the topics, have a like title to our veneration as antiquities: they are uncommon efforts, not of human power, but of human genius; and they make a remarkable period in the progreſs of human reaſon.

The prejudice againſt logic has probably been ſtrengthened by its being taught too early in life. Boys are often taught logic as they are taught their creed, when it is an exerciſe of memory only, without underſtanding. One may as well expect to underſtand grammar before he can ſpeak, as to underſtand logic before he can reaſon. It muſt even be acknowledged, that commonly we are capable of reaſoning in mathematics more early than in logic. The objects preſented to the mind in this ſcience, are of a very abſtract nature, and can be diſtinctly conceived only when we are capable of attentive reflection upon the operations of our own underſtanding, and after we have been accuſtomed to reaſon. There may be an elementary logic, level to the capacity of thoſe who have been but little exerciſed in reaſoning; but the moſt important parts of this ſcience require a ripe underſtanding, capable of reflecting

reflecting upon its own operations. Therefore to make logic the firſt branch of ſcience that is to be taught, is an old error that ought to be corrected.

SECT. 2. *Of the Improvement of Logic.*

In compoſitions of human thought expreſſed by ſpeech or by writing, whatever is excellent and whatever is faulty, fall within the province, either of grammar, or of rhetoric, or of logic. Propriety of expreſſion is the province of grammar; grace, elegance, and force, in thought and in expreſſion, are the province of rhetoric; juſtneſs and accuracy of thought are the province of logic.

The faults in compoſition, therefore, which fall under the cenſure of logic, are obſcure and indiſtinct conceptions, falſe judgement, inconcluſive reaſoning, and all improprieties in diſtinctions, definitions, diviſion, or method. To aid our rational powers, in avoiding theſe faults and in attaining the oppoſite excellencies, is the end of logic; and whatever there is in it that has no tendency to promote this end, ought to be thrown out.

The rules of logic being of a very abſtract nature, ought to be illuſtrated by a variety of real and ſtriking examples taken from the writings of good authors. It is both inſtructive and entertaining, to obſerve the virtues of accurate compoſition in writers of fame. We cannot ſee them, without being drawn to the imitation of them, in a more powerful manner than we can be by dry rules. Nor are the faults of ſuch writers leſs inſtructive or leſs powerful monitors. A wreck, left upon a ſhoal, or upon a rock, is not more uſeful to the ſailor, than the faults of good writers, when ſet up to view, are to thoſe who come after them. It was a

happy thought in a late ingenious writer of Engliſh grammar, to collect under the ſeveral rules, examples of bad Engliſh found in the moſt approved authors. It were to be wiſhed that the rules of logic were illuſtrated in the ſame manner. By this means, a ſyſtem of logic would become a repoſitory; wherein whatever is moſt acute in judging and in reaſoning, whatever is moſt accurate in dividing, diſtinguiſhing, and defining, ſhould be laid up and diſpoſed in order for our imitation; and wherein the falſe ſteps of eminent authors ſhould be recorded for our admonition.

After men had laboured in the ſearch of truth near two thouſand years, by the help of ſyllogiſms, Lord Bacon propoſed the method of induction, as a more effectual engine for that purpoſe. His *Novum Organum* gave a new turn to the thoughts and labours of the inquiſitive, more remarkable, and more uſeful, than that which the *Organum* of Ariſtotle had given before; and may be conſidered as a ſecond grand æra in the progreſs of human reaſon.

The art of ſyllogiſm produced numberleſs diſputes, and numberleſs ſects, who fought againſt each other with much animoſity, without gaining or loſing ground; but did nothing conſiderable for the benefit of human life. The art of induction, firſt delineated by Lord Bacon, produced numberleſs laboratories and obſervatories, in which Nature has been put to the queſtion by thouſands of experiments, and forced to confeſs many of her ſecrets, which before were hid from mortals. And by theſe, arts have been improved, and human knowledge wonderfully increaſed.

In reaſoning by ſyllogiſm, from general principles we deſcend to a concluſion virtually contained in them. The proceſs of induction is more arduous; being an aſcent from particular premiſes to a general concluſion. The evidence of ſuch general concluſions is not demonſtrative, but probable: but when the induc-

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tion is ſufficiently copious, and, carried on according to the rules of art, it forces conviction no leſs than demonſtration itſelf does.

The greateſt part of human knowledge reſts upon evidence of this kind. Indeed we can have no other for general truths which are contingent in their nature, and depend upon the will and ordination of the maker of the world. He governs the world he has made, by general laws. The effects of theſe laws in particular phenomena are open to our obſervation; and by obſerving a train of uniform effects with due caution, we may at laſt decypher the law of nature by which they are regulated.

Lord Bacon has diſplayed no leſs force of genius in reducing to rules this method of reaſoning, than Ariſtotle did in the method of ſyllogiſm. His *Novum Organum* ought therefore to be held as a moſt important addition to the ancient logic. Thoſe who underſtand it, and enter into the ſpirit of it, will be able to diſtinguiſh the chaff from the wheat in philoſophical diſquiſitions into the works of God. They will learn to hold in due contempt all hypotheſes and theories, the creatures of human imagination, and to reſpect nothing but facts ſufficiently vouched, or concluſions drawn from them by a fair and chaſte interpretation of nature.

Moſt arts have been reduced to rules, after they had been brought to a conſiderable degree of perfection by the natural ſagacity of artiſts; and the rules have been drawn from the beſt examples of the art that had been before exhibited: but the art of philoſophical induction was delineated by Lord Bacon in a very ample manner, before the world had ſeen any tolerable example of it. This, altho' it adds greatly to the merit of the author, muſt have produced ſome obſcurity in the work, and a defect of proper examples for illuſtration. This defect may now be eaſily ſupplied, from thoſe authors who, in their philoſophical diſquiſitions, have moſt ſtrictly purſued the path pointed out in the *Novum Organum*. Among theſe Sir Iſaac Newton ſeems to hold the firſt rank, having,

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in the third book of his *Principia*, and in his Optics, had the rules of the *Novum Organum* conſtantly in his eye.

I think Lord Bacon was alſo the firſt who endeavoured to reduce to a ſyſtem the prejudices or biaſſes of the mind, which are the cauſes of falſe judgement, and which he calls *the idols of the human underſtanding*. Some late writers of logic have very properly introduced this into their ſyſtem; but it deſerves to be more copiouſly handled, and to be illuſtrated by real examples.

It is of great conſequence to accurate reaſoning, to diſtinguiſh firſt principles which are to be taken for granted, from propoſitions which require proof. All the real knowledge of mankind may be divided into two parts: the firſt conſiſting of ſelf-evident propoſitions; the ſecond, of thoſe which are deduced by juſt reaſoning from ſelf-evident propoſitions. The line which divides theſe two parts ought to be marked as diſtinctly as poſſible, and the principles that are ſelf-evident reduced, as far as can be done, to general axioms. This has been done in mathematics from the beginning, and has tended greatly to the emolument of that ſcience. It has lately been done in natural philoſophy: and by this means that ſcience has advanced more in an hundred and fifty years, than it had done before in two thouſand. Every ſcience is in an unformed ſtate until its firſt principles are aſcertained: after that is done, it advances regularly, and ſecures the ground it has gained.

Altho' firſt principles do not admit of direct proof, yet there muſt be certain marks and characters, by which thoſe that are truly ſuch may be diſtinguiſhed from counterfeits. Theſe marks ought to be deſcribed, and applied, to diſtinguiſh the genuine from the ſpurious.

In the ancient philoſophy there is a redundance, rather than a defect, of firſt principles. Many things were aſſumed under that character without a juſt title: That nature abhors a *vacuum*;

That

That bodies do not gravitate in their proper place; That the heavenly bodies undergo no change; That they move in perfect circles, and with an equable motion. Such principles as theſe were aſſumed in the Peripatetic philoſophy, without proof, as if they were ſelf-evident.

Des Cartes, ſenſible of this weakneſs in the ancient philoſophy, and deſirous to guard againſt it in his own ſyſtem, reſolved to admit nothing until his aſſent was forced by irreſiſtible evidence. The firſt thing which he found to be certain and evident was, that he thought, and reaſoned, and doubted. He found himſelf under a neceſſity of believing the exiſtence of thoſe operations of mind of which he was conſcious: and having thus found ſure footing in this one principle of conſciouſneſs, he reſted ſatisfied with it, hoping to be able to build the whole fabric of his knowledge upon it; like Archimedes, who wanted but one fixed point to move the whole earth. But the foundation was too narrow; and in his progreſs he unawares aſſumes many things leſs evident than thoſe which he attempts to prove. Altho' he was not able to ſuſpect the teſtimony of conſciouſneſs, yet he thought the teſtimony of ſenſe, of memory, and of every other faculty, might be ſuſpected, and ought not to be received until proof was brought that they are not fallacious. Therefore he applies theſe faculties, whoſe character is yet in queſtion, to prove, That there is an infinitely perfect Being, who made him, and who made his ſenſes, his memory, his reaſon, and all his faculties; That this Being is no deceiver, and therefore could not give him faculties that are fallacious; and that on this account they deſerve credit.

It is ſtrange, that this philoſopher, who found himſelf under a neceſſity of yielding to the teſtimony of conſciouſneſs, did not find the ſame neceſſity of yielding to the teſtimony of his ſenſes, his memory, and his underſtanding: and that while he was certain that he doubted, and reaſoned, he was uncertain whether two

and

and three made five, and whether he was dreaming or awake. It is more ſtrange, that ſo acute a reaſoner ſhould not perceive, that his whole train of reaſoning to prove that his faculties were not fallacious, was mere ſophiſtry: for if his faculties were fallacious, they might deceive him in this train of reaſoning; and ſo the concluſion, That they were not fallacious, was only the teſtimony of his faculties in their own favour, and might be a fallacy.

It is difficult to give any reaſon for diſtruſting our other faculties, that will not reach conſciouſneſs itſelf. And he who diſtruſts thoſe faculties of judging and reaſoning which God hath given him, muſt even reſt in his ſcepticiſm till he come to a ſound mind, or until God give him new faculties to ſit in judgement upon the old. If it be not a firſt principle, That our faculties are not fallacious, we muſt be abſolute ſceptics: for this principle is incapable of proof; and if it is not certain, nothing elſe can be certain.

Since the time of Des Cartes, it has been faſhionable with thoſe who dealt in abſtract philoſophy, to employ their invention in finding philoſophical arguments, either to prove thoſe truths which ought to be received as firſt principles, or to overturn them: and it is not eaſy to ſay, whether the authority of firſt principles is more hurt by the firſt of theſe attempts, or by the laſt; for ſuch principles can ſtand ſecure only upon their own bottom; and to place them upon any other foundation than that of their intrinſic evidence, is in effect to overturn them.

I have lately met with a very ſenſible and judicious treatiſe, wrote by Father Buffier about fifty years ago, concerning firſt principles, and the ſource of human judgements, which, with great propriety, he prefixed to his treatiſe of logic. And indeed I apprehend it is a ſubject of ſuch conſequence, that if inquiſitive men

men can be brought to the ſame unanimity in the firſt principles of the other ſciences, as in thoſe of mathematics and natural philoſophy, (and why ſhould we deſpair of a general agreement in things that are ſelf-evident?), this might be conſidered as a third grand æra in the progreſs of human reaſon.

SKETCH II.

Principles and Progreſs of MORALITY.

THE ſcience of morals, like other ſciences, is in a very imperfect ſtate among ſavages; and arrives at maturity among enlightened nations by very ſlow degrees. This progreſs points out the hiſtorical part, as firſt in order: but as that hiſtory would give little ſatisfaction, without a rule for comparing the morals of different ages, and of different nations, I begin with the principles of morality, ſuch as ought to govern at all times, and in all nations. The preſent ſketch accordingly is divided into two parts. In the firſt, the principles are unfolded; and the ſecond is altogether hiſtorical.

PART I.

PRINCIPLES of MORALITY.

SECT. I.

HUMAN ACTIONS *analyſed.*

THE hand of God is no where more viſible, than in the nice adjuſtment of our internal frame to our ſituation in this world. An animal is endued with a power of ſelf-motion; and in

in performing animal functions, requires not any external aid. This more eſpecially is the caſe of man, the nobleſt of terreſtrial beings. His heart beats, his blood circulates, his ſtomach digeſts, evacuations proceed, &c. &c. By what means? Not ſurely by the laws of mechaniſm, which are far from being adequate to ſuch operations. The operations mentioned are effects of an internal power, beſtow'd on man for preſerving life. The power is exerted uniformly, and without interruption, independent of will, and without conſciouſneſs.

Man is a being ſuſceptible of pleaſure and pain: theſe generate deſire to attain what is agreeable, and to ſhun what is diſagreeable; and he is enabled by other powers to gratify his deſires. One power, termed *inſtinct*, is exerted indeed with conſciouſneſs; but blindly, without will, and without intention to produce any effect. Brute animals act for the moſt part by inſtinct: hunger prompts them to eat, and cold, to take ſhelter; knowingly indeed, but without exerting any act of will, and without foreſight of what will happen. Infants of the human ſpecies, little ſuperior to brutes, are, like brutes, governed by inſtinct: they lay hold of the nipple, without knowing that ſucking will ſatisfy their hunger; and they weep when pained, without any view of relief *. Another power is governed by intention and will. In the progreſs from infancy to maturity, the mind opens to objects, with-

* Akin to theſe, are certain habitual acts done without thought, ſuch as ſnuffing or grinning. Cuſtom enables one to move the fingers on an inſtrument of muſic, without being directed by will: the motion is often too quick for an act of will. Some arrive at great perfection in the art of balancing: the ſlighteſt deviation from the juſt balance is inſtantly redreſſed: were a preceding act of will neceſſary, it would be too late. An unexpected hollow in walking, occaſions a violent ſhock: is not this evidence, that external motion is governed by the mind, frequently without conſciouſneſs; and that in walking, the body is adjuſted beforehand to what is expected?

out end, of deſire and of averſion, the attaining or ſhunning of which depend more or leſs on our own will. We are placed in a wide world, left to our own conduct; and we are by nature provided with a proper power for performing what we intend and will. The actions we perform by this power are termed *voluntary*. There ſtill remain another ſpecies of actions, termed *involuntary*; as where we act by ſome irreſiſtible motive againſt our will. An action may be voluntary, tho' done with reluctance; as where a man, to free himſelf from torture, reveals the ſecrets of his friend: his confeſſion is voluntary, tho' drawn from him with great reluctance. But let us ſuppoſe, that after the firmeſt reſolution to reveal nothing, his mind is unhinged by exquiſite torture; the diſcovery he makes may be juſtly termed *involuntary*: he ſpeaks indeed; but he is compelled to it abſolutely againſt his will.

Man is by his nature an accountable being, anſwerable for his conduct to God and man. In doing any action that wears a double face, he is prompted by his nature to explain the ſame to his relations, his friends, his acquaintance; and above all, to thoſe who have authority over him. He hopes for praiſe for every right action, and dreads blame for every one that is wrong. But for what ſort of actions does he hold himſelf accountable? Not ſurely for an inſtinctive action, which is done blindly, without intention, and without will: neither for an involuntary action, becauſe it is extorted from him againſt his will: and leaſt of all, for actions done without conſciouſneſs, ſuch as thoſe which preſerve life. What only remain are voluntary actions, which are either right or wrong. Such actions are done wittingly and willingly: for theſe we muſt anſwer, if at all accountable; and for theſe every man in conſcience holds himſelf bound to anſwer.

And now more particularly upon voluntary actions. To intend and to will, tho' commonly held ſynonymous, ſignify different

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acts of the mind. Intention reſpects the effect: Will reſpects the action that is exerted for producing the effect. It is my intention, for example, to relieve my friend from diſtreſs: upon ſeeing him, it is my Will to give him a ſum for his relief: the external act of giving follows; and my friend is relieved, which is the effect intended. But theſe internal acts, tho' in their nature different, are always united: I cannot will the means, without intending the effect; and I cannot intend the effect, without willing the means *.

Some effects of voluntary action follow neceſſarily: A wound is an effect that neceſſarily follows the ſtabbing a perſon with a dagger: death is a neceſſary effect of throwing one down from the battlements of a high tower. Some effects are probable only: I labour in order to provide for my family; fight for my country to reſcue it from oppreſſors; take phyſic for my health. In ſuch caſes, the event intended does not neceſſarily nor always follow.

A man, when he wills to act, muſt intend the neceſſary effect: a perſon who ſtabs, certainly intends to wound. But where the effect is probable only, a man may act without intending the effect that follows: a ſtone thrown by me at random into the market-place, may happen to wound a man without my intending it. One acts by inſtinct, without either will or intention: voluntary actions that neceſſarily produce their effect, imply intention: voluntary actions, when the effect is probable only, are ſometimes intended, ſometimes not.

Human actions are diſtinguiſhed from each other by certain *qualities*, termed *right* and *wrong*. But as theſe make the corner-ſtone of morality, they are reſerved to the following ſection.

* To incline, to reſolve, to intend, to will, are acts of the mind relative to external action. Theſe ſeveral acts are well underſtood; tho' they cannot be defined, being perfectly ſimple.

SECT.

SECT. II.

Diviſion of Human Actions into RIGHT, WRONG, *and* INDIFFERENT

THE qualities of right and wrong in voluntary actions, are univerſally acknowledged as the foundation of morality; and yet philoſophers have been ſtrangely perplexed about them. The hiſtory of their various opinions, would ſignify little but to darken the ſubject: the reader will have more ſatisfaction in ſeeing theſe qualities explained, without entering at all into controverſy.

No perſon is ignorant of primary and ſecondary qualities, a diſtinction much inſiſted on by philoſophers. Primary qualities, ſuch as figure, coheſion, weight, are permanent qualities, that exiſt in a ſubject whether perceived or not. Secondary qualities, ſuch as colour, taſte, ſmell, depend on the percipient as much as on the ſubject, being nothing when not perceived. Beauty and uglineſs are qualities of the latter ſort: they have no exiſtence but when perceived; and, like all other ſecondary qualities, they are perceived intuitively; having no dependence on reaſon nor on judgement, more than colour has, or ſmell, or taſte (*a*).

The qualities of right and wrong in voluntary actions, are ſecondary, like beauty and uglineſs, and the other ſecondary qualities mentioned. Like them, they are objects of intuitive perception, and depend not in any degree on reaſon or on judge-

(*a*) Elements of Criticiſm, vol. 1 p. 207. edit. 5.

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ment. No argument is requiſite to prove, that to reſcue an innocent babe from the jaws of a wolf, to feed the hungry, to clothe the naked, are right actions: they are perceived to be ſo intuitively. As little is an argument requiſite to prove, that murder, deceit, perjury, are wrong actions: they are perceived intuitively to be ſo. The Deity has beſtow'd on man, different faculties for different purpoſes. Truth and falſehood are inveſtigated by the reaſoning faculty. Beauty and uglineſs are objects of a ſenſe, known by the name of *taſte*. Right and wrong are objects of a ſenſe termed the *moral ſenſe* or *conſcience*. And ſuppoſing theſe qualities to be hid from our perception, in vain would we try to diſcover them by any argument, or proceſs of reaſoning: the attempt would be abſurd; no leſs ſo than an attempt to diſcover colour, by reaſoning, or taſte, or ſmell *.

Right and wrong, as mentioned above, are qualities of voluntary actions, and of no other kind. An inſtinctive action is beneficial, is agreeable; but it cannot properly be denominated either right or wrong. An involuntary act is hurtful to the agent, and diſagreeable to the ſpectator; but in the agent it is neither right nor wrong. Theſe qualities alſo depend in no degree on the event. Thus, if, to ſave my friend from drowning, I plunge into a river, the action is right, tho' I happen to come too late.

* Every perception muſt proceed from ſome faculty or power of perception, termed *ſenſe*. The moral ſenſe, by which we perceive the qualities of right and wrong, may be conſidered either as a branch of the ſenſe of ſeeing, by which we perceive the actions to which theſe qualities belong, or as a ſenſe diſtinct from all others. The ſenſes by which objects are perceived, are not ſeparated from each other by diſtinct boundaries; and the ſorting or claſſing them, ſeems to depend more on taſte and fancy, than on nature. I have followed the plan laid down by former writers; which is, to conſider the moral ſenſe as a ſenſe diſtinct from others, becauſe it is the eaſieſt and cleareſt manner of conceiving it.

And if I aim a ſtroke at a man behind his back, the action is wrong, tho' I happen not to touch him.

The qualities of right and of agreeable, are inſeparable; and ſo are the qualities of wrong and of diſagreeable. A right action, accordingly, is agreeable, not only in the direct perception, but equally ſo in every ſubſequent recollection. And in both circumſtances equally, a wrong action is diſagreeable.

Right actions are diſtinguiſhed by the moral ſenſe into two kinds, viz. what *ought* to be done, and what *may* be done, or left undone. Wrong actions admit not that diſtinction: they are all prohibited to be done. To ſay that an action ought to be done, means that we are tied or obliged to perform; and to ſay that an action ought not to be done, means that we are reſtrained from doing it. Tho' the neceſſity implied in the being tied or obliged, is not phyſical, but only what is commonly termed *moral*; yet we conceive ourſelves deprived of liberty or freedom, and neceſſarily bound to act or to forbear acting, in oppoſition to every other motive. The neceſſity here deſcribed is termed *duty*. The moral neceſſity we are under to forbear harming the innocent, is a proper example: the moral ſenſe declares the reſtraint to be our duty, which no motive whatever will excuſe us for tranſgreſſing.

The duty of performing or forbearing any action, implies a *right* in ſome perſon to exact performance of that duty; and accordingly, a duty or obligation neceſſarily infers a correſponding right. A promiſe on my part to pay L. 100, confers a right to demand performance. The man who commits an injury, violates the *right* of the perſon injured, which entitles him to demand reparation of the wrong.

Duty is twofold; duty to others, and duty to ourſelves. With reſpect to the former, the doing what we ought to do, is termed *juſt*: the doing what we ought not to do, and the omitting what

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we ought to do, are termed *unjuſt*. With reſpect to ourſelves, the doing what we ought to do, is termed *proper*: the doing what we ought not to do, and the omitting what we ought to do, are termed *improper*. Thus, *right*, ſignifying a quality of certain actions, is a genus; of which *juſt* and *proper* are ſpecies: *wrong*, ſignifying a quality of other actions, is a genus; of which *unjuſt* and *improper* are ſpecies.

Right actions left to our free will, to be done, or left undone, come next in order. They are, like the former, right when done; but they differ, in not being wrong when left undone. To remit a juſt debt for the ſake of a growing family, to yield a ſubject in controverſy rather than go to law with a neighbour, generouſly to return good for ill, are examples of this ſpecies. They are univerſally approved as right actions: but as no perſon has a right or title to oblige us to perform ſuch actions, the leaving them undone is not a wrong: no perſon is injured by the forbearance. Actions that come under this claſs, ſhall be termed *arbitrary*, for want of a more proper deſignation.

So much for right actions, and their diviſions. Wrong actions are of two kinds, *criminal* and *culpable*. What are done intentionally to produce miſchief, are criminal: ſuch raſh or unguarded actions as produce miſchief without intention, are culpable. The former are reſtrained by puniſhment, to be handled in the 5th ſection; the latter by reparation, to be handled in the 6th.

The diviſions of voluntary actions are not yet exhauſted. Some there are that, properly ſpeaking, cannot be denominated either right or wrong. Actions done merely for amuſement or paſtime, without intention to produce good or ill, are of that kind; leaping, for example, running, jumping over a ſtick, throwing a ſtone to make circles in the water. Such actions are neither approved nor diſapproved: they may be termed *indifferent*.

There is no cauſe for doubting the exiſtence of the moral ſenſe,

more than for doubting the exiſtence of the ſenſe of beauty, of ſeeing, or of hearing. In fact, the perception of right and wrong as qualities of actions, is no leſs diſtinct and clear, than that of beauty, of colour, or of any other quality; and as every perception is an act of ſenſe, the ſenſe of beauty is not with greater certainty evinced from the perception of beauty, than the moral ſenſe is from the perception of right and wrong. We find this ſenſe diſtributed among individuals in different degrees of perfection: but there perhaps never exiſted any one above the condition of an idiot, who poſſeſſed it not in ſome degree; and were any man entirely deſtitute of it, the terms *right* and *wrong* would be to him no leſs unintelligible, than the term colour is to one born blind.

That every individual is endued with a ſenſe of right and wrong, more or leſs diſtinct, will probably be granted; but whether there be among men what may be termed a *common ſenſe* of right and wrong, producing uniformity of opinion as to right and wrong, is not ſo evident. There is no abſurdity in ſuppoſing the opinions of men about right and wrong, to be as various as about beauty and deformity: and that this ſuppoſition is not deſtitute of foundation, we are led to ſuſpect, upon diſcovering that in different countries, and even in the ſame country at different times, the opinions publicly eſpouſed with regard to right and wrong, are extremely various; that among ſome nations it was held lawful for a man to ſell his children for ſlaves, and in their infancy to abandon them to wild beaſts; that it was held equally lawful to puniſh children, even capitally, for the crime of their parent; that the murdering an enemy in cold blood, was once a common practice; that human ſacrifices, impious no leſs than immoral according to our notions, were of old univerſal; that even in later times, it has been held meritorious, to inflict cruel torments for the ſlighteſt deviations from the religious creed

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of the plurality; and that among the moſt enlightened nations, there are conſiderable differences with reſpect to the rules of morality.

Theſe facts tend not to diſprove the reality of a common ſenſe in morals: they only prove, that the moral ſenſe has not been equally perfect at all times, nor in all countries. This branch of the hiſtory of morality, is reſerved for the ſecond part. To give ſome preſent ſatisfaction, I ſhall ſhortly obſerve, that the ſavage ſtate is the infancy of man; during which, the more delicate ſenſes lie dormant, leaving nations to the authority of cuſtom, of imitation, and of paſſion, without any juſt taſte of morals more than of the fine arts. But nations, like individuals, ripen gradually, and acquire a refined taſte in morals as well as in the fine arts: after which we find great uniformity of opinion about the rules of right and wrong; with few exceptions, but what may proceed from imbecility, or corrupted education. There may be found, it is true, even in the moſt enlightened ages, men who have ſingular notions of morality; and there may be found the like ſingularity upon many other ſubjects: which no more affords an argument againſt a common ſenſe or ſtandard of right and wrong, than a monſter doth againſt the ſtandard that regulates our external form, or than an exception doth againſt the truth of a general propoſition.

That there is in mankind an uniformity of opinion with reſpect to right and wrong, is a matter of fact of which the only infallible evidence is obſervation and experience: and to that evidence I appeal; entering only a caveat, that, for the reaſon above given, the enquiry be confined to enlightened nations. In the mean time, I take liberty to ſuggeſt an argument from analogy, That if there be great uniformity among the different tribes of men in ſeeing and hearing, in pleaſure and pain, in judging of truth and error, the ſame uniformity ought to hold with reſpect

to right and wrong. Whatever minute differences there may be to diſtinguiſh one perſon from another, yet in the general principles that conſtitute our nature, internal and external, there is wonderful uniformity.

This uniformity of ſentiment, which may be termed *the common ſenſe of mankind with reſpect to right and wrong*, is eſſential to ſocial beings. Did the moral ſentiments of men differ as much as their faces, they would be altogether unqualified for ſociety: diſcord and controverſy would be endleſs, and *major vis* would be the only rule of *meum et tuum*.

But ſuch uniformity of ſentiment, tho' general, is not altogether univerſal: men there are, as above mentioned, who differ from the common ſenſe of mankind with reſpect to various points of morality. What ought to be the conduct of ſuch men? ought they to regulate their conduct by that ſtandard, or by their private conviction? There will be occaſion afterward to obſerve, that we judge of others as we believe they judge of themſelves; and that private conviction is the ſtandard for rewards and puniſhments (*a*). But with reſpect to every controverſy about property and pecuniary intereſt, and, in general, about every civil right and obligation, the common ſenſe of mankind is the ſtandard, and not private conviction or conſcience; which I ſhall endeavour to make out as follows.

We have an innate ſenſe of a common nature, not only in our own ſpecies, but in every ſpecies of animals. And that the fact correſponds to our ſenſe of it, is verified by experience; for there appears a remarkable uniformity in creatures of the ſame kind, and a diſformity, no leſs remarkable, in creatures of a different kind. As that common nature is perceived to be a model or ſtandard for each individual of the kind, it raiſes wonder to find

(*a*) Sect. 5.

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an individual deviating from the common nature of the ſpecies, whether in its internal or external ſtructure: a child born with averſion to its mother's milk, is a wonder, no leſs than if born without a mouth, or with more than one.

Secondly, The innate ſenſe mentioned dictates, that the common nature of man in particular, is invariable as well as univerſal; that it will be the ſame hereafter as it is at preſent, and as it was in time paſt, the ſame among all nations, and in all corners of the earth: nor are we deceived; becauſe, allowing for ſlight differences occaſioned by culture and other accidental circumſtances, the fact correſponds to our perception.

Thirdly, We perceive that this common nature is *right* and *perfect*, and that it *ought* to be a model or ſtandard for every human being. Any remarkable deviation from it in the ſtructure of an individual, appears imperfect or irregular; and raiſes a painful emotion: a monſtrous birth, exciting curioſity in philoſophers, fails not at the ſame time to excite averſion in every ſpectator.

This ſenſe of perfection in the common nature of man, comprehends every branch of his nature, and particularly the common ſenſe of mankind with reſpect to right and wrong; which accordingly is perceived by all to be perfect, having authority over all men as the ultimate and unerring ſtandard of morals, even in contradiction to private conviction. Thus, a law in our nature binds us to regulate our conduct by that ſtandard: its authority is univerſally acknowledged, as nothing is more common in every diſpute about *meum et tuum*, than an appeal to it as the ultimate and unerring ſtandard.

At the ſame time, as that ſtandard, through infirmity or prejudice, is not conſpicuous to every individual, many are miſled into erroneous opinions, by miſtaking a falſe ſtandard for that of nature. And hence a diſtinction between a right and a wrong ſenſe in morals; a diſtinction which every one underſtands, but which,

which, unleſs for the conviction of a moral ſtandard, would be altogether unintelligible.

The final cauſe of this branch of our nature is conſpicuous. Were there no ſtandard of right and wrong for determining endleſs controverſies about matters of intereſt, the ſtrong would have recourſe to force, the weak to cunning, and ſociety would be intolerable. Courts of law could afford no remedy; for without a ſtandard of morals, their deciſions would be arbitrary, and of no authority. Happy it is for men to be provided with ſuch a ſtandard: it is neceſſary in ſociety that our actions be uniform with reſpect to right and wrong; and in order to uniformity of action, it is neceſſary that our perceptions of right and wrong be alſo uniform: to produce ſuch uniformity, a ſtandard of morals is indiſpenſable. Nature has provided us with that ſtandard, which is daily apply'd by courts of law with ſucceſs.

In reviewing what is ſaid, it muſt afford great ſatisfaction, to find morality eſtabliſhed upon the moſt ſolid of all foundations, viz. intuitive perception, which is not only a ſingle mental act, but is complete in itſelf, having no dependence on any antecedent propoſition. The moſt accurate reaſoning affords not equal conviction; for every ſort of reaſoning, as explained in the ſketch immediately foregoing, requires not only ſelf-evident truths or axioms to found upon, but employs over and above various propoſitions to bring out its concluſions. By intuitive perception ſolely, without reaſoning, we acquire knowledge of right and wrong; of what we may do, of what we ought to do, and of what we ought to abſtain from: and conſidering that we have thus greater certainty of moral laws, than of any propoſition diſcoverable by reaſoning, man may well be deemed a favourite of heaven, when he is ſo admirably qualified for acting the part that is agreeable to his Maker. The moral ſenſe or conſcience is the voice of God within us; conſtantly admoniſhing us of our duty, and requiring

quiring from us no exerciſe of our faculties but attention merely. The celebrated Locke ventured what he thought a bold conjecture, That moral duties might be ſuſceptible of demonſtration: how agreeable would the diſcovery have been to him, that they are founded upon intuitive perception, ſtill more convincing and authoritative!

By one branch of the moral ſenſe, we are taught what we ought to do, and what we ought not to do; and by another branch, what we may do, or leave undone. But ſociety would be imperfect, if the moral ſenſe ſtopped here. There is no particular that tends more to complete ſociety, than what is mentioned in the firſt ſection, viz. That every man is accountable for his conduct to his fellow-creatures; and he is rendered accountable by a third branch of the moral ſenſe, which teaches him, that this is his duty. And it will be made evident afterward, in the 3d ſketch, that we are accountable to our Maker, as well as to our fellow-creatures.

To complete this theory, I add, that an action is right or wrong, independent of the actor's own opinion. Thus, when a man, excited by friendſhip or pity, reſcues a heretic from the flames, the action is right, even tho' he think it wrong, from a conviction that heretics ought to be burnt. But we apply a different rule to thoſe who act: a man is approved, and held to be innocent, when he does what he himſelf thinks right; he is diſapproved, and held to be guilty, when he does what he himſelf thinks wrong. Thus, to aſſaſſinate an atheiſt for the ſake of religion, is a wrong action; and yet the enthuſiaſt who commits that wrong, may be innocent: and one is guilty who, againſt conſcience, eats meat in lent, tho' the action is not wrong. In ſhort, an action is perceived to be right or wrong, independent of the actor's own opinion: but he is approved or diſapproved, held to be innocent or guilty, according to his own opinion.

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SECT. III.

Laws of Nature reſpecting our MORAL CONDUCT IN SOCIETY.

A Standard being thus eſtabliſhed for regulating our moral conduct in ſociety, we proceed to inveſtigate the laws that reſult from it. But firſt we take under conſideration, what other principles concur with the moral ſenſe to qualify men for ſociety.

When we reflect on the different branches of human knowledge, it might ſeem, that of all ſubjects human nature ſhould be the beſt underſtood; becauſe every man has daily opportunities to ſtudy it, in his own paſſions and in his own actions. But human nature, an intereſting ſubject, is ſeldom left to the inveſtigation of philoſophy. Writers of a ſweet diſpoſition and warm imagination hold, that man is a benevolent being, and that every man ought to direct his conduct for the good of all, without regarding himſelf but as one of the number (*a*). Thoſe of a cold temperament, and contracted mind, hold him to be an animal entirely ſelfiſh; to evince which, examples are accumulated without end (*b*). Neither of theſe ſyſtems is that of nature. The ſelfiſh ſyſtem is contradicted by the experience of all ages, affording the cleareſt evidence, that men frequently act for the ſake of others, without regarding themſelves, and ſometimes in direct oppoſition to their own intereſt. And however much ſelfiſhneſs may prevail

(*a*) Lord Shafteſbury.

(*b*) Helvetius.

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in action, it certainly prevails not in ſentiment and affection: all men conſpire to put a high eſtimation upon generoſity, benevolence, and other ſocial virtues; while even the moſt ſelfiſh are diſguſted with ſelfiſhneſs in others, and endeavour to hide it in themſelves. The moſt zealous patron of the ſelfiſh principle will not venture to maintain, that it renders us altogether indifferent about our fellow-creatures. Laying aſide ſelf-intereſt, with every connection of love and hatred, good fortune happening to any one is agreeable to all, and bad fortune happening to any one is diſagreeable to all. On the other hand, the ſyſtem of univerſal benevolence, is no leſs contradictory to experience; from which we learn, that men commonly are diſpoſed to prefer their own intereſt before that of others, eſpecially where there is no ſtrict connection: nor do we find that ſuch bias is oppoſed by the moral ſenſe. Man in fact is a complex being, compoſed of principles, ſome benevolent, ſome ſelfiſh: and theſe principles are ſo juſtly blended in his nature, as to fit him for acting a proper part in ſociety. It would indeed be loſing time to prove, that without ſome affection for his fellow-creatures he would be ill qualified for ſociety. And it will be made evident afterward (*a*), that univerſal benevolence would be more hurtful to ſociety, than even abſolute ſelfiſhneſs *.

(*a*) Sect. 4.

* "Many moraliſts enter ſo deeply into one paſſion or bias of human nature, "that, to uſe the painter's phraſe, they quite overcharge it. Thus I have ſeen a "whole ſyſtem of morals founded upon a ſingle pillar of the inward frame; and "the entire conduct of life, and all the characters in it, accounted for, ſometimes "from ſuperſtition, ſometimes from pride, and moſt commonly from intereſt. "They forget how various a creature it is they are painting; how many ſprings "and weights, nicely adjuſted and balanced, enter into the movement, and re"quire allowance to be made for their ſeveral clogs and impulſes, ere you can de"fine its operation and effects." *Enquiry into the life and writings of Homer.*

We are now prepared for inveſtigating the laws that reſult from the foregoing principles. The ſeveral duties we owe to others ſhall be firſt diſcuſſed, taking them in order, according to the extent of their influence. And for the ſake of perſpicuity, I ſhall firſt preſent them in a general view, and then proceed to particulars. Of our duties to others, one there is ſo extenſive, as to have for its object all the innocent part of mankind. It is the duty that prohibits us to hurt others: than which no law is more clearly dictated by the moral ſenſe; nor is the tranſgreſſion of any other law more deeply ſtamped with the character of wrong. A man may be hurt externally in his goods, in his perſon, in his relations, and in his reputation. Hence the laws, Do not ſteal; Defraud not others; Do not kill nor wound; Be not guilty of defamation. A man may be hurt internally, by an action that occaſions to him diſtreſs of mind, or by being impreſſed with falſe notions of men and things. Therefore conſcience dictates, that we ought not to treat men diſrepectfully; that we ought not cauſeleſsly to alienate their affections from others; and, in general, that we ought to forbear whatever may tend to break their peace of mind, or tend to unqualify them for being good men, and good citizens.

The duties mentioned are duties of reſtraint. Our active duties regard particular perſons; ſuch as our relations, our friends, our benefactors, our maſters, our ſervants. It is our duty to honour and obey our parents; and to eſtabliſh our children in the world with all advantages internal and external: we ought to be faithful to our friends, grateful to our benefactors, ſubmiſſive to our maſters, kind to our ſervants, and to aid and comfort every one of theſe perſons when in diſtreſs. To be obliged to do good to others beyond theſe bounds, muſt depend on poſitive engagement; for, as will appear afterward, univerſal benevolence is not a duty.

This general ſketch will prepare us for particulars. The duty of reſtraint comes firſt in view, that which bars us from harming the innocent; and to it correſponds a right in the innocent to be ſafe from harm. This is the great law preparatory to ſociety; becauſe without it, ſociety could never have exiſted. Here the moral ſenſe is inflexible: it dictates, that we ought to ſubmit to any diſtreſs, even death itſelf, rather than procure our own ſafety by laying violent hands upon an innocent perſon. And we are under the ſame reſtraint with reſpect to the property of another; for robbery and theft are never upon any pretext indulged. It is indeed true, that in extreme hunger I may lawfully take food where it can be found; and may freely lay hold of my neighbour's horſe, to carry me from an enemy who threatens death. But it is his duty as a fellow-creature to aſſiſt me in diſtreſs; and when there is no time for delay, I may lawfully uſe what he ought to offer were he preſent, and what I may preſume he would offer. For the ſame reaſon, if in a ſtorm my ſhip be driven among the anchor-ropes of another ſhip, I may lawfully cut the ropes in order to get free. But in every caſe of this kind, it would be a wrong in me to uſe my neighbour's property, without reſolving to pay the value. If my neighbour be bound to aid me in diſtreſs, conſcience binds me to make up his loſs *.

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* This doctrine is obviouſly founded on juſtice; and yet, in the Roman law, there are two paſſages which deny any recompence in ſuch caſes. "Item Labeo "ſcribit, ſi cum vi ventorum navis impulſa eſſet in funes anchorarum alterius, et "nautæ funes præcidiſſent; ſi nullo alio modo, niſi præciſis funibus, explicare ſe "potuit, nullam actionem dandam;" *l.* 29. § 3. *ad leg. Aquil.* "Quod dicitur "*damnum injuria datum Aquilia perſequi*, ſic erit accipiendum, ut videatur damnum injuria datum quod cum damno injuriam attulerit; niſi magna vi cogente, "fuerit factum. Ut Celſus ſcribit circa eum, qui incendii arcendi gratia vicinas "ædes intercidit: et ſive pervenit ignis, ſive ante extinctus eſt, exiſtimat legis A-

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The prohibition of hurting others internally, is perhaps not eſſential to the formation of ſocieties, becauſe the tranſgreſſion of that law doth not much alarm plain people: but where manners and refined ſentiments prevail, the mind is ſuſceptible of more grievous wounds than the body; and therefore, without that law, a poliſhed ſociety could have no long endurance.

By adultery, miſchief is done both external and internal. Each ſex is ſo conſtituted, as to require ſtrict fidelity and attachment in a mate: and the breach of theſe duties is the greateſt external harm that can befal them: it harms them alſo internally, by breaking their peace of mind. It has indeed been urged, that no harm will enſue, if the adultery be kept ſecret; and conſequently, that there can be no crime where there is no diſcovery. But ſuch as reaſon thus do not advert, that to declare ſecret adultery to be lawful, is in effect to overturn every foundation of mutual truſt and fidelity in the married ſtate. It is clear beyond all doubt, ſays a reputable writer, that no man is permitted to violate his

" quiliæ actionem ceſſare." *l.* 49. § 1. *eod.* — [*In Engliſh thus:* " In the opinion " of Labeo, if a ſhip is driven by the violence of a tempeſt among the anchor- " ropes of another ſhip, and the ſailors cut the ropes, having no other means " of getting free, there is no action competent. —— The Aquilian law muſt " be underſtood to apply only to ſuch damage as carries the idea of an injury a- " long with it, unleſs ſuch injury has not been wilfully done, but from neceſſity. " Thus Celſus puts the caſe of a perſon who, to ſtop the progreſs of a fire, pulls " down his neighbour's houſe; and whether the fire had reached that houſe which " is pulled down, or was extinguiſhed before it got to it, in neither caſe, he thinks, " will an action be competent from the Aquilian law."] —— Theſe opinions are undoubtedly erroneous. And it is not difficult to ſay what has occaſioned the error: the caſes mentioned are treated as belonging to the *lex Aquilia*; which being confined to the reparation of wrongs, lays it juſtly down for a rule, That no action for reparation can lie, where there is no *culpa*. But had Labeo and Celſus adverted, that theſe caſes belong to a different head, viz. the duty of recompenſe, where one ſuffers loſs by benefiting another, they themſelves would have had no difficulty of ſuſtaining a claim for making up that loſs.

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faith; and that the man is unjuſt and barbarous who deprives his wife of the only reward ſhe has for adhering to the auſtere duties of her ſex. But an unfaithful wife is ſtill more criminal, by diſſolving the whole ties of nature: in giving to her huſband children that are not his, ſhe betrays both, and joins perfidy to infidelity (*a*).

Veracity is commonly ranked among the active duties; but erroneouſly: for if a man be not bound to ſpeak, he cannot be bound to ſpeak truth. It is therefore only a reſtraining duty, prohibiting us to deceive others, by affirming what is not true. Among the many correſponding principles in the human mind that in conjunction tend to make ſociety comfortable, a principle of veracity *, and a principle that leads us to rely on human teſtimony, are two: without the latter, the former would be an uſeleſs principle; and without the former, the latter would lay us open to fraud and treachery. The moral ſenſe accordingly dictates, that we ought to adhere ſtrictly to truth, without regard to conſequences.

It muſt not be inferred, that we are bound to explain our thoughts, when truth is demanded from us by unlawful means. Words uttered voluntarily, are naturally relied on, as expreſſing the ſpeaker's mind; and if his mind differ from his words, he tells a lie, and is guilty of deceit. But words drawn from a man

(*a*) Emile, liv. 5.

* Truth is always uppermoſt, being the natural iſſue of the mind: it requires no art nor training, no inducement nor temptation, but only that we yield to natural impulſe. Lying, on the contrary, is doing violence to our nature; and is never practiſed, even by the worſt of men, without ſome temptation. Speaking truth is like uſing our natural food, which we would do from appetite altho' it anſwered no end: lying is like taking phyſic, which is nauſeous to the taſte, and which no man takes but for ſome end which he cannot otherwiſe attain. *Dr Reid's Enquiry into the human mind.*

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by torture, are no indication of his mind; and he is not guilty of deceit in uttering whatever words may be agreeable, however alien from his thoughts: if the author of the unlawful violence ſuffer himſelf to be deceived, he ought to blame himſelf, not the ſpeaker.

It need ſcarce be mentioned, that the duty of veracity excludes not fable, nor any liberty of ſpeech intended for amuſement ſolely.

Active duties, as hinted above, are all of them directed to particular perſons. And the firſt I ſhall mention is, that which ſubſiſts between a parent and child. The relation of parent and child, the ſtrongeſt that can exiſt between individuals, binds theſe perſons to exert their utmoſt powers in mutual good offices. Benevolence among other blood-relations, is alſo a duty; but not ſo indiſpenſable, being proportioned to the inferior degree of relation.

Gratitude is a duty directed to the perſon who has been kind to us. But tho' gratitude is ſtrictly a duty, the meaſure of performance, and the kind, are left moſtly to our own choice. It is ſcarce neceſſary to add, that the active duties now mentioned, are acknowledged by all to be abſolutely inflexible, perhaps more ſo than the reſtraining duties: many find excuſes for doing harm; but no one hears with patience an excuſe for deviating from truth, friendſhip, or gratitude.

Diſtreſs tends to convert benevolence into a duty. But diſtreſs alone is not ſufficient, without other concurring circumſtances: for to relieve every perſon in diſtreſs, is beyond the power of any human being. Our relations in diſtreſs claim that duty from us, and even our neighbours: but diſtant diſtreſs, without a particular connection, ſcarce rouſes our ſympathy, and never is an object of duty. Many other connections, too numerous for this ſhort eſſay, extend the duty of relieving others from diſtreſs; and

theſe

theſe make a large branch of equity. Tho' in various inſtances, benevolence is thus converted into a duty by diſtreſs, it follows not, that the duty is always proportioned to the degree of diſtreſs. Nature has more wiſely provided for the ſupport of virtue. A virtuous perſon in diſtreſs commands our pity: a vicious perſon in diſtreſs has much leſs influence; and if by vice he have brought on the diſtreſs, indignation is raiſed, not pity (*a*).

One great advantage of ſociety, is the co-operation of many to accompliſh ſome uſeful work, where a ſingle hand would be inſufficient. Arts, manufactures, and commercial dealings, require many hands: but as hands cannot be ſecured without a previous engagement, the performance of promiſes and covenants is, upon that account, a capital duty in ſociety. In their original occupations of hunting and fiſhing, men living ſcattered and diſperſed, have ſeldom opportunity to aid and benefit each other; and in that ſituation, covenants being of little uſe, are little regarded: but huſbandry requiring the co-operation of many hands, draws men together for mutual aſſiſtance; and then covenants make a figure: arts and commerce make them more and more neceſſary; and in a poliſhed ſociety great regard is paid to them.

But contracts and promiſes are not confined to commercial dealings: they ſerve alſo to make benevolence a duty; and are even extended to connect the living with the dead: a man would die with regret, if he thought his friends were not bound by their promiſes, to fulfil his will after his death: and to quiet the minds of men with reſpect to futurity, the moral ſenſe makes the performing ſuch promiſes our duty. Thus, if I promiſe to my friend to erect a monument for him after his death, conſcience binds me, even tho' no perſon alive be entitled to demand performance: every one perceives this to be my duty; and I muſt expect to ſuffer reproach and blame, if I neglect my engagement.

(*a*) See Elements of Criticiſm, vol. 1. p. 187. edit. 5.

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To fulfil a rational promiſe or covenant, deliberately made, is a duty no leſs inflexible than thoſe duties are which ariſe independent of conſent. But as man is fallible, often miſled by ignorance or error, and liable to be deceived, his condition would be deplorable, did the moral ſenſe compel him to fulfil every engagement, however imprudent or irrational. Here the moral ſenſe gives way to human infirmity: it relieves from deceit, from impoſition, from ignorance, from error; and binds a man by no engagement but what anſwers the end fairly intended.

The other branch of duties, viz. thoſe we owe to ourſelves, ſhall be diſcuſſed in a few words. *Propriety*, a branch of the moral ſenſe, regulates our conduct with reſpect to ourſelves; as *Juſtice*, another branch of the moral ſenſe, regulates our conduct with reſpect to others. Propriety dictates, that we ought to act up to the dignity of our nature, and to the ſtation allotted us by Providence: it dictates in particular, that temperance, prudence, modeſty, and uniformity of conduct, are ſelf-duties. Theſe duties contribute to private happineſs, by preſerving health, peace of mind, and ſelf-eſteem; which are ineſtimable bleſſings: they contribute no leſs to happineſs in ſociety, by gaining the love and eſteem of others, and aid and ſupport in time of need.

Upon reviewing the foregoing duties reſpecting others, we find them more or leſs extenſive; but none ſo extenſive as to have for their end the good of mankind in general. The moſt extenſive duty is that of reſtraint, prohibiting us to harm others: but even that duty has a limited end; for its purpoſe is only to protect others from miſchief, not to do them any poſitive good. The active duties of doing poſitive good are circumſcribed within ſtill narrower bounds, requiring ſome relation that connects us with others; ſuch as thoſe of parent, child, friend, benefactor. The ſlighter relations, unleſs in peculiar circumſtances, are not the foundation of any active duty: neighbourhood, for example, does not

not alone make benevolence a duty: but ſuppoſing a neighbour to be in diſtreſs, it becomes our duty to relieve him, if it can be done without diſtreſs to ourſelves. The duty of relieving from diſtreſs, ſeldom goes farther; for tho' we always ſympathiſe with our relations, and with thoſe under our eye, the diſtreſs of perſons remote and unknown affects us very little. Pactions and agreements become neceſſary, if we would extend the duty of benevolence, in any particular, beyond the limits mentioned. Men, it is true, are capable of doing more good than is required of them as a duty; but every ſuch good muſt be a free-will offering.

And this leads to arbitrary actions, viz. thoſe that may be done or left undone; which make the ſecond general head of moral actions. With reſpect to theſe, the moral ſenſe leaves us at freedom: a benevolent act is approved, but the omiſſion is not condemned. This holds ſtrictly in ſingle acts; but in viewing the whole of a man's conduct, the moral ſenſe appears to vary a little. As the nature of man is complex, partly ſocial, partly ſelfiſh, we have an intuitive perception, that our conduct ought to be conformable to our nature; and that in advancing our own intereſt, we ought not altogether to neglect that of others. The man accordingly who confines his whole time and thoughts within his own little ſphere, is condemned by all the world as guilty of wrong conduct; and the man himſelf, if his moral perceptions be not blunted by ſelfiſhneſs, muſt be ſenſible that he deſerves to be condemned. On the other hand, it is poſſible that free benevolence may be extended beyond proper bounds. The juſt temperament is a ſubordination of benevolence to ſelf-love: but where benevolence prevails, it commonly leads to exceſs, by prompting a man to ſacrifice a great intereſt of his own to a ſmall intereſt of others; and the moral ſenſe dictates, that ſuch conduct is wrong.

Thus, moral actions are divided into two claſſes: the firſt re-

gards our duty, containing actions that ought to be done, and actions that ought not to be done; the other regards arbitrary actions, containing actions that are right when done, but not wrong when left undone. The well-being of ſociety depends more on the firſt claſs than on the ſecond: ſociety is indeed promoted by the latter; but it can ſcarce ſubſiſt, unleſs the former be made our duty. Hence it is, that actions only of the firſt claſs are made indiſpenſable; thoſe of the other claſs being left to our free-will. And hence alſo it is, that the various propenſities that diſpoſe us to actions of the firſt ſort, are diſtinguiſhed by the name of *primary virtues*; leaving the name of *ſecondary virtues* to thoſe propenſities which diſpoſe us to actions of the other ſort *.

The deduction above given makes it evident, that the general tendency of right actions is to promote the good of ſociety, and of wrong actions, to obſtruct that good. Univerſal benevolence is indeed not required of man; becauſe to put that principle in practice, is beyond his utmoſt abilities. But for promoting the general good, every thing is required of him that he can accompliſh; which will appear from reviewing the foregoing duties. The prohibition of harming others is an eaſy taſk; and upon that account is made univerſal. Our active duties are very different: man is circumſcribed both in capacity and power: he cannot do good but in a ſlow ſucceſſion; and therefore it is wiſely ordered, that his obligation to do good ſhould be confined to his relations, his friends, his benefactors. Even diſtreſs makes not benevolence a general duty: all a man can readily do, is to relieve thoſe at hand; and accordingly we hear of diſtant misfortunes with little or no concern.

* Virtue ſignifies that diſpoſition of mind which gives the aſcendant to moral principles. Vice ſignifies that diſpoſition of mind which gives little or no aſcendant to moral principles.

At the ſame time, let not the moral ſyſtem be miſapprehended, as if it were our duty, or even lawful, to proſecute what upon the whole we reckon the moſt beneficial to ſociety, balancing ill with good. The moral ſenſe permits not a violation of any perſon's right, however trivial, whatever benefit may thereby accrue to another. A man, for example, in low circumſtances, by denying a debt he owes to a rich miſer, ſaves himſelf and a hopeful family from ruin. In that caſe, the good effect far outweighs the ill, or rather has no counterbalance: but the moral ſenſe permits not the debtor to balance ill with good; nor gives countenance to an unjuſt act, whatever benefit it may produce. And hence a maxim in which all moraliſts agree, That we muſt not do ill to bring about even the greateſt good; the final cauſe of which ſhall be given below (*a*).

SECT. IV.

Principles of DUTY *and of* BENEVOLENCE.

HAving thus ſhortly delineated the moral laws of our nature, we proceed to an article of great importance, which is, to enquire into the means provided by our Maker for compelling obedience to theſe laws. The moral ſenſe is an unerring guide; but the moſt expert guide will not profit thoſe who are not diſpoſed to follow. This conſideration makes it evident, that to com-

(*a*) Sect. 7.

plete the moral ſyſtem, we ought to be endued with ſome principle or propenſity, ſome impulſive power, to enforce obedience to the laws dictated by the moral ſenſe.

The author of our nature leaves none of his works imperfect. In order to render us obſequious to the moral ſenſe as our guide, he hath implanted in our nature the principles of duty, of benevolence, of rewards and puniſhments, and of reparation. It may poſſibly be thought, that rewards and puniſhments, of which afterward, are ſufficient of themſelves to enforce the laws of nature, without neceſſity of any other principle. Human laws, it is true, are enforc'd by theſe means; becauſe no higher ſanction is under command of a terreſtrial legiſlator. But the celeſtial legiſlator, with power that knows no control, and benevolence that knows no bounds, hath enforc'd his laws by means no leſs remarkable for mildneſs than for efficacy: he employs no external compulſion; but, in order to engage our will on the right ſide, hath in the breaſt of every individual eſtabliſhed the principles of duty and of benevolence, which efficaciouſly excite us to obey the dictates of the moral ſenſe.

As the reſtraining, as well as active duties, are eſſential to ſociety, our Maker has wiſely ordered, that the principle which enforces theſe ſeveral duties, ſhould be the moſt cogent of all that belong to our nature. Other principles may ſolicit, allure, or terrify; but the principle of duty aſſumes authority, commands, and muſt be obey'd.

As one great purpoſe of ſociety, is to furniſh opportunities without end of mutual aid and ſupport, nature ſeconding that purpoſe, hath provided the principle of benevolence; which excites us to be kindly, beneficent, and generous. Nor ought it to eſcape obſervation, that the author of nature, attentive to our wants and to our well-being, hath endued us with a liberal portion of that principle. It enforces benevolence, not only to thoſe we are connected

nected with, but to our neighbours, and even to thoſe we are barely acquainted with. Providence is peculiarly attentive to objects in diſtreſs, who require immediate aid and relief. To the general principle of benevolence, it hath ſuperadded the paſſion of pity, which in every feeling heart is irreſiſtible. To make benevolence more extenſive, would be fruitleſs, becauſe here are objects in plenty to fill the moſt capacious mind. It would not be fruitleſs only, but hurtful to ſociety: I ſay hurtful; for inability to procure gratification, rendering benevolence a troubleſome gueſt, would weaken the principle itſelf, and attach us the more to ſelfiſhneſs, which we can always gratify. At the ſame time, tho' there is not room for greater variety of particular objects, yet the faculty we have of uniting numberleſs individuals in one complex object, enlarges greatly the ſphere of benevolence: by that faculty our country, our government, our religion, become objects of public ſpirit, and of a lively affection. The individuals that compoſe the group, conſidered apart, may be too minute, or too diſtant, for our benevolence; but when comprehended in one great whole, accumulation makes them great, greatneſs renders them conſpicuous; and affection, preſerved entire and undivided, is beſtow'd upon an abſtract object, as upon one that is ſingle and viſible; but with much greater energy, being proportioned to its ſuperior dignity and importance. Thus it appears, that the principle of benevolence is not too ſparingly ſcattered among men. It is indeed made ſubordinate to ſelf-intereſt, which is wiſely ordered, as will afterward be made evident (*a*); but its power and extent are nicely proportioned to the limited capacity of man, and to his ſituation in this world; ſo as better to fulfil its deſtination, than if it were an overmatch for ſelf-intereſt, and for every other principle.

(*a*) Sect. 7.

SECT.

SECT. V.

Laws reſpecting REWARDS *and* PUNISHMENTS.

REflecting on the moral branch of our nature, qualifying us for ſociety in a manner ſuited to our capacity, we cannot overlook the hand of our Maker; for means ſo finely adjuſted to an important end, never happen by chance. It muſt however be acknowledged, that in many individuals, the principle of duty has not vigour nor authority ſufficient to ſtem every tide of unruly paſſion: by the vigilance of ſome paſſions, we are taken unguarded; deluded by the ſly inſinuations of others; or overwhelmed with the ſtormy impetuoſity of a third ſort. Moral evil is thus introduced, and much wrong is done. This new ſcene ſuggeſts to us, that there muſt be ſome article ſtill wanting, to complete the moral ſyſtem. The means provided for directing us in the road of duty have been explained: but as in deviating from the road wrongs are committed, nothing hitherto has been ſaid, about redreſſing ſuch wrongs, nor about preventing the reiteration of them. To accompliſh theſe important ends, there are added to the moral ſyſtem, laws relative to rewards and puniſhments, and to reparation; of which in their order.

Many animals are qualified for ſociety by inſtinct merely; ſuch as beavers, ſheep, monkeys, bees, rooks. But men are ſeldom led by inſtinct: their actions are commonly prompted by paſſions; of which there is an endleſs variety, ſocial and ſelfiſh, benevolent and malevolent. And were every paſſion equally intitled to gratification,

fication, man would be utterly unqualified for ſociety: he would be a ſhip without a rudder, obedient to every wind, and moving at random, without any ultimate deſtination. The faculty of reaſon would make no oppoſition: for were there no ſenſe of wrong, it would be reaſonable to gratify every deſire that harms not ourſelves: and to talk of puniſhment would be abſurd; for puniſhment, in its very idea, implies ſome wrong that ought to be redreſſed. Hence the neceſſity of the moral ſenſe, to qualify us for ſociety: by inſtructing us in our duty, it renders us accountable for our conduct, and makes us ſuſceptible of rewards and puniſhments. The moral ſenſe fulfils another valuable purpoſe: it erects in man an unerring ſtandard for the application and meaſure of rewards and puniſhments.

To complete the ſyſtem of rewards and puniſhments, it is neceſſary that a proviſion be made, both of power and of willingneſs to reward and puniſh. The author of our nature hath provided amply for the former, by intitling every man to reward and puniſh as his native privilege. And he has provided for the latter, by a noted principle in our nature, prompting us to exerciſe the power. Impelled by that principle, we reward the virtuous with approbation and eſteem, and puniſh the vicious with diſapprobation and contempt. So prevalent is the principle, that we have great ſatisfaction in rewarding, and no leſs in puniſhing.

As to puniſhment in particular, an action done intentionally to produce miſchief, is criminal, and merits puniſhment. Such an action, being diſagreeable, raiſes my reſentment, even where I have no connection with the perſon injured; and the principle under conſideration impells me to chaſtiſe the delinquent with indignation and hatred. An injury done to myſelf raiſes my reſentment to a higher tone: I am not ſatisfied with ſo ſlight a puniſhment as indignation and hatred: the author muſt by my hand ſuffer miſchief, as great as he has made me ſuffer.

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Even the moſt ſecret crime eſcapes not puniſhment. The delinquent is tortured with remorſe: he even deſires to be puniſhed; ſometimes ſo ardently, as himſelf to be the executioner. There cannot be imagined a contrivance more effectual, to deter one from vice; for remorſe is itſelf a grievous puniſhment. Self-puniſhmen goes ſtill farther: every criminal, ſenſible that he ought to be puniſhed, dreads puniſhment from others; and this dread, however ſmothered during proſperity, breaks out in adverſity, or in depreſſion of mind: his crime ſtares him in the face, and every accidental misfortune is in his diſturbed imagination interpreted to be a puniſhment: "And they ſaid one to another, We are ve-
"rily guilty concerning our brother, in that we ſaw the anguiſh
"of his ſoul, when he beſought us; and we would not hear:
"therefore is this diſtreſs come upon us. And Reuben anſwered
"them, ſaying, Spake I not unto you, ſaying, Do not ſin againſt
"the child; and ye would not hear? therefore behold alſo his
"blood is required (*a*)" *.

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(*a*) Geneſis xlii. 21.

* John Duke of Britany, commonly termed *the Good Duke*, illuſtrious for generoſity, clemency, and piety, reigned forty-three years, wholly employ'd about the good of his ſubjects. He was ſucceeded by his eldeſt ſon Francis, a prince weak and ſuſpicious, and conſequently fit to be governed. Arthur of Montauban, in love with the wife of Gilles, brother to the Duke, perſuaded the Duke that his brother was laying plots to dethrone him. Gilles being impriſoned, the Duke's beſt friends conjured him to pity his unhappy brother, who might be imprudent, but aſſuredly was innocent; but in vain. Gilles being proſecuted before the three eſtates of the province for high treaſon, was unanimouſly abſolved; which irritated the Duke more and more. Arthur of Montauban artfully ſuggeſted to his maſter to try poiſon; which having miſcarried, they next reſolved to ſtarve the priſoner to death. The unfortunate prince, through the bars of a window, cried aloud for bread; but the paſſengers durſt not ſupply him. One poor woman only had courage more than once to ſlip ſome bread within the window. He charged

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No tranſgreſſion of ſelf-duty eſcapes puniſhment, more than tranſgreſſion of duty to others. The puniſhments, tho' not the ſame, differ in degree more than in kind. Injuſtice is puniſhed with remorſe: impropriety with ſhame, which is remorſe in a lower degree. Injuſtice raiſes indignation in the beholder, and ſo doth every flagrant impropriety: ſlighter improprieties receive a milder puniſhment, being rebuked with ſome degree of contempt, and commonly with deriſion (*a*).

So far we have been led in a beaten track; but in attempting to proceed, we are entangled in mazes and intricacies. An action well intended, may happen to produce no good; and an action ill intended, may happen to produce no miſchief: a man overawed by fear, may be led to do miſchief againſt his will; and a perſon, miſtaking the ſtandard of right and wrong, may be innocently led to do acts of injuſtice. By what rule, in ſuch caſes, are rewards and puniſhments to be apply'd? Ought a man to be rewarded when he does no good, or puniſhed when he does no miſchief: ought he to be puniſhed for doing michief againſt his will,

a prieſt, who had received his confeſſion, to declare to the Duke, "That ſeeing "juſtice was refuſed him in this world, he appealed to Heaven, and called upon "the Duke to appear before the judgement-ſeat of God in forty days." The Duke and his favourite, amazed that the prince lived ſo long without nouriſhment, employ'd aſſaſſins to ſmother him with his bed-cloaths. The prieſt, in obedience to the orders he had received, preſented himſelf before the Duke, and with a loud voice cited him in name of the deceaſed Lord Gilles to appear before God in forty days. Shame and remorſe verified the prediction. The Duke was ſeized with a ſudden terror; and the image of his brother, expiring by his orders, haunted him day and night. He decay'd daily without any marks of a regular diſeaſe, and died within the forty days in frightful agony.

See this ſubject further illuſtrated in the Sketch *Principles and Progreſs of Theology*, chap. 1.

(*a*) See Elements of Criticiſm, chap. 10.

or for doing miſchief when he thinks he is acting innocently? Theſe queſtions ſuggeſt a doubt, whether the ſtandard of right and wrong be applicable to rewards and puniſhments.

We have ſeen that there is an invariable ſtandard of right and wrong, which depends not in any degree on private opinion or conviction. By that ſtandard, all pecuniary claims are judged, all claims of property, and, in a word, every demand founded on intereſt, not excepting reparation, as will afterward appear. But with reſpect to the moral characters of men, and with reſpect to rewards and puniſhments, a different ſtandard is erected in the common ſenſe of mankind, neither rigid nor inflexible; which is, the opinion that men have of their own actions. It is mentioned above, that a man is eſteemed innocent in doing what he himſelf thinks right, and guilty in doing what he himſelf thinks wrong. In applying this ſtandard to rewards and puniſhments, we reward thoſe who in doing wrong are however convinced that they are innocent; and puniſh thoſe who in doing right are however convinced that they are guilty *. Some, it is true, are ſo perverted by bad education, or by ſuperſtition, as to eſpouſe numberleſs abſurd tenets, contradictory to the ſtandard of right and wrong; and yet ſuch men are no exception from the general rule: if they act according to conſcience, they are innocent, and ſafe againſt puniſhment, however wrong the action may be; and if they act againſt conſcience, they are guilty and puniſhable, however right the action may be: it is abhorrent to every moral perception, that a guilty perſon be rewarded, or an innocent perſon puniſhed. Further, if miſchief be done contrary to Will, as where a man is

* Virtuous and vicious, innocent and guilty, ſignify qualities both of men and of their actions. Approbation and diſapprobation, praiſe and blame, ſignify certain emotions or ſentiments of thoſe who ſee or contemplate men and their actions.

compelled

compelled by fear, or by torture, to reveal the ſecrets of his party; he may be grieved for yielding to the weakneſs of his nature, contrary to his firmeſt reſolves; but he has no check of conſcience, and upon that account is not liable to puniſhment. And, laſtly, in order that perſonal merit and demerit may not in any meaſure depend on chance, we are ſo conſtituted as to place innocence and guilt, not on the event, but on the intention of doing right or wrong; and accordingly, whatever be the event, a man is praiſed for an action well intended, and condemned for an action ill intended.

But what if a man intending a certain wrong, happen by accident to do a wrong he did not intend; as, for example, intending to rob a warren by ſhooting the rabbits, he accidentally wounds a child unſeen behind a buſh? The delinquent ought to be puniſhed for intending to rob; and he is alſo ſubjected to repair the hurt done to the child: but he cannot be puniſhed for the accidental wound; becauſe our nature regulates puniſhment by the intention, and not by the event *.

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* During the infancy of nations, pecuniary compoſitions for crimes were univerſal; and during that long period, very little weight was laid upon intention. This proceeded from the cloudineſs and obſcurity of moral perceptions among barbarians, joined with the reſemblance of pecuniary puniſhment to reparation. Where a man does miſchief intentionally, or is *verſans in illicito*, as expreſſed in the Roman law, he is juſtly bound to repair all the harm that enſues, however accidentally; and from the reſemblance of pecuniary puniſhment to reparation, the rule was childiſhly extended to puniſhment. But this rule, ſo little conſiſtent with moral principles, could not long ſubſiſt after pecuniary compoſitions gave place to corporal puniſhment; and accordingly, among civilized nations, the law of nature is reſtored, which prohibits puniſhment for any miſchief that is not intentional. The Engliſh muſt be excepted, who, remarkably tenacious of their original laws and cuſtoms, preſerve in force, even as to capital puniſhment, the above-mentioned rule that obtained among barbarians, when pecuniary compoſi-

A crime againſt any primary virtue is attended with ſevere and never-failing puniſhment, more efficacious than any that have been invented to enforce municipal laws: on the other hand, the preſerving primary virtues inviolate, is attended with little merit. The ſecondary virtues are directly oppoſite: the neglecting them is not attended with any puniſhment; but the practice of them is attended with illuſtrious rewards. Offices of undeſerved kindneſs, returns of good for ill, generous toils and ſufferings for our friends or for our country, are attended with conſciouſneſs of ſelf-merit, and with univerſal praiſe and admiration; the higheſt rewards human nature is ſuſceptible of.

From what is ſaid, the following obſervation will occur: The pain of tranſgreſſing juſtice, fidelity, or any duty, is much greater than the pleaſure of performing; but the pain of neglecting a generous action, or any ſecondary virtue, is as nothing, compared with the pleaſure of performing. Among the vices oppoſite to the primary virtues, the moſt ſtriking moral deformity is found; among the ſecondary virtues, the moſt ſtriking moral beauty.

tions were in vigour. The following paſſage is from Hales (Pleas of the Crown, chap. 39.) "Regularly he that voluntarily and knowingly intends hurt to the per-"ſon of a man, as for example to beat him, tho' he intend not death, yet if "death enſues, it excuſeth not from the guilt of murder, or manſlaughter at "leaſt, as the circumſtances of the caſe happen." And Foſter, in his Crown-law, teaches the ſame doctrine, never once ſuſpecting in it the leaſt deviation from moral principles. "A ſhooteth at the poultry of B, and by accident killeth a man: "if his intention was to ſteal the poultry, which muſt be collected from circum-"ſtances, it will be murder by reaſon of that felonious intent; but if it was done "wantonly, and without that intention, it will be barely manſlaughter." (p. 259.)

SECT.

SECT. VI.

Laws reſpecting REPARATION.

THE principle of reparation is made a branch of the moral ſyſtem for accompliſhing two ends: which are, to repreſs wrongs that are not criminal, and to make up the loſs ſuſtained by wrongs of whatever kind. With reſpect to the former, reparation is a ſpecies of puniſhment: with reſpect to the latter, it is an act of juſtice. Theſe ends will be better underſtood, after aſcertaining the nature and foundation of reparation; to which the following diviſion of actions is neceſſary. Firſt, actions that we are bound to perform. Second, actions that we perform in proſecution of a right or privilege. Third, indifferent actions, deſcribed above. Actions of the firſt kind ſubject not a man to reparation, whatever damage enſues; becauſe it is his duty to perform them, and it would be inconſiſtent with morality that a man ſhould be ſubjected to reparation for doing his duty. The laws of reparation that concern actions of the ſecond kind, are more complex. The ſocial ſtate, highly beneficial by affording opportunity for mutual good offices, is attended with ſome inconveniencies; as where a perſon happens to be in a ſituation of neceſſarily harming others by exerciſing a right or privilege. If the foreſight of harming another, reſtrain me not from exerciſing my right, the intereſt of that other is made ſubſervient to mine: on the other hand, if ſuch foreſight reſtrain me from exerciſing my right, my intereſt is made ſubſervient to his. What doth the moral ſenſe provide in that

that caſe? To preſerve as far as poſſible an equality among perſons born free, and by nature equal in rank, the moral ſenſe lays down a rule, no leſs beautiful than ſalutary; which is, That the exerciſing a right will not juſtify me for doing direct miſchief; but will juſtify me, tho' I foreſee that miſchief may poſſibly happen. The firſt branch of the rule reſolves into a propoſition eſtabliſhed above, viz. That no intereſt of mine, not even life itſelf, will authoriſe me to hurt an innocent perſon. The other branch is ſupported by expediency: for if the bare poſſibility of hurting others were ſufficient to reſtrain a man from proſecuting his rights and privileges, men would be too much cramped in action; or rather would be reduced to a ſtate of abſolute inactivity. With reſpect to the firſt branch, I am criminal, and liable even to puniſhment: with reſpect to the other, I am not even culpable, nor bound to repair the miſchief that happens to enſue.

With reſpect to the third kind, viz. indifferent actions, the moral ſenſe dictates, that we ought carefully to avoid doing miſchief, either direct or conſequential. As we ſuffer no loſs by forbearing actions that are done for paſtime merely, ſuch an action is *culpable* or *faulty*, if the conſequent miſchief was foreſeen or might have been foreſeen; and the actor of courſe is ſubjected to reparation. As this is a cardinal point in the doctrine of reparation, I ſhall endeavour to explain it more fully. Without intending any harm, a man may foreſee, that what he is about to do will probably or poſſibly produce miſchief; and ſometimes miſchief follows that was neither intended nor foreſeen. The action in the former caſe is not criminal; becauſe ill intention is eſſential to a crime: but it is culpable or faulty; and if miſchief enſue, the actor blames himſelf, and is blamed by others, for having done what he ought not to have done. Thus, a man who throws a large ſtone among a crowd of people, is highly culpable; becauſe he muſt foreſee that miſchief will probably enſue, tho' he has no intention

intention to hurt any perſon. As to the latter caſe, tho' miſchief was neither intended nor foreſeen, yet if it might have been foreſeen, the action is raſh or uncautious, and conſequently culpable or faulty in ſome degree. Thus, if a man in pulling down an old houſe, happen to wound one paſſing accidentally, without calling aloud to keep out of the way, the action is in ſome degree culpable, becauſe the miſchief might have been foreſeen. But tho' miſchief enſue, an action is not culpable or faulty if all reaſonable precaution have been adhibited: the moral ſenſe declares the author to be innocent * and blameleſs: the miſchief is accidental, and the action may be termed *unlucky*, but comes not under the denomination of either right or wrong. In general, when we act merely for amuſement, our nature makes us anſwerable for the harm that enſues, if it was either foreſeen or might with due attention have been foreſeen. But our rights and privileges would profit us little, if their exerciſe were put under the ſame reſtraint: it is more wiſely ordered, that the probability of miſchief, even foreſeen, ſhould not reſtrain a man from proſecuting his concerns, which may often be of conſequence to him. He proceeds accordingly with a ſafe conſcience, and is not afraid of being blamed either by God or man.

With reſpect to raſh or uncautious actions, where the miſchief might have been foreſeen tho' not actually foreſeen, it is not ſufficient to eſcape blame, that a man, naturally raſh or inattentive, acts according to his character: a degree of precaution is required, both by himſelf and by others, ſuch as is natural to the generality of men: he perceives that he might and *ought* to have acted more cautiouſly; and his conſcience reproaches him for his inattention,

* *Innocent* here is oppoſed to *culpable*: in a broader ſenſe it is oppoſed to *criminal*. With reſpect to puniſhment, an action tho' culpable is innocent, if it be not criminal: with reſpect to reparation, it is not innocent if it be culpable.

no leſs than if he were naturally more ſedate and attentive. Thus the circumſpection natural to mankind in general, is applied as a ſtandard to every individual; and if they fall ſhort of that ſtandard, they are culpable and blameable, however unforeſeen by them the miſchief may have been.

What is ſaid upon culpable actions is equally applicable to culpable omiſſions; for by theſe alſo miſchief may be occaſioned, entitling the ſufferer to reparation. If we forbear to do our duty with an intention to occaſion miſchief, the forbearance is criminal. The only queſtion is, how far forbearance without ſuch intention is culpable. Suppoſing the probability of miſchief to have been foreſeen, tho' not intended, the omiſſion is highly culpable; and tho' neither intended nor foreſeen, yet the omiſſion is culpable in a lower degree, if there have been leſs care and attention than are proper for performing the duty required. But ſuppoſing all due care, the omiſſion of extreme care and diligence is not culpable.

By aſcertaining what acts and omiſſions are culpable or faulty, the doctrine of reparation is rendered extremely ſimple; for it may be laid down as a rule without a ſingle exception, That every culpable act, and every culpable omiſſion, binds us in conſcience to repair the miſchief occaſioned by it. The moral ſenſe binds us no farther; for it loads not with reparation the man who is blameleſs and innocent; the harm is accidental; and we are ſo conſtituted as not to be reſponſible in conſcience for what happens by accident. But here it is requiſite, that the man be in every reſpect innocent: for if he intend harm, tho' not what he has done, he will find himſelf bound in conſcience to repair the accidental harm he has done; as, for example, when aiming a blow unjuſtly at one in the dark, he happens to wound another whom he did not ſuſpect to be there. And hence it is a rule in all municipal laws, That one *verſans in illicito* is liable to repair every conſequent

ſequent damage. That theſe particulars are wiſely ordered by the Author of our nature for the good of ſociety, will appear afterward (*a*). In general, the rules above mentioned are dictated by the moral ſenſe; and we are compelled to obey them by the principle of reparation.

We are now prepared for a more particular inſpection of the two ends of reparation above mentioned, viz. the repreſſing wrongs that are not criminal, and the making up what loſs is ſuſtained by wrongs of whatever kind. With reſpect to the firſt, it is clear, that puniſhment, in its proper ſenſe, cannot be inflicted for a wrong that is culpable only; and if nature did not provide ſome means for repreſſing ſuch wrongs, ſociety would ſcarce be a comfortable ſtate. Laying conſcience aſide, pecuniary reparation is the only remedy that can be provided againſt culpable omiſſions: and with reſpect to culpable commiſſions, the neceſſity of reparation is ſtill more apparent; for conſcience alone, without the ſanction of reparation, would ſeldom have authority ſufficient to reſtrain us from acting raſhly or uncautiouſly, even where the poſſibility of miſchief is foreſeen, and far leſs where it is not foreſeen.

With reſpect to the ſecond end of reparation, my conſcience dictates to me, that if a man ſuffer by my fault, whether the miſchief was foreſeen or not foreſeen, it is my duty to make up his loſs; and I perceive intuitively, that the loſs ought to reſt ultimately upon me, and not upon the ſufferer, who has not been culpable in any degree.

In every caſe where the miſchief done can be eſtimated by a pecuniary compenſation, the two ends of reparation coincide. The ſum is taken from the one as a ſort of puniſhment for his fault,

(*a*) Sect. 7.

and is beſtow'd on the other to make up the loſs he has ſuſtained. But in numberleſs caſes where miſchief done cannot be compenſated with money, reparation is in its nature a ſort of puniſhment. Defamation, contemptuous treatment, perſonal reſtraint, the breaking one's peace of mind, are injuries that cannot be repaired by money; and the pecuniary reparation decreed againſt the wrong-doer, can only be a ſort of puniſhment, in order to deter him from reiterating ſuch injuries: the ſum, it is true, is awarded to the perſon injured; but not as ſufficient to make up his loſs, which money cannot do, but only as a *ſolatium* for what he has ſuffered.

Hitherto it is ſuppoſed, that the man who intends a wrong action, is, at the ſame time, conſcious of its being ſo. But a man may intend a wrong action, thinking erroneouſly that it is right; or a right action, thinking erroneouſly that it is wrong; and the queſtion is, What ſhall be the conſequence of ſuch errors with reſpect to reparation. The latter caſe is clear: the perſon who occaſionally ſuffers loſs by a right action, has not a claim for reparation, becauſe he has no juſt cauſe of complaint. On the other hand, if the action be wrong, the innocence of the author, for which he is indebted to an error in judgement, will not relieve him from reparation. When he is made ſenſible of his error, he feels himſelf bound in conſcience to repair the harm he has done by a wrong action: and others, ſenſible of his error from the beginning, have the ſame feeling: nor will his obſtinacy in reſiſting conviction, or his dullneſs in not apprehending his error, mend the matter: it is well that theſe defects relieve him from puniſhment, without wronging others by denying a claim for reparation. A man's errors ought to affect himſelf only, and not thoſe who have not erred. Hence in general, reparation always follows wrong; and is not affected by any erroneous opinion of a wrong action being right, more than of a right action being wrong.

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But this doctrine ſuffers an exception with reſpect to a man, who, having undertaken a truſt, is bound in duty to act. A judge is in that ſituation: it is his duty to pronounce ſentence in every caſe that comes before him; and if he judge according to the beſt of his knowledge, he is not liable for conſequences. A judge cannot be ſubjected to reparation, unleſs it can be verified, that the judgement he gave was intentionally wrong. An officer of the revenue is in the ſame predicament. Led by a doubtful clauſe in a ſtatute, he makes a ſeizure of goods as forfeited to the crown, which afterward, in the proper court, are found not to be ſeizable. The officer ought not to be ſubjected to reparation, if he have acted to the beſt of his judgement. This rule however muſt be taken with a limitation: a public officer who is groſsly erroneous, will not be excuſed; for he ought to know better.

Reparation is due, tho' the immediate act be involuntary, provided it be connected with a preceding voluntary act. Example: "If A ride an unruly horſe in Lincolns-inn fields, to tame him, "and the horſe breaking from A, run over B and grievouſly hurt "him; B ſhall have an action againſt A: for tho' the miſchief "was done againſt the will of A, yet ſince it was his fault to "bring a wild horſe into a frequented place, where miſchief "might enſue, he muſt anſwer for the conſequences." Gaius ſeems to carry this rule ſtill farther, holding in general, that if a horſe, by the weakneſs or unſkilfulneſs of the rider, break away and do miſchief, the rider is liable (*a*). But Gaius probably had in his eye a frequented place, where the miſchief might have been foreſeen. Thus in general a man is made liable for the miſchief occaſioned by his voluntary deed, tho' the immediate act that occaſioned the miſchief be involuntary.

(*a*) l. 8. § 1. ad leg. Aquil.

SECT. VII.

FINAL CAUSES *of the foregoing Laws of Nature.*

SEveral final cauſes have been occaſionally mentioned in preceding parts of this eſſay, which could not conveniently be reſerved for the preſent ſection, being neceſſary for explaining the ſubjects to which they relate, the final cauſe for inſtance of erecting a ſtandard of morals upon the common ſenſe of mankind. I proceed now to what have not been mentioned, or but ſlightly mentioned.

The final cauſe that preſents itſelf firſt to view, reſpects man conſidered as an accountable being. The ſenſe of being accountable, is one of our moſt vigilant guards againſt the ſilent attacks of vice. When a temptation moves me, it immediately occurs, What will the world ſay? I imagine my friends expoſtulating, my enemies reviling — I dare not diſſemble — my ſpirits ſink — the temptation vaniſhes. 2dly, Praiſe and blame, eſpecially from thoſe we regard, are ſtrong incentives to virtue: but if we were not accountable for our conduct, praiſe and blame would be ſeldom well directed; for how ſhall a man's intentions be known, without calling him to account? And praiſe or blame, frequently ill-directed, would loſe their influence. 3dly, This branch of our nature, is the corner-ſtone of the criminal law. Did not a man think himſelf accountable to all the world, and to his judge in a peculiar manner, it would be natural for him to think, that the juſteſt ſentence pronounced againſt him, is oppreſſion, not juſtice.

ſtice. 4thly, This branch is a ſtrong cement to ſociety. If we were not accountable beings, thoſe connected by blood, or by country, would be no leſs ſhy and reſerved, than if they were mere ſtrangers to each other.

The final cauſe that next occurs, being ſimple and obvious, is mentioned only that it may not ſeem to have been overlooked. All right actions are agreeable, all wrong actions diſagreeable. This is a wiſe appointment of Providence. We meet with ſo many temptations againſt duty, that it is not always an eaſy taſk to perſevere in the right path: would we perſevere, were duty diſagreeable? And were acts of pure benevolence diſagreeable, they would be extremely rare, however worthy of praiſe.

Another final cauſe reſpects duty, in contradiſtinction to pure benevolence. All the moral laws are founded on intuitive perception; and are ſo ſimple and plain, as to be perfectly apprehended by the moſt ignorant. Were they in any degree complex or obſcure, they would be perverted by ſelfiſhneſs and prejudice. No conviction inferior to what is afforded by intuitive perception, could produce in mankind a common ſenſe with reſpect to moral duties. Reaſon would afford no general conviction; becauſe that faculty is diſtributed in portions ſo unequal, as to bar all hopes from it of uniformity either in practice or in opinion. At the ſame time, we are taught by woful experience, that reaſon has little influence over the greater part of men. Reaſon, it is true, aided by experience, ſupports morality, by convincing us, that we cannot be happy if we abandon duty for any other intereſt. But conviction ſeldom weighs much againſt imperious paſſion; to control which the vigorous and commanding principle of duty is requiſite, directed by the ſhining light of intuition.

A propoſition laid down above appears to be a ſort of myſtery in the moral ſyſtem, viz. That tho' evidently all moral duties are contrived for promoting the general good, yet that choice is not permitted

permitted among different goods, or between good and ill; and that we are ſtrictly tied down to perform or forbear certain particular acts, without regard to conſequences; or, in other words, that we muſt not do wrong, whatever good it may produce. The final cauſe, which I am about to unfold, will clear this myſtery, and ſet the beauty of the moral ſyſtem in a conſpicuous light. I begin with obſerving, that as the general good of mankind, or even of the ſociety we live in, reſults from many and various circumſtances intricately combined, it is far above the capacity of man, to judge in every inſtance what particular actions will tend the moſt to that end. The authoriſing therefore a man to trace out his duty, by weighing endleſs circumſtances good and ill, would open a wide door to partiality and paſſion, and often lead him unwittingly to prefer the preponderating ill, under a falſe appearance of being the greater good. At that rate, the opinions of men about right and wrong, would be as various as their faces; which, as obſerved above, would totally unhinge ſociety. It is better ordered by Providence, even for the general good, that, avoiding complex and obſcure objects, we are directed by the moral ſenſe to perform certain plain and ſimple acts, which are obvious to us by intuitive perception.

In the next place, To permit ill in order to produce greater good, may ſuit a being of univerſal benevolence; but is repugnant to the nature of man, compoſed of ſelfiſh and benevolent principles. We have ſeen above, that the true moral balance depends on a ſubordination of ſelf-love to duty, and of arbitrary benevolence to ſelf-love; and accordingly every man is ſenſible of injuſtice when he is hurt in order to benefit another. Were it a rule in ſociety, That a greater good to any other would make it an act of juſtice to deprive me of my life, of my reputation, or of my property, I ſhould renounce the ſociety of men, and aſſociate with more harmleſs animals.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, The true moral ſyſtem, that which is diſplay'd above, is not only better ſuited to the nature of man, and to his limited capacity and intelligence, but contributes more to the general good, which I now proceed to demonſtrate. It would be loſing time to prove, that a man entirely ſelfiſh is ill fitted for ſociety; and we have ſeen (*a*), that univerſal benevolence, were it a duty, would contribute to the general good perhaps leſs than abſolute ſelfiſhneſs. Man is too limited in capacity and in power for univerſal benevolence. Even the greateſt monarch has not power to exerciſe his benevolence but within a very ſmall compaſs; and if ſo, how unfit would ſuch a duty be for private perſons, who have very little power? Serving only to diſtreſs them by inability of performance, they would endeavour to ſmother it altogether, and give full ſcope to ſelfiſhneſs. Man is much better qualified for doing good, by a conſtitution in which benevolence is duly blended with ſelf-love. Benevolence, as a duty, takes place of ſelf-love; a regulation eſſential to ſociety. Benevolence, as a virtue, not a duty, gives place to ſelf-love; becauſe as every man has more power, knowledge, and opportunity, to promote his own good than that of others, a greater quantity of good is produced, than if benevolence were our only principle of action. This holds, even ſuppoſing no harm done to any perſon: much more would it hold, were we permitted to hurt ſome, in order to produce more good to others.

The foregoing final cauſes reſpect morality in general. We now proceed to particulars; and the firſt and moſt important is the law of reſtraint. Man is evidently framed for ſociety: and as there can be no ſociety among creatures who prey upon each other, it was neceſſary to provide againſt mutual injuries; which is effectually done by this law. Its neceſſity with reſpect to perſo-

(*a*) Sect. 4.

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nal ſecurity is ſelf-evident; and with reſpect to property, its neceſſity will appear from what follows. In the nature of every man, there is a propenſity to hoard or ſtore up things uſeful to himſelf and family. But this natural propenſity would be rendered ineffectual, were he not ſecured in the poſſeſſion of what he thus ſtores up; for no man will toil to accumulate what he cannot ſecurely poſſeſs. This ſecurity is afforded by the moral ſenſe, which dictates, that the firſt occupant of goods provided by nature for the ſubſiſtence of man, ought to be ſecure in his poſſeſſion, and that ſuch goods ought to be inviolable as his property. Thus, by the great law of reſtraint, men have a protection for their goods, as well as for their perſons; and are no leſs ſecure in ſociety, than if they were ſeparated from each other by impregnable walls.

Several other duties are little leſs eſſential than of reſtraint to the exiſtence of ſociety. Mutual truſt and confidence, without which ſociety would be an uncomfortable ſtate, enter into the character of the human ſpecies; to which the duties of veracity and fidelity correſpond. The final cauſe of theſe correſponding duties, is obvious: the latter would be of no uſe in ſociety without the former; and the former, without the latter, would be hurtful, by laying men open to fraud and deceit.

With reſpect to veracity in particular, man is ſo conſtituted, that he muſt be indebted to information for the knowledge of moſt things that benefit or hurt him; and if he could not depend upon information, ſociety would be very little beneficial. Further, it is wiſely ordered, that we ſhould be bound by the moral ſenſe always to ſpeak truth, even where we perceive no harm in tranſgreſſing that duty; becauſe it is ſufficient that harm may enſue, tho' not foreſeen. At the ſame time, falſehood always does miſchief: it may happen not to injure us externally in our reputation, or in our goods: but it never fails to injure us internally; for one great bleſſing of ſociety is, a candid intercourſe of ſentiments,

ments, of opinions, of deſires, and wiſhes; and to admit any falſehood in ſuch intercourſe, would poiſon the moſt refined pleaſures of life.

Becauſe man is the weakeſt of all animals in a ſtate of ſeparation; and the very ſtrongeſt in ſociety, by mutual aid and ſupport to which covenants and promiſes greatly contribute, theſe are made binding by the moral ſenſe.

The final cauſe of the law of propriety, which enforces the duty we owe to ourſelves, comes next in order. In diſcourſing upon thoſe laws of nature which concern ſociety, there is no occaſion to mention any ſelf-duty but what relates to ſociety; of which kind are prudence, temperance, induſtry, firmneſs of mind. And that ſuch qualities ſhould be made our duty, is wiſely ordered in a double reſpect; firſt, as qualifying us to act a proper part in ſociety, and next, as intitling us to good-will from others. It is the intereſt, no doubt, of every man, to ſuit his behaviour to the dignity of his nature, and to the ſtation allotted him by Providence; for ſuch rational conduct contributes to happineſs, by preſerving health, procuring plenty, gaining the eſteem of others, and, which of all is the greateſt bleſſing, by gaining a juſtly-founded ſelf-eſteem. But here intereſt ſolely is not relied on: the powerful authority of duty is added, that in a matter of the utmoſt importance to ourſelves, and of ſome importance to the ſociety we live in, our conduct may be regular and ſteady. Theſe duties tend not only to render a man happy in himſelf, but alſo, by procuring the good-will and eſteem of others, to command their aid and aſſiſtance in time of need.

I proceed to the final cauſes of natural rewards and puniſhments. It is laid down above, that controverſies about property and about other matters of intereſt, muſt be adjuſted by the ſtandard of right and wrong. But to bring rewards and puniſhments under the ſame ſtandard, without regard to private conſcience,

would be a plan unworthy of our Maker. It is extremely clear, that to reward one who is not conſcious of merit, or to puniſh one who is not conſcious of guilt, cannot anſwer any good end; and in particular, cannot tend either to improvement or to reformation of manners. How much more like the Deity is the plan of nature, which rewards no man who is not conſcious that he merits reward, and puniſhes no man who is not conſcious that he merits puniſhment! By that plan, and by that only, rewards and puniſhments accompliſh every good end; a final cauſe moſt illuſtrious! The rewards and puniſhments that attend the primary and ſecondary virtues, are finely contrived for ſupporting the diſtinction between them, ſet forth above. Puniſhment muſt be confined to the tranſgreſſion of primary virtues, it being the intention of nature, that ſecondary virtues be entirely free. On the other hand, ſecondary virtues are more highly rewarded than primary: generoſity, for example, makes a greater figure than juſtice; and magnanimity, heroiſm, undaunted courage, a ſtill greater figure. One would imagine, at firſt view, that primary virtues, being more eſſential, ſhould be intitled to the firſt place in our eſteem, and be more amply rewarded than ſecondary; and yet in elevating the latter above the former, peculiar wiſdom and foreſight are conſpicuous. Puniſhment is appropriated to enforce primary virtues; and if theſe virtues were alſo attended with high rewards, ſecondary virtues, degraded to a lower rank, would be deprived of that enthuſiaſtic admiration which is their chief ſupport: ſelf-intereſt would univerſally prevail over benevolence, and baniſh thoſe numberleſs favours we receive from each other in ſociety, which are beneficial in point of intereſt, and ſtill more ſo by generating affection and friendſhip.

In our progreſs through final cauſes we come at laſt to reparation, one of the principles deſtined by Providence for redreſſing wrongs committed, and for preventing the reiteration of them.

The

The final cauſe of this principle, when the miſchief ariſes from intention, is clear: for to protect individuals in ſociety, it is not ſufficient that the delinquent be puniſhed; it is neceſſary over and above, that the miſchief be repaired.

Secondly, Where the act is wrong or unjuſt, tho' not underſtood by the author to be ſo, it is wiſely ordered that reparation ſhould follow; which will thus appear. Conſidering the fallibility of man, it would be too ſevere to permit advantage to be taken of one's error in every circumſtance. On the other hand, to make it a law in our nature, never to take advantage of error, would be giving too much indulgence to indolence and remiſſion of mind, tending to make us neglect the improvement of our rational faculties. Our nature is ſo happily framed, as to avoid theſe extremes by diſtinguiſhing between gain and loſs. No man is conſcious of wrong, when he takes advantage of an error committed by another to ſave himſelf from loſs: if there muſt be a loſs, common ſenſe dictates, that it ought to reſt upon the perſon who has erred, however innocently, rather than upon the perſon who has not erred. Thus, in a competition among creditors about the eſtate of their bankrupt debtor, every one is at liberty to avail himſelf of every error committed by his competitor, in order to recover payment. But *in lucro captando*, the moral ſenſe teacheth a different leſſon; which is, that no man ought to lay hold of another's error to make gain by it. Thus, an heir finding a rough diamond in the repoſitories of his anceſtor, gives it away, miſtaking it for a common pebble: the purchaſer is in conſcience and equity bound to reſtore, or to pay a juſt price.

Thirdly, The following conſiderations unfold a final cauſe, no leſs beautiful than that laſt mentioned. Society could not ſubſiſt in any tolerable manner, were full ſcope given to raſhneſs and negligence, and to every action that is not ſtrictly criminal;

whence it is a maxim founded no leſs upon utility than upon juſtice, That men in ſociety ought to be extremely circumſpect, as to every action that may poſſibly do harm. On the other hand, it is alſo a maxim, That as the proſperity and happineſs of man depend on action, activity ought to be encouraged, inſtead of being diſcouraged by dread of conſequences. Theſe maxims, ſeemingly in oppoſition, have natural limits that prevent their encroaching upon each other. There is a certain degree of attention and circumſpection that men generally beſtow upon affairs, proportioned to their importance: if that degree were not ſufficient to defend againſt a claim of reparation, individuals would be too much cramped in action; which would be a great diſcouragement to activity: if a leſs degree were ſufficient, there would be too great ſcope for raſh or remiſs conduct; which would prove the bane of ſociety. Theſe limits, which evidently tend to the good of ſociety, are adjuſted by the moral ſenſe; which dictates, as laid down in the ſection of Reparation, that the man who acts with foreſight of the probability of miſchief, or acts raſhly and uncautiouſly without ſuch foreſight, ought to be liable for conſequences; but that the man who acts cautiouſly, without foreſeeing or ſuſpecting any miſchief, ought not to be liable for conſequences.

In the ſame ſection it is laid down, that the moral ſenſe requires from every man, not his own degree of vigilance and attention, which may be very ſmall, but that which belongs to the common nature of the ſpecies. The final cauſe of that regulation will appear upon conſidering, that were reparation to depend upon perſonal circumſtances, there would be a neceſſity of enquiring into the characters of men, their education, their manner of living, and the extent of their underſtanding; which would render judges arbitrary, and ſuch law-ſuits inextricable. But by aſſuming the

the common nature of the ſpecies as a ſtandard, by which every man in conſcience judges of his own actions, law-ſuits about reparation are rendered eaſy and expeditious.

SECT. VIII.

LIBERTY *and* NECESSITY *conſidered with reſpect to Morality.*

HAving, in the foregoing ſections, aſcertained the reality of a moral ſenſe, with its ſentiments of approbation and diſapprobation, praiſe and blame; the purpoſe of the preſent ſection is, to ſhew, that theſe ſentiments are conſiſtent with the laws that govern the actions of man as a rational being. In order to which, it is firſt neceſſary to explain theſe laws; for there has been much controverſy about them, eſpecially among divines of the Arminian and Calviniſt ſects.

Human actions, as laid down in the firſt ſection, are of three kinds: one, where we act by inſtinct, without any view to conſequences; one, where we act by will in order to produce ſome effect; and one, where we act againſt will. With reſpect to the firſt, the agent acts blindly, without deliberation or choice; and the external act follows neceſſarily from the inſtinctive impulſe *. Actions

* A ſtonechatter makes its neſt on the ground or near it; and the young, as ſoon as they can ſhift for themſelves, leave the neſt inſtinctively. An egg of that bird

tions done with a view to an end, are in a very different condition: in theſe, deliberation, choice, will, enter: the intention to accompliſh the end goes firſt; the will to act in order to accompliſh the end is next; and the external act follows of courſe. It is the will then that governs every action done as means to an end; and it is deſire to accompliſh the end that puts the will in motion; deſire in this view being commonly termed the *motive* to act. Thus, hearing that my friend is in the hands of robbers, I burn with deſire to free him: deſire influences my will to arm my ſervants, and to fly to his relief. Actions done againſt will come in afterward.

But what is it that raiſes deſire? The anſwer is at hand: it is the proſpect of attaining ſome agreeable end, or of avoiding one that is diſagreeable. And if it be again enquired, What makes an object agreeable or diſagreeable, the anſwer is equally ready, that our nature makes it ſo; and more we cannot ſay. Certain viſible objects are agreeable, certain ſounds, and certain ſmells: other objects of theſe ſenſes are diſagreeable. But there we muſt ſtop; for we are far from being ſo intimately acquainted with our own nature as to aſſign the cauſes. Theſe hints are ſufficient for my preſent purpoſe: if one be curious to know more, the

bird was laid in a ſwallow's neſt, fixed to the roof of a church. The ſwallow fed all the young equally without diſtinction. The young ſtonechatter left the neſt at the uſual time before it could fly; and falling to the g ound, it was taken up dead. Here is inſtinct in purity, exerting itſelf blindly without regard to variation of circumſtances. The ſame is obſervable in our dunghill-fowl. They feed on worms, corn, and other ſeeds dropt on the ground. In order to diſcover their food, nature has provided them with an inſtinct to ſcrape with the foot; and the inſtinct is ſo regularly exerciſed, that they ſcrape even when they are ſet upon a heap of corn.

theory

theory of deſire, and of agreeableneſs and diſagreeableneſs, will be found in Elements of Criticiſm (*a*).

With reſpect to inſtinctive actions, no perſon, I preſume, thinks that there is any freedom, more than in acts done againſt will: an infant applies to the nipple, and a bird builds its neſt, no leſs neceſſarily than a ſtone falls to the ground. With reſpect to voluntary actions, ſuch as are done with a view to an end, the neceſſity is the ſame, tho' leſs apparent at firſt view. The external action is determined by the will: the will is determined by deſire: and deſire by what is agreeable or diſagreeable. Here is a chain of cauſes and effects, not one link of which is arbitrary, or under command of the agent: he cannot will but according to his deſire: he cannot deſire but according to what is agreeable or diſagreeable in the objects perceived: nor do theſe qualities depend on his inclination or fancy; he has no power to make a beautiful woman ugly, nor to make a rotten carcaſe ſweet.

Many good men apprehending danger to morality from holding our actions to be neceſſary, endeavour to break the chain of cauſes and effects above mentioned, maintaining, "That whatever "influence deſire or motives may have, it is the agent himſelf "who is the cauſe of every action; that deſire may adviſe, but "cannot command; and therefore that a man is ſtill free to act "in contradiction to deſire and to the ſtrongeſt motives." That a being may exiſt, which in every caſe acts blindly and arbitrarily, without having any end in view, I can make a ſhift to conceive: but it is difficult for me even to imagine a thinking and rational being, that has affections and paſſions, that has a deſireable end in view, that can eaſily accompliſh this end; and yet, after all, can fly off, or remain at reſt, without any cauſe, reaſon, or motive, to ſway it. If ſuch a whimſical being can poſſibly ex-

(*a*) Chap. 2.

iſt,

iſt, I am certain that man is not ſuch a being. There is perhaps not a perſon above the condition of a changeling, but can ſay why he did ſo and ſo, what moved him, what he intended. Nor is a ſingle fact ſtated to make us believe, that ever a man acted againſt his own will or deſire, who was not compelled by external violence. On the contrary, conſtant and univerſal experience proves, that human actions are governed by certain inflexible laws; and that a man cannot exert his ſelf-motive power, but in purſuance of ſome deſire or motive.

Had a motive always the ſame influence, actions proceeding from it would appear no leſs neceſſary than the actions of matter. The various degrees of influence that motives have on different men at the ſame time, and on the ſame man at different times, occaſion a doubt by ſuggeſting a notion of chance. Some motives however have ſuch influence, as to leave no doubt: a timid female has a phyſical power to throw herſelf into the mouth of a lion, roaring for food; but ſhe is with-held by terror no leſs effectually than by cords: if ſhe ſhould ruſh upon the lion, would not every one conclude that ſhe was frantic? A man, tho' in a deep ſleep, retains a phyſical power to act, but he cannot exert it. A man, tho' deſperately in love, retains a phyſical power to refuſe the hand of his miſtreſs; but he cannot exert that power in contradiction to his own ardent deſire, more than if he were faſt aſleep. Now if a ſtrong motive have a neceſſary influence, there is no reaſon for doubting, but that a weak motive muſt alſo have its influence, the ſame in kind, tho' not in degree. Some actions indeed are ſtrangely irregular; but let the wildeſt action be ſcrutiniz'd, there will always be diſcovered ſome motive or deſire, which, however whimſical or capricious, was what influenced the perſon to act. Of two contending motives is it not natural to expect, that the ſtronger will prevail, however little its exceſs may be? If there be any doubt, it muſt be from a ſuppoſition that a

weak

weak motive can be reſiſted arbitrarily. Where then are we to fix the boundary between a weak and a ſtrong motive? If a weak motive can be reſiſted, why not one a little ſtronger, and why not the ſtrongeſt? In Elements of Criticiſm (*a*) the reader will find many examples of contrary motives weighing againſt each other. Let him ponder theſe with the ſtricteſt attention: his concluſion will be, that between two motives, however nearly balanced, a man has not an arbitrary choice, but muſt yield to the ſtronger. The mind indeed fluctuates for ſome time, and feels itſelf in a meaſure looſe: at laſt, however, it is determined by the more powerful motive, as a balance is by the greater weight after many vibrations.

Such then are the laws that govern our voluntary actions. A man is abſolutely free to act according to his own will; greater freedom than which is not conceivable. At the ſame time, as man is made accountable for his conduct, to his Maker, to his fellow-creatures, and to himſelf, he is not left to act arbitrarily; for at that rate he would be altogether unaccountable: his will is regulated by deſire; and deſire by what pleaſes or diſpleaſes him. Where we are ſubjected to the will of another, would it be our wiſh, that his will ſhould be under no regulation? And where we are guided by our own will, would it be reaſonable to wiſh, that it ſhould be under no regulation, but be exerted without reaſon, without any motive, and contrary to common ſenſe? Thus, with regard to human conduct, there is a chain of laws eſtabliſhed by nature, not one link of which is left arbitrary. By that wiſe ſyſtem, man is rendered accountable: by it, he is made a fit ſubject for divine and human government: by it, perſons of ſagacity foreſee the conduct of others: and by it, the preſcience of the Deity with reſpect to human actions, is firmly eſtabliſhed.

(*a*) Chap. 2. part 4.

The abſurd figure men would make if they could act contrary to motives, ſhould be ſufficient, one may think, to open our eyes without an argument. What a deſpicable figure does a perſon make, upon whom the ſame motive has great influence at one time, and very little at another? He is a bad member of ſociety, and cannot be rely'd on as a friend or as an aſſociate. But how highly rational is this ſuppoſed perſon, compared with one who can act in contradiction to every motive? The former may be termed whimſical or capricious: the latter is worſe; he is abſolutely unaccountable, and cannot be the ſubject of government, more than a lump of matter unconſcious of its own motion.

Let the faculty of acting be compared with that of reaſoning: the compariſon will tend to ſoften our reluctance to the neceſſary influence of motives. A man ſometimes blunders in reaſoning; but he is tied by his nature, to form concluſions upon what appears to him true at the time. If he could arbitrarily form a different concluſion, what an abſurd reaſoner would he be! Would a man be leſs abſurd, if he had a power of acting againſt motives, and contrary to what he thinks right or eligible? To act in that manner, is inconſiſtent with any notion we can form of a ſenſible being. Nor do we ſuppoſe that man is ſuch a being: in accounting for any action, however whimſical, we always aſcribe it to ſome motive, never once dreaming that there was no motive.

And after all, where would be the advantage of ſuch an arbitrary power? Can a rational man wiſh ſeriouſly to have ſuch a power? or can he ſeriouſly think, that God would make man ſo whimſical a being? To endue man with a degree of ſelf-command ſufficient to reſiſt every vicious motive, without any power to reſiſt thoſe that are virtuous, would indeed be a gift of value; but too great for man, becauſe it would exalt him to be an angel. But ſuch ſelf-command as to reſiſt both equally, which is the preſent ſuppoſition, would unqualify us for being governed either

either by God or by man. Better far to be led as rational creatures by the proſpect of good, however erroneous our judgement may ſometimes be.

Conſidering that man is the only terreſtrial being formed to know his Maker, and to worſhip him, will it not ſound harſhly, while all other animals are ſubjected to divine government, and unerringly fulfil their deſtination, that man alone ſhould be withdrawn from divine government, and be ſo framed, that neither his Maker, nor he himſelf, can foreſee what he will do the next moment? The power of reſiſting the ſtrongeſt motives, whether of religion or of morality, would render him independent of the Deity.

This reaſoning is too diffuſe: may it not be comprehended in a ſingle view? it will make the deeper impreſſion. There may be conceived different ſyſtems for governing man as a thinking and rational being. One is, That virtuous motives ſhould always prevail over every other motive. This, in appearance, would be the moſt perfect government. But man is not ſo conſtituted; and there is reaſon to doubt, whether ſuch perfection would in his preſent ſtate correſpond to the other branches of his nature (*a*). Another ſyſtem is, That virtuous motives ſometimes prevail, ſometimes vitious; and that we are always determined by the prevailing motive. This is the true ſyſtem of nature; and hence great variety of character and of conduct among men. A third ſyſtem is, That motives have influence; but that one can act in contradiction to every motive. This is the ſyſtem I have been combating. Obſerve only what it reſolves into. How is an action to be accounted for that is done in contradiction to every motive? It wanders from the region of common ſenſe into that of mere

(*a*) See book 2. ſketch 1. at the end.

chance. If ſuch were the nature of man, no one could rely on another: a promiſe or an oath would be a rope of ſand: the utmoſt cordiality between my friend and me, would be no ſecurity againſt his ſtabbing me with the firſt weapon that comes in his way. Would any man wiſh to have been formed according to ſuch a ſyſtem? He would probably wiſh to have been formed according to the ſyſtem firſt mentioned: but that is deny'd him, virtuous motives ſometimes prevailing, ſometimes vicious; and from the wiſdom of Providence we have reaſon to believe, that this law is of all the beſt fitted for man in his preſent ſtate.

To conclude this branch of the ſubject: In none of the works of Providence, ſo far as we can penetrate, is there diſplay'd a deeper reach of art and wiſdom, than in the laws of action peculiar to man as a thinking and rational being. Were he left looſe, to act in contradiction to motives, there would be no place for prudence, foreſight, nor for adjuſting means to an end: it could not be foreſeen by others what a man will do the next hour; nay it could not be foreſeen, even by himſelf. Man would not be capable of rewards and puniſhments: he would not be fitted, either for divine or for human government: he would be a creature that has no reſemblance to the human race. But man is not left looſe; for tho' he is at liberty to act according to his own will, yet his will is regulated by deſire, and deſire by what pleaſes and diſpleaſes. This connection preſerves uniformity of conduct, and confines human actions within the great chain of cauſes and effects. By this admirable ſyſtem, liberty and neceſſity, ſeemingly incompatible, are made perfectly concordant, fitting us for ſociety, and for government both human and divine.

Having explained the laws that govern human actions, we proceed to what is chiefly intended in the preſent ſection, which is, to examine, how far the moral ſentiments handled in the foregoing ſections are conſiſtent with theſe laws. Let it be kept in view, that

that our moral ſentiments and feelings are founded entirely upon the moral ſenſe; which unfolds to us a right and a wrong in actions. From the ſame ſenſe are derived the ſentiments of approbation and praiſe when a man does right, and of diſapprobation and blame when he does wrong. Were we deſtitute of the moral ſenſe, right and wrong, praiſe and blame, would be as little underſtood as colours are by one born blind *.

The formidable argument that is urged, to prove that our moral ſentiments are inconſiſtent with the ſuppoſed neceſſary influence of motives, is what follows. "If motives have a neceſſary influence on our actions, there can be no good reaſon to "praiſe a man for doing right, nor to blame him for doing "wrong. What foundation can there be, either for praiſe or "blame, when it was not in a man's power to have acted otherwiſe. A man commits murder inſtigated by a ſudden fit of "revenge: why ſhould he be puniſhed, if he acted neceſſarily, "and could not reſiſt the violence of the paſſion?" Here it is ſuppoſed, that a power of reſiſtance is eſſential to praiſe and blame. But upon examination it will be found, that this ſuppoſition has not any ſupport in the moral ſenſe, nor in reaſon, nor in the common ſenſe of mankind.

With reſpect to the firſt, the moral ſenſe, as we have ſeen above, places innocence and guilt, and conſequently praiſe and blame,

* In an intricate ſubject like the preſent, great care ſhould be taken to avoid ambiguities. The term *praiſe* has two different ſignifications: in one ſenſe it is oppoſed to *blame*; in another, to *diſpraiſe*. In the former ſenſe it expreſſes a moral ſentiment: in the latter, it expreſſes only the approving any object that pleaſes me. I praiſe one man for his candour, and blame another for being a double-dealer. Theſe, both of them, imply will and intention. I praiſe a man for being acute; but for being dull, I only diſpraiſe him. I praiſe a woman for beauty; but blame not any for uglineſs, I only diſpraiſe them. None of theſe particulars imply will or intention.

entirely

entirely upon will and intention. The connection between the motive and the action, ſo far from diminiſhing, enhances the praiſe or blame. The greater influence a virtuous motive has, the greater is the virtue of the agent, and the more warm our praiſe. On the other hand, the greater influence a vitious motive has, the greater is the vice of the agent, and the more violently do we blame him. As this is the cardinal point, I wiſh to have it conſidered in a general view. It is eſſential both to human and divine government, that the influence of motives ſhould be neceſſary. It is equally eſſential, that that neceſſary influence ſhould not have the effect to leſſen guilt in the eſtimation of men. To fulfil both ends, guilt is placed by the moral ſenſe entirely upon will and intention: a man accordingly blames himſelf for doing miſchief willingly and intentionally, without once conſidering whether he acted neceſſarily or not. And his ſentiments are adopted by all the world: they pronounce the ſame ſentence of condemnation that he himſelf does. A man put to the torture, yields to the pain, and with bitter reluctance reveals the ſecrets of his party: another does the ſame, yielding to a tempting bribe. The latter only is blamed as guilty of a crime; and yet the bribe perhaps operated as ſtrongly on the latter, as torture did on the former. But the one was compelled againſt his will to reveal the ſecrets of his party; and therefore is innocent: the other acted willingly, in order to procure a great ſum of money; and therefore is guilty.

With reſpect to reaſon, I obſerve, that the argument I am combating is an appeal to a wrong tribunal: the moral ſenſe is the only judge in this controverſy, not the faculty of reaſon. At the ſame time, I ſhould have no fear of a ſentence againſt me, were reaſon to be the judge. For would not reaſon dictate, that the leſs a man wavers about his duty; or, in other words, the leſs influence

ence vitious motives have, the more praiſe-worthy he is; and the more blameable, the leſs influence virtuous motives have.

Nor are we led by common ſenſe to differ from reaſon and the moral ſenſe. A man commits murder, overcome by a ſudden fit of revenge which he could not reſiſt; will not one be led to reflect, even at firſt view, that the man did not wiſh to reſiſt? on the contrary, that he would have committed the murder, tho' he had not been under any neceſſity? A perſon of plain underſtanding will ſay, What ſignifies it whether the criminal could reſiſt or not, when he committed the murder wittingly and willingly? A man gives poiſon privately out of revenge. Does any one doubt of his guilt, when he never once repented; tho' after adminiſtering the poiſon it no longer was in his power to draw back? A man may be guilty and blame-worthy, even where there is external compulſion that he cannot reſiſt. With ſword in hand I run to attack an enemy: my foot ſlipping, I fall headlong upon him, and by that accident the ſword is puſh'd into his body. The external act was not the effect of Will, but of accident: but my intention was to commit murder, and I am guilty. All men acknowledge, that the Deity is neceſſarily good. Does that circumſtance detract from his praiſe in common apprehenſion? On the contrary, he merits from us the higheſt praiſe on that very account.

It is commonly ſaid, that there can be no virtue where there is no ſtruggle. Virtue, it is true, is beſt known from a ſtruggle: a man who has never met with a temptation, can be little confident of his virtue. But the obſervation taken in a ſtrict ſenſe, is undoubtedly erroneous. A man, tempted to betray his truſt, wavers; but, after much doubting, refuſes at laſt the bribe. Another heſitates not a moment, but rejects the bribe with diſdain: duty is obſtinate, and will not ſuffer him even to deliberate. Is there

there no virtue in the latter? Undoubtedly more than in the former.

Upon the whole, it appears that praiſe and blame reſt ultimately upon the diſpoſition or frame of mind. Nor is it obvious, that a power to act againſt motives, could vary in any degree theſe moral ſentiments. When a man commits a crime, let it be ſuppoſed, that he could have reſiſted the prevailing motive. Why then did he not reſiſt, inſtead of bringing upon himſelf ſhame and miſery? The anſwer muſt be, for no other can be given, that his diſpoſition is vitious, and that he is a deteſtable creature. Further, it is not a little difficult to conceive, how a man can reſiſt a prevailing motive, without having any thing in his mind that ſhould engage him to reſiſt it. But letting that paſs, I make the following ſuppoſition. A man is tempted by avarice to accept a bribe: if he reſiſt upon the principle of duty, he is led by the prevailing motive: if he reſiſt without having any reaſon or motive for reſiſting, I cannot diſcover any merit in ſuch reſiſtance: it ſeems to reſolve into a matter of chance or accident, whether he reſiſt or do not reſiſt. Where can the merit lie of reſiſting a vitious motive, when reſiſtance happens by mere chance? and where the demerit of reſiſting a virtuous motive, when it is owing to the ſame chance? If a man, actuated by no principle, good or bad, and having no end or purpoſe in view, ſhould kill his neighbour, I ſee not that he would be more accountable, than if he had acted in his ſleep, or were mad.

Human puniſhments are perfectly conſiſtent with the neceſſary influence of motives, without ſuppoſing a power to withſtand them. If it be urged, That a man ought not to be puniſhed for committing a crime when he could not reſiſt; the anſwer is, That as he committed the crime intentionally, and with his eyes open, he is guilty in his own opinion, and in the opinion of all men; and he juſtly ſuffers puniſhment, to prevent him or others from doing

doing the like in time to come. The dread of puniſhment is a weight in the ſcale on the ſide of virtue, to counterbalance vicious motives.

The final cauſe of this branch of our nature is admirable. If the neceſſary influence of motives had the effect either to leſſen the merit of a virtuous action, or the demerit of a crime, morality would be totally unhinged. The moſt virtuous action would of all be the leaſt worthy of praiſe; and the moſt vicious be of all the leaſt worthy of blame. Nor would the evil ſtop there: inſtead of curbing inordinate paſſions, we ſhould be encouraged to indulge them, as an excellent excuſe for doing wrong. Thus, the moral ſentiments of approbation and diſapprobation, of praiſe and blame, are found perfectly conſiſtent with the laws above mentioned that govern human actions, without having recourſe to an imaginary power of acting againſt motives.

The only plauſible objection I have met with againſt the foregoing theory, is the remorſe a man feels for a crime he ſuddenly commits, and as ſuddenly repents of. During a fit of bitter remorſe for having ſlain my favourite ſervant in a violent paſſion, without juſt provocation, I accuſe myſelf for having given way to paſſion; and acknowledge that I could and ought to have reſtrained it. Here we find remorſe founded on a ſyſtem directly oppoſite to that above laid down; a ſyſtem that acknowledges no neceſſary connection between an action and the motive that produced it; but, on the contrary, ſuppoſes that it is in a man's power to reſiſt his paſſion, and that he ought to reſiſt it. What ſhall be ſaid upon this point? Can a man be a neceſſary agent, when he is conſcious of the contrary, and is ſenſible that he can act in contradiction to motives? This objection is ſtrong in appearance; and would be invincible, were we not happily relieved of it by a doctrine laid down in Elements of Criti-

ciſm (*a*) concerning the irregular influence of paſſion on our opinions and ſentiments. Upon examination, it will be found, that the preſent caſe may be added to the many examples there given of this irregular influence. In a peeviſh fit, I take exception at ſome ſlight word or geſture of my friend, which I interpret as if he doubted of my veracity. I am inſtantly in a flame: in vain he proteſts that he had no meaning, for impatience will not ſuffer me to liſten. I bid him draw, which he does with reluctance; and before he is well prepared, I give him a mortal wound. Bitter remorſe and anguiſh ſucceed inſtantly to rage. "What have "I done? why did I not abſtain? I was not mad, and yet I have "murdered my innocent friend: there is the hand that did the "horrid deed; why did not I rather turn it againſt my own "heart?" Here every impreſſion of neceſſity vaniſhes: my mind tells me that I was abſolutely free, and that I ought to have ſmothered my paſſion. I put an oppoſite caſe. A brutal fellow treats me with great indignity, and proceeds even to a blow. My paſſion riſes beyond the poſſibility of reſtraint: I can ſcarce forbear ſo long as to bid him draw; and that moment I ſtab him to the heart. I am ſorry for having been engaged with a ruffian, but have no contrition nor remorſe. In this caſe, my ſentiments are very different from what they are in the other. I never once dream that I could have reſiſted the impulſe of paſſion: on the contrary, my thoughts and words are, "That fleſh and blood "could not bear the affront; and that I muſt have been branded "for a coward, had I not done what I did." In reality, both the actions were equally neceſſary. Whence then opinions and ſentiments ſo oppoſite to each other? The irregular influence of paſſion on our opinions and ſentiments, will ſolve the queſtion. All violent paſſions are prone to their own gratification. A man affected

(*a*) Chap. 2, part 5.

with

with deep remorſe abhors himſelf, and is odious in his own eyes; and it gratifies the paſſion, to indulge the thought that his guilt is beyond the poſſibility of excuſe. In the firſt caſe accordingly, remorſe forces upon me a conviction that I might have reſtrained my paſſion, and ought to have reſtrained it. I will not give way to any excuſe; becauſe in a fit of remorſe it gives me pain to be excuſed. In the other caſe, there being no remorſe, there is no diſguiſe; and things appear in their true light. To illuſtrate this reaſoning, I obſerve, that paſſion warps my judgement of the actions of others, as well as of my own. Many examples are given in the chapter above quoted: join to theſe the following. My ſervant aiming at a partridge, happens to ſhoot a favourite ſpaniel croſſing the way unſeen. Inflamed with anger, I ſtorm at his raſhneſs, pronounce him guilty, and will liſten to no excuſe. When my paſſion is ſpent, I become ſenſible that it was merely accidental, and that the man is abſolutely innocent. The nurſe overlays my only child, the long-expected heir to a great eſtate. It is with difficulty that I refrain from putting her to death: "The "wretch has murdered my infant, and deſerves to be torn to "pieces." When my paſſion ſubſides, I ſee the matter in a very different light. The poor woman is inconſolable, and can ſcarce believe that ſhe is innocent: ſhe bitterly reproaches herſelf for want of care and concern. But, upon cool reflection, both ſhe and I are ſenſible, that no perſon in ſound ſleep has any ſelf-command; and that we cannot be anſwerable for any action of which we are not conſcious. Thus, upon the whole, we find, that any impreſſion we may occaſionally have of being able to act in contradiction to motives, is the reſult of paſſion, not of ſound judgement.

The reader will obſerve, that this ſection is copied from Eſſays on Morality and Natural Religion. The ground-work is the ſame: the alterations are only in the ſuperſtructure; and the ſubject is

abridged in order to adapt it to its preſent place. Part of the abridgement was publiſhed in the ſecond edition of the Principles of Equity. But as law-books have little currency, the publiſhing the whole in one eſſay, will not, I hope, be thought improper.

APPENDIX.

Upon CHANCE *and* CONTINGENCY.

I Hold it to be an intuitive propoſition, That the Deity is the primary cauſe of all things; that with conſummate wiſdom he formed the great plan of government, which he carries on by laws ſuited to the different natures of animate and inanimate beings; and that theſe laws, produce a regular chain of cauſes and effects in the moral as well as the material world, admitting no events but what are comprehended in the original plan (*a*). Hence it clearly follows, that chance is excluded out of this world, that nothing can happen by accident, and that no event is arbitrary or contingent. This is the doctrine of the eſſay quoted; and, in my apprehenſion, well founded. But I cannot ſubſcribe to what follows, viz. "That we have an impreſſion of chance and contin-" gency, which conſequently muſt be deluſive." I would not willingly admit any deluſion in the nature of man, where it is not made evident beyond contradiction; and I now ſee clearly, that

(*a*) See Eſſays on Morality and Natural Religion, part 1. eſſay 3.

the

the impreſſion we have of chance and contingency, is not deluſive, but perfectly conſiſtent with the eſtabliſhed plan.

The explanation of chance and contingency in the ſaid eſſay, ſhall be given in the author's own words, as a proper text to reaſon upon. " In our ordinary train of thinking, it is certain " that all events appear not to us as neceſſary. A multitude of " events ſeem to be under our power to cauſe or to prevent; and " we readily make a diſtinction betwixt events that are *neceſſary*, " *i. e.* that muſt be; and events that are *contingent*, *i. e.* that may " be, or may not be. This diſtinction is void of truth: for all " things that fall out either in the material or moral world, are, " as we have ſeen, alike neceſſary, and alike the reſult of fixed " laws. Yet, whatever conviction a philoſopher may have of " this, the diſtinction betwixt things neceſſary and things con- " tingent, poſſeſſes his common train of thought, as much as it " poſſeſſes the moſt illiterate. We act univerſally upon that diſ- " tinction: nay it is in truth the cauſe of all the labour, care, " and induſtry, of mankind. I illuſtrate this doctrine by an ex- " ample. Conſtant experience hath taught us, that death is a ne- " ceſſary event. The human frame is not made to laſt for ever " in its preſent condition; and no man thinks of more than a " temporary exiſtence upon this globe. But the particular time " of our death appears a contingent event. However certain it " be, that the time and manner of the death of each individual " is determined by a train of preceding cauſes, and is no leſs " fixed than the hour of the ſun's riſing or ſetting; yet no perſon " is affected by this doctrine. In the care of prolonging life, we " are directed by the ſuppoſed contingency of the time of death, " which, to a certain term of years, we conſider as depending in " a great meaſure on ourſelves, by caution againſt accidents, " due uſe of food, exerciſe, &c. Theſe means are proſecuted " with the ſame diligence as if there were in fact no neceſſary

" train

" train of cauſes to fix the period of life. In ſhort, whoever at-
" tends to his own practical ideas, whoever reflects upon the
" meaning of the following words which occur in all languages,
" of things *poſſible*, *contingent*, *that are in our power to cauſe or pre-
" vent*; whoever, I ſay, reflects upon theſe words, will clearly
" ſee, that they ſuggeſt certain perceptions or notions repugnant
" to the doctrine above eſtabliſhed of univerſal neceſſity."

In order to ſhow that there is no repugnance, I begin with defining *chance* and *contingency*. The former is applied to events that have happened; the latter to future events. When we ſay a thing has happened by *chance*, we do not mean that *chance* was the cauſe; for no perſon ever thought that *chance* is a thing that can act, and by acting produce events: we only mean, that we are ignorant of the cauſe, and that, for ought we ſee, it might have happened or not happened, or have happened differently. Aiming at a bird, I ſhoot *by chance* a favourite ſpaniel: the meaning is not, that chance killed the dog, but that as to me the dog's death was accidental. With reſpect to contingency, future events that are variable, and the cauſe unknown, are ſaid to be contingent; changes of the weather, for example, whether it will be froſt or thaw to-morrow, whether fair or foul. In a word, chance and contingency applied to events, mean not that ſuch events happen without any cauſe, but only that we are ignorant of the cauſe.

It appears to me clear, that there is no ſuch thing in human nature as a ſenſe of *contingency*; or, in other words, a ſenſe that any thing happens without a cauſe: ſuch a ſenſe would be groſsly deluſive. True it is indeed, that our ſenſe of a cauſe is but cloudy and indiſtinct with reſpect to certain events. Events that happen regularly, ſuch as ſummer and winter, riſing and ſetting of the ſun, give us a diſtinct impreſſion of a cauſe. The impreſſion is leſs diſtinct with reſpect to events leſs regular, ſuch as alterations

terations of the weather; and extremely indiſtinct with reſpect to events that ſeldom happen, and that happen without any known cauſe. But with reſpect to no event whatever does our ſenſe of a cauſe vaniſh altogether, and give place to a poſitive ſenſe of contingency, that is, a ſenſe of things happening without a cauſe.

Chance and contingency thus explained, ſuggeſt not any perception or notion repugnant to the doctrine of univerſal neceſſity; for my ignorance of a cauſe, does not, even in my own apprehenſion, exclude a cauſe. Deſcending to particulars, I take the example mentioned in the text, viz. the uncertainty of the time of my death. Knowing that my life depends in ſome meaſure on myſelf, I uſe all means to preſerve it, by proper food, exerciſe, and care to prevent accidents. Nor is there any deluſion here. I am moved to uſe theſe means by the deſire I have to live: theſe means accordingly prove effectual to carry on my preſent exiſtence to the appointed period; and in that view are ſo many links in the great chain of cauſes and effects. A burning coal falling from the grate upon the floor, wakes me from a ſound ſleep. I ſtart up to extinguiſh the fire. The motive is irreſiſtible; nor have I reaſon to reſiſt, were it in my power; for I conſider the extinction of the fire by my hand to be one of the means choſen by Providence for prolonging my life to its deſtined period.

Were there a chain of cauſes and effects eſtabliſhed entirely independent on me, and were my life in no meaſure under my own power, it would indeed be fruitleſs for me to act; and the abſurdity of knowingly acting in vain, would be a prevailing motive for remaining at reſt. Upon that ſuppoſition, the *ignavia ratio* of Chryſippus might take place; *cui ſi pareamus, nihil omnino agamus in vita* *. But I act neceſſarily when influenced by motives;

* "The indolent principle; which if we were to follow, we ſhould do nothing "in life."

and

and I have no reaſon to forbear, conſidering that my actions, by producing their intended effects, contribute to carry on the univerſal chain.

PART II.

Progress of Morality.

HAving unfolded the principles of morality, the next ſtep is, to trace out its gradual progreſs, from its infancy among ſavages, to its maturity among poliſhed nations. The hiſtory of opinions concerning the foundation of morality, falls not within my plan; and I am glad to be relieved from an article that is executed in perfection by more able hands (*a*).

An animal is brought forth with every one of its external members; and completes its growth, not by production of any new member, but by addition of matter to thoſe originally formed. The ſame holds with reſpect to internal members; the ſenſes, for example, inſtincts, powers and faculties, principles and propenſities: theſe are coeval with the individual, and are gradually unfolded, ſome early, ſome late. The external ſenſes, being neceſſary for ſelf-preſervation, ſoon arrive at maturity. Some internal ſenſes, of order for inſtance, of propriety, of dignity, being of no uſe during infancy, are not only ſlow in their progreſs toward maturity, but require much culture. Among ſavages they are ſcarce perceptible.

The moral ſenſe, in its progreſs, differs from thoſe laſt men-

(*a*) Dr Cudworth and Dr Smith.

tioned:

tioned: it is frequently diſcovered, even in childhood. It is however ſlow of growth, and ſeldom arrives at perfection without culture and experience.

The moral ſenſe not only ripens gradually with the other internal ſenſes mentioned, but from them acquires force and additional authority: a ſavage makes no difficulty to kill an enemy in cold blood: bloody ſcenes are familiar to him, and his moral ſenſe is not ſufficiently vigorous to give him compunction. The action appears in a different light to a perſon who has more delicacy of feeling; and accordingly the moral ſenſe has much more authority over thoſe who have received a refined education, than over ſavages.

It is pleaſant to trace the progreſs of morality in members of a poliſhed nation. Objects of external ſenſe make the firſt impreſſions; and from them are derived a ſtock of ſimple ideas. Affection, accompanying ideas, is firſt directed to particular objects, ſuch as my brother, my wife, my friend. The mind, opening by degrees, takes in complex objects, ſuch as my country, my religion, the government under which I live; and theſe alſo become objects of affection. Our connections multiply, and the moral ſenſe gaining ſtrength as the mind opens, regulates our duty to each of them. Objects of hatred multiply, as well as objects of affection, and give full ſcope to diſſocial paſſions, the moſt formidable antagoniſts that morality has to encounter. But nature hath provided a remedy: the perſon who indulges malice or revenge, is commonly the greateſt ſufferer by the indulgence: men become wiſe by experience, and have more peace and ſatisfaction in foſtering kindly affection: ſtormy paſſions are ſubdued, or brought under rigid diſcipline; and benevolence triumphs over ſelfiſhneſs. We refine upon the pleaſures of ſociety: we learn to ſubmit our opinions: we affect to give preference to others; and readily fall in with whatever ſweetens ſocial intercourſe: we carefully avoid

cauſes of diſcord; and overlooking trifling offences, we are ſatisfied with moderate reparation, even for groſs injuries.

A nation from its original ſavage ſtate, grows to maturity like the individuals above deſcribed, and the progreſs of morality is the ſame in both. The ſavage ſtate is the infancy of a nation, during which the moral ſenſe is feeble, yielding to cuſtom, to imitation, to paſſion. But a nation, like a member of a poliſhed ſociety, ripens gradually, and acquires a taſte in the fine arts, with acuteneſs of ſenſe in matters of right and wrong. Hatred and revenge, the great obſtacles to moral duty, raged without control, while the privilege of avenging wrongs was permitted to individuals (*a*). But hatred and revenge yielded gradually to the pleaſures of ſociety, and to the growing authority of the moral ſenſe; and benevolent affections prevailed over diſſocial paſſions. In that comfortable period, we hear no more of cruelty as a national character: on the contrary, the averſion we have to an enemy, is even in war exerciſed with moderation. Nor do the ſtormy paſſions ever again revive; for after a nation begins to decline from its meridian height, the paſſions that prevail are not of the violent kind, but ſelfiſh, timorous, and deceitful.

Morality however has not to this day arrived to ſuch maturity as to operate between nations with equal ſteadineſs and vigour as between individuals. Ought this to be regretted as an imperfection in our nature? I think not: had we the ſame compunction of heart for injuring a nation as for injuring an individual, and were injuſtice equally blameable as to both, war would ceaſe, and a golden age enſue; than which a greater misfortune could not befal the human race (*b*).

(*a*) See Hiſtorical Law-tracts, tract 1.

(*b*) Book 2. ſketch 1.

In

In the progreſs from maturity to a declining ſtate, a nation differs widely from an individual. Old age puts an end to the latter: there are many cauſes that weaken the former; but old age is none of them, if it be not in a metaphorical ſenſe. Riches, ſelfiſhneſs, and luxury, are the diſeaſes that weaken proſperous nations: theſe diſeaſes, following each other in a train, corrupt the heart, dethrone the moral ſenſe, and make an anarchy in the ſoul: men ſtick at no expence to purchaſe pleaſure; and they ſtick at no vice to ſupply that expence.

Such are the outlines of morality in its progreſs from birth to burial; and theſe outlines I propoſe to fill up with an induction of particulars. Looking back to the commencement of civil ſociety, when no wants were known but thoſe of nature, and when ſuch wants were amply provided for; we find individuals of the ſame tribe living innocently and cordially together: they had no irregular appetites, nor any ground of ſtrife. In that ſtate, moral principles joined their influence with that of national affection, to ſecure individuals from harm. Savages accordingly, who have plenty of food, and are ſimple in habitation and cloathing, ſeldom traſgreſs the rules of morality within their own tribe. Diodorus Siculus, who compoſed his hiſtory recently after Cæſar's expedition into Britain, ſays, that the inhabitants dwelt in mean cottages covered with reeds or ſticks; that they were of much ſincerity and integrity, contented with plain and homely fare; and were ſtrangers to the exceſs and luxury of rich men. In Friezeland, in Holland, and in other maritime provinces of the Netherlands, locks and keys were unknown, till the inhabitants became rich by commerce: they contented themſelves with bare neceſſaries, which every one had in plenty. The Laplanders have no notion of theft. When they make an excurſion into Norway, which is performed in the ſummer months, they leave their huts open, without fear that any thing will be purloined. Formerly, they

were entirely upright in their only commerce, that of bartering the ſkins of wild beaſts for tobacco, brandy, and coarſe cloth. But being often cheated by ſtrangers, they begin to be more cunning. Grantz, deſcribing the inhabitants of Iceland before they were corrupted by commerce with ſtrangers, ſays, that they lived under the ſame roof with their cattle; that every thing was common among them except their wives and children; and that they were ſimple in their manners, having no appetite but for what nature requires. In the reign of Edwin King of Northumberland, a child, as hiſtorians report, might have travelled with a purſe of gold, without hazard of robbery: in our days of luxury, want is ſo intolerable, that even fear of death is not ſufficient to deter us. All travellers agree, that the native Canadians are perfectly diſintereſted, abhorring deceit and lying. The Californians are fond of iron and ſharp inſtruments; and yet are ſo ſtrictly honeſt, that carpenter-tools left open during night, were ſafe. The ſavages of North America had no locks for their goods: they probably have learned from Europeans, to be more circumſpect. Procopius bears teſtimony (*a*), that the Sclavi, like the Huns, were innocent people, free of all malice. Plan Carpin, the Pope's ambaſſador to the Cham of Tartary, ann. 1246, ſays, that the Tartars are not addicted to thieving; and that they leave their goods open without a lock. Nicholas Damaſcenus reports the ſame of the Celtæ. The original inhabitants of the iſland Borneo, expelled by the Mahometans from the ſea-coaſt to the center of the country, are honeſt, induſtrious, and kindly to each other: they have ſome notion of property, but not ſuch as to render them covetous. Pagans in Siberia are numerous; and, tho' groſsly ignorant eſpecially in matters of religion, they are a good moral people. It is rare to hear

(*a*) Hiſtoria Gothica, lib. 3.

among

among them of perjury, thieving, fraud, or drunkenneſs; if we except thoſe who live among the Ruſſian Chriſtians, with whoſe vices they are tainted. Strahlenberg (*a*) bears teſtimony to their honeſty. Having employ'd a number of them in a long navigation, he ſlept in the ſame boat with men whoſe names he knew not, whoſe language he underſtood not, and yet loſt not a particle of his baggage. Being obliged to remain a fortnight among the Oſtiacs, upon the river Oby, his baggage lay open in a hut inhabited by a large family, and yet nothing was purloined. The following incident, which he alſo mentions, is remarkable. A Ruſſian of Tobolſki, in the courſe of a long journey, lodged one night in an Oſtiac's hut, and the next day on the road miſſed his purſe with a hundred rubles. His landlord's ſon, hunting at ſome diſtance from the hut, found the purſe, but left it there. By his father's order, he covered it with branches, to ſecure it in caſe an owner ſhould be found. After three months, the Ruſſian returning, lodged with the ſame Oſtiac; and mentioning occaſionally the loſs of his purſe, the Oſtiac, who at firſt did not recollect his face, cry'd out with joy, "Art thou the man who "loſt that purſe? my ſon ſhall go and ſhow thee where it lies, "that thou may'ſt take it up with thine own hand." The Hottentots (*b*) have not the leaſt notion of theft: tho' immoderately fond of tobacco and brandy, they are employ'd by the Dutch for tending warehouſes full of theſe commodities. Here is an inſtance of probity above temptation, even among ſavages in the firſt ſtage of ſocial life. Some individuals are more liberally endued than others with virtuous principles: may it not be thought, that in that reſpect nature has been more kind to the Hottentots

(*a*) Deſcription of Ruſſia, Siberia, &c.

(*b*) Kolben.

than

than to many other tribes? Spaniards, ſettled on the ſea-coaſt of Chili, carry on a commerce with neighbouring ſavages, for bridles, ſpurs, knives, and other manufactures of iron; and in return receive oxen, horſes, and even children for ſlaves. A Spaniard carries his goods there; and after obtaining liberty to diſpoſe of them, he moves about, and delivers his goods, without the leaſt reſerve, to every one who bargains with him. When all is ſold, he intimates his departure; and every purchaſer hurries with his goods to him; and it is not known that any one Indian ever broke his engagement. They give him a guard to carry him ſafe out of their territory, with all the ſlaves, horſes, and cattle he has purchaſed. The ſavages of Brazil are faithful to their promiſes, and to the treaties they make with the Portugueſe. Upon ſome occaſions, they may be accuſed of error and wrong judgement, but never of injuſtice nor of duplicity.

While the earth was thinly peopled, plenty of food, procured by hunting and fiſhing, promoted population; but as population leſſens the ſtock of animal food, a ſavage nation, encreaſing in numbers, muſt ſpread wider and wider for more game. Thus tribes, at firſt widely ſeparated from each other, approach gradually till they become neighbours. Hence a new ſcene with reſpect to morality. Differences about their hunting-fields, about their game, about perſonal injuries, multiply between neighbours; and every quarrel is blown into a flame, by the averſion men naturally have to ſtrangers. Anger, hatred, and revenge, find now vent, which formerly lay latent without an object: diſſocial paſſions prevail without control, becauſe among ſavages morality is no match for them; and cruelty becomes predominant in the human race. Ancient hiſtory accordingly is full of enormous cruelties; witneſs the incurſions of the northern barbarians into the Roman empire; and witneſs the incurſions of Genhizcan and Tamerlane

merlane into the fertile countries of Aſia, ſpreading deſtruction with fire and ſword, and ſparing neither man, woman, nor infant.

Malevolent paſſions daily exerciſed againſt perſons of a different tribe, acquiring ſtrength by exerciſe, came to be vented againſt perſons even of the ſame tribe; and the privilege long enjoy'd by individuals, of avenging the wrongs done to them, beſtow'd irreſiſtible force upon ſuch paſſions (*a*). The hiſtory of ancient Greece preſents nothing to the reader but uſurpations, aſſaſſinations, and other horrid crimes. The names of many famous for wickedneſs, are ſtill preſerved; Atreus, for example, Eteocles, Alcmeon, Phedra, Clytemneſtra. The ſtory of Pelops and his deſcendents, is a chain of criminal horrors: during that period, parricide and inceſt were ordinary incidents. Euripides repreſents Medea vowing revenge againſt her huſband Jaſon, and laying a plot to poiſon him. Of that infamous plot the chorus expreſs their approbation, juſtifying every woman who, in like circumſtances, acts the ſame part.

The frequent incurſions of northern barbarians into the Roman empire, ſpred deſolation and ruin through the whole. The Romans, from the higheſt poliſh degenerating into ſavages, aſſumed by degrees the cruel and bloody manners of their conquerors; and the conquerors and conquered, blended into one maſs, equalled the groſſeſt barbarians of ancient times in ignorance and brutality. Clovis, King of the Franks, even after his converſion to Chriſtianity, aſſaſſinated without remorſe his neareſt kinſman. The children of Clodomir, ann. 530, were aſſaſſinated by their two uncles. In the thirteenth century, Ezzelino de Aromano obtained the ſovereignty of Padua, by maſſacring 12,000 of his fellow-citizens. Galeas Sforza, Duke of Milan, was aſſaſſinated

(*a*) See Hiſtorical Law-tracts, tract 1.

ann.

ann. 1476 in the cathedral church of Milan, after the aſſaſſins had put up their prayers for courage to perpetrate the deed. It is a ſtill ſtronger proof how low morality was in thoſe days, that the Pope himſelf, Sextus IV. attempted to aſſaſſinate the two brothers, Laurent and Julien de Medicis; chuſing the elevation of the hoſt as a proper time, when the people would be buſy about their devotions. Nay more, that very Pope, with unparallelled impudence, excommunicated the Florentines for doing juſtice upon the intended aſſaſſins. The moſt ſacred oaths were in vain employed as a ſecurity againſt that horrid crime. Childebert II. King of the Franks, enticed Magnovald to his court, by a ſolemn oath that he ſhould receive no harm; and yet made no difficulty to aſſaſſinate him during the gaiety of a banquet. But theſe inſtances, however horrid, make no figure compared with the maſſacre of St Bartholomew, where many thouſands were inhumanly and treacherouſly butchered. Even ſo late as the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, aſſaſſination was not held in every caſe to be criminal. Many ſolicitous applications were made to general councils of Chriſtian clergy, to declare it criminal in every caſe; but without ſucceſs. Ferdinand King of Aragon and Navarre, after repeated aſſaſſinations and acts of perfidy, obtained the appellation of *Great*: ſo little authority had the moral ſenſe during theſe dark ages.

But it is ſcarce neceſſary to mention particular inſtances of the overbearing power of malevolent paſſions during ſuch ages. An opinion, formerly univerſal, that the innocent may be juſtly involved in the ſame puniſhment with the guilty, is of itſelf irrefragable evidence, that morality once had very little influence when oppoſed by revenge. There is no moral principle more evident, than that puniſhment cannot be inflicted with juſtice but upon the guilty; and yet in Greece, the involving of the innocent with the guilty in the ſame puniſhment, was authoriſed even by poſitive

tive law. By an Athenian law, a man committing ſacrilege, or betraying his country, was baniſhed with all his children (*a*). And when a tyrant was put to death, his children ſuffered the ſame fate (*b*). The puniſhment of treaſon in Macedon, was extended againſt the criminal's relations (*c*). Hanno, a citizen of Carthage, formed a plot to enſlave his country, by poiſoning the whole ſenate at a banquet. He was tortured to death; and his children, with all his relations, were cut off without mercy, tho' they had no acceſſion to his guilt. Among the Japanneſe, a people remarkably ferocious, it is the practice to involve children and relations in the puniſhment of capital crimes. Even Cicero, the chief man for learning in the moſt enlightened period of the Roman republic, and a celebrated moraliſt, approves that practice: "Nec vero me fugit, quam ſit acerbum parentum ſcelera filiorum "pœnis lui: ſed hoc præclare legibus comparatum eſt, ut caritas "liberorum amiciores parentes reipublicæ redderet * (*d*)." In Britain, every one knows, that murder was retaliated, not only againſt the criminal and his relations, but againſt his whole clan; a practice ſo common as to be diſtinguiſhed by a peculiar name, that of *deadly feud*. As late as the days of King Edmund, a law was made in England, prohibiting deadly feud, except between the relations of the perſon murdered and the murderer himſelf.

* "I am ſenſible of the hardſhip of puniſhing the child for the crime of the "parent: this, however, is a wiſe enactment of our laws; for hereby the parent "is bound to the intereſt of the ſtate by the ſtrongeſt of all ties, the affection to "his offspring."

(*a*) Meurſeus de legibus Atticis, lib. 2. cap. 2.

(*b*) Eod. lib. 2. cap. 15.

(*c*) Quintus Curtius, lib. 6. cap. 11.

(*d*) Ep. 12. ad Brutum.

I embrace the preſent opportunity to honour the Jews, by obſerving, that they were the firſt people we read of, who had correct notions of morality with reſpect to the preſent point. The following law is expreſs: "The fathers ſhall not be put to "death for the children, neither ſhall the children be put to "death for the fathers: every man ſhall be put to death for his "own ſin (*a*)." Amaziah, King of Judah, gave ſtrict obedience to that law, in avenging his father's death: "And it came to "paſs as ſoon as the kingdom was confirmed in his hand, that he "ſlew his ſervants which had ſlain the king his father. But the "children of the murderers he ſlew not; according to that which "is written in the book of the law of Moſes (*b*)." There is an elegant paſſage in Ezekiel to the ſame purpoſe (*c*): "What mean "ye, that ye uſe this proverb concerning the land of Iſrael, ſaying, The fathers have eaten ſour grapes, and the childrens "teeth are ſet on edge? As I live, ſaith the Lord God, ye ſhall "not have occaſion any more to uſe this proverb in Iſrael. The "ſoul that ſinneth, it ſhall die: the ſon ſhall not bear the iniquity "of the father, neither ſhall the father bear the iniquity of the "ſon; the righteouſneſs of the righteous ſhall be upon him, and "the wickedneſs of the wicked ſhall be upon him." Among the Jews however, as among other nations, there are inſtances without number, of involving innocent children and relations in the ſame puniſhment with the guilty. Such power has revenge, as to trample upon conſcience, and upon the moſt expreſs laws. Inſtigated with rage for Nabal's ingratitude, King David made a vow to God, not to leave alive of all who pertained to Nabal any

(*a*) Deuteronomy xxiv. 16.

(*b*) 2 Kings, chap. 14.

(*c*) Chap. 18.

that

that piſſeth againſt the wall. And it was not any compunction of conſcience that diverted him from his cruel purpoſe, but Nabal's beautiful wife, who pacified him (*a*). But ſuch contradiction between principle and practice, is not peculiar to the Jews. We find examples of it in the laws of the Roman empire. The true principle of puniſhment is laid down in an edict of the Emperors Arcadius and Honorius (*b*). "Sancimus, ibi eſſe pœnam, ubi "et noxia eſt. Propinquos, notos, familiares, procul a calum- "nia ſubmovemus, quos reos ſceleris ſocietas non facit. Nec e- "nim adfinitas vel amicitia nefarium crimen admittunt. Pecca- "ta igitur ſuos teneant auctores: nec ulterius progrediatur me- "tus quam reperiatur delictum. Hoc ſingulis quibuſque judici- "bus intimetur.*" Theſe very Emperors, with reſpect to treaſon, which touched them nearer than other crimes, talk a very different languge. After obſerving, that will and purpoſe alone without an ouvert act, is treaſon, ſubjecting the criminal to capital puniſhment, and to forfeiture of all that belongs to him, they proceed in the following words (*c*). "Filii vero ejus, quibus vitam Impe- "ratoria ſpecialiter lenitate concedimus, (paterno enim deberent "perire ſupplicio, in quibus paterni, hoc eſt, hereditarii criminis "exempla metuuntur), a materna, vel avita, omnium etiam proxi-

* "We ordain, that the puniſhment of the crime ſhall extend to the criminal "alone. We hold his relations, his friends, and his acquaintances, unſuſpected; "for intimacy, friendſhip, or connection, are no proof or argument of guilt. "The conſequences of the crime ſhall purſue only its perpetrator. Let this ſtatute "be intimated to all our judges."

(*a*) 1 Samuel, chap. 25.

(*b*) l. 22. Cod. De pœnis.

(*c*) l. 3. Cod. ad leg. Jul. majeſt.

" morum hereditate ac ſucceſſione, habeantur alieni: teſtamentis " extraneorum nihil capeant: ſint perpetuo egentes et pauperes, " infamia eos paterna ſemper comitetur, ad nullos prorſus hono- " res, ad nulla ſacramenta perveniant: ſint poſtremo tales, ut " his, perpetua egeſtate ſordentibus, ſit et mors ſolatium et vita " ſupplicium *."

Human nature is not ſo perverſe, as without veil or diſguiſe to puniſh a perſon acknowledged to be innocent. An irregular bias of imagination, which extends the qualities of the principal to its acceſſories, paves the way to that unjuſt practice (*a*). That bias, ſtrengthened by indignation againſt an atrocious criminal, leads the mind haſtily to conclude, that all his connections are partakers of his guilt. In an enlightened age, the clearneſs of moral principles fetters the imagination from confounding the innocent with the guilty. There remain traces however of that bias, tho' not carried ſo far as murder. The ſentence pronounced againſt Ravilliac for aſſaſſinating Henry IV. of France, ordains, " That " his houſe be erazed to the ground, and that no other building " be ever erected upon that ſpot." Was not this in imagination puniſhing a houſe for the proprietor's crime?

* " By a ſpecial extenſion of our imperial clemency, we allow the ſons of the " criminal to live; altho', in ſtrict juſtice, being tainted with hereditary guilt, " they ought to ſuffer the puniſhment of their father. But it is our will, that " they ſhall be incapable of all inheritance, either from the mother, the grand- " father, or any of their kindred; that they ſhall be deprived of the power of in- " heriting by the teſtament of a ſtranger; that they ſhall be abandoned to the ex- " treme of poverty and perpetual indigence; that the infamy of their father ſhall " ever attend them, incapable of honours, and excluded from the participation " of religious rites; that ſuch, in fine, ſhall be the miſery of their condition, that " life ſhall be a puniſhment, and death a comfort."

(*a*) Elements of Criticiſm, chap. 2. ſect. 5.

Murder

Murder and aſſaſſination are not only deſtructive in themſelves, but, if poſſible, ſtill more deſtructive in their conſequences. The practice of ſhedding blood unjuſtly, and often wantonly, blunts conſcience, and paves the way to every crime. This obſervation is verified in the ancient Greeks: their cruel and ſanguinary character, rendered them little regardful of the ſtrict rules of juſtice. Right was held to depend on power, among men as among wild beaſts: it was conceived to be the will of the gods, that ſuperior force ſhould be a lawful title to dominion; "for what right can "the weak have to what they cannot defend?" Were that maxim to obtain, a weak man would have no right to liberty nor to life. That impious doctrine was avowed by the Athenians, and publicly aſſerted by their ambaſſadors in a conference with the Melians, reported by Thucydides (*a*). Many perſons act as if force and right were the ſame; but a barefac'd profeſſion of ſuch a doctrine, is uncommon. In the Eumenides, a tragedy of Eſchylus, Oreſtes is arraigned in the Areopagus for killing his mother. Minerva, preſident of the court, decrees in favour of Oreſtes: and for what reaſon? "Having no mother myſelf, the "murder of a mother toucheth not me *." In the tragedy of Electra, Oreſtes, conſulting the Delphic oracle about means to avenge his father's murder, was enjoined by Apollo to forbear

* Athens, from the nature of its government as eſtabliſhed by Solon, was rendered uncapable of any regular or conſiſtent body of laws. In every caſe, civil and criminal, the whole people were judges in the laſt reſort. And what ſort of judges will an ignorant multitude make, who have no guide but paſſion and prejudice? It is vain to make good laws, when ſuch judges are the interpreters. Anacharſis, the Scythian, being preſent at an aſſembly of the people, ſaid, "It was "ſingular, that in Athens, wiſe men pleaded cauſes, and fools determined them."

(*a*) Lib. 5.

force,

force, but to employ fraud and guile. Obedient to that injunction, Oreſtes commands his tutor to ſpread in Argos the news of his death, and to confirm the ſame with a ſolemn oath. In Homer, even the great Jupiter makes no difficulty to ſend a lying dream to Agamemnon, chief of the Greeks. Diſſimulation is recommended by the goddeſs Minerva (*a*). Ulyſſes declares his deteſtation at uſing freedom with truth (*b*): and yet no man deals more in feigned ſtories (*c*). In the 22d book of the Iliad, Minerva is guilty of groſs deceit and treachery to Hector. When he flies from Achilles, ſhe appears to him in the ſhape of his brother Deiphobus, exhorts him to turn upon Achilles, and promiſes to aſſiſt him. Hector accordingly, returning to the fight, darts his lance; which rebounds from the ſhield of Achilles; for by Vulcan it was made impenetrable. Hector calls upon his brother for another lance; but in vain, for Deiphobus was not there. The Greeks in Homer's time muſt have been ſtrangely deformed in their morals, when ſuch a ſtory could be reliſhed *. A nation begins not to poliſh nor to advance in morality, till writing be common; and writing was not known among the Greeks at the ſiege of Troy. Nor were the morals of that people, as we ſee, much purified for a long time after writing became common.

* Upon the ſtory of Jupiter being deceived by Juno in the 14th book of the Iliad, Pope ſays, "That he knows not a bolder fiction in all antiquity, nor one "that has a greater air of impiety." Pope it would ſeem was little acquainted with antiquity: for ſuch acts of impiety were common among the Greeks; and in particular the incident mentioned in the text, is not only more impious, but alſo a more groſs violation of the laws of morality.

(*a*) Odyſſey, book 13.

(*b*) Book 14.

(*c*) Book 14. book 15.

When

When Plautus wrote, the Roman ſyſtem of morals muſt have been extremely impure. In his play termed *Menæchmi*, a gentleman of faſhion having accidentally got into his hands a lady's robe with a gold claſp, inſtead of returning them to the owner, endeavours to ſell them without ſhame or remorſe. Such a ſcene would not be ſuffered at preſent, except among pick-pockets. Both the Greeks and Carthaginians were held by the Romans to be artful and cunning. The Romans continued a plain people, with much ſimplicity of manners, when the nations mentioned had made great progreſs in the arts of life; and it is a ſad truth, that morality declines in proportion as a nation poliſhes. But if the Romans were later than the Greeks and Carthaginians in the arts of life, they ſoon ſurpaſſed them in every ſort of immorality. For this change of manners they were indebted to their rapid conqueſts. The ſanguinary diſpoſition both of the Greeks and Romans, appears from another practice, that of expoſing their infant children, which continued till humanity came in ſome meaſure to prevail. The practice continues in China to this day, the populouſneſs of the country throwing a veil over the cruelty; but from the humanity of the Chineſe, I conjecture, that the practice will be found rare. The Jews, a cloudy and peeviſh tribe, much addicted to bloodſhed, were miſerably defective in moral principles. Take the following examples out of an endleſs number recorded in the books of the Old Teſtament. Jael, wife of Heber, took under her protection Siſera general of the Canaanites, and engaged her faith for his ſecurity. She put him treacherouſly to death when aſleep; and was applauded by Deborah the propheteſs for the meritorious action (*a*). That horrid deed would probably have appeared to her in a different light, had it been committed againſt Barac, general of the Iſraelites.

(*a*) Judges iv. 5.

David,

David, flying from Saul, took refuge with Achiſh, King of Gath; and tho' protected by that King, made war againſt the King's allies, ſaying, that it was againſt his own countrymen of Judah. "And David ſaved neither man nor woman alive to bring tidings to "Gath. And Achiſh believed David, ſaying, He hath made his people "Iſrael utterly to abhor him: therefore he ſhall be my ſervant for "ever (*a*)." This was a complication of ingratitude, lying, and treachery. Ziba, by preſents to King David, and by defaming his maſter Mephiboſheth, procured from the King a gift of his maſter's inheritance; tho' Mephiboſheth had neither trimmed his beard, nor waſhed his cloaths, from the day the King departed till he returned in peace. "And it came to paſs, when Mephiboſheth "was come to Jeruſalem to meet the king, that the king ſaid "unto him, Wherefore wenteſt thou not with me, Mephiboſheth? "And he anſwered, My lord, O king, my ſervant deceived "me; for thy ſervant ſaid, I will ſaddle me an aſs, that I may "ride thereon, and go to the king; becauſe thy ſervant is lame, "and he hath ſlandered thy ſervant unto my lord the king. But "my lord the king is as an angel of God: do therefore what is "good in thine eyes. For all my father's houſe were but dead "men before my lord the king: yet didſt thou ſet thy ſervant a-"mong them that did eat at thine own table: what right there-"fore have I to cry any more unto the king?" David could not poſſibly atone for his raſhneſs, but by reſtoring to Mephiboſheth his inheritance, and puniſhing Ziba in an exemplary manner. But hear the ſentence: "And the king ſaid unto him, Why "ſpeakeſt thou any more of thy matters? I have ſaid, Thou and "Ziba divide the land (*b*)." The ſame king, after pardoning

(*a*) 1 Samuel, xxvii. 11.

(*b*) 2 Samuel, xix. 24.

Shimei

Shimei for curſing him, and ſwearing that he ſhould not die; yet upon deathbed enjoined his ſon Solomon to put Shimei to death: "Now therefore hold him not guiltleſs; but his hoary head bring "thou down to the grave with blood (*a*)." I wiſh not to be miſapprehended, as intending to cenſure David in particular. If the beſt king the Jews ever had, was ſo miſerably deficient in morality, what muſt be thought of the nation in general? When David was lurking to avoid the wrath of Saul, he became acquainted with Nabal, who had a great ſtock of cattle. "He diſ-"charged his followers," ſays Joſephus (*b*), "either for avarice, "or hunger, or any pretext whatever, to touch a ſingle hair of "them; preaching ſtill on the text of doing juſtice to all men, in "conformity to the will of God, who is not pleaſed with any "man that covets or lays violent hands on the goods of his neigh-"bour." Our author proceeds to acquaint us, that Nabal having refuſed to ſupply David with proviſions, and having ſent back the meſſengers with a ſcoffing anſwer, David in great rage made a vow, that he would deſtroy Nabal with his houſe and family. Our author obſerves, that David's indignation againſt Nabal, was not ſo much for his ingratitude, as for the virulence of an inſolent outrage againſt one who had never injured him. And what was the outrage? It was, ſays our author, that Nabal enquiring who the ſaid David was, and being told that he was one of the ſons of Jeſſe, "Yes, yes," ſays Nabal, "your run-away ſervants look "upon themſelves to be brave fellows, I warrant you." Strange looſeneſs of morals! I mean not David, who was in wrath, but Joſephus writing ſedately in his cloſet. He every where celebrates David for his juſtice and piety, compoſes for him the very warm

(*a*) 1 Kings, ii. 9.

(*b*) Antiquities, book 6.

exhortation mentioned above: and yet thinks him not guilty of any wrong, in vowing to break every rule of juſtice and humanity, upon ſo ſlight a provocation as a ſcoffing expreſſion, ſuch as no man of temper will regard.

European nations, who originally were fierce and ſanguinary like the Greeks and Jews, had the ſame cloudy and uncorrect notions of right and wrong. It is ſcarce neceſſary to give inſtances, the low ſtate of morality during the dark ages of Chriſtianity being known to all. In the time of Louis XI. of France, promiſes and engagements were utterly diſregarded, till they were ſanctified by a ſolemn oath: nor were ſuch oaths long regarded; they loſt their force, and were not relied on more than ſimple promiſes. All faith among men ſeemed to be at an end. Even thoſe who appeared the moſt ſcrupulous about character, were however ready to graſp at any ſubterfuge to excuſe their breach of engagement. And it is a ſtill ſtronger proof of ſelf-deceit, that ſuch ſubterfuges were frequently prepared beforehand, in order to furniſh an excuſe. It was a common practice ſome ages ago, to make private proteſtations, which were thought ſufficient to relieve men in conſcience from being bound by a ſolemn treaty. Charles, afterward Emperor of Germany, during his minority, gave authority to declare publicly his acceſſion to a treaty of peace, between his grandfather Maximilian and the King of France: but at the ſame time proteſted privately, before a notary and witneſſes, "That, notwithſtanding his public acceſſion to the ſaid treaty, it was not his "intention to be bound by every article of it; and particularly, "that the clauſe reſerving to the King of France the ſovereignty "of certain territories in the Netherlands, ſhould not be binding." Is it poſſible Charles could be ſo blind, as not to ſee, that ſuch practice, if it have any effect, muſt deſtroy all faith among men? What better was this than what was practiſed by Robert King of France in the tenth century, to free his ſubjects from the guilt of perjury? They ſwore upon a box of relics, out of which the relics

lics were privately taken. Correa, a Portugueſe general, made a treaty with the King of Pegu; and it was agreed, that each party ſhould ſwear to obſerve the treaty, laying his hand upon the ſacred book of his religion. Correa ſwore upon a collection of ſongs, and by that vile ſtratagem thought that he was not bound. The inhabitants of Britain were ſo looſe formerly, that a man was not reckoned ſafe in his own houſe, without a maſtiff to protect him from violence. Maſtiffs were permitted even to thoſe who dwelt within the king's foreſts; and to prevent danger to the deer, there was in England a court for *lawing* or *expeditation* of maſtives, *i. e.* for cutting off the claws of their fore-feet, to prevent them from running (*a*). The trial and condemnation of Charles I. in a pretended court of juſtice, however audacious and unconſtitutional, was yet an effort toward regularity and order. In the preceding age, the king would have been taken off by aſſaſſination or poiſon. Every prince in Europe had an officer whoſe province it was to ſecure his maſter againſt poiſon. A lady was appointed to that office by Queen Eliſabeth of England; and the form was, to give to each of the ſervants a mouthful to eat of the diſh he brought in. Poiſon muſt have been frequent in thoſe days, to make ſuch a regulation neceſſary. To vouch ſtill more clearly the low ebb of morality during that period, ſeldom it happened that a man of figure died ſuddenly, or of an unuſual diſeaſe, but poiſon was ſuſpected. Men conſcious of their own vicious diſpoſition, are prone to ſuſpect others. The Dauphin, ſon to Francis I. of France, a youth of about eighteen, having overheated himſelf at play, took a great draught of iced water, and died of a pleuriſy in five days. The death was ſudden, but none is more natural. The ſuſpicion however of poiſon was univerſal; and Montecuculi, who attended the young prince, was formally condemned to death and

(*a*) Carta de Foreſta, cap. 6.

executed for it; for no better reaſon, than that he had at all times ready acceſs to the prince.

Conſidering the low ſtate of morality where diſſocial paſſions bear rule, as in the ſcenes now diſplay'd, one would require a miracle to recover mankind out of ſuch anarchy. But, as obſerved above (*a*), Providence brings order out of confuſion. The intolerable diſtreſs of a ſtate of things where a promiſe, or even an oath, is a rope of ſand, and where all are ſet againſt all (*b*), made people at laſt ſenſible, that they muſt either renounce ſociety altogether, or qualify themſelves for it, by checking their diſſocial paſſions. Finding from experience, that the gratification of ſocial affections exceeds greatly that of cruelty and revenge, men endeavoured to acquire a habit of ſelf-command, and of reſtraining their ſtormy paſſions. The neceſſity of fulfilling every moral duty was recogniſed: men liſtened to conſcience, the voice of God in their hearts: and the moral ſenſe was cordially ſubmitted to, as the ultimate judge in all matters of right and wrong. Salutary laws and ſteady government contributed to perfect that glorious revolution: private conviction alone would not have been effectual, not at leaſt in many ages.

From that revolution is derived what is termed *the law of nations*, meaning certain regulations dictated by the moral ſenſe in its maturity. The laws of our nature refine gradually as our nature refines. The putting an enemy to death in cold blood, is averſe to improved nature, tho' common while barbarity prevailed. It is held infamous to uſe poiſoned weapons, tho' the moral ſenſe made little oppoſition while rancour and revenge were ruling paſſions. Averſion againſt ſtrangers is taught to vary its object, from

(*a*) Book 2. ſketch 1.

(*b*) Hobbes.

individuals,

individuals, to the nation that is our enemy: I bear enmity againſt France; but diſlike not any one Frenchman, being conſcious that it is the duty of ſubjects to ſerve their king and country *. In diſtributing juſtice, we make no diſtinction between natives and foreigners: if any partiality be indulged, it is in favour of the helpleſs ſtranger.

But cruelty is not the only antagoniſt to morality. There is another, leſs violent indeed, but more cunning and undermining; and that is the hoarding-appetite. Before money was introduced, that appetite was extremely faint: in the firſt ſtage of civil ſociety, men are ſatisfied with plain neceſſaries; and having theſe in plenty, they think not of providing againſt want. But money is a ſpecies of property, ſo univerſal in operation, and ſo permanent in value, as to rouſe the appetite for hoarding: love of money excites induſtry; and the many beautiful productions of induſtry, magnificent houſes, ſplendid gardens, rich garments, inflame the appetite to an extreme. In the thirteenth century, ſo obſcured was the moral ſenſe by rapacity and avarice, that robbery on the highway, and the coining falſe money, were in Germany held to be privileges of great lords. That perjury was common in the city of London, eſpecially among jurymen, makes a preamble in more than one ſtatute of Henry VII. In *the Dance of Death*, tranſlated from the French in the ſaid king's reign, with additions adapted to Engliſh manners, a juryman is introduced, who, influenced by bribes, had often given a falſe verdict. And the ſheriff was often ſuſpected as acceſſory to the crime, by returning for jurymen perſons of a bad character. Carew, in his account of Cornwall, ſays,

* In one of our ill-concerted deſcents upon France during the late war, ſignal humanity appeared, in forbearing to burn a manufactory of ſails and ropes, belonging to the King; becauſe it would have deſtroy'd an adjoining building of the ſame kind belonging to a private manufacturer.

that

that it was an ordinary article in an attorney's bill, to charge *pro amicitia vicecomitis* *. Perjury in jurors of the city of London, is greatly complained of. Stow informs us, that, in the year 1468, many jurors of that city were puniſhed, and papers fixed on their heads, declaring their offence, of being corrupted by the parties to the ſuit. He complains of that corruption as flagrant in the reign of Eliſabeth, when he wrote his account of London. Fuller, in his Engliſh Worthies, mentions it as a proverbial ſaying, "That London juries hang half, and ſave half." Grafton, in his Chronicle, mentions, that the chancellor of the Biſhop of London being indicted for murder, the Biſhop wrote a letter to Cardinal Wolſey, begging his interpoſition for having the proſecution ſtopt, "becauſe London juries were ſo corrupted, that "they would find Abel guilty of the murder of Cain." In that period, the morals of the Engliſh were in every particular extremely looſe. We learn from Strype's annals (*a*), that in the county of Somerſet alone, forty perſons were executed in one year for robbery, theft, and other felonies, thirty-five burnt in the hand, thirty-ſeven whipped, one hundred and eighty-three diſcharged, tho' moſt wicked and deſperate perſons; and yet that the fifth part of the felonies committed in that county were not brought to trial, either from cunning in the felons, indolence in the magiſtrate, or fooliſh lenity in the people; that other counties were in no better condition, and many in a worſe; and that commonly there were three or four hundred able-bodied vagabonds in every county, who lived by theft and rapine. Harriſon computes, that in the reign of Henry VIII. ſeventy-two thouſand thieves and rogues were hanged; and that in Eliſabeth's time there were

* "For the friendſhip of the ſheriff."

(*a*) Vol. 4.

only

only hanged yearly between three and four hundred for theft and robbery. At preſent, there are not forty hanged in a year for theſe crimes. The ſame author reports, that in the reign of Eliſabeth, there were computed to be in England ten thouſand gypſies. In the year 1601, complaints were made in parliament, of the rapine of the juſtices of peace; and a member ſaid, that this magiſtrate was an animal, who, for half a dozen of chickens, would diſpenſe with a dozen of penal ſtatutes. The people of Whidah, in Guinea, are much addicted to pilfering. Boſman was told by the King, "That his ſubjects were not like thoſe of Ardrah, who on the ſlighteſt umbrage will poiſon an European. "This, ſays he, you have no reaſon to apprehend here: but take "care of your goods; for ſo expert are my people at thieving, "that they will ſteal from you while you are looking on." The Caribbeans, who know no wants but what nature inſpires, are amaz'd at the induſtry of the Europeans in amaſſing wealth. Liſten to one of them expoſtulating with a Frenchman in the following terms: "How miſerable art thou, to expoſe thy perſon "to tedious and dangerous voyages, and to ſuffer thyſelf to be "oppreſſed with anxiety about futurity! An inordinate appetite "for wealth is thy bane; and yet thou art no leſs tormented in "preſerving the goods thou haſt acquired, than in acquiring "more: fear of robbery or ſhipwreck ſuffers thee not to enjoy a "quiet moment. Thus thou groweſt old in thy youth, thy hair "turns gray, thy forehead is wrinkled, a thouſand ailments af"flict thy body, a thouſand diſtreſſes ſurround thy heart, and "thou moveſt with painful hurry to the grave. Why art thou "not content with what thy own country produceth? Why not "contemn ſuperfluities, as we do?"

To control the hoarding appetite, which when inflamed is the bane of civil ſociety, the God of nature has provided two efficacious principles; the moral ſenſe, and the ſenſe of property. The

hoarding

hoarding appetite, it is true, is more and more inflamed by beautiful productions in the progreſs of art: but, on the other hand, the ſenſes mentioned growing to maturity, have a commanding influence over the actions of men; and, when cheriſhed in a good government, are a ſufficient counterbalance to the hoarding appetite. The ancient Egyptians enjoy'd for ages the bleſſings of good government; and moral principles were among them carried to a greater degree of refinement, than at preſent even in our courts of equity. It was made the duty of every one, to ſuccour thoſe who were unjuſtly attacked: even paſſengers were not exempted. A regulation among them, that a man could not be impriſoned for debt, was well ſuited to the tenor of their laws and manners: it could not have taken place but among an honeſt and induſtrious people. In old Rome, tho' remarkable for temperance and auſterity of manners, a debtor could be impriſoned, and even ſold as a ſlave, for payment of the debt; but the Patricians were the creditors, and the poor Plebeians were held in woful ſubjection *. The moderation

* A bankrupt in England who pays three fourths of his debt, and obtains a certificate of his good behaviour, is diſcharged of all the debts contracted by him before his bankruptcy. Such regulation was perhaps not unſuitable to the moderation and frugality of the period when it was made. But luxury and external ſhow, have now become our ruling paſſions; and to ſupply our extravagance, money muſt be procured at any rate. Trade in particular has degenerated into a ſpecies of gaming; men venturing their all, in hopes of a lucky hit to elevate them above their neighbours. And did they only venture their own, the caſe would not be deplorable: they venture all they can procure upon credit; and by that means, reduce to beggary many an innocent family: with reſpect to themſelves, they know the worſt of it, which is to be clear'd from their debts by a certificate. The morals of our people are indeed at ſo low an ebb, as to require the moſt ſevere laws againſt bankruptcy. When a man borrows a ſum, it is implied in the covenant, that all his effects preſent and future ſhall lie open to the creditor; for which reaſon, it is contradictory to juſtice, that a creditor ſhould be forc'd to diſcharge

moderation of the inhabitants of Hamburgh, and their public ſpirit, kept in vigour by a free government, preſerve morality among them entire from taint or corruption. I give an illuſtrious inſtance. Inſtead of a tax upon trade or riches, every merchant puts privately into the public cheſt, what he thinks ought to be his contribution: the total ſum ſeldom falls ſhort of expectation; and among that numerous body of men, not one is ſuſpected of contributing leſs than his proportion. But luxury has not yet got footing in that city. A climate not kindly, and a ſoil not fertile, enured the Swiſs to temperance and to virtue. Patriotiſm continues their ruling paſſion: they are fond of ſerving their country; and are honeſt and faithful to each other: a law-ſuit among them is a wonder; and a door is ſeldom ſhut unleſs to keep out cold.

The hurtful effects of the hoarding appetite with reſpect to individuals, make no figure compared with its poiſonous influence upon the public, in every ſtate enriched by conqueſt or by commerce; which I have had more than one opportunity to mention.

charge his debtor without obtaining complete payment. Many debtors, it is true, deſerve favour; but it ought to be left to the humanity of creditors, and not be forc'd from them by law. The debtor, at the ſame time, may be ſafely left to the humanity of his creditors: for if he have conducted his affairs with ſtrict integrity, and with any degree of prudence, there will ſcarce be found one man ſo hard-hearted, as to ſtand out againſt the laudable and benevolent intentions of his fellow-creditors. Nay, if he have any regard to character, he dares not ſtand out: he would be held as a monſter, and be abhorred by all the world. To leave a bankrupt thus to the mercy of his creditors, would produce the moſt ſalutary effects. It would excite men to be ſtrictly juſt in their dealings, and put an end to gaming, ſo deſtructive to credit; becauſe miſbehaviour in any of theſe particulars would ſet the whole creditors againſt their debtor, and leave him no hope of favour. In the late bankrupt-ſtatute for Scotland, accordingly, the clauſe concerning the certificate was wiſely left out, as unſuitable to the depraved manners of the preſent times.

Overflowing riches unequally diſtributed, multiply artificial wants beyond all bounds: they eradicate patriotiſm: they foſter luxury, ſenſuality, and ſelfiſhneſs, which are commonly gratified at the expence even of juſtice and honour. The Athenians were early corrupted by opulence; to which every thing was made ſubſervient. "It is an oracle," ſays the chorus in the Agamemnon of Eſchylus, "that is not purchaſed with money." During the infancy of a nation, vice prevails from imbecility in the moral ſenſe: in the decline of a nation, it prevails from the corruption of affluence.

In a ſmall ſtate, there is commonly much virtue at home, and much violence abroad. The Romans were to their neighbours more baneful than famine or peſtilence; but patriotiſm in them occaſioned great integrity at home. An oath when given to fortify an engagement with a fellow-citizen, was more ſacred at Rome than in any other part of the world (*a*). The cenſorian office cannot ſucceed but among a virtuous people; becauſe its rewards and puniſhments have no influence but upon thoſe who are aſhamed of vice *. As ſoon as Aſiatic opulence and luxury prevailed in Rome, ſelfiſhneſs, ſenſuality, and avarice, formed the character of the Romans; and the cenſorian power was at an end. Such relaxation of morals enſued, as to make a law neceſſary prohibiting the cuſtody of an infant to be given to the heir, for fear of murder. And for the ſame reaſon, it was held unlawful to make a covenant *de hereditate viventis*. Theſe regulations prove the

* In the fifteenth century, the French clergy from the pulpit cenſured public tranſactions, and even the conduct of their king, as our Britiſh clergy did in the days of Charles I. and II. They aſſumed the privilege of a Roman cenſor; but they were not men of ſuch authority as to do any good in a corrupted nation.

(*a*) L'Eſprit des loix, liv. 8. ch. 13.

Romans

Romans to have been groſsly corrupt. Our law is different in both articles; becauſe it entertains not the ſame bad opinion of the people whom it governs. Domitius Enobarbus and Appius Pulcher were conſuls of Rome in the 699th year; and Memmius and Calvinus were candidates for ſucceeding them in that office. It was agreed among theſe four worthy gentlemen, that they ſhould mutually aſſiſt each other. The conſuls engaged to promote the election of Memmius and Calvinus: and they, on the other hand, ſubſcribed a bond, obliging themſelves, under a penalty of about L. 3000 Sterling, to procure three augurs, who ſhould atteſt, that they were preſent in the comitia when a law paſſed, inveſting the conſuls with military command in their provinces; and alſo obliging themſelves to produce three perſons of conſular rank, to depoſe, that they were not only preſent in the ſenate, but actually in the number of thoſe who ſigned a decree, conferring on the conſuls the uſual proconſular appointments. And yet the law made in the comitia, and the decree in the ſenate, were pure fictions, never even ſpoken of. Infamous as this tranſaction was, Memmius, to anſwer ſome political purpoſe, was not aſhamed to divulge it to the ſenate. This ſame Memmius, however, continued to be Cicero's correſpondent, and his profeſſed friend. *Proh tempora! proh mores!* But power and riches were at that time ruling paſſions; and the principles of morality were very little regarded.

It is needleſs to diſſemble, that ſelfiſhneſs, ſenſuality, and avarice, muſt in England be the fruits of great opulence, as in every other country; and that morality cannot maintain its authority againſt ſuch undermining antagoniſts. Cuſtomhouſe-oaths have become ſo familiar among us, as to be ſwallowed without a wry face; and is it certain, that bribery and perjury in electing parliament-members, are not approaching to the ſame cool ſtate? In the infancy of morality, a promiſe makes but a ſlight impreſſion: to give it

force, it is commonly accompanied with many ſolemnities (*a*); and in treaties between ſovereigns, even theſe ſolemnities are not relied on without a ſolemn oath. When morality arrives at maturity, the oath is thought unneceſſary; and at preſent, morality is ſo much on the decline, that a ſolemn oath is not more relied on, than a ſimple promiſe was originally. Laws have been made to prevent ſuch immorality, but in vain: becauſe none but patriots have an intereſt to ſupport them; and when patriotiſm is baniſhed by corruption, there is no remaining ſpring in government to make them effectual. The ſtatutes made againſt gaming, and againſt bribery and corruption in elections, have no authority over a degenerate people. Nothing is ſtudied, but how to evade the penalties; and ſuppoſing ſtatutes to be made without end for preventing known evaſions, new evaſions will ſpring up in their ſtead. The miſery is, that ſuch laws, if they prove abortive, are never innocent with regard to conſequences; for nothing is more ſubverſive of morality as well as of patriotiſm, than a habit of diſregarding the laws of our country *.

But

(*a*) See Hiſtorical Law-tracts, tract 2.

* Lying and perjury are not in every caſe equally criminal; at leaſt are not commonly reckoned ſo. Lying or perjury, in order to injure a man, is held highly criminal; and the greater the hurt, the greater the crime. To relieve from puniſhment, few boggle at a lie or at perjury: ſincerity is not even expected; and hence the practice of torture. Many men are not ſcrupulous about oaths, when they have no view but to obtain juſtice to themſelves: the Jacobites, that they might not be deprived of their privileges as Britiſh ſubjects, made no great difficulty to ſwallow oaths to the preſent government, tho' in them it was perjury. It is dangerous to withdraw the ſmalleſt peg in the moral edifice; for the whole will totter and tumble. Men creep on to vice by degrees. Perjury, in order to ſupport a friend, has become cuſtomary of late years; witneſs fictitious qualifications in the electors of parliament-men, which are made effectual by perjury: yet ſuch is the degeneracy of the preſent times, that no man is the worſe thought of upon that

But pride ſometimes happily interpoſes to ſtem the tide of corruption. The poor are not aſhamed to take a bribe from the rich; nor weak ſtates from thoſe that are powerful, diſguiſed only under the name of *ſubſidy* or *penſion*. Both France and England have been in the practice of ſecuring the alliance of ſome foreign princes by penſions; and it is natural in the miniſters of a penſioned prince, to receive a gratification for keeping their maſter to his engagement. England never was at any time ſo inferior to France, as to ſuffer their king to accept a penſion, whatever private tranſactions might be between the kings themſelves. But the miniſters of England thought it no diſparagement, to receive penſions from France. Every miniſter of Edward IV. of England received a penſion from Louis XI.; and they made no difficulty of granting a receipt accordingly. The old Earl of Warwick, ſays Commines, was the only exception: he took the money, but refuſed a receipt. Cardinal Wolſey had a penſion both from the Emperor and from the King of France: and his maſter Henry was vain, that his miniſter was ſo much regarded by the firſt powers in Europe. During the reigns of Charles II. and of his brother James, England made ſo deſpicable a figure, that the miniſters accepted penſions from Louis XIV. A king void of virtue was never well ſerved. King Charles, moſt diſgracefully, accepted a penſion from France: what ſcruple could his miniſters have? Britain, governed by a king eminently virtuous and patriotic, makes at preſent ſo great a figure, that even the loweſt miniſter would diſdain a penſion from any foreign prince. Men formerly were ſo blind as not to ſee, that a penſion creates a bias in a miniſter, againſt his maſter and his country. At preſent,

that account. We muſt not flatter ourſelves that the poiſon will reach no farther: a man who boggles not at perjury to ſerve a friend, will in time become ſuch an adept, as to commit perjury in order to ruin a friend when he becomes an enemy.

men

men are ſo quick-ſighted as clearly to ſee, that a foreign penſion to a miniſter is no better than a bribe; and it would be held ſo by all the world.

In a nation enriched by conqueſt or commerce, where ſelfiſh paſſions always prevail, it is difficult to ſtem the tide of immorality: the decline of virtue may be retarded by wholeſome regulations; but no regulations will ever reſtore it to its meridian vigour. Marcus Aurelius, Emperor of Rome, cauſed ſtatues to be made of all the brave men who figured in the Germanic war. It has long been a practice in China, to honour perſons eminent for virtue, by feaſting them annually at the Emperor's expence. A late Emperor made an improvement: he ordered reports to be ſent him annually, of men and women who when alive had been remarkable for public ſpirit or private virtue, in order that monuments might be erected to their memory. The following report is one of many that were ſent to the Emperor. "According "to the order of your Majeſty, for erecting monuments to the ho- "nour of women, who have been celebrated for continence, for "filial piety, or for purity of manners, the viceroy of Canton re- "ports, that in the town of Sinhoei, a beautiful young woman, "named *Leang*, ſacrificed her life to ſave her chaſtity. In the "fifteenth year of our Emperor Canghi, ſhe was dragg'd by pi- "rates into their ſhip; and having no other way to eſcape their "brutal luſt, ſhe threw herſelf headlong into the ſea. Being of "opinion, that to prefer honour before life is an example worthy "of imitation, we purpoſe, according to your Majeſty's order, to "erect a triumphal arch for that young woman, and to engrave "her ſtory upon a large ſtone, that it may be preſerved in per- "petual remembrance." At the foot of the report is written, *The Emperor approves.* Pity it is, that ſuch regulations ſhould ever prove abortive, for their purpoſe is excellent. But they would need angels to put them in execution. Every deviation from a

juſt

juſt ſelection enervates them; and frequent deviations render them a ſubject of ridicule. But how are deviations to be prevented, when men are the judges? Thoſe who diſtribute the rewards will prefer their friends, and overlook thoſe of greater merit. Like the cenſorian power in Rome, ſuch regulations, after many abuſes, will ſink into contempt.

Two errors, which infeſted morality in dark times, have occaſioned much injuſtice; and I am not certain, that they are yet totally eradicated. The firſt is an opinion, That an action derives its quality of right and wrong from the event, without regard to intention. The other is, That the end juſtifies the means; or, in other words, That means, otherwiſe unlawful, may be lawfully employ'd to bring about a good end. With an account of theſe two errors, I ſhall cloſe the preſent hiſtorical ſketch.

That intention is the circumſtance which qualifies an action, and its author, to be criminal or innocent, is made evident in the firſt part of the preſent ſketch, and is now admitted to be ſo by every moral writer. But rude and barbarous nations ſeldom carry their thoughts beyond what falls under their external ſenſes: they conclude an action to be right that happens to do good, and an action to be wrong that happens to do harm; without ever thinking of motives, of Will, of intention, or of any circumſtance that is not obvious to eye-ſight. From many paſſages in the Old Teſtament it appears, that the external act only, with its conſequences, were regarded. Iſaac, imitating his father Abraham, made his wife Rebecca paſs for his ſiſter. Abimelech, King of the Philiſtines, having diſcovered the impoſture, ſaid to Iſaac, "What is this thou haſt done unto us? One of the people might "lightly have lien with thy wife, and thou ſhouldſt have "brought guiltineſs upon us (*a*)." Jonathan was condemned to die

(*a*) Geneſis, chap. 26.

for

for tranſgreſſing a prohibition he had never heard of (*a*). A ſin of ignorance, *i. e.* an action done without ill intention, required a ſacrifice of expiation (*b*). Saul being defeated by the Philiſtines, fell on his own ſword: the wound not being mortal, he prevailed on a young Amalekite, to pull out the ſword, and to diſpatch him with it. Joſephus (*c*) ſays, that David ordered the criminal to be delivered up to juſtice as a regicide.

The Greeks appear to have wavered greatly about intention, ſometimes holding it eſſential to a crime, and ſometimes diſregarding it as a circumſtance of no moment. Of theſe contradictory opinions we have pregnant evidence in the two tragedies of Oedipus; the firſt taking it for granted, that a crime conſiſts entirely in the external act and its conſequences; the other holding intention to be indiſpenſable. Oedipus had killed his father Laius, and married his mother Jocaſta; but without any criminal intention, being ignorant of his relation to them. And yet hiſtory informs us, that the gods puniſhed the Thebans with peſtilence, for ſuffering a wretch ſo groſsly criminal to live. Sophocles, author of both tragedies, puts the following words in the mouth of Tireſias the prophet.

——— Know then,
That Oedipus, in ſhameful bonds united,
With thoſe he loves, unconſcious of his guilt,
Is yet moſt guilty.

And that doctrine is eſpouſed by Ariſtotle in a later period, who holding Oedipus to have been deeply criminal, tho' without intention, is of opinion, that a more proper ſubject for tragedy ne-

(*a*) 1 Samuel, xiv. 44.

(*b*) Leviticus, chap. 4.

(*c*) Book 3. of Antiquities.

ver

ver was brought upon the ſtage. Nay as a philoſopher he talks currently of an involuntary crime. Oreſtes, in Euripides, acknowledges himſelf to be guilty in killing his mother; yet aſſerts with the ſame breath, that his crime was inevitable, a neceſſary crime, a crime commanded by religion.

In Oedipus Coloneus, the other tragedy mentioned, a very different propoſition is maintained. A defence is made for that unlucky man, agreeable to ſound moral principles, that, having had no bad intention, he was entirely innocent; and that his misfortunes ought to be aſcribed to the wrath of the gods.

Thou who upbraid'ſt me thus for all my woes,
Murder and inceſt, which againſt my will
I had committed; ſo it pleas'd the gods,
Offended at my race for former crimes.
But I am guiltleſs; can'ſt thou name a fault
Deſerving this? For, tell me, was it mine,
When to my father, Phœbus did declare,
That he ſhould one day periſh by the hand
Of his own child; was Oedipus to blame,
Who had no being then? If, born at length
To wretchedneſs, he met his ſire unknown,
And ſlew him, that involuntary deed
Can'ſt thou condemn? And for my fatal marriage,
Doſt thou not bluſh to name it? was not ſhe
Thy ſiſter, ſhe who bore me, ignorant
And guiltleſs woman! afterwards my wife,
And mother to my children? What ſhe did, ſhe did unknowing.
But, not for that, nor for my murder'd father,
Have I deſerv'd thy bitter taunts: for, tell me,
Thy life attack'd, wouldſt thou have ſtaid to aſk

Th' aſſaſſin, if he were thy father? No;
Self-love would urge thee to revenge the inſult.
Thus was I drove to ill by th' angry gods;
This, ſhou'd my father's ſoul reviſit earth,
Himſelf would own, and pity Oedipus.

Again, in the fourth act, the following prayer is put up for Oedipus by the chorus.

——— O grant,
That not oppreſs'd by tort'ring pain
Beneath the ſtroke of death he linger long;
But ſwift, with eaſy ſteps, deſcend to Styx's drear abode;
For he hath led a life of toil and pain;
May the juſt gods repay his undeſerved woe.

The audience was the ſame in both plays. Did they think Oedipus to be guilty in the one play, and innocent in the other? If they did not, how could both plays be reliſhed? if they did, they muſt have been groſsly ſtupid.

The ſtatues of a Roman Emperor were held ſo ſacred, that to treat them with any contempt was high treaſon. This ridiculous opinion was carried ſo far out of common ſenſe, that a man was held guilty of high treaſon, if a ſtone thrown by him happened accidentally to touch one of theſe ſtatues. And the law continued in force till abrogated by a reſcript of Severus Antoninus (*a*).

In England, ſo little was intention regarded, that caſual homicide, and even homicide in ſelf-defence, were capitally puniſhed. It requires ſtrong evidence to vouch ſo abſurd a law; and I have the ſtrongeſt, viz. the act 52° Henry III. cap. 26. converting the capital puniſhment into a forfeiture of moveables. The ſame groſs blunder continued much longer to be law in Scotland. By act 19.

(*a*) l. 5. ad leg. Jul. Majeſt.

part

parl. 1649, renewed act 22. parl. 1661, the capital puniſhment is converted to impriſonment, or a fine to the wife and children. In a period ſo late as the Reſtoration, ſtrange blindneſs it was, not to perceive, that homicide in ſelf-defence, being a lawful act, juſtified by the ſtricteſt rules of morality, ſubjects not a man to puniſhment, more than the defending his property againſt a robber; and that caſual homicide, meaning homicide committed innocently without ill intention, may ſubject him to reparation, but never to any puniſhment, mild or ſevere.

The Jeſuits in their doctrines ſeem to reſt on the external act, diſregarding intention. It is with them a matter of perfect indifference, from what motive men obey the laws of God; and that the ſervice of thoſe who obey from fear of puniſhment, is no leſs acceptable to the Deity, than of thoſe who obey from a principle of love *.

The other error mentioned above, is, That the end juſtifies the means. In defence of that propoſition, it is urged, that the character of the means is derived from the end; that every action muſt be right which contributes to a good end, and that every action muſt be wrong which contributes to an ill end. But thoſe who reaſon thus, ought firſt to conſider, whether reaſoning be at all applicable to the preſent ſubject. Reaſon is the true touchſtone of truth and falſehood; but the moral ſenſe is the only touchſtone of right and wrong; and to maintain, that reaſon is our guide in judging of right and wrong, is no leſs abſurd than to maintain,

* External ſhow made a great figure, when nothing was regarded but what is viſible. By acuteneſs of judgement, and refinement of taſte, the pleaſures of ſociety prevail, and forms and ceremonies are diſregarded. External ſhow, however, continues to ſtand its ground in ſeveral inſtances. It occaſions, in particular, many an ill-ſorted match: a young man is apt to be captivated with beauty or dreſs; a young woman with equipage or a title.

that the moral ſenſe is our guide in judging of truth and falſehood. The moral ſenſe dictates, that on no pretext whatever is it lawful to do an act of injuſtice, or any wrong (*a*): and men, conſcious that the moral ſenſe governs in matters of right and wrong, ſubmit implicitly to its dictates. Influenced however by the reaſoning mentioned, during the nonage of the moral ſenſe, men did wrong currently in order to bring about a good end; witneſs pretended miracles and forged writings, urged without reſerve by every ſect of Chriſtians againſt their antagoniſts. And I am ſorry to obſerve, that the error is not totally eradicated: miſſionaries employ'd in converting infidels to the true faith, are little ſcrupulous about the means: they make no difficulty to feign prodigies in order to convert thoſe who are not moved by argument. Such pious frauds tend to ſap the very foundations of morality.

(*a*) See the firſt part of this ſketch, § 2. at the end.

SKETCH

SKETCH III.

Principles and Progreſs of THEOLOGY.

AS no branch of knowledge can vie with theology, either in dignity or importance, it juſtly claims to be a favourite ſtudy with every perſon endued with true taſte and ſolid judgement. From the time that writing was invented, natural religion has employ'd pens without number; and yet in no language is there found a complete hiſtory of it. That taſk is far above my abilities: I propoſe only a ſlight ſketch; which I ſhall glory in, however imperfect, if it excite any one of ſuperior talents to undertake a taſk ſo arduous.

CHAP. I.

Exiſtence of a DEITY.

THat there are beings, one or many, powerful above men, has been generally believed among the various tribes of men: I may ſay univerſally believed, notwithſtanding what is reported of ſome groſs ſavages; for reports repugnant to the common nature of man, require more able vouchers than a few illiterate voyagers. Among many ſavage tribes, there are no words but

but for objects of external ſenſe: is it ſurpriſing, that ſuch people are incapable to expreſs their religious perceptions, or any perception of internal ſenſe? and from their ſilence can it be fairly preſumed, that they have no ſuch perception *? The belief of ſuperior powers, in every country where there are words to expreſs it, is ſo well vouched, that in fair reaſoning it ought to be taken for granted among the few tribes where language is deficient. Even the groſſeſt idolatry affords to me evidence of that belief. No nation can be ſo brutiſh as to worſhip a ſtock or a ſtone, merely as ſuch. The viſible object is always imagined to be connected with ſome inviſible power; and the worſhip paid to the former, is as repreſenting the latter, or as in ſome manner connected with it. Every family among the ancient Lithuanians, entertained a real ſerpent as a houſehold god; and the ſame practice is at preſent univerſal, among the negroes in the kingdom of Whidah: it is not the ſerpent that is worſhipped, but ſome deity imagined to reſide in it. The ancient Egyptians were not idiots, to pay divine honours to a bull or a cat, as ſuch: the divine honours were paid to a deity, as reſiding in theſe animals. The ſun is to man a familiar object: as it is frequently obſcured by clouds, and totally eclipſed during night, a ſavage readily conceives it to be a great fire, ſometimes flaming bright, ſometimes obſcured, and ſometimes extinguiſhed. Whence then ſun-worſhip, once univerſal among ſavages? Plainly from the ſame cauſe: it is not properly the ſun that is worſhipped, but a deity who is ſuppoſed to dwell in that luminary.

* In the language even of Peru, there is not a word for expreſſing an abſtract idea, ſuch as *time, endurance, ſpace, exiſtence, ſubſtance, matter, body*. It is no leſs defective in expreſſing moral ideas, ſuch as *virtue, juſtice, gratitude, liberty*. The Yameos, a tribe on the river Oroonoko, deſcribed by Condamine, uſe the word *poettarraroincouroac* to expreſs the number three, and have no word for a greater number. The Braſilian language is nearly as barren.

Taking

Taking it then for granted, that our belief of ſuperior powers has been long univerſal, the important queſtion is, From what cauſe it proceeds. A belief ſo univerſal, and ſo permanent, cannot proceed from chance, but muſt have a cauſe operating conſtantly and invariably upon all men in all ages. Philoſophers, who believe the world to be eternal and ſelf-exiſtent, and imagine it to be the only deity, tho' without intelligence, endeavour to account for our belief of ſuperior powers, from the terror that thunder and other elementary convulſions raiſe in ſavages; and thence conclude that ſuch belief is no evidence of a deity. Thus Lucretius,

> Præterea, cui non animus formidine divum
> Contrahitur? cui non conripunt membra pavore,
> Fulminis horribili cum plaga torrida tellus
> Contremit, et magnum percurrunt murmura cœlum * (a)?

And Petronius Arbiter,

> Primus in orbe deos fecit timor: arduа cœlo
> Fulmina quum caderent diſcuſſaque mœnia flammis,
> Atque ictus flagraret Athos †.

Man, during infancy a defenceleſs animal, is endued on that ac-

* What man can boaſt, that firm undaunted ſoul,
That hears, unmov'd, when thunder ſhakes the pole;
Nor ſhrinks with fear of an offended pow'r,
When lightnings flaſh, and ſtorms and tempeſts roar?

† When dread convulſions rock'd the lab'ring earth,
And livid clouds firſt gave the thunder birth,
Inſtinctive fear within the human breaſt
The firſt ideas of a God impreſs'd.

(a) Lib. 5.

count

count with a large portion of fear. Savages, groſsly ignorant of cauſes and effects, take fright at every unuſual appearance, and recur to ſome malignant power as the cauſe. Now, if the authors quoted mean only, that the firſt perception of deity among ſavages is occaſioned by fear, I heartily ſubſcribe to their opinion. But if it was their meaning, that ſuch perceptions proceed from fear ſolely, without having any other cauſe, I wiſh to be informed, from what ſource is derived the belief we have of ſuperior benevolent beings. Fear cannot be the ſource: and it will be ſeen anon, that tho' malevolent deities were firſt recogniſed among ſavages; yet that in the progreſs of ſociety, the exiſtence of benevolent deities was univerſally believed. The fact is certain; and therefore fear is not the ſole cauſe of our believing the exiſtence of ſuperior beings.

It is beſide to me evident, that the belief even of malevolent deities, once univerſal among all the tribes of men, cannot be accounted for from fear ſolely. I obſerve, firſt, That there are many men, to whom an eclipſe, an earthquake, and even thunder, are unknown: Egypt in particular, tho' the country of ſuperſtition, is little or not at all acquainted with the two latter. Nor do ſuch appearances ſtrike terror into every one who is acquainted with them. The univerſality of the belief, muſt then have ſome cauſe more univerſal than fear. I obſerve next, That if the belief were founded ſolely on fear, it would die away gradually as men improve in the knowledge of cauſes and effects. Inſtruct a ſavage, that thunder, an eclipſe, an earthquake, proceed from natural cauſes, and are not threatenings of an incenſed deity; his fear of malevolent beings will vaniſh; and with it his belief in them, if founded ſolely on fear. Yet the direct contrary is true: in proportion as the human underſtanding ripens, our belief of ſuperior powers, or of a Deity, turns more and more firm and authoritative;

tive; which will be made evident in the chapter immediately following.

Philoſophers of more enlarged views, and of deeper penetration, may poſſibly think, that the operations of nature, and the government of this world, which loudly proclaim a Deity, may be ſufficient to open the eyes of the groſſeſt ſavages, and to convince them that there is a Deity. And to give due weight to the argument, I ſhall relate a converſation between a Greenlander and a Daniſh miſſionary, mentioned by Crantz in his hiſtory of Greenland. "It is true," ſays the Greenlander, "we were ignorant "Heathens, and knew little of a God, till you came. But you "muſt not imagine, that no Greenlander thinks about theſe "things. A kajak (*a*), with all its tackle and implements, can-"not exiſt but by the labour of man; and one who does not un-"derſtand it, would ſpoil it. But the meaneſt bird requires "more ſkill than the beſt kajak; and no man can make a bird. "There is ſtill more ſkill required to make a man: by whom "then was he made? He proceeded from his parents, and they "from their parents. But ſome muſt have been the firſt pa-"rents: whence did they proceed? Common report ſays, that "they grew out of the earth: if ſo, why do not men ſtill grow "out of the earth? And from whence came the earth itſelf, the "ſun, the moon, the ſtars? Certainly there muſt be ſome be-"ing who made all theſe things, a being more wiſe than the "wiſeſt man." The reaſoning here from effects to their cauſes, is ſtated with great preciſion; and were all men equally penetrating with the Greenlander, ſuch reaſoning might perhaps be ſufficient to account for the belief of Deity, univerſally ſpred among all ſavages. But ſuch penetration is a rare quality among ſava-

(*a*) A Greenland boat.

ges; and yet the belief of ſuperior powers is univerſal, not excepting even the groſſeſt ſavages, who are altogether incapable of reaſoning like our Greenland philoſopher. Natural hiſtory has made ſo rapid a progreſs of late years, and the finger of God is ſo viſible to us in the various operations of nature, that we do not readily conceive how even ſavages can be ignorant: but it is a common fallacy in reaſoning, to judge of others by what we feel in ourſelves. And to give juſter notions of the condition of ſavages, I take liberty to introduce the Wogultzoi, a people in Siberia, as exhibiting a ſtriking picture of ſavages in their natural ſtate. That people were baptized at the command of Prince Gagarin, governor of the province; and Laurent Lange, in his relation of a journey from Peterſburg to Pekin ann. 1715, gives the following account of their converſion. "I had curioſity," ſays he, "to queſtion them about their worſhip before they embraced "Chriſtianity. They ſaid, that they had an idol hung upon a "tree, before which they proſtrated themſelves, raiſing their eyes "to heaven, and howling with a loud voice. They could not ex- "plain what they meant by howling; but only, that every man "howled in his own faſhion. Being interrogated, Whether, in "raiſing their eyes to heaven, they knew that a god is there, "who ſees all the actions, and even the thoughts of men; they "anſwered ſimply, That heaven is too far above them to know "whether a god be there or not; and that they had no care but "to provide meat and drink. Another queſtion was put, Whe- "ther they had not more ſatisfaction in worſhipping the living "God, than they formerly had in the darkneſs of idolatry; they "anſwered, We ſee no great difference; and we do not break "our heads about ſuch matters." Judge how little capable ſuch ignorant ſavages are, to reaſon from effects to their cauſes, and to trace a Deity from the operations of nature. And it may be added with great certainty, that could they be made in any degree

gree to conceive ſuch reaſoning, yet ſo weak and obſcure would their conviction be, as to reſt there without moving them to any ſort of worſhip; which however among ſavages goes hand in hand with the belief of ſuperior powers.

To ſum up this argument: As fear is a cauſe altogether inſufficient for the belief of Deity, univerſal among all tribes; and as reaſoning from effects to their cauſes can have no influence upon ignorant ſavages; what cauſe remains but nature itſelf? To make this belief univerſal, the image of the Deity muſt be ſtamp'd upon the mind of every human being, the ignorant equally with the knowing: nothing leſs is ſufficient. And the perception we have of Deity muſt proceed from an internal cauſe, which may be termed the *ſenſe of Deity*.

Included in the ſenſe of Deity, is the duty we are under to worſhip him. And to enforce that duty, the principle of devotion is made a part of our nature. All men accordingly agree in worſhipping ſuperior beings, however they may differ in the mode of worſhip. And the univerſality of ſuch worſhip, proves devotion to be an innate principle.

The perception we have of being accountable beings, ariſes from another branch of the ſenſe of Deity. We expect approbation from the Deity when we do right; and dread puniſhment from him when guilty of any crime; not excepting the moſt occult crimes, hid from every mortal eye. From what cauſe can dread proceed in that caſe, but from belief of a ſuperior being, avenger of wrongs? That dread, when immoderate, diſorders the mind, and makes every unuſual misfortune paſs for a puniſhment inflicted by an inviſible hand. "And they ſaid one to another, We are verily guilty concerning our brother, in that we "ſaw the anguiſh of his ſoul, when he beſought us, and we "would not hear: therefore is this diſtreſs come upon us. And "Reuben anſwered them, ſaying, Spake I not unto you, ſaying,

" Do not ſin againſt the child; and ye would not hear? there-
" fore behold alſo his blood is required (*a*)." Alphonſus King of Naples, was a cruel and tyrannical prince. He drove his people to deſpair with oppreſſive taxes, treacherouſly aſſaſſinated ſeveral of his barons, and loaded others with chains. During proſperity, his conſcience gave him little diſquiet; but in adverſity, his crimes ſtar'd him in the face, and made him believe that his diſtreſſes proceeded from the hand of God, as a juſt puniſhment. He was terrified to diſtraction, when Charles VIII. of France approached with a numerous army: he deſerted his kingdom; and fled to hide himſelf from the face of God and man.

But admitting a ſenſe of Deity, is it evidence to us that a Deity actually exiſts? The anſwer is, That it is complete evidence. So framed is man as to rely on the evidence of his ſenſes (*b*); which evidence it is not in his power to reject, were he even diſpoſed to be a ſceptic. And experience confirms our belief; for our ſenſes, when in order, never deceive us.

The foregoing ſenſe of Deity is not the only evidence we have of his exiſtence: there is additional evidence from other branches of our nature. Inherent in the nature of man are two paſſions, devotion, of which the Deity is the immediate and only object; and dread of puniſhment, when one is guilty of any crime. Theſe paſſions would be idle and abſurd, were there no Deity to be worſhipped or to be dreaded: they would be illuſory paſſions, having no object: they would be the ſingle inſtance of ſuch irregularity; and groſsly irregular it would be, to be endued with paſſions or principles contrived for no end or purpoſe. Man makes a capital figure; and is the moſt perfect being that inhabits this earth: how then is it poſſible to believe, that he ſhould be endued with paſſions

(*a*) Geneſis xlii. 21. 22.

(*b*) See Eſſays on Morality and Natural Religion, part 2. ſect. 3.

contradictory

contradictory to the regular and beautiful laws which govern all other things here? It is not credible. The paſſions mentioned, both of them, direct us to a Deity, and afford us irreſiſtible evidence of his exiſtence.

Thus our Maker leaves no work of his imperfect: he has revealed himſelf to us, in a way perfectly analagous to our nature: in the mind of every human creature, he has lighted up a lamp, which renders him viſible even to the weakeſt ſight. Nor ought it to eſcape obſervation, that here, as in every other caſe, the conduct of Providence to man, is uniform. It leaves him to be directed by reaſon, where liberty of choice is permitted: but in matters of duty, he is provided with guides leſs fallible than reaſon: in performing his duty to man, he is guided by the moral ſenſe; in performing his duty to God, he is guided by the ſenſe of Deity. In theſe mirrors, he perceives his duty intuitively.

It is no ſlight ſupport to this doctrine, that if there really be a Deity, it is highly preſumable, that he will reveal himſelf to man, fitted by nature to adore and worſhip him. To other animals, the knowledge of a Deity is of no importance: to man, it is of high importance. Were we totally ignorant of a Deity, this world would appear to us a mere chaos: under the government of a wiſe and benevolent Deity, chance is excluded; and every event, the reſult of eſtabliſhed laws, is perceived to be the beſt on the whole. Good men ſubmit to whatever happens, without repining, truſting that every event is ordered by divine Providence: they ſubmit with entire reſignation; and ſuch reſignation is a ſovereign balſam to every misfortune.

The ſenſe of Deity reſembles our other ſenſes, which lie dormant till a proper object preſent itſelf. When all is ſilent about us, the ſenſe of hearing is dormant; and if from infancy a man were confined to a dark room, he would be as ignorant of the

ſenſe

ſenſe of ſeeing, as one born blind. Among ſavages, the objects that rouſe the ſenſe of Deity, are uncommon events above the power of man; an earthquake, for example, a hurricane, a total eclipſe of the ſun, a ſudden ſwell of a river that prevents their eſcape from an impending enemy. A ſavage, if he be acquainted with no events but what are familiar, has no perception of ſuperior powers; but thunder rattling in his ears, or the convulſion of an earthquake, rouſes in him the ſenſe of Deity, and directs him to ſome ſuperior being as the cauſe of theſe dreadful effects. The ſavage, it is true, errs in aſcribing to the immediate operation of a Deity, things that have a natural cauſe: his error however is evidence that he has a ſenſe of Deity, no leſs pregnant, than when he more juſtly attributes to the immediate operation of Deity, the formation of man, of this earth, of all the world.

The ſenſe of Deity, like the moral ſenſe, makes no capital figure among ſavages; the perceptions of both ſenſes being in them faint and obſcure. But in the progreſs of nations to maturity, theſe ſenſes turn more and more vigorous, ſo as among enlightened nations to acquire a commanding influence; leaving no doubt about right and wrong, and as little about the exiſtence of a Deity.

The obſcurity of the ſenſe of Deity among ſavages, has encouraged ſome ſceptical philoſophers to deny its exiſtence. It has been urged, That God does nothing by halves; and that if he intended to make himſelf known to man, the ſenſe of Deity would produce equal conviction with that of ſeeing or hearing. When we argue thus about the purpoſes of the Almighty, we tread on ſlippery ground, where we ſeldom fail to ſtumble. What if it be the purpoſe of the Deity, to afford us but an obſcure glimpſe of his being and attributes? We have reaſon from analogy to conjecture, that this may be the caſe. From ſome particulars mentioned

mentioned above (*a*), it appears at leaſt probable, that entire ſubmiſſion to the moral ſenſe, would be ill-ſuited to man in his preſent ſtate; and would prove more hurtful than beneficial. And to me it appears evident, that to be conſcious of the preſence of the Great God, as I am of a friend whom I hold by the hand, would be inconſiſtent with the part that Providence has deſtined me to act in this life. Reflect only on the reſtraint one is under, in preſence of a ſuperior, ſuppoſe the King himſelf: how much greater our reſtraint with the ſame lively impreſſion of God's awful preſence! Humility and veneration would leave no room for other paſſions: man would be no longer man; and the ſyſtem of our preſent ſtate would be totally ſubverted. Take another inſtance: Such a conviction of future rewards and puniſhments as to overcome every inordinate deſire, would reduce us to the condition of a traveller in a paltry inn, having no wiſh but for day-light to proſecute his journey. For that very reaſon, it appears agreeable to the plan of Providence, that we ſhould have but an obſcure glimpſe of futurity. As the ſame plan of Providence is viſible in all, I conclude with aſſurance, that a certain degree of obſcurity, weighs nothing againſt the ſenſe of Deity, more than againſt the moral ſenſe, or againſt a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments. Whether all men might not have been made angels, and whether more happineſs might not have reſulted from a different ſyſtem, lie far beyond the reach of human knowledge. From what is known of the conduct of Providence, we have reaſon to preſume, that our preſent ſtate is the reſult of wiſdom and benevolence. So much we know with certainty, that the ſenſe we have of Deity and of moral duty, correſpond accurately to the nature of man as an imperfect being; and that theſe ſenſes, were they abſolutely perfect, would unhinge his nature, and convert him into a very different being.

(*a*) Book 2. ſketch 1.

A theory eſpouſed by ſeveral writers ancient and modern, muſt not be overlooked; becauſe it pretends to compoſe the world without a Deity; which would reduce the ſenſe of Deity to be deluſive, if it have any exiſtence. The theory is, That the world, compoſed of animals, vegetables, and brute matter, is ſelf-exiſtent and eternal; and that all events happen by a neceſſary chain of cauſes and effects. In this theory, tho' wiſdom and benevolence are conſpicuous in every part, yet the great work of planning and executing the whole, is underſtood to have been done blindly without intelligence or contrivance. It is ſcarce neceſſary to remark, that this theory, aſſumed at pleaſure, is highly improbable, if not abſurd; and yet that it is left naked to the world without the leaſt cover or ſupport. But what I chiefly inſiſt on is, that the endleſs number of wiſe and benevolent effects, diſplay'd every where on the face of this globe, afford to us complete evidence of a wiſe and benevolent cauſe; and as theſe effects are far above the power of man, we neceſſarily aſcribe them to ſome ſuperior being, or in other words to the Deity (*a*). And this is ſufficient to remove the preſent objection againſt the exiſtence of a ſenſe of Deity. But I am not ſatisfied with this partial victory. I proceed to obſerve, that nothing more is required but the proof of a Deity, to overturn the ſuppoſition of ſelf-exiſtence in a world compoſed of many heterogeneous parts, and of a chain of cauſes and effects framed without intelligence or foreſight, tho' full of wiſdom and contrivance in every part. For if a Deity exiſt, wiſe and powerful above all other beings, ſelf-exiſtence ought to be his peculiar attribute; and no perſon of rationality will have any heſitation in rejecting the ſelf-exiſtence of ſuch a world, when ſo natural a ſuppoſition lies in view, as that the whole is the operation of the truly ſelf-exiſtent being,

(*a*) Firſt ſketch of this third book, ſect. 1.

whoſe

whoſe power and wiſdom are fully adequate to that arduous taſk.

Many groſs and abſurd conceptions of Deity that have prevailed among rude nations, are urged by ſome writers as another objection againſt a ſenſe of Deity. That objection ſhall not be overlooked; but it will be anſwered to better purpoſe, after theſe groſs and abſurd conceptions are examined; which ſhall be done in the chapter immediately following.

The proof of a Deity from the innate ſenſe here explained, differs materially from what is contained in eſſays on morality and natural religion (*a*). The proof there given is founded on a chain of reaſoning, altogether independent on the innate ſenſe of Deity. Both equally produce conviction; but as a ſenſe operates intuitively without reaſoning, the ſenſe of Deity is made a branch of human nature, in order to enlighten thoſe who are incapable of a long chain of reaſoning; and to ſuch, who make the bulk of mankind, it is more convincing, than the moſt perſpicuous reaſoning to a philoſopher.

CHAP. II.

Progreſs of Opinions with reſpect to DEITY.

THE ſenſe of Deity, like many other delicate ſenſes, is in ſavages ſo faint and obſcure as eaſily to be biaſſed from truth. Among them, the belief of many ſuperior beings, is univerſal. And two cauſes join to produce that belief. The firſt is, that be-

(*a*) Part 2. ſect. 7.

ingaccuſtomed to a plurality of viſible objects, men, mountains, trees, cattle, and ſuch like, they are naturally led to imagine the ſame plurality in things not viſible; and from that ſlight bias, ſlight indeed but natural, is partly derived the ſyſtem of Polytheiſm, univerſal among ſavages. The other is, that ſavages know little of the connection between cauſes and effects, and ſtill leſs of the order and government of this world: every event that is not familiar, appears to them ſingular and extraordinary; and if ſuch event exceed human power, it is without heſitation aſcribed to a ſuperior being. But as it occurs not to a ſavage, nor to any perſon who is not a philoſopher, that the many various events exceeding human power and ſeemingly unconnected, may all proceed from the ſame cauſe; they are readily aſcribed to different beings. Pliny aſcribes Polytheiſm to another cauſe, viz. the conſciouſneſs men have of their imbecility: "Our powers are confined within narrow bounds: we do not readily conceive powers in the Deity much more extenſive; and we ſupply by number what is wanting in power." Polytheiſm, thus founded, is the firſt ſtage in the progreſs of theology; for it is embraced by the rudeſt ſavages, who have neither capacity nor inclination to pierce deeper into the nature of things.

The next ſtage is diſtinguiſhable from others, by a belief that all ſuperior beings are malevolent. Man, by nature weak and helpleſs, is prone to fear, dreading every new object and every unuſual event. Savages, having no protection againſt ſtorms, tempeſts, or other external accidents, and having no pleaſures but in gratifying hunger, thirſt, and animal love, have much to fear, and little to hope. In that diſconſolate condition, they attribute the bulk of their diſtreſſes to inviſible beings, who in their opinion muſt be malevolent. This ſeems to have been the opinion of the Greeks in the days of Solon; as appears in a converſation between him and Crœſus King of Lydia, mentioned by Herodotus

Herodotus in the firſt book of his hiſtory. "Crœſus, ſaid So-"lon, you aſk me about human affairs; and I anſwer as one "who thinks that all the gods are envious, and diſturbers of "mankind." The negroes on the coaſt of Guinea, dread their deities as tyrants and oppreſſors: having no conception of a good deity, they attribute the few bleſſings they receive, to the ſoil, to the rivers, to the trees, and to the plants. The Lithuanians continued Pagans down to the fourteenth century; and worſhipped in gloomy woods, where their deities were held to reſide. Their worſhip probably was prompted by fear, which is allied to gloomineſs or darkneſs. The people of Kamſkatka acknowledge to this day many malevolent deities, having little or no notion of a good deity. They believe the air, the water, the mountains, and the woods, to be inhabited by malevolent ſpirits, whom they fear and worſhip. The ſavages of Guiana aſcribe to the devil even their moſt common diſeaſes; nor do they ever think of another remedy, but to apply to a ſorcerer to drive him away. Such negroes as believe in the devil, paint his images white.

Conviction of ſuperior beings, who, like men, are of a mixed nature, ſometimes doing good, ſometimes miſchief, conſtitutes the third ſtage. This came to be the ſyſtem of theology in Greece. The introduction of writing among the Greeks, while they were little better than ſavages, produced a compound of character and manners, that has not a parallel in any other nation. They were acute in ſcience, ſkilful in fine arts, extremely deficient in morals, groſs beyond conception in theology, and ſuperſtitious to a degree of folly; a ſtrange jumble of exquiſite ſenſe and abſurd nonſenſe. They held their gods to reſemble men in their external figure, and to be corporeal. In the 21ſt book of the Iliad, Minerva with a huge ſtone beats Mars to the ground, whoſe monſtrous body covered ſeven broad acres. As corporeal beings, they were ſuppoſed

to require the nouriſhment of meat, drink, and ſleep. Homer mentions more than once the inviting of gods to a feaſt: and Pauſanias reports, that in the temple of Bacchus at Athens, there were figures of clay, repreſenting a feaſt given by Amphyction to Bacchus and other deities. The inhabitants of the iſland Java are not ſo groſs in their conceptions, as to think that the gods eat the offerings preſented to them: but it is their opinion, that a deity brings his mouth near the offering, ſucks out all its ſavour, and leaves it taſteleſs like water *. The Grecian gods, as deſcribed by Homer, dreſs, bathe, and anoint, like mortals. Venus, after being detected by her huſband in the embraces of Mars, retires to Paphos,

> Where to the pow'r an hundred altars riſe,
> And breathing odours ſcent the balmy ſkies:
> Conceal'd ſhe bathes in conſecrated bow'rs,
> The Graces unguents ſhed, ambroſial ſhow'rs,
> Unguents that charm the gods! She laſt aſſumes
> Her wondrous robes; and full the goddeſs blooms.
>
> ODYSSEY, *book* 8.

Juno's dreſs is moſt poetically deſcribed, Iliad, book 14. It was alſo univerſally believed, that the gods were fond of women, and had many children by them. The ancient Germans thought more ſenſibly, that the gods were too high to reſemble men in any degree, or to be confined within the walls of a temple. Led by the ſame impreſſions of deity, the Greeks ſeem to have thought, that the gods did not much exceed themſelves in knowledge. When Ageſilaus journeyed with his private retinue, he uſually lodged in

* All Greek writers, and thoſe in their neighbourhood, form the world out of a chaos. They had no ſuch exalted notion of a deity as to believe, that he could make the world out of nothing.

a temple; making the gods witneſſes, ſays Plutarch, of his moſt ſecret actions. The Greeks thought, that a god, like a man, might know what paſſed within his own houſe; without knowing any thing paſſing at a greater diſtance. Agamemnon, in Eſchylus, putting off his travelling habit, and dreſſing himſelf in ſplendid purple, is afraid of being ſeen and envied by ſome jealous god. We learn from Seneca, that people ſtrove for the ſeat next to the image of the deity, that their prayers might be the better heard. But what we have chiefly to remark upon this head, is, that the Grecian gods were, like men, held capable of doing both good and ill. Jupiter, their higheſt deity, was a raviſher of women, and a notorious adulterer. In the ſecond book of the Iliad, he ſends a lying dream to deceive Agamemnon. Mars ſeduces Venus by bribes to commit adultery (*a*). In the Rheſus of Euripides, Minerva, diſguiſed like Venus, deceives Paris by a groſs lie. The ground-work of the tragedy of Xuthus is a lying oracle, declaring Ion, ſon of Apollo and Creuſa, to be the ſon of Xuthus. Oreſtes in Euripides, having ſlain his mother Clytemneſtra, excuſes himſelf as having been miſled by Apollo to commit the crime. "Ah!" ſays he, "had I conſulted the ghoſt of my fa-"ther, he would have diſſuaded me from a crime that has proved "my ruin, without doing him any good." He concludes with obſerving, that having acted by Apollo's command, Apollo is the only criminal. In a tragedy of Sophocles, Minerva makes no difficulty to cheat Ajax, by promiſing to be his friend, while underhand ſhe is ſerving Ulyſſes, his bitter enemy. Mercury, in revenge for the murder of his ſon Myrtilus, entails curſes on Pelops the murderer, and on all his race *. In general, the gods, every

(*b*) Odyſſey, book 8.

* The Engliſh tranſlator of that tragedy, obſerves it to be remarkable in the Grecian creed, that the gods puniſh the crimes of men upon their innocent poſterity.

where

where in Greek tragedies, are partial, unjuſt, tyrannical, and revengeful. The Greeks accordingly have no reſerve in maltreating their gods. In the tragedy of Prometheus, Jupiter, without the leaſt ceremony, is accuſed of being an uſurper. Eſchylus proclaims publicly on the ſtage, that Jupiter, a jealous, cruel, and implacable tyrant, had overturned every thing in heaven; and that the other gods were reduced to be his ſlaves. In the Iliad, book 13. Menelaus addreſſes Jupiter in the following words: "O father Jove! in wiſdom, they ſay, thou excelleſt both men and "gods. Yet all theſe ills proceed from thee; for the wicked thou "doſt aid in war. Thou art a friend to the Trojans, whoſe ſouls de-"light in force, who are never glutted with blood." The gods were often treated with a ſort of contemptuous familiarity, and employed in very low offices. Nothing is more common, than to introduce them as actors in Greek tragedies; frequently for trivial purpoſes: Apollo comes upon the ſtage moſt courteouſly to acquaint the audience with the ſubject of the play. Why is this not urged by our critics, as claſſical authority againſt the rule of Horace, *Nec deus interſit niſi dignus vindice nodus* *. Homer makes very uſeful ſervants of his gods. Minerva, in particular, is a faithful attendant upon Ulyſſes. She acts the herald, and calls the chiefs to council (*a*). She marks the place where a great ſtone fell that was thrown by Ulyſſes (*b*). She aſſiſts Ulyſſes to hide his treaſure in a cave (*c*), and helps him to wreſtle with the beggar (*d*). Ulyſſes being toſt with cares in bed, ſhe deſcends

* Nor let a god in perſon ſtand diſplay'd,
Unleſs the labouring plot deſerve his aid.
FRANCIS.

(*a*) Odyſſey, book 8.

(*b*) Book 8.

(*c*) Book 13.

(*d*) Book 18.

from

from heaven to make him fall asleep (*a*). This last might possibly be squeez'd into an allegory, if Minerva were not frequently introduced where there is no place for an allegory. Jupiter, book 17. of the Iliad, is introduced comforting the steeds of Achilles for the death of Patroclus. It appears from Cicero (*b*), that when Greek philosophers began to reason about the deity, their notions were wonderfully crude. One of the hardest morsels to digest in Plato's philosophy, was his doctrine, That God is incorporeal; which by many was thought absurd, for that, without a body, he could not have senses, nor prudence, nor pleasure. The religious creed of the Romans seems to have been little less impure than that of the Greeks. It was a ceremony of theirs, in besieging a town, to evocate the tutelar deity, and to tempt him by a reward to betray his friends and votaries. In that ceremony, the name of the tutelar deity was thought of importance; and for that reason, the tutelar deity of Rome was a profound secret *. Appian of

(*a*) Odyssey, book 20.

(*b*) Lib. 1. De natura deorum.

* The form of the *evocatio* follows. "Tuo ductu, inquit, Pythie Apollo, "tuoque numine instinctus, pergo ad delendam urbem Veios: tibique hinc decimam partem prædæ voveo. Te simul, Juno Regina, quæ nunc Veios colis, precor, ut nos victores in nostram tuamque mox futuram urbem sequare: ubi te, "dignum amplitudine tua, templum accipiat." *Titus Livius, lib. 5. cap. 21.* — [*In English thus:* "Under thy guidance and divine inspiration, O Pythian Apollo, I "march to the destruction of *Veii*; and to thy shrine I devote a tenth of the plunder. Imperial Juno, guardian of Veii, deign to prosper our victorious arms, "and a temple shall be erected to thy honour, suitable to the greatness and "majesty of thy name."] —— But it appears from Macrobius, that they used a form of evocation even when the name of the tutelar deity was unknown to them. "Si deus, si dea est, cui populus civitasque Carthaginiensis est in tutela, teque "maxime ille qui urbis hujus populique tutelam recipisti, precor, venerorque, veniamque a vobis peto, ut vos populum civitatemque Carthaginiensem deseratis, "loca, templa, sacra, urbemque eorum relinquiatis, absque his abeatis, eique po-

"pulo,

of Alexandria in his book of the Parthian war, reports, that Anthony, reduced to extremity by the Parthians, lifted up his eyes to heaven, and beſought the gods, that if any of them were jealous of his former happineſs, they would pour their vengeance upon his head alone, and ſuffer his army to eſcape. The ſtory of Paris and the three goddeſſes gives no favourable impreſſion, either of the morals or religion of the Romans. Juno and her two ſiſter-deities ſubmit their diſpute about beauty to the ſhepherd Paris, who conſcientiouſly pronounces in favour of Venus. But

———*manet alta mente repoſtum*
Judicium Paridis, ſpretæque injuria formæ.

Juno, not ſatisfied with wreaking her malice againſt the honeſt ſhepherd, declares war againſt his whole nation. Not even Eneas, tho' a fugitive in foreign lands, eſcapes her fury. Their great god Jupiter is introduced on the ſtage by Plautus, to deceive Alcmena, and to lie with her in the ſhape of her huſband. Nay, it was the opinion of the Romans, that this play made much for the honour of Jupiter; for in times of national troubles and calamaties, it was commonly acted to appeaſe his anger;—a moſt

" pulo, civitatique metum, formidinem, oblivionem injiciatis, proditique Romam " ad me meoſque veneatis, noſtraque vobis loca, templa, ſacra, urbs, acceptior " probatiorque ſit, mihique populoque Romano militibuſque meis præpoſiti ſitis, " ut ſciamus intelligamuſque. Si ita feceritis, voveo vobis templa ludoſque factu- " rum." *Saturnal. lib.* 3. *cap.* 9.—[*In Engliſh thus:* " That divinity, whether " god or goddeſs, who is the guardian of the ſtate of Carthage, that divinity I in- " voke, I pray and ſupplicate, that he will deſert that perfidious people. Honour " not with thy preſence their temples, their ceremonies, nor their city, abandon " them to all their fears, leave them to infamy and oblivion. Fly hence to Rome, " where, in my country, and among my fellow-citizens, thou ſhalt have nobler " temples, and more acceptable ſacrifices; thou ſhalt be the tutelar deity of this " army, and of the Roman ſtate. On this condition, I here vow to erect temples " and inſtitute games to thine honour."]

pregnant

pregnant inſtance of the groſs conceptions of that warlike people in morality, as well as in religion.

A diviſion of inviſible beings into benevolent and malevolent, without any mixture of theſe qualities, makes the fourth ſtage. The talents and feelings of men, refine gradually under good government: ſocial amuſements begin to make a figure: benevolence is highly regarded; and ſome men are found without gall. Having thus acquired a notion of pure benevolence, and finding it exemplified in ſome perſons, it was an eaſy ſtep in the progreſs of theological opinions, to beſtow the ſame character upon ſome ſuperior beings. This led men to diſtinguiſh their gods into two kinds, eſſentially different; one entirely benevolent, another entirely malevolent; and the difference between good and ill, which are diametrically oppoſite, favoured that diſtinction. Fortunate events out of the common courſe of nature, were accordingly aſcribed to benevolent deities; and unfortunate events of that kind, to malevolent. In the time of Pliny the elder, malevolent deities were worſhipped at Rome. He mentions a temple dedicated to *Bad Fortune*, another to the diſeaſe termed a *Fever*. The Lacedemonians worſhipped *Death* and *Fear*; and the people of Cadiz *Poverty* and *Old Age*; in order to deprecate their wrath. Such gods were by the Romans termed *Averrunci*, as putting away evil.

Conviction of one ſupreme benevolent Deity, and of inferior deities, ſome benevolent, ſome malevolent, is the fifth ſtage. Such conviction, which gains ground in proportion as morality ripens, ariſes from a remarkable difference between gratitude and fear. Willing to ſhow my gratitude for ſome kindneſs proceeding from an unknown hand, ſeveral perſons occur to my conjectures; but I always fix at laſt upon one perſon as the moſt likely. Fear is of an oppoſite nature: it expands itſelf upon every ſuſpicious perſon, and blackens them all equally. Thus, upon providential good fortune above the power of man, we naturally

turally reſt upon one benevolent Deity as the cauſe; and to him we confine our gratitude and veneration. When, on the other hand, we are ſtruck with an uncommon calamity, every thing that poſſibly may be the cauſe, raiſes terror in us. Hence the propenſity in ſavages to multiply objects of fear; but to confine their gratitude and veneration to a ſingle object. Gratitude and veneration, at the ſame time, are of ſuch a nature, as to raiſe a high opinion of the perſon who is their object; and when a ſingle inviſible being is underſtood to pour out bleſſings with a liberal hand, good men, inflamed with gratitude, put no bounds to the power and benevolence of that being. And thus one ſupreme benevolent Deity comes to be recogniſed among the more enlightened ſavages. With reſpect to malevolent deities, as they are ſuppoſed to be numerous, and as there is no natural impulſe for elevating one above another, they are all of them held to be of an inferior rank, ſubordinate to the ſupreme Deity.

Unity in the ſupreme being hath, among philoſophers, a more ſolid foundation, viz. unity of deſign and of order in the creation and government of this world *. At the ſame time, the paſſion of gratitude, which leads even ſavages to the attribute of unity in the ſupreme being, prepares the mind for reliſhing the proof of that unity, founded on the unity of his works.

The belief of one ſupreme benevolent Deity, and of ſubordinate deities benevolent and malevolent, is and has been more univerſal than any other religious creed. I confine myſelf to a few in-

* All things in the univerſe are evidently of a piece. Every thing is adjuſted to every thing; one deſign prevails through the whole: and this uniformity leads the mind to acknowledge one author; becauſe the conception of different authors without diſtinction of attributes or operations, ſerves only to perplex the imagination, without beſtowing any ſatisfaction on the underſtanding. *Natural hiſtory of Religion, by David Hume, Eſquire.*

ſtances;

ſtances; for a complete enumeration would be endleſs. The different ſavage tribes in Dutch Guiana, agree pretty much in their articles of faith. They hold the exiſtence of one ſupreme Deity, whoſe chief attribute is benevolence; and to him they aſcribe every good that happens. But as it is againſt his nature to do ill, they believe in ſubordinate malevolent beings, like our devil, who occaſion thunder, hurricanes, earthquakes, and who are the authors of death, diſeaſes, and of every misfortune. To theſe devils, termed in their language *Yowahoos*, they direct every ſupplication, in order to avert their malevolence; while the ſupreme Deity is entirely neglected: ſo much more powerful among ſavages, is fear than gratitude. The North-American ſavages have all of them a notion of a ſupreme Deity, creator and governor of the world, and of inferior deities, ſome good, ſome ill. Theſe are ſuppoſed to have bodies, and to live much as men do, but without being ſubjected to any diſtreſs. The ſame creed prevails among the negroes of Benin and Congo, among the people of New Zeland, among the inhabitants of Java, of Madagaſcar, of the Molucca iſlands, and of the Caribbee iſlands. The Chinguleſe, a tribe in the iſland of Ceylon, acknowledge one God creator of the univerſe, with ſubordinate deities who act as his deputies: agriculture is the peculiar province of one, navigation of another. The creed of the Tonquineſe is nearly the ſame. The inhabitants of Otaheite, termed *King George's iſland*, believe in one ſupreme Deity; and in inferior deities without end, who preſide over particular parts of the creation. They pay no adoration to the ſupreme Deity, thinking him too far elevated above his creatures to concern himſelf with what they do. They believe the ſtars to be children of the ſun and moon, and an eclipſe to be the time of copulation. According to Arnobius, certain Roman deities preſided over the various operations of men. Venus preſided over carnal copulation; Puta aſſiſted at pruning trees; and

Peta in requeſting benefits; Nemeſtrinus was god of the woods, Nodutus ripened corn, and Terenſis helped to threſh it; Vibilia aſſiſted travellers; orphans were under the care of Orbona, and dying perſons, of Nænia; Oſſilago hardened the bones of infants; and Mellonia protected bees, and beſtow'd ſweetneſs on their honey. The inhabitants of the iſland of Formoſa recogniſe two ſupreme deities in company; the one a male, god of the men, the other a female, goddeſs of the women. The bulk of their inferior deities are the ſouls of upright men, who are conſtantly doing good, and the ſouls of wicked men, who are conſtantly doing ill. The inland negroes acknowledge one ſupreme being, creator of all things; attributing to him infinite power, infinite knowledge, and ubiquity. They believe that the dead are converted into ſpirits, termed by them *Iananini*, or protectors, being appointed to guard their parents and relations. The ancient Goths, and ſeveral other northern nations, acknowledged one ſupreme being; and at the ſame time worſhipped three ſubordinate deities; Thor, reputed the ſame with Jupiter; Oden, or Woden, the ſame with Mars; and Friga, the ſame with Venus *. Socrates, taking the cup of poiſon from the executioner, held it up toward heaven, and pouring out ſome of it as an oblation to the ſupreme Deity, pronounced the following prayer: "I implore the immortal God "that my tranſlation hence may be happy." Then turning to Crito, ſaid, "O Crito! I owe a cock to Eſculapius, pay it." From this incident we find that Socrates, ſoaring above his countrymen, had attained to the belief of a ſupreme benevolent Deity. But in that dark age of religion, ſuch purity is not to be expected from

* Regnator omnium Deus, cætera ſubjecta atque parentia; *Tacitus de moribus Germanorum, cap.* 39. [*In Engliſh thus:* "One God the ruler of all; the reſt "inferior and ſubordinate."]

Socrates

Socrates himſelf, as to have rejected ſubordinate deities, even of the mercenary kind.

Different offices being aſſigned to the gods, as above mentioned, proper names followed of courſe. And when a god was aſcertained by a name, the buſy mind would naturally proceed to trace his genealogy.

As unity in the Deity was not an eſtabliſhed doctrine in the countries where the Chriſtian religion was firſt promulgated, Chriſtianity could not fail to prevail over Paganiſm; for improvements in the mental faculties lead by ſure ſteps, tho' ſlow, to one God.

The ſixth ſtage is, the belief of one ſupreme benevolent Deity, as in that immediately foregoing, with many inferior benevolent deities, and one only who is malevolent. As men improve in natural knowledge, and become ſkilful in tracing cauſes from effects, they find much leſs malice and ill-deſign than was imagined: humanity at laſt prevails, which, in connection with improved knowledge, baniſhes the ſuſpicion of ill-deſign, in every caſe where an event can poſſibly be explained without it. In a word, a ſettled opinion of good prevailing in the world, produced conviction among ſome nations, leſs ignorant than their neighbours, and leſs brutal, that there is but one malevolent ſubordinate deity, and good ſubordinate deities without number. The ancient Perſians acknowledged two principles; one all good and all powerful, named *Hormuz*, and by the Greeks corruptly *Oromazes*; the other evil, named *Ahariman*, and by the Greeks *Arimanes*. Some authors aſſert, that the Perſians held theſe two principles to be coeternal: others, that Oromazes firſt ſubſiſted alone, that he created both light and darkneſs, and that he created Arimanes out of darkneſs. That the latter was the opinion of the ancient Perſians, appears from their Bible, termed the *Sadder*; which teaches, That there is one God ſupreme over all, many good angels, and but one

one evil ſpirit. Plutarch acquaints us, that Hormuz and Ahariman, for ever at variance, formed, each of them, creatures of their own ſtamp; that the former created good genii, ſuch as goodneſs, truth, wiſdom, juſtice; and that the latter created evil genii, ſuch as infidelity, falſehood, oppreſſion, theft. This ſyſtem of theology, commonly termed the *Manichean ſyſtem*, is ſaid to be alſo the religious creed of Pegu, with the following addition, that the evil principle only is to be worſhipped; which is abundantly probable, as fear is a predominant paſſion in barbarians. The people of Florida believe a ſupreme benevolent Deity, and a ſubordinate deity that is malevolent: neglecting the former, who, they ſay, does no harm, they bend their whole attention to ſoften the latter, who, they ſay, torments them day and night. The inhabitants of Darien acknowledge but one evil ſpirit, of whom they are deſperately afraid. The Hottentots, mentioned by ſome writers as altogether deſtitute of religion, are, on the contrary, farther advanced toward its purity, than ſome of their neighbours. Their creed is, That there is a ſupreme being, who is goodneſs itſelf; of whom they have no occaſion to ſtand in awe, as he is incapable by his nature to hurt them; that there is alſo a malevolent ſpirit, ſubordinate to the former, who muſt be ſerved and worſhipped in order to avert his malice. The Epicurean doctrine with reſpect to the gods in general, That being happy in themſelves, they extend not their providential care to men, differs not widely from what the Hottentot believes with reſpect to the ſupreme being.

Having traced the ſenſe of deity, from its dawn in the groſſeſt ſavages, to its approaching maturity among enlightened nations, we proceed to the laſt ſtage of the progreſs, which makes the true ſyſtem of theology; and that is, conviction of a ſupreme being, boundleſs in every perfection, without any ſubordinate deities, benevolent or malevolent. Savages learn early to trace the chain of

of cauſes and effects, with reſpect to ordinary events: they know that faſting produces hunger, that labour occaſions wearineſs, that fire burns, that the ſun and rain contribute to vegetation. But when they go beyond ſuch familiar events, they loſe ſight of cauſe and effect: the changes of weather, of winds, of heat and cold, impreſs them with a notion of chance: earthquakes, hurricanes, ſtorms of thunder and lightning, which fill them with terror, are aſcribed to malignant beings of greater power than man. In the progreſs of knowledge, light begins to break in upon them: they diſcover, that ſuch phenomena, however tremendous, come under the general law of cauſe and effect, and that there is no ground for aſcribing them to malignant ſpirits. At the ſame time, our more refined ſenſes ripen by degrees: ſocial affections come to prevail, and morality makes a deep impreſſion. In maturity of ſenſe and underſtanding, benevolence appears more and more; and beautiful final cauſes are diſcovered in many of nature's productions, that formerly were thought uſeleſs, or perhaps deſtructive: and the time may come, we have ſolid ground to hope that it will come, when doubts and difficulties about the government of Providence, will all of them be cleared up; and every event be found conducive to the general good. Such views of Providence baniſh malevolent deities; and we ſettle at laſt in a moſt comfortable opinion; either that there are no ſuch beings; or that, if they exiſt and are permitted to perpetrate any miſchief, it is in order to produce greater good. Thus, through a long maze of errors, man arrives at true religion, acknowledging but one Being, ſupreme in power, intelligence, and benevolence, who created all other beings, to whom all other beings are ſubjected, and who directs every event to anſwer the beſt purpoſes. This ſyſtem is true theology *.

Having

* Pliny ſeems to reliſh the doctrine of unity in the Deity; but is at a loſs about forming

Having gone through the different ſtages of religious belief, in its gradual progreſs toward truth and purity, I proceed to a very important article, viz. The hiſtory of tutelar deities. The belief of tutelar deities preceded indeed ſeveral of the ſtages mentioned, witneſs the tutelar deities of Greece and Rome; but as it is not connected with any one of them excluſive of the reſt, the clearneſs of method required it to be poſtponed to all of them. This belief, founded on ſelfiſhneſs, made a rapid progreſs after property in the goods of fortune was eſtabliſhed. The Greeks, the Romans, and indeed moſt nations that were not mere ſavages, appropriated to themſelves tutelar deities, who were underſtood to befriend them upon all occaſions; and, in particular, to fight for them againſt their enemies. The Iliad of Homer is full of miraculous battles between the Greeks and Trojans, the tutelar deities mixing with the contending parties, and partaking of every diſaſter, death only excepted, which immortals could not ſuffer. The *lares*, *penates*, or houſehold-gods, of Indoſtan, of Greece, and of Rome, bear witneſs, that every family, perhaps every perſon, was thought to be under the protection of a tutelar deity. Alexander ab Alexandro gives a liſt of tutelar deities. Apollo and Minerva were the tutelar deities of Athens; Bacchus and Hercules of the Bœotian Thebes; Juno of Carthage, Samos, Sparta, Argos, and Mycené; Venus of Cyprus; Apollo of Rhodes, and of Delphos; Vulcan of Lemnos; Bacchus of Naxus; Neptune of Tenedos, &c. The poets teſtify, that even individuals had tutelar deities:

Mulciber in Trojam, pro Troja ſtabat Apollo:
Æqua Venus Teucris, Pallas iniqua fuit.
Oderat Æneam, propior Saturnia Turno;
Ille tamen Veneris numine tutus erat.

forming any juſt conception of him, ſometimes conſidering the world to be our only deity, ſometimes the ſun.

Sæpe

Sæpe ferox cautum petiit Neptunus Ulyſſem;
Eripuit patruo ſæpe Minerva ſuo * (*a*).

Though the North-American ſavages recogniſe a ſupreme Being, wiſe and benevolent, and alſo ſubordinate benevolent beings who are intruſted with the government of the world; yet as the great diſtance of theſe ſubordinate beings, and the full occupation they have in general government, are ſuppoſed to make them overlook individuals, every man has a tutelar deity of his own, termed *Manitou*, who is conſtantly invoked during war to give him victory over his enemies. The Natches, bordering on the Miſſiſippi, offer up the ſkulls of their enemies to their god, and depoſite them in his temple. They conſider that being as their tutelar deity who aſſiſts them againſt their enemies, and to whom therefore the ſkull of an enemy muſt be an acceptable offering. Tho' they worſhip the ſun, who impartially ſhines on all mankind; yet ſuch is their partiality, that they conſider themſelves as his choſen people, and that their enemies are his enemies.

A belief ſo abſurd ſhows woful imbecility in human nature. Is it not obvious, that the great God of heaven and earth, governs the world by inflexible laws, from which he never can ſwerve in any caſe, becauſe they are the beſt poſſible in every caſe? To ſuppoſe any family or nation to be an object of his peculiar love, is no leſs impious, than to ſuppoſe any family or nation to be an

* "The rage of Vulcan, and the martial maid,
"Purſu'd old Troy; but Phœbus' love repay'd.
"Æneas ſafe, defy'd great Juno's hate,
"For Venus guards her favour'd offspring's fate:
"In vain Ulyſſes Neptune's wrath aſſails,
"O'er winds and waves Minerva's power prevails."

(*a*) Ovid. Triſt. lib. 1. eleg. 2.

object of his peculiar hatred: they equally arraign Providence of partiality. Even the Goths had more juſt notions of the Deity. Totila, recommending to his people juſtice and humanity, ſays, "Quare ſic habete, ea quæ amari ab hominibus ſolent ita vobis "ſalva fore, ſi juſtitiæ reverentiam ſervaveritis. Si tranſitis in "mores alios, etiam Deum ad hoſtes tranſiturum. Neque enim "ille, aut omnibus omnino hominibus, aut uni alicui genti, ad-"dicit ſe ſocium *."

That God was once the tutelar deity of the Jews, is true; but not in the vulgar acceptation of that term, importing a deity choſen by a people to be their patron and protector. The orthodox faith is, "That God choſe the Jews as his peculiar people, not "from any partiality to them, but that there might be one nation "to keep alive the knowledge of one ſupreme Deity; which ſhould "be proſperous while they adhered to him, and unproſperous when "they declined to idolatry; not only in order to make them perſevere "in the true faith, but alſo in order to exemplify to all nations the "conduct of his Providence." It is certain, however, that the perverſe Jews claimed God Almighty as their tutelar deity, in the vulgar acceptation of the term. And this error throws light upon an incident related in the Acts of the Apoſtles. There was a prophecy firmly believed by the Jews, that the Meſſiah would come among them in perſon to reſtore their kingdom. The Chriſtians gave a different ſenſe to the prophecy, viz. that the kingdom promiſed was not of this world. And they ſaid, that Chriſt was ſent to pave

* "Be aſſured of this, that while ye preſerve your reverence for juſtice, ye will "enjoy all the bleſſings which are eſtimable among mankind. If ye refuſe to obey "her dictates, and your morals become corrupted, God himſelf will abandon you, "and take the part of your enemies. For altho' the benevolence of that power "is not partially confined to tribe or people, yet in the eye of his juſtice all men "are not equally the objects of his approbation."

the

the way to their heavenly kingdom, by obtaining forgiveneſs of their ſins. At the ſame time, as the Jews held all other nations in abhorrence, it was natural for them to conclude, that the Meſſiah would be ſent to them only, God's choſen people; for which reaſon, even the apoſtles were at firſt doubtful about preaching the goſpel to any but to the Jews (*a*). But the apoſtles reflecting, that it was one great purpoſe of the miſſion, to baniſh from the Jews their groveling and impure notion of a tutelar deity, and to proclaim a ſtate of future happineſs to all who believe in Chriſt, they proceeded to preach the goſpel to all men: "Then Peter opened "his mouth, and ſaid, Of a truth I perceive, that God is no re-"ſpecter of perſons: but in every nation, he that feareth him, "and worketh righteouſneſs, is accepted with him (*b*)." The foregoing reaſoning, however, did not ſatisfy the Jews: they could not digeſt the opinion, that God ſent his Meſſiah to ſave all nations; and that he was the God of the Gentiles as well as of the Jews. They ſtormed againſt Paul in particular for inculcating that doctrine (*c*).

Conſidering that religion in its purity was eſtabliſhed by the goſpel, is it not amazing, that even Chriſtians fell back to the worſhip of tutelar deities? They did not indeed adopt the abſurd opinion, that the ſupreme Being was their tutelar deity: but they held, that there are divine perſons ſubordinate to the Almighty, who take under their care nations, families, and even individuals; an opinion that differs not eſſentially from that of tutelar deities among the Heathens. That opinion, which flatters ſelf-love, took root in the fifth century, when the deification of ſaints was introduced, ſimilar to the deification of heroes among the an-

(*a*) See the 10th and 11th chapters of the Acts of the Apoſtles.

(*b*) Acts of the Apoſtles, x. 34.

(*c*) Acts of the Apoſtles, chap. 13.

cients. With regard to matters ſpiritual, as well as temporal, people are fond of friends to be their interceſſors; and with regard to the Deity, deified ſaints were thought the propereſt interceſſors. Temples were built and dedicated to them, and ſolemn rites of worſhip inſtituted to render them propitious. It was imagined, that the ſouls of deified ſaints are at liberty to roam where they liſt, and that they love the places where their bodies are interred; which accordingly made the ſepulchres of the ſaints a common rendezvous of ſupplicants. What paved the way to notions ſo abſurd, was the groſs ignorance that clouded the Chriſtian world after the northern barbarians became maſters of Europe. In the ſeventh century, the biſhops were ſo illiterate, as to be indebted to others for the ſhallow ſermons they preached; and the very few of that order who had any learning, ſatisfied themſelves with compoſing inſipid homilies, collected from the writings of Auguſtin and Gregory. In the ninth century, matters grew worſe and worſe; for theſe ſaints, held at firſt to be mediators for Chriſtians in general, were now converted into tutelar deities in the ſtricteſt ſenſe. An opinion prevailed, that ſuch ſaints as are occupied about the ſouls of Chriſtians in general, have little time for individuals; which led every church, and every private Chriſtian, to elect for themſelves a particular ſaint, as their peculiar patron or tutelar deity. That practice made it neceſſary to deify ſaints without end, in order to furniſh a tutelar deity to every individual. The dubbing of ſaints, became a new ſource of abuſes and frauds in the Chriſtian world: lying wonders were invented and fabulous hiſtories compoſed, to celebrate exploits that never were performed, and to glorify perſons that never had a being. And thus religion among Chriſtians, ſunk down into as low a ſtate as it had been among Pagans.

There ſtill remains upon hand a capital branch of our hiſtory; and that is idolatry, which properly ſignifies the worſhipping viſible

ſible objects as deities. But as idolatry evidently ſprung from religious worſhip, corrupted by the ignorant and brutiſh, it will make its appearance with more advantage in the next ſection, of which religious worſhip is the ſubject.

We have thus traced with wary ſteps, the gradual progreſs of theology through many ſtages, correſponding to the gradual openings and improvements of the human mind. But tho' that progreſs in almoſt all countries appears uniform with reſpect to the order of ſucceſſion, it is far otherwiſe with reſpect to the quickneſs of ſucceſſion: nations, like individuals, make a progreſs from infancy to maturity; but they advance not with an equal pace, ſome making a rapid courſe toward perfection in knowledge and in religion, while others remain ignorant barbarians. The religion of Hindoſtan, if we credit hiſtory or tradition, had advanced to a conſiderable degree of purity and refinement, at a very early period. The Hindoſtan Bible, termed *Chatahbhade* or *Shaſtah*, gives an account of the creation, lapſe of the angels, and creation of man; inſtructs us in the unity of the Deity, but denies his preſcience as being inconſiſtent with free-will in man; all of them profound doctrines of an illuminated people; to eſtabliſh which a long courſe of time muſt have been requiſite, after wandering through errors without number. Compared with the Hindows in theology, even the Greeks were mere ſavages. The Grecian gods were held to be little better than men, and their hiſtory, as above mentioned, correſponds to the notion entertain'd of them.

In explaining the opinions of men with reſpect to Deity, I have confined my view to ſuch opinions as are ſuggeſted by principles or biaſſes that make a part of common nature; omitting many whimſical notions, no better than dreams of a roving imagination. The plan delineated ſhows wonderful uniformity in the progreſs of religion through all nations. That the whimſical notions

tions mentioned are far otherwiſe, is not wonderful. Take the following ſpecimen. The Kamſkatkans are not ſo ſtupidly ignorant, as to be altogether void of curioſity. They ſometimes think of natural appearances.—Rain, ſay they, is ſome deity piſſing upon them; and they imagine the rainbow to be a party-coloured garment, put on by him in preparing for that operation. They believe wind to be produced by a god ſhaking his long hair about his head with violence. Such tales will ſcarce amuſe children in the nurſery. The inhabitants of the iſland Celebes formerly acknowledged no gods but the ſun and the moon, which were held to be eternal. Ambition for ſuperiority made them fall out. The moon being wounded in flying from the ſun, was delivered of the earth.

Hitherto of the gradual openings of the human mind with reſpect to Deity. I cloſe this ſection with an account of ſome unſound notions concerning the conduct of Providence, and concerning ſome ſpeculative matters. I begin with the former.

In days of ignorance, the conduct of Providence is very little underſtood. Far from having any notion, that the government of this world is carried on by general laws, which are inflexible becauſe they are the beſt poſſible, every important event is attributed to an immediate interpoſition of the Deity. As the Grecian gods were thought to have bodies like men, and like men to require nouriſhment; they were imagined to act like men, forming ſhort-ſighted plans of operation, and varying them from time to time according to exigencies. Even the wiſe Athenians, had an utter averſion at philoſophers who attempted to account for effects by general laws: ſuch doctrine they thought tended to fetter the gods, and to prevent them from governing events at their pleaſure. An eclipſe being held to be a prognoſtic given by the gods of ſome grievous calamity, Anaxagoras was accuſed of Atheiſm for attempting to explain the eclipſe of the moon by natural cauſes:

ſes: he was thrown into priſon, and with difficulty was relieved by the influence of Pericles. Protagoras was baniſhed Athens for maintaining the ſame doctrine. Procopius overflows with ſignal interpoſitions of Providence; and Agathias, beginning at the battle of Marathon, ſagely maintains, that from that time downward, there was not a battle loſt, but by an immediate judgement of God, for the ſins of the commander, or of his army, or of one perſon or other. Our Saviour's doctrine with reſpect to thoſe who ſuffered by the fall of the tower of Siloam, ought to have opened their eyes; but ſuperſtitious eyes are never opened by inſtruction. At the ſame time, it is deplorable that ſuch belief has no good influence on manners: on the contrary, never doth wickedneſs ſo much abound as in dark times. A curious fact is related by Procopius (*a*) with reſpect to that ſort of ſuperſtition. When Rome was beſieged by the Goths, and in danger of deſtruction, a part of the town-wall, declining from the perpendicular, was in a tottering condition. Beliſarius, propoſing to fortify it, was oppoſed by the citizens, affirming, that it was guarded by St Peter. Procopius obſerves, that the event anſwered expectation; for that the Goths, during a tedious ſiege, never once attempted that weak part. He adds, that the wall remained in the ſame ruinous ſtate at the time of his writing. Here is a curious conceit:—Peter created a tutelar deity, able and willing, for the ſake of his votaries, to counteract the laws by which God governs the material world. And for what mighty benefit to them? Only to ſave them five or fifty pounds in rebuilding the crazy part of the wall.

It is no leſs inconſiſtent with the regular courſe of Providence, to believe, as many formerly did, that in all doubtful caſes the Almighty, when appealed to, never fails to interpoſe in favour of

(*a*) Hiſtoria Gothica, lib. 1.

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the right ſide. The inhabitants of Conſtantinople, ann. 1284, being ſplit into parties about two contending patriarchs, the Emperor ordered a fire to be made in the church of St Sophia, and a memorial from each party to be thrown into it; never doubting, but that God would ſave from the flames the memorial of the party whoſe cauſe he eſpouſed. But, to the utter aſtoniſhment of all beholders, the flames paid not the leaſt regard to either of the memorials. The ſame abſurd opinion gave birth to the trial by fire, by water, and by ſingular battle. And it is not a little remarkable, that ſuch trials were common among many nations that had no intercourſe one with another; even the enlightened people of Indoſtan try crimes by dipping the hand of a ſuſpected perſon in boiling oil.—Such uniformity is there with reſpect even to ſuperſtitious opinions. Pope Gregory VII. inſiſting, that the Kings of Caſtile and Aragon ſhould lay aſide their Gothic liturgy for the Romiſh, the matter was put to trial by ſingular battle; and two champions were choſen, to declare by victory the opinion of God Almighty. The Emperor Otho I. obſerving the doctors to differ about a point of law, viz. the right of repreſentation in land-eſtates, appointed a duel; and the right of repreſentation gain'd the victory. If any thing can render ſuch a doctrine palatable, it is the believing in a tutelar deity, who with leſs abſurdity may interpoſe in behalf of a favourite opinion, or of a favourite people. Appian gravely reports, that when the city of Rhodes was beſieged by Mithridates, a ſtatue of the goddeſs Iſis was ſeen to dart flames of fire upon a bulky engine, raiſed by the beſiegers to overtop the wall.

Hiſtorians mention an incident that happened in the iſland Celebes, founded on a belief of the ſame kind with that above mentioned. About two centuries ago, ſome Chriſtian and ſome Mahometan miſſionaries made their way to that iſland. The chief king, ſtruck with the fear of hell taught by both, aſſembled

a general council; and extending his hands toward heaven, addreſſed the following prayer to the ſupreme being. "Great "God, from thee I demand nothing but juſtice, and to me thou "oweſt it. Men of different religions have come to this iſland, "threatening eternal puniſhment to me and my people if we diſ- "obey thy laws. What are thy laws? Speak, O my God, who "art the author of nature: thou knoweſt the bottom of our "hearts, and that we can never intentionally diſobey thee. But "if it be unworthy of thy eſſence to employ the language of men, "I call upon my whole people, the ſun which gives me light, "the earth which bears me, the ſea which ſurrounds my empire, "and upon thee thyſelf, to bear witneſs for me, that in the ſin- "cerity of my heart I wiſh to know thy will; and this day I de- "clare, that I will acknowledge as the depoſitaries of thy oracles, "the firſt miniſters of either religion that ſhall land on this iſland."

It is equally erroneous to believe, that certain ceremonies will protect one from miſchief. In the dark ages of Chriſtianity, the ſigning with the figure of a croſs, was held not only to be an antidote againſt the ſnares of malignant ſpirits, but to inſpire reſolution for ſupporting trials and calamities: for which reaſon no Chriſtian in thoſe days undertook any thing of moment, till he had uſed that ceremony. It was firmly believed in France, that a gold or ſilver coin of St Louis, hung from the neck, was a protection againſt all diſeaſes: and we find accordingly a hole in every remaining coin of that king, for fixing it to a riband. In the minority of Charles VIII. of France, the three eſtates, ann. 1484, ſupplicated his Majeſty, that he would no longer defer the being anointed with the holy oil, as the favour of Heaven was viſibly connected with that ceremony. They affirmed, that his grandfather Charles VII. never proſpered till he was anointed; and that Heaven afterward fought on his ſide, till the Engliſh were expelled out of his kingdom. The high altar of St Margaret's

church in the iſland of Icolmkill, was covered with a plate of blue marble finely veined; which has ſuffered from a ſuperſtitious conceit, that the ſmalleſt bit of it will preſerve a ſhip from ſinking. It has accordingly been carried off piece-meal; and at preſent there is ſcarce enough left to make an experiment. In the Sadder, certain prayers are enjoined when one ſneezes or piſſes, in order to chaſe away the devil. Cart-wheels in Liſbon, are compoſed of two boards clumſily cut in a circular form, and nailed together. Tho' the noiſe is intolerable, yet the axles are never greaſed, becauſe the noiſe, ſay they, frightens the devil from hurting their oxen.

Nay, ſo far has ſuperſtition been carried, as to found a belief, that the devil by magic can control the courſe of Providence. A Greek biſhop having dreamed, that a certain miracle had failed by magic, the ſuppoſed magician and his ſon were condemned to die, without the leaſt evidence but the dream. Monteſquieu collects a number of circumſtances, each of which, tho' all extremely improbable, ought to have been clearly made out, in order to prove the crime (*a*). The Emperor Theodore Laſcaris, imagining magic to be the cauſe of his diſtemper, put the perſons ſuſpected to the trial of holding a red-hot iron without being burnt. In the capitularies of Charlemagne, in the canons of ſeveral councils, and in the ancient laws of Norway, puniſhments are enacted againſt thoſe who are ſuppoſed able to raiſe tempeſts, termed *Tempeſtarii*. During the time of Catharine de Medicis, in the court of France there was a jumble of politics, gallantry, luxury, debauchery, ſuperſtition, and Atheiſm. It was common to take the reſemblance of enemies in wax, in order to torment them by roaſting the figure at a ſlow fire, and pricking it with needles. If

(*a*) L'Eſprit des loix, lib. 12. ch. 5.

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an enemy happened in one inſtance of a thouſand to pine and die, the charm was eſtabliſhed for ever. Sorcery and witchcraft were ſo univerſally believed in England, that in a preamble to a ſtatute of Henry VIII. ann. 1511, it is ſet forth, "That ſmiths, weavers, "and women, boldly take upon them great cures, in which they "partly uſe ſorcery and witchcraft." The firſt printers, who were Germans, having carried their books to Paris for ſale, were condemned by the parliament to be burnt alive as ſorcerers; and did not eſcape puniſhment but by a precipitant flight. It had indeed much the appearance of ſorcery, that a man could write ſo many copies of a book, without the ſlighteſt variation.

There are many examples of extraordinary virtue being attributed to certain things, in themſelves of no ſignificancy. The Hungarians were poſſeſſed of a golden crown, ſent from heaven with the peculiar virtue, as they believed, of beſtowing upon the perſon who wore it, an undoubted title to be their king.

But the moſt extraordinary effort of abſurd ſuperſtition, is a perſuaſion, that one may control the courſe of Providence, by making a downright bargain with God Almighty to receive from him *quid pro quo*. A herd of Tartars in Siberia, named by the Ruſſians *Baravinſkoi*, have in every hut a wooden idol, termed in their language *Sheitan*, about eighteen inches high, to which they addreſs their prayers for plenty of game in hunting, promiſing to give it, if ſucceſsful, a new coat or a new bonnet: a ſort of bargain abundantly brutiſh; and yet more excuſable in mere ſavages, than what is made with the Virgin Mary by enlightened Roman Catholics; who, upon condition of her relieving them from diſtreſs, promiſe her a waxen taper to burn on her altar. Philip II. of Spain made a vow, that, upon condition of gaining the battle of St Quintin, he would build the monaſtery of Eſcurial; as if an eſtabliſhment for ſome idle monks, could be a motive with

the great God to vary the courſe of his Providence *. Beſide the abſurdity of thinking that ſuch vows can have the effect to alter the eſtabliſhed laws of Providence, they betray a moſt contemptible notion of the Deity, as if his favours, like a horſe or a cow, could be purchaſed with money.

But however looſe and disjointed, events appear to the ignorant, when viewed as paſt, or as paſſing, future events take on a very different appearance. The doctrine of prognoſtics is evidently founded upon a ſuppoſition, that future events are unalterably fixed; for otherwiſe that doctrine would appear abſurd, even to the moſt ignorant. There is no bias in human nature that has greater influence, than curioſity about futurity; which in dark ages governs without control: men with no leſs folly than induſtry have ranſacked the earth, the ſea, the air, and even the ſtars, for prognoſtics of future events. The Greeks had their oracles, the Romans their augurs, and all the world their omens. The Grecian oracles and the Roman auguries are evidently built upon their belief of tutelar deities; and the numberleſs omens that influence weak people in every country, ſeem to reſt upon the ſame foundation †. Ancient hiſtories are ſtuffed with omens, prodi-

* Having gained the battle of St Quintin on the feſtival of St Laurence, Philip reckoned himſelf obliged to the ſaint for this victory, no leſs than to God Almighty; and accordingly, he not only built the monaſtery he had vowed, but alſo a church for the ſaint and a palace for himſelf, all under one roof: and what is not a little ludicrous, the edifice is built in reſemblance of a gridiron, which, according to the legend, was the inſtrument of Laurence's martyrdom.

† It is no wonder that the Romans were ſuperſtitiouſly addicted to omens and auguries: like mere ſavages, they put no value upon any ſcience but that of war; and, for that reaſon, they baniſhed all philoſophers, as uſeleſs members of ſociety. Thus, that nation, ſo fierce and ſo great in war, ſurrendered themſelves blindly to ſuperſtition, and became ſlaves to imaginary evils. Even their graveſt hiſtorians were deeply tainted with that diſeaſe.

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gies, and prognoſtics: Livy overflows with fooleries of that kind. Endleſs are the adverſe omens reported by Appian of Alexandria, that are ſaid to have given warning of the defeat of Craſſus by the Parthians; and no fewer in number are thoſe which happened at the death of the Emperor Hadrian, if we believe Spartianus. Lampridius, with great gravity, recites the omens which prognoſticated that Alexander Severus would be Emperor: he was born the ſame day on which Alexander the Great died: he was brought forth in a temple dedicated to Alexander the Great: he was named *Alexander*; and an old woman gave to his mother, a pigeon's egg of a purple colour produced on his birthday. A comet is an infallible prognoſtic of the death of a king. But of what king? Why, of the king who dies next. Suetonius, with the ſolemnity of a pulpit-inſtructor, informs us, that the death of the Emperor Claudius was predicted by a comet; and of Tiberius, by the fall of a tower during an earthquake. Such opinions, which indeed have ſome foundation in our nature, take faſt hold of the mind, when envigorated by education and example. Even philoſophy is not ſufficient to eradicate them but by ſlow degrees: witneſs Tacitus, the moſt profound of all hiſtorians, who cannot forbear to uſher in the death of the Emperor Otho, with a fooliſh account of a ſtrange unknown bird appearing at that time. He indeed, with decent reſerve, mentions it only as a fact reported by others; but from the warm ſtyle of his narrative it is evident, that the ſtory had made an impreſſion upon him. The ancient Germans drew many of their omens from horſes: "Proprium gentis, equorum "preſagia ac monitus experiri. Publice aluntur iiſdem nemo-"ribus ac lucis, candide, et nullo mortali opere contacti, quos "preſſos ſacro curru, ſacerdos, ac rex, vel princeps civitatis, comi-"tantur, hinnituſque ac fremitus obſervant. Nec ulli auſpicio "major fides, non ſolum apud plebem, ſed apud proceres, apud "ſacerdotes

" ſacerdotes * (*a*)." There is ſcarce a thing ſeen or imagined, but what the inhabitants of Madagaſcar conſider as a prognoſtic of ſome future event. The Hindows rely on the augury of birds, preciſely as the old Romans did. Tho' there is not the ſlighteſt probability, that an impending misfortune was ever prevented by ſuch prognoſtics; yet the deſire of knowing future events is ſo deeply rooted in our nature, that omens will always prevail among the vulgar, in ſpite of the cleareſt light of philoſophy †.

With reſpect to prophecies in particular, one apology may be made for them, that no other prognoſtic of futurity is leſs apt to do miſchief. What Procopius (*b*) obſerves of the Sybilline oracles, is equally applicable to prophecies in general, " That it is above " the ſagacity of man to explain any of them before the event " happen." After peruſing many, he gives the following reaſon. " Matters are there handled," ſays he, " not in any order, nor in " a continued diſcourſe: but after mentioning the diſtreſſes of A- " frica, for example, they give a ſlight touch at the Perſians, the " Romans, the Aſſyrians; then returning to the Romans, they

* " It is peculiar to that people, to deduce omens and preſages from horſes. " Theſe animals are maintained at the public expence, in groves and foreſts, and " are not allowed to be polluted with any work for the uſe of man; but being " yoked in the ſacred chariot, the prieſt, and the king, or chief of the ſtate, at- " tend them, and carefully obſerve their neighings. The greateſt faith is given to " this method of augury, both among the vulgar and the nobles."

† Is it not mortifying to human pride, that a great philoſopher [*Bacon*] ſhould think like the vulgar upon this ſubject? Mentioning great rejoicings in London upon the daughter of Henry VII. of England being married to James IV. of Scotland, he adds, " not from any affection to the Scots, but from a ſecret inſtinct " and inſpiration of the advantages that would accrue from the match."

(*a*) Tacitus, De moribus Germanorum, cap. 10.

(*b*) Gothica Hiſtoria, lib. 1.

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" fall ſlap-daſh upon the calamities of Britain." A curious example of this obſervation, is a book of prophecies compoſed in Scotland by Thomas Learmont, commonly called *Thomas the Rhymer*, becauſe the book is in rhyme. Plutarch, in the life of Cicero, reports, that a ſpectre appeared to Cicero's nurſe, and foretold, that the child would become a great ſupport to the Roman ſtate; and moſt innocently he makes the following reflection: " This might have paſſed for an idle tale, had not Cicero " demonſtrated the truth of the prediction;" which in effect is ſaying, that if a prediction happen to prove true, it is a real prophecy; if otherwiſe, that it is an idle tale. There have been prophecies not altogether ſo well guarded as the Sybilline oracles. Napier, inventor of the logarithms, found the day of judgement predicted in the Revelation; and named the very day; which unfortunately he ſurvived. He made another prediction, but prudently named a day ſo diſtant, as to be in no hazard of bluſhing a ſecond time. Michel Stifels, a German clergyman, ſpent moſt of his life in attempting to diſcover the day of judgement; and at laſt annouced to his pariſhioners, that it would happen within a year. The pariſhioners, reſolving to make the beſt of a bad bargain, ſpent their time merrily, taking no care to lay up proviſions for another year; and ſo nice was their calculation, as at the end of the year to have not a morſel remaining, either of food or of induſtry. The famous Jurieu has ſhown great ingenuity in explaining prophecies; of which take the following inſtance. In his book, intitled, *Accompliſhment of the prophecies*, he demonſtrates, that the beaſt in the Apocalypſe, which held the *poculum aureum plenum abominationum* *, is the Pope; and his reaſon is, that the initial letters of theſe four Latin words compoſe the word *papa*; a very ſingular prophecy indeed, that is a prophecy

* " The golden cup full of abominations."

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in Latin, but in no other language. The candid reader will advert, that ſuch prophecies as relate to our Saviour, and tend to aſcertain the truth of his miſſion, fall not under the foregoing reaſoning; for they do not anticipate futurity, by producing foreknowledge of future events. They were not underſtood till our Saviour appeared among men; and then they were clearly underſtood as relative to him.

There is no end of ſuperſtition in its various modes. It was believed univerſally in dark times, that by certain forms and invocations, the ſpirits of the dead could be called upon to reveal future events. A lottery in Florence, gainful to the government, and ruinous to the people, gives great ſcope to ſuperſtition. The purchaſer of tickets, in order to be ſucceſsful, muſt faſt ſix and thirty hours, muſt repeat a certain number of Ave Maries and Pater Noſters, muſt not ſpeak to a living creature, muſt not go to bed, muſt continue in prayer to the Virgin, and to ſaints, till ſome propitious ſaint appear and declare the numbers that are to be ſucceſsful. The ticket-holder, fatigued with faſting, praying, and expectation, falls aſleep. Occupied with the thoughts he had when awake, he dreams that a ſaint appears, and mentions the numbers that are to be ſucceſsful. If he be diſappointed, he is vexed at his want of memory; but truſts in the ſaint as an infallible oracle. Again he buys tickets, again falls aſleep, again ſees a viſion, and again is diſappointed.

Lucky and unlucky days, which were ſo much rely'd on as even to be marked in the Greek and Roman calendars, make an appendix to prophecies. The Tartars never undertake any thing of moment on a Wedneſday, being held by them unlucky. The Nogayan Tartars hold every thirteenth year to be unlucky: they will not even wear a ſword that year, believing that it would be their death; and they maintain, that none of their warriors ever returned who went upon an expedition in one of theſe years. They

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paſs that time in faſting and prayer, and during it never marry. The inhabitants of Madagaſcar have days fortunate and unfortunate with reſpect to the birth of children: they deſtroy without mercy every child that is born on an unfortunate day.

I cloſe this important article with a reflection that ought to make an impreſſion upon every rational mind. The knowledge of future events, as far as it tends to influence our conduct, is inconſiſtent with a ſtate of trial, ſuch as Providence has allotted to man in this life. It would deprive him of hopes and fears, and leave him nothing to deliberate upon, nor any end to proſecute. In a word, it would put an end to his activity, reduce him to be merely a paſſive being. Providence therefore has wiſely drawn a veil over future events, affording us no light for prying into them but ſagacity and experience.

Theſe are a few of the numberleſs abſurd opinions about the conduct of Providence, that have prevailed among Chriſtians, and ſtill prevail among ſome of them. Many opinions no leſs abſurd have prevailed about ſpeculative points. I confine myſelf to one or two inſtances; for to make a complete liſt would require a volume. The firſt I ſhall mention, and the moſt noted, is tranſubſtantiation; which, tho' it has not the leaſt influence on practice, is reckoned ſo eſſential to ſalvation, as to be placed above every moral duty. The following text is appealed to as the ſole foundation of that article of faith. "And as they were eating, Jeſus "took bread, and bleſſed it, and brake it, and gave it to the diſ-"ciples, and ſaid, Take, eat; this is my body. And he took the "cup, and gave thanks, and gave it to them, ſaying, Drink ye "all of it: for this is my blood of the new teſtament, which is "ſhed for many for the remiſſion of ſins. But I ſay unto you, "I will not drink henceforth of this fruit of the vine, until that "day when I drink it new with you in my Father's king-

" dom (*a*)." That this is a metaphor, muſt ſtrike every one: the paſſage cannot even bear a literal meaning, conſidering the final clauſe; for ſurely the moſt zealous Roman believes not, that Chriſtians are to drink new wine with their Saviour in the kingdom of heaven. At the ſame time, it is not ſo much as inſinuated, that there was here any miraculous tranſubſtantiation of the bread and wine into the body and blood of our Saviour; nor is it inſinuated, that the apoſtles believed they were eating the fleſh of their maſter, and drinking his blood. St John, the favourite apoſtle, mentions not a word of this ceremony, which he certainly would not have omitted, had he imagined it an eſſential article of faith.

But ſuppoſing tranſubſtantiation to be more clearly expreſſed in this text, than it really is; yet men of good underſtanding will be loth to admit a meaning that contradicts their five ſenſes. They will reflect, that no man now living ever ſaw the original books of the New Teſtament; nor are they certain, that the editions we have, are copied directly from the originals. Every remove from them is liable to errors, which may juſtly create a ſuſpicion of every text that contradicts reaſon and common ſenſe. Add, that the bulk of Chriſtians have not even a copy from the original to build their faith upon, but only a tranſlation into another language.

And this leads to what chiefly determined me to ſelect that inſtance. God and nature have beſtowed upon us the faculty of reaſon, for diſtinguiſhing truth from falſehood. If by reaſoning with candor and impartiality, we diſcover a propoſition to be true or falſe, it is not in our power to remain indifferent: we muſt judge, and according to our judgement we muſt pronounce. I ſay more, to pronounce is a duty we owe to our Maker; for to

(*a*) St Matthew, xxvi. 26. &c.

what

what purpoſe has he beſtow'd reaſon upon us, but in order to direct our belief? At the ſame time, we may depend on it as an intuitive truth, that God will never impoſe any belief on us, contradictory not only to our reaſon, but to our ſenſes.

The following objection however will perhaps reliſh more with people of plain underſtanding. Tranſubſtantiation is a very extraordinary miracle, reiterated every day and in every corner of the earth, by prieſts not always remarkable either for piety or for morality. Now I demand an anſwer to the following plain queſtion: To what good end or purpoſe is ſuch a profuſion of miracles ſubſervient? I ſee none. But I diſcover a very bad one, if they have any influence; which is, that they accuſtom the Roman Catholics to more cruelty and barbarity, than even the groſſeſt ſavages are ever guilty of: ſome of them indeed devour the fleſh of their enemies; but none of them, the fleſh of their friends, eſpecially of their greateſt friend. But to do juſtice to people of that religion, I am confident, that this ſuppoſed miracle has no influence whatever upon their manners: to me it appears impoſſible for any man ſeriouſly to believe, that the bread and wine uſed at the Lord's ſupper, is actually converted into the body and blood of our Saviour. The Romiſh church requires the belief of tranſubſtantiation; and a zealous Catholic, out of pure obedience, thinks he believes it. Convince once a man that ſalvation depends on belief, and he will believe any thing; that is, he will imagine that he believes: *Credo quia impoſſibile eſt* *.

That

* A traveller deſcribing the Virgin Mary's houſe at Loretto, has the following reflection. "When there are ſo many ſaints endued with ſuch miraculous powers, "ſo many relics, and ſo many impregnated wells, each of them able to cure the "moſt dangerous diſeaſes; one would wonder, that phyſicians could live there, or "others die. But people die here as elſewhere; and even churchmen, who preach "upon the miracles wrought by relics, grow ſick and die like other men." It is

That our firſt reformers, who were prone to differ from the Romiſh faith, ſhould adopt this doctrine, ſhows the ſupreme influence of ſuperſtition. The Lutherans had not even the excuſe of inattention: after ſerious examination, they added one abſurdity more; teaching, that the bread and wine are converted into the body and blood of our Saviour, and yet remain bread and wine as at firſt; which is termed by them *conſubſtantiation*. I am perſuaded, that at this time not a ſingle man of them harbours ſuch a thought.

Many perſons, proof againſt a ſerious argument, are ſufficiently clear-ſighted to diſcover falſehood when put in a ridiculous light. It requires, I am ſenſible, a very delicate hand to attack a grave ſubject with ridicule as a teſt of truth; and for that reaſon, I forbear to offer any thing of my own. But I will ſet before my readers ſome excerpts from a book of abſolute authority with Roman Catholics. Tho' tranſubſtantiation be there handled in the moſt ſerious manner, with all the ceremonies and punctilios that naturally flow from it, yet to my taſte, nothing can be contrived to give it a more ridiculous appearance. The book is the Roman Miſſal, from which the following is a literal tranſlation.

" Maſs may be deficient in the matter, in the form, in the mi-

one thing to believe, it is another thing to fancy that we believe. In the year 1666 a Jew named *Sabatai Levi* appeared at Smyrna, pretending to be the true Meſſiah, and was acknowledged to be ſuch by many. The Grand Signior, for proof of his miſſion, inſiſted for a miracle; propoſing that he ſhould preſent himſelf as a mark to be ſhot at, and promiſing to believe that he was the Meſſiah, if he remained unwounded. Sabatai, declining the trial, turned Mahometan to ſave his life. But obſerve the blindneſs of ſuperſtition: tho' Sabatai was ſeen every day walking the ſtreets of Conſtantinople in the Turkiſh habit, the Jews inſiſted that the true Sabatai was taken up into heaven, leaving only behind him his ſhadow; and probably they moſt piouſly fancied that they believed ſo.

" niſter,

" niſter, or in the action. Firſt, in the matter. If the bread be " not of wheat, or if there be ſo great a mixture of other grain " that it cannot be called wheat-bread, or if any way corrupted, " it does not make a ſacrament. If it be made with roſe-water, " or any other diſtilled water, it is doubtful whether it make a " ſacrament or not. Tho' corruption have begun, or tho' it be " leavened, it makes a ſacrament, but the celebrator ſins grievouſ- " ly.

" If the celebrator, before conſecration, obſerve that the hoſt " is corrupted, or is not of wheat, he muſt take another hoſt: " if after conſecration, he muſt ſtill take another and ſwallow it, " after which he muſt alſo ſwallow the firſt, or give it to another, " or preſerve it in ſome place with reverence. But if he have " ſwallowed the firſt before obſerving its defects, he muſt never- " theleſs ſwallow alſo the perfect hoſt; becauſe the precept about " the perfection of the ſacrament, is of greater weight than that " of taking it faſting. If the conſecrated hoſt diſappear by an " accident, as by wind, by a miracle, or by ſome animal, ano- " ther muſt be conſecrated.

" If the wine be quite ſour or putrid, or made of unripe grapes, " or be mixed with ſo much water as to ſpoil the wine, it is no " ſacrament. If the wine have begun to ſour or to be corrupted, " or be quite new, or not mixed with water, or mixed with roſe- " water or other diſtilled water, it makes a ſacrament, but the ce- " lebrator ſins grievouſly.

" If the prieſt, before conſecration, obſerve that the materials " are not proper, he muſt ſtop, if proper materials cannot be got; " but after conſecration, he muſt proceed, to avoid giving ſcan- " dal. If proper materials can be procured by waiting, he muſt " wait for them, that the ſacrifice may not remain imperfect.

" Second, in form. If any of the words of conſecration be o- " mitted, or any of them be changed into words of a different " meaning,

" meaning, it is no ſacrament: if they be changed into words of " the ſame meaning, it makes a ſacrament; but the celebrator " ſins grievouſly.

" Third, in the miniſter. If he does not intend to make a ſa- " crament, but to cheat; if there be any part of the wine, or a- " ny wafer that he has not in his eye, and does not intend to " conſecrate; if he have before him eleven wafers, and intends " to conſecrate only ten, not determining what ten he intends: " in theſe caſes the conſecration does not hold, becauſe intention " is requiſite. If he think there are ten only, and intends to " conſecrate all before him, they are all conſecrated; therefore " prieſts ought always to have ſuch intention. If the prieſt, " thinking he has but one wafer, ſhall, after the conſecration, " find two ſticking together, he muſt take them both. And he " muſt take off all the remains of the conſecrated matter; for " they all belong to the ſame ſacrifice. If in conſecrating, the " intention be not actual by wandering of mind, but virtual in " approaching the altar, it makes a ſacrament: tho' prieſts " ſhould be careful to have intention both virtual and actual.

" Beſide intention, the prieſt may be deficient in diſpoſition of " mind. If he be ſuſpended, or degraded, or excommunicated, " or under mortal ſin, he makes a ſacrament, but ſins grievouſ- " ly. He may be deficient alſo in diſpoſition of body. If he " have not faſted from midnight, if he have taſted water, or any " other drink or meat, even in the way of medicine, he cannot " celebrate nor communicate. If he have taken meat or drink " before midnight, even tho' he have not ſlept nor digeſted it, " he does not ſin. But on account of the perturbation of mind, " which bars devotion, it is prudent to refrain.

" If any remains of meat, ſticking in the mouth, be ſwallow- " ed with the hoſt, they do not prevent communicating, provi- " ded they be ſwallowed, not as meat, but as ſpittle. The ſame

" is

" is to be ſaid, if in waſhing the mouth a drop of water be ſwal-
" lowed, provided it be againſt our will.

" Fourth, in the action. If any requiſite be wanting, it is no
" ſacrament; for example, if it be celebrated out of holy ground,
" or upon an altar not conſecrated, or not covered with three nap-
" kins; if there be no wax candles; if it be not celebrated be-
" tween day-break and noon; if the celebrator have not ſaid mat-
" tins with lauds; if he omit any of the ſacerdotal robes; if theſe
" robes and the napkins be not bleſſed by a biſhop; if there be
" no clerk preſent to ſerve, or one who ought not to ſerve, a wo-
" man, for example; if there be no chalice, the cup of which is
" gold, or ſilver, or pewter; if the veſtment be not of clean linen
" adorned with ſilk in the middle, and bleſſed by a biſhop; if the
" prieſt celebrate with his head covered; if there be no miſſal pre-
" ſent, tho' he have it by heart.

" If a gnat or ſpider fall into the cup after conſecration, the
" prieſt muſt ſwallow it with the blood, if he can: otherwiſe,
" let him take it out, waſh it with wine, burn it, and throw it
" with the waſhings into holy ground. If poiſon fall into the
" cup, the blood muſt be poured on tow or on a linen cloth, re-
" main till it be dry, then be burnt, and the aſhes be thrown
" upon holy ground. If the hoſt be poiſoned, it muſt be kept in
" a tabernacle till it be corrupted.

" If the blood freeze in winter, put warm cloths about the
" cup: if that be not ſufficient, put the cup in boiling water.

" If any of Chriſt's blood fall on the ground by negligence, it
" muſt be licked up with the tongue, and the place ſcraped: the
" ſcrapings muſt be burnt, and the aſhes buried in holy ground.

" If the prieſt vomit the euchariſt, and the ſpecies appear en-
" tire, it muſt be licked up moſt reverently. If a nauſea prevent
" that to be done, it muſt be kept till it be corrupted. If the ſpe-
" cies

" cies do not appear, let the vomit be burnt, and the aſhes thrown " upon holy ground."

As the foregoing article has beyond intention ſwelled to an enormous ſize, I ſhall add but one other article, which, at the ſame time, ſhall be extremely ſhort; and that is the creed of Athanaſius. It is a heap of unintelligible jargon; and yet we are appointed to believe every article of it, under the pain of eternal damnation. As it enjoins belief of rank contradictions, it ſeems purpoſely calculated to be a teſt of ſlaviſh ſubmiſſion to the tyrannical authority of a proud and arrogant prieſt *.

CHAP. III.

Religious Worship.

IN the foregoing chapter are traced the gradual advances of the ſenſe of Deity, from its imperfect ſtate among ſavages to its maturity among enlightened nations, diſplaying to us one great being to whom all other beings owe their exiſtence, who made the world, and who governs it by the moſt perfect laws. And our perception of Deity, ariſing from that ſenſe, is fortified by an intuitive propoſition, that there neceſſarily muſt exiſt ſome being who had no beginning. Conſidering the Deity as the author of our exiſtence, we owe him gratitude; conſidering him as govern-

* Biſhop Burnet ſeems doubtful whether this creed was compoſed by Athanaſius; tho' his doubts, in my apprehenſion, are ſcarce ſufficient to weigh againſt the unanimous opinion of the Chriſtian church.

or

or of the world, we owe him obedience: and upon theſe duties is founded the obligation we are under to worſhip him. Further, God made man for ſociety, and implanted in his nature the moral ſenſe to direct his conduct in that ſtate. From theſe premiſes, may it not with certainty be inferred to be the will of God, that men ſhould obey the dictates of the moral ſenſe in fulfilling every duty of juſtice and benevolence? Theſe moral duties, it would appear, are our chief buſineſs in this life; being enforced not only by a moral but by a religious principle.

Morality, as laid down in a former ſketch, conſiſts of two great branches, viz. the moral ſenſe, which unfolds our duty to man, and an active moral principle, which prompts us to perform that duty. Natural religion conſiſts alſo of two great branches, viz. the ſenſe of Deity, which unfolds our duty to our Maker, and the active principle of devotion, which prompts us to perform our duty to him. The univerſality of the ſenſe of Deity proves it to be innate: the ſame reaſon proves the principle of devotion to be innate; for all men agree in worſhipping ſuperior beings, whatever difference there may be in the mode of worſhip.

Both branches of the duty we owe to God, that of worſhipping him, and that of obeying his will with reſpect to our fellow-creatures, are ſummed up by the Prophet Micah in the following emphatic words. "He hath ſhewed thee, O man, what is good: "and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do juſtly, to love "mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?" The two articles firſt mentioned, are moral duties regarding our fellow-creatures; and as to ſuch, what is required of us by the Lord is to do our duty to others, not only as directed by the moral ſenſe, but as being the will of our Maker, to whom we owe abſolute obedience. That branch of our duty is reſerved for a ſecond ſection: at preſent we are to treat of religious worſhip, included in the third article, viz. the walking humbly with our God.

SECT. I.

Religious Worſhip.

THE obligation we are under to worſhip God, or to walk humbly with him, is, as obſerved above, founded on the two great principles of gratitude and obedience; both of them requiring fundamentally a pure heart, and a well-diſpoſed mind. But heart-worſhip is alone not ſufficient: there are over and above required external ſigns, teſtifying to others the ſenſe we have of theſe duties, and a firm reſolution to perform them. That ſuch is the will of God, will appear as follows. The principle of devotion, like moſt of our other principles, partakes of the imperfection of our nature: yet however faint originally, it is capable of being greatly invigorated by cultivation and exerciſe. Private exerciſe is not ſufficient. Nature, and conſequently the God of nature, require public exerciſe or public worſhip: for devotion is infectious, like joy or grief (*a*); and by mutual communication in a numerous aſſembly, is greatly invigorated. A regular habit of expreſſing publicly our gratitude and reſignation, never fails to purify the mind, tending to wean it from every unlawful purſuit. This is the true motive of public worſhip; not what is commonly inculcated, viz. That it is required from us, as a teſtimony to our Maker of our obedience to his laws: God, who knows the heart, needs no ſuch teſtimony *. I ſhall only add upon the general head,

(*a*) Elements of Criticiſm, vol. 1. p. 180. edit. 5.

* Arnobius (*Adverſus gentes, lib.* 1.) accounts rationally for the worſhip we pay to the Deity: "Huic omnes ex more proſternimur, hunc collatis precibus adora-
"mus,

head, that lawgivers ought to avoid with caution the enforcing public worſhip by rewards and puniſhments: human laws cannot reach the heart, in which the eſſence of worſhip conſiſts: they may indeed bring on a liſtleſs habit of worſhip, by ſeparating the external act from the internal affection, than which there can be nothing more hurtful to true religion. The utmoſt that can be ſafely ventured, is to bring public worſhip under cenſorian powers, as a matter of police, for preſerving good order, and for preventing bad example.

The religion of Confucius, profeſſed by the *literati* and perſons of rank in China and Tonquin, conſiſts in a deep inward veneration for the God or King of heaven, and in the practice of every moral virtue. They have neither temples, nor prieſts, nor any ſettled form of external worſhip: every one adores the ſupreme Being in the manner he himſelf thinks beſt. This is indeed the moſt refined ſyſtem of religion that ever took place among men. There is however an invincible objection againſt it, which is, that it is not fitted for the human race: an excellent religion it would

" mus, ab hoc juſta, et honeſta, et auditu ejus condigna, depoſcimus. Non quo " ipſe deſideret ſupplices nos eſſe, aut amet ſubſterni tot millium venerationem vide- " re. Utilitas hæc noſtra eſt, et commodi noſtri rationem ſpectans. Nam quia " proni ad culpas, et ad libidinis varios appetitus, vitio ſumus infirmitatis ingenitæ, " patitur ſe ſemper noſtris cogitationibus concipi: ut dum illum oramus, et mere- " ri ejus contendimus munera, accipiamus innocentiæ voluntatem, et ab omni nos " labe delictorum omnium amputatione purgemus."—[*In Engliſh thus*: " It is " our cuſtom to proſtrate ourſelves before him; and we aſk of him ſuch gifts only " as are conſiſtent with juſtice and with honour, and ſuitable to the character of the " Being whom we adore. Not that he receives pleaſure or ſatisfaction from the " humble veneration of thouſands of his creatures. From this we ourſelves derive " benefit and advantage; for being the ſlaves of appetite, and prone to err from " the weakneſs of our nature, when we addreſs ourſelves to God in prayer, and " ſtudy by our actions to merit his approbation, we gain at leaſt the will, and the " inclination, to be virtuous."]

be for angels; but is far too refined, even for ſages and philoſophers.

Proceeding to deviations from the genuine worſhip required by our Maker, and groſs deviations there have been, I begin with that ſort of worſhip which is influenced by fear, and which for that reaſon is univerſal among ſavages. The American ſavages believe, that there are inferior deities without end, moſt of them prone to miſchief: they neglect the ſupreme Deity becauſe he is good; and direct their worſhip to ſoothe the malevolent inferior deities from doing harm. The inhabitants of the Molucca iſlands, who believe the exiſtence of malevolent inviſible beings ſubordinate to the ſupreme benevolent Being, confine their worſhip to the former, in order to avert their wrath; and one branch of their worſhip is, to ſet meat before them, hoping that when the belly is full, there will be leſs inclination to miſchief. The worſhip of the inhabitants of Java is much the ſame. The negroes of Benin worſhip the devil, as Dapper expreſſes it, and ſacrifice to him both men and beaſts. They acknowledge indeed a ſupreme Being, who created the univerſe, and governs it by his Providence: but they regard him not; "for," ſay they, "it is needleſs, if not impertinent, to invoke a being, who, good and gracious, is incapable of injuring or moleſting us."

The auſterities and penances that are practiſed in almoſt all religions, ſpring from the ſame root. One way to pleaſe inviſible malignant powers, is to make ourſelves as miſerable as poſſible. Hence the horrid penances of the Faquirs in Hindoſtan, who outdo in mortification whatever is reported of the ancient Chriſtian anchorites. Some of theſe Faquirs continue for life in one poſture: ſome never lie down: ſome have always their arms raiſed above their head: and ſome mangle their bodies with knives and ſcourges. The town of Jagrenate in Hindoſtan is frequented by pilgrims, ſome of them from the diſtance of 300 leagues, which they

they travel, not by walking or riding, but by meaſuring the road with the length of their bodies; in which method of loco-motion, ſome of them conſume years, before they complete their pilgrimage. A religious ſect made its way ſome centuries ago into Japan, termed *Bubſdoiſts*, from *Bubs*, the founder. This ſect has prevailed over the ancient ſect of the Sintos, chiefly by its auſterity and mortifications. The ſpirit of this ſect inſpires nothing but exceſſive fear of the gods, who are painted prone to vengeance, and always offended. The people of that religion paſs moſt of their time in tormenting themſelves, to expiate imaginary faults; and they are treated by their prieſts with deſpotiſm and cruelty, that is not paralleled but by the inquiſitors of Spain. The manners of the people are fierce, cruel, and unrelenting, ſuch as never fail to be inſpired by horrible ſuperſtition. The notion of inviſible malevolent powers, formerly univerſal, is not to this hour eradicated, even among Chriſtians; for which I appeal to the faſtings and flagellations among Roman-Catholics, held by them to be an eſſential part of religion. People infected with religious horrors, are never ſeriouſly convinced, that an upright heart and ſound morality make the eſſence of religion. The doctrine of the Janſeniſts, concerning repentance and mortification, ſhows evidently, however they may deceive themſelves, that they have an impreſſion of the Deity as a malevolent being. They hold the guilt contracted by Adam's fall to be a heinous ſin, which ought to be expiated by acts of mortification, ſuch as the torturing and macerating the body with painful labour, exceſſive abſtinence, continual prayer and contemplation. Their penances, whether for original or voluntary ſin, are carried to extravagance; and they who put an end to their lives by ſuch ſeverities, are termed the ſacred victims of repentance, conſumed by the fire of divine love. Such ſuicides are eſteemed peculiarly meritorious in the eye of Heaven; and it is thought, that their ſufferings cannot fail to appeaſe the

anger

anger of the Deity. That celibacy is a ſtate of purity and perfection, is a prevailing notion in many countries: among the Pagans, a married man was forbid to approach the altar, for ſome days after knowing his wife; and this ridiculous notion of pollution, contributed to introduce celibacy among the Roman-Catholic prieſts. The Emperor Otho, *anno* 1218, became a ſignal penitent: but inſtead of atoning for his ſins by repentance and reſtitution, he laid himſelf down to be trod under foot by the boys of his kitchen; and frequently ſubmitted to the diſcipline of the whip, inflicted by monks. The Emperor Charles V. toward the end of his days, was ſorely depreſſed in ſpirit with fear of hell. Monks were his only companions, with whom he ſpent his time in chanting hymns. As an expiation for his ſins, he in private diſciplined himſelf with ſuch ſeverity, that his whip, found after his death, was tinged with his blood. Nor was he ſatisfied with theſe acts of mortification: timorous and illiberal ſolicitude ſtill haunting him, he aimed at ſomething extraordinary, at ſome new and ſingular act of piety, to diſplay his zeal, and to merit the favour of Heaven. The act he fixed on was as wild as any that ſuperſtition ever ſuggeſted to a diſtempered brain: it was to celebrate his own obſequies. He ordered his tomb to be erected in the chapel of the monaſtery: his domeſtics marched there in funeral proceſſion, holding black tapers: he followed in his ſhroud: he was laid in his coffin with much ſolemnity: the ſervice of the dead was chanted; and he himſelf joined in the prayers offered up for his *requiem*, mingling his tears with thoſe of his attendants. The ceremony cloſed with ſprinkling holy water upon the coffin; and the aſſiſtants retiring, the doors of the chapel were ſhut. Then Charles roſe out of the coffin, and ſtole privately to his apartment.

The hiſtory of ancient ſacrifices is not ſo accurate, as in every inſtance to aſcertain upon what principle they were founded, whether

ther upon fear, upon gratitude for favours received, or to ſolicit future favour. Human ſacrifices undoubtedly belong to the preſent head: for being calculated to deprecate the wrath of a malevolent deity, they could have no other motive but fear; and indeed they are a moſt direful effect of that paſſion. It is needleſs to loſe time in mentioning inſtances, which are well known to thoſe who are acquainted with ancient hiſtory. A number of them are collected in Hiſtorical Law-tracts (*a*): and to theſe I take the liberty of adding, that the Cimbrians, the Germans, the Gauls, particularly the Druids, practiſed human ſacrifices; for which we have the authority of Julius Cæſar, Strabo, and other authors. A people upon the Miſſiſippi, named *Tenſas*, worſhip the ſun, and, like the Natches their neighbours, have a temple for that luminary, with a ſacred fire in it, continually burning. The temple having been ſet on fire by thunder, was all in flames, when ſome French travellers ſaw them throw children into the fire, one after another, to appeaſe the incenſed deity. The Prophet Micah (*b*), in a paſſage partly quoted above, inveighs bitterly againſt ſuch ſacrifices: "Wherewith ſhall I come before the "Lord, and bow myſelf before the high God? ſhall I come be- "fore him with burnt-offerings, with calves of a year old? will "the Lord be pleaſed with thouſands of rams, or with ten thou- "ſands of rivers of oil? ſhall I give my firſt-born for my tranſgreſ- "ſion, the fruit of my body for the ſin of my ſoul? He hath "ſhewed thee, O man, what is good: and what doth the Lord "require of thee, but to do juſtly, to love mercy, and to walk "humbly with thy God?"

The ancient Perſians acknowledged Oromazes and Arimanes as their great deities, authors of good and ill to men. But I find

(*a*) Tract 1.

(*b*) Chap. 6.

not

not that Arimanes, the evil principle, was ever an object of any religious worſhip. The Gaures, who profeſs the ancient religion of Perſia, addreſs no worſhip but to one God, all-good and all-powerful.

Next, of worſhipping the Deity in the character of a mercenary being. Under that head come ſacrifices and oblations, whether prompted by gratitude for favours received, or by ſelf-intereſt to procure future favours; which, for the reaſon mentioned, I ſhall not attempt to diſtinguiſh. As the deities of early times were thought to reſemble men, it is not wonderful, that men endeavoured to conciliate their favour, with ſuch offerings as were the moſt acceptable to themſelves. It is probable, that the firſt ſacrifices of that kind were of ſweet-ſmelling herbs, which in the fire emitted a flavour, that might reach the noſtrils of a deity, even at a diſtance. The burning incenſe to their gods, was practiſed in Mexico and Peru; and at preſent is practiſed in the peninſula of Corea. An opportunity ſo favourable for making religious zeal a fund of riches to the prieſthood, is ſeldom neglected. There was no difficulty to perſuade ignorant people, that the gods could eat as well as ſmell: what was offered to a deity for food, being carried into the temple, was underſtood to be devoured by him.

With reſpect to the Jewiſh ſacrifices of burnt-offerings, meat-offerings, ſin-offerings, peace-offerings, heave-offerings, and wave-offerings, theſe were appointed by God himſelf, in order to keep that ſtiff-necked people in daily remembrance of their dependence on him, and to preſerve them if poſſible from idolatry. But that untractable race did not adhere to the purity of the inſtitution: they inſenſibly degenerated into the notion that their God was a mercenary being; and in that character only, was the worſhip of ſacrifices performed to him: the offerings mentioned were liberally beſtowed on him, not ſingly as a token of their dependence,

pendence, but chiefly in order to avert his wrath, or to gain his favour *.

The religious notions of the Greeks were equally impure: they could not think of any means for conciliating the favour of their gods, more efficacious than gifts. Homer paints his gods as mercenary to an extreme. In the fourth book of the Iliad, Jupiter ſays, "Of theſe cities, honoured the moſt by the ſoul of Jove, is "ſacred Troy. Never ſtands the altar empty before me, oblations "poured forth in my preſence, ſavour that aſcends the ſkies." Speaking in the fifth book of a warrior, known afterward to be Diomedes, "Some god he is, ſome power againſt the Trojans en-"raged for vows unpaid: deſtructive is the wrath of the gods." Diomedes prays to Minerva, "With thine arm ward from me the "foe: a year-old heifer, O Queen, ſhall be thine, broad-fronted, "unbroken, and wild: her to thee I will offer with prayer, gild-"ing with gold her horns." Preciſely of the ſame kind, are the offerings made by ſuperſtitious Roman-Catholics to the Virgin Mary, and to ſaints. Electra, in the tragedy of that name, ſupplicates Apollo in the following terms.

——— O! hear Electra too;
Who, with unſparing hand, her choiceſt gifts
Hath never fail'd to lay before thy altars;
Accept the little All that now remains
For me to give.

The people of Hindoſtan, as mentioned above, atone for their

* There is no mention in ancient authors of fiſh being offered to the gods in ſacrifice. The reaſon I take to be, that the moſt ſavoury food of man was reckoned the moſt agreeable to their gods; that ſavages never thought of fiſh till land-animals became ſcarce; and that the matter as well as form of ſacrifices were eſtabliſhed in practice, long before men had recourſe to fiſh for food.

ſins by auſtere penances; but they have no notion of preſenting gifts to the Deity, nor of deprecating his wrath with the blood of animals. On the contrary, they reckon it a ſin to ſlay any living creature; which reduces them to vegetable food. This is going too far; for the Deity could never mean to prohibit animal food, when man's chief dependence originally was upon it. The abſtaining, however, from animal food, ſhows greater humanity in the religion of Hindoſtan, than of any other known country. The inhabitants of Madagaſcar are in a ſtage of religion, common among many nations, which is, the acknowledging one ſupreme benevolent deity, and many malevolent inferior deities. Moſt of their worſhip is indeed addreſſed to the latter; but they have ſo far advanced before ſeveral other nations, as to offer ſacrifices to the ſupreme Being, without employing either idols or temples.

Philoſophy and ſound ſenſe, in poliſhed nations, have purified religious worſhip, by baniſhing the profeſſion at leaſt of oblations and ſacrifices. The Being that made the world, governs it by laws that are inflexible, becauſe they are the beſt poſſible; and to imagine that he can be moved by prayers, oblations, or ſacrifices, to vary his plan of government, is an impious thought, degrading the Deity to a level with ourſelves: "Hear, O my people, and I "will teſtify againſt thee: I am God, even thy God. I will take "no bullock out of thy houſe, nor he-goat out of thy fold: for "every beaſt of the foreſt is mine, and the cattle upon a thouſand "hills. Will I eat the fleſh of bulls, or drink the blood of goats? "Offer unto God thankſgiving, and pay thy vows to the Moſt "High. Call upon me in the day of trouble: I will deliver thee, "and thou ſhall glorify me (*a*)." "Thou deſireſt not ſacrifice, "elſe would I give it; thou delighteſt not in burnt-offering.

(*a*) Pſalm 50.

"The

" The ſacrifices of God are a broken ſpirit: a broken and a con-
" trite heart, O God, thou wilt not deſpiſe (*a*)." " For I deſired
" mercy, and not ſacrifice; and the knowledge of God, more
" than burnt-offerings (*b*)." In dark ages, there is great ſhew of religion, with little heart-worſhip: in ages of philoſophy, warm heart-worſhip, with little ſhew *.

This is a proper place for the hiſtory of idolatry; which, as will anon appear, ſprung from religious worſhip, corrupted by

* Agathias urges a different reaſon againſt ſacrifices. " Ego nullam naturam
" eſſe exiſtimo, cui voluptati ſint fœdata ſanguine altaria, et animantium laniena.
" Quod ſi qua tamen eſt cui iſta ſint cordi, non ea mitis et benigna eſt aliqua, ſed
" fera ac rabida, qualem pavorem poetæ fingunt, et Metum, et Bellonam, et Ma-
" lam Fortunam, et Diſcordiam, quam indomitam appellant." — [*In Engliſh thus:*
" I cannot conceive, that there ſhould exiſt a ſuperior being, who takes delight in
" the ſacrifice of animals, or in altars ſtained with blood. If ſuch there be, his
" nature is not benevolent, but barbarous and cruel. Such indeed were the gods
" whom the poets have created: ſuch were Fear and Terror, the goddeſs of War,
" of Evil Fortune, and of Diſcord."] —— Arnobius batters down bloody ſacrifices with a very curious argument. " Ecce ſi bos aliquis, aut quodlibet ex his animal,
" quod ad placandas cæditur mitigandaſque ad numinum furias, vocem hominis
" ſumat, eloquaturque his verbis: Ergone, O Jupiter, aut quis alius deus es,
" humanum eſt iſtud et rectum, aut æquitatis alicujus in æſtimatione ponendum,
" ut cum alius peccaverit, ego occidar, et de meo ſanguine fieri tibi patiaris ſatis,
" qui nunquam te læſerim, nunquam ſciens aut neſciens, tuum numen majeſta-
" temque violarim, animal, ut ſcis, mutum, naturæ meæ ſimplicitatem ſequens,
" nec multiformium morum varietatibus lubricum?" — [*In Engliſh thus:* " What
" if the ox, while he is led out to ſlaughter to appeaſe the fancied wrath of an of-
" fended deity, ſhould aſſume the human voice, and in theſe words aſtoniſh his
" conductors: Are theſe, O merciful God, are theſe the dictates of humanity, or
" of juſtice, that for the crime of another I ſhould forfeit my life. I have never
" by my will offended thee, and, dumb as I am, and uninformed by reaſon, my
" actions, according to the ſimplicity of my nature, cannot have given thee diſ-
" pleaſure, who haſt made me as I am."] —— If this argument were ſolid, it would be equally concluſive againſt animal food.

(*a*) Pſalm 51.

(*b*) Hoſea vi. 6.

men of ſhallow underſtanding and groſs conceptions, upon whom things inviſible make little impreſſion.

Savages, even of the loweſt claſs, have an impreſſion of inviſible powers, tho' they cannot form any diſtinct notion of them. But ſuch impreſſion is too faint for the exerciſe of devotion. Whether inſpired with love to a good being, or with fear of an ill being, ſavages are not at eaſe without ſome ſort of viſible object to animate them. A great ſtone ſerved that purpoſe originally; a very low inſtrument indeed of religious worſhip; but not altogether whimſical, if it was introduced, which is highly probable, in the following manner. It was an early and a natural cuſtom among ſavages, to mark with a great ſtone, the place where their worthies were interred; of which we have hints every where in ancient hiſtory, particularly in the poems of Oſſian. "Place me," ſays Calmar, mortally wounded, "at the ſide of a ſtone of remem-"brance, that future times may hear my fame, and the mother of "Calmar rejoice over the ſtone of my renown." Superſtition in later times having deified theſe worthies, their votaries, rejoicing as formerly over the ſtones dedicated to them, held theſe ſtones to be eſſential in every act of religious worſhip performed to their new deities *.

* Frequent mention is made of ſuch ſtones in the poems of Oſſian. "But re-"member, my ſon, to place this ſword, this bow, and this horn, within that dark "and narrow houſe marked with one gray ſtone." *p.* 55. "Whoſe fame is in "that dark-green tomb? Four ſtones with their heads of moſs ſtand there, and "mark the narrow houſe of death." *p.* 67. "Let thy bards mourn thoſe who "fell. Let Erin give the ſons of Lochlin to earth, and raiſe the moſſy ſtones of "their fame; that the children of the north hereafter may behold the place where "their fathers fought." *p.* 78. "Earth here incloſes the loveliеſt pair on the "hill: graſs grows between the ſtones of the tomb." *p.* 208. In the ſame poems we find ſtones made inſtruments of worſhip. The ſpirit of Loda is introduced threatening Fingal: "Fly to thy land, replied the form: receive the wind and fly. "The blaſts are in the hollow of my hand: the courſe of the ſtorm is mine. The "King of Sora is my ſon: he bends at the ſtone of my power." *p.* 200.

Tradition

Tradition points out many ſtones in different parts of the world, that were uſed in religious worſhip. A large ſtone worſhipped by the Peſſenuntians, a people of Phrygia, under the name of *Idæa mater*, was, upon a ſolemn embaſſy to that people, brought to Rome; it being contained in the Sybilline books, that unleſs the Romans got poſſeſſion of that goddeſs, they never would prevail over Hannibal. And Pauſanias mentions many ſtones in Greece, dedicated to different divinities; particularly thirty ſquare ſtones in Achaia, on which were engraved the names of as many gods. In another place, he mentions a very ancient ſtatue of Venus in the iſland Delos, which, inſtead of feet, had only a ſquare ſtone. This may appear a puzzling circumſtance in the hiſtory of Greece, conſidering that all the Grecian gods were originally mortals, whom it was eaſy to repreſent by ſtatues: but in that early period, the Greeks knew no more of ſtatuary than the moſt barbarous nations. It is perhaps not eaſy to gather the meaning of ſavages, with reſpect to ſuch ſtones: the moſt natural conjecture is, that a great ſtone, dedicated to the worſhip of a certain deity, was conſidered as belonging to him. This notion of property had a double effect: the worſhippers, by connection of ideas, were led from the ſtone to the deity: and the ſtone tended to fix their wandering thoughts. It was probably imagined, over and above, that ſome latent virtue communicated to the ſtone, made it holy or ſacred. Even among enlightened people, a ſort of virtue or ſanctity is conceived to reſide in the place of worſhip: why not alſo in a ſtone dedicated to a deity? The ancient Ethiopians, in their worſhip, introduced the figure of a ſerpent as a ſymbol of the deity: two ſticks laid croſs repreſented Caſtor and Pollux, Roman divinities: a javelin repreſented their god Mars; and in Tartary, formerly, the god of war was worſhipped under the ſymbol of an old ruſty ſabre. The ancient Perſians uſed conſecrated fire, as an emblem of the great God. Tho' the negroes of Congo

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and Angola have images without number, they are not however idolaters in any proper ſenſe: their belief is, that theſe images are only organs by which the deities ſignify their will to their votaries.

If the uſe that was made of ſtones and of other ſymbols in religious worſhip, be fairly repreſented, it may appear ſtrange, that the ingenious Greeks ſunk down into idolatry, at the very time they were making a rapid progreſs in the fine arts. Their improvements in ſtatuary, one of theſe arts, was the cauſe. They began with attempting to carve heads of men and women, repreſenting their deified heroes; which were placed upon the ſtones dedicated to theſe divinities. In the progreſs of the art, ſtatues were executed complete in every member; and at laſt, ſtatues of the gods were made, expreſſing ſuch dignity and majeſty, as inſenſibly to draw from beholders a degree of devotion to the ſtatues themſelves. Hear Quintilian upon that ſubject. "At quæ Polycleto defuerunt, Phidiæ atque Alcameni dantur. Phidias tamen diis quam hominibus efficiendis melior artifex traditur: in ebore vero, longe citra æmulum, vel ſi nihil niſi Minervam Athenis aut Olympium in Elide Jovem feciſſet, cujus pulchritudo adjeciſſe aliquid etiam receptæ religioni videtur; adeo majeſtas operis deum æquavit *." Here is laid a foundation for idolatry: let us trace its progreſs. Such ſtatues as are repreſented by Quintilian, ſerve greatly to enflame devotion; and during a warm fit of the religious paſſion, the repreſentation is loſt,

* "The deficiencies of Polycletus were made up in Phidias and Alcamenes. Phidias is reckoned to have had more ſkill in forming the ſtatues of gods than of men. In works of ivory he was unrivalled, altho' there had been no other proofs of his excellence than the ſtatue of Minerva at Athens, and the Jupiter Olympius in Elis. Its beauty ſeems to have added to the received religion; the majeſtic ſtatue reſembling ſo much the god himſelf."

and

and the ſtatue becomes a deity; preciſely as where King Lear is repreſented by Garrick: the actor vaniſhes; and, behold! the King himſelf. This is not ſingular. Anger occaſions a metamorphoſis ſtill more extraordinary: if I happen to ſtrike my gouty toe againſt a ſtone, the violence of the pain converts the ſtone for a moment into a voluntary agent; and I wreak my reſentment on it, as if it really were ſo. It is true, the image is only conceived to be a deity during the fervour of devotion; and when that ſubſides, the image falls back to its original repreſentative ſtate. But frequent inſtances of that kind, have at laſt the effect among illiterate people, to convert the image into a ſort of permanent deity: what ſuch people ſee, makes a deep impreſſion; what they ſee not, little or none at all. There is another thing that concurs with eye-ſight, to promote this deluſion: devotion, being a vigorous principle in the human breaſt, will exert itſelf upon the meaneſt object, when none more noble is in view.

The ancient Perſians held the conſecrated fire to be an emblem only of the great God: but ſuch veneration was paid to that emblem, and with ſo great ceremony was it treated, that the vulgar came at laſt to worſhip it as a ſort of deity. The prieſts of the Gaures watch the conſecrated fire day and night: they keep it alive with the pureſt wood, without bark: they touch it not with ſword nor knife: they blow it not with bellows, nor with the mouth: even the prieſt is prohibited to approach it, till his mouth be covered with fine linen, leſt it be polluted with his breath: if it happen to go out, it muſt be rekindled by ſtriking fire from flint, or by a burning glaſs.

The progreſs of idolatry will more clearly appear, from attending to the religion of the Greeks and Romans. The Greeks, as mentioned above, made uſe of ſtones in divine worſhip, long before idolatry was introduced: and we learn from Varro, that for a hundred and ſeventy years after Numa, the Romans had no ſta-

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tues nor images in their temples. After ſtatues of the gods came in faſhion, they acquired by degrees more and more reſpect. The Greek and Roman writers, talk of divine virtue being communicated to ſtatues; and ſome of the Roman writers talk familiarly, of the *numen* of a deity reſiding in his ſtatue. Arnobius, in his book againſt the Gentiles, introduces a Gentile delivering the following opinion. "We do not believe, that the metal which com-" poſes a ſtatue, whether gold, or ſilver, or braſs, is a god. But " we believe, that a ſolemn dedication brings down the god to " inhabit his image; and it is the god only that we worſhip in " that image." This explains the Roman ceremony, of inviting to their ſide the tutelar deities of towns beſieged by them, termed *evocatio tutelarium deorum:* the Romans, cruel as they were, overflowed with ſuperſtition; and as they were averſe from combating the tutelar deities even of their enemies, they endeavoured to gain theſe deities by large promiſes, and aſſurance of honourable treatment. As they could not hope that a ſtatue would change its place, their notion muſt have been, that by this ceremony, the tutelar deity might be prevailed upon to withdraw its *numen*, and leave the ſtatue a dead lump of matter. When Stilpo was baniſhed by the Areopagus of Athens for affirming, that the ſtatue in the temple of Minerva was not the goddeſs, but a piece of matter carved by Phidias; he ſurely was not condemned for ſaying, that the ſtatue was made by Phidias, a fact univerſally known: his hereſy conſiſted in denying that the *numen* of Minerva reſided in the ſtatue. Auguſtus, having twice loſt his fleet by ſtorm, forbade Neptune to be carried in proceſſion along with the other gods; imagining he had avenged himſelf of Neptune, by neglecting the favourite ſtatue in which his *numen* reſided.

When ſaints in the Chriſtian church were deified, even their images became objects of worſhip; from a fond imagination, that ſuch worſhip draws down into the images, the ſouls of the ſaints they

they repreſent: which is the ſame doctrine that Arnobius, in the paſſage above mentioned, aſcribes to the Gentiles; and is not widely different from the belief of the Pagan Tartars and Oſtiacs, by and by to be mentioned. In the eleventh century, there was a violent diſpute about images in the Greek church; many aſſerting, that in the images of our Saviour and of the ſaints, there reſides an inherent ſanctity, which is a proper object of worſhip; and that Chriſtians ought not to confine their worſhip to the perſons repreſented, but ought alſo to extend it to their images.

As ignorant and ſavage nations can form no conception of Deity, but of a being like a man, only ſuperior in power and greatneſs, images are made of the Deity in ſeveral nations conformable to this conception. It is eaſy to make ſome reſemblance of a man; but how is power and greatneſs to be repreſented? To perform this with propriety, would require a Hogarth. Savages go more bluntly to work: they endeavour to repreſent a man with many heads, and with a ſtill greater number of hands. The northern Tartars ſeem to have no deities but certain ſtatues or images coarſely formed out of wood, and bearing ſome diſtant reſemblance to the human figure. To palliate ſo groſs an abſurdity, as that a god can be fabricated by the hands of man, they imagine this image to be endued with a ſoul: to ſay whence that ſoul came, would puzzle the wiſeſt of them. That ſoul is conceived to be too elevated for dwelling conſtantly in a piece of matter: they believe that it reſides in ſome more honourable place; and that it only viſits the image or idol, when it is called down by prayers and ſupplications. They ſacrifice to this idol, by rubbing its mouth with the fat of fiſh, and by offering it the warm blood of ſome beaſt killed in hunting. The laſt ſtep of the ceremony is, to honour the ſoul of the idol with a joyful ſhout, as a ſort of convoy to it when it returns home. The Oſtiacs have a wooden idol, termed, *The Old Man of Oby*, who is guardian of

their fiſhery: it hath eyes of glaſs, and a head with ſhort horns. When the ice diſſolves, they crowd to this idol, requeſting that he will be propitious to their fiſhery. If unſucceſsful, he is loaded with reproaches: if ſucceſsful, he is entitled to a ſhare of the capture. They make a feaſt for him, rubbing his ſnout with choice fat; and, when the entertainment is over, they accompany the ſoul of the idol a little way, beating the air with their cudgels. The Oſtiacs have another idol, that is fed with milk ſo abundantly, as to come out on both ſides of the ſpoon, and to fall down upon the veſture; which, however, is never waſhed, ſo little is cleanlineſs thought eſſential to religion by that people. It is indeed wonderfully abſurd, to think, that inviſible ſouls require food like human creatures; and yet the ſame abſurdity prevailed in Greece.

The ancient Germans, a ſober and ſenſible people, had no notion of repreſenting their gods by ſtatues, nor of building temples to them. They worſhipped in conſecrated groves (*a*). The Egyptians, from a juſt conception that an inviſible being can have no reſemblance to one that is viſible, employ'd hieroglyphical figures for denoting metaphorically the attributes of their gods; and they employ'd, not only the figures of birds and beaſts, but of vegetables; leeks, for example, and onions. This metaphorical adjunct to religion, innocent in itſelf, ſunk the Egyptians to the loweſt degree of idolatry. As hieroglyphical figures, compoſed frequently of heterogeneous parts, reſemble not any being human or divine; the vulgar, loſing ſight of the emblematic ſignification, which is not readily underſtood but by poets and philoſophers, took up with the plain figures as real divinities. How otherwiſe can it be accounted for, that the ox, the ape, the onion, were in Egypt worſhipped as deities? But this muſt be under-

(*a*) Tacitus de moribus Germanorum, cap. 9.

ſtood

ſtood of the vulgar only. It is ſcarce ſuppoſable, that the better ſort of people could think ſo groſsly; and we have the authority of Plutarch for doubting. In his chapter upon Iſis and Oſiris, he obſerves, that the Egyptians worſhipped the bull, the cat, and other animals; not as divinities, but as repreſentatives of them, like an image ſeen in a glaſs; or, as he expreſſes it in another part of the ſame chapter, "juſt as we ſee the reſemblance of the ſun "in a drop of water." However this be, the Egyptian worſhip is an illuſtrious inſtance of the influence of devotion: how powerful muſt it be in its purity, when even in a wrong direction, it can force its way againſt every obſtacle of common ſenſe! And ſuch reſpect was paid to theſe animals, if we can truſt Diodorus Siculus, that in a great famine, the Egyptians ventured not to touch the ſacred animals, tho' they were forc'd to devour one another. The veneration paid to a cow in Hindoſtan aroſe probably from the ſame cauſe, viz. its having been uſed as a ſymbol of the Deity. A ſnake of a particular kind, about a yard long, and about the thickneſs of a man's arm, is worſhipped by the Whidans in Guinea. It has a large round head, piercing eyes, a ſhort pointed tongue, and a ſmooth ſkin, beautifully ſpeckled. It has a ſtrong antipathy to all the venomous kind; in other reſpects, innocent and tame. To kill them being a capital crime, they travel about unmoleſted, even into bedchambers. They occaſioned, ann. 1697, a ridiculous perſecution. A hog, teaſed by one of them, gnaſhed it with his tuſks till it died. The prieſts carried their complaint to the king; and no one preſuming to appear as counſel for the hogs, orders were iſſued for ſlaughtering the whole race. At once were brandiſhed a thouſand cutlaſſes; and the race would have been extirpated, had not the king interpoſed, repreſenting to the prieſts, that they ought to reſt ſatisfied with the innocent blood they had ſpilt. Rancour and cruelty never rage more violently, than under the maſk of religion.

It is amazing how prone the moſt poliſhed nations formerly were to idolatry. The Tyrians, beſieged by Alexander, chained down Hercules, their tutelar deity, to prevent him from deſerting to the enemy; which is ſaid to have been alſo practiſed in Sparta. The city of Ambracia being taken by the Romans, and every ſtatue of their gods being carried to Rome; the Ambracians complained bitterly, that not a ſingle divinity was left them to worſhip. How much more rational are the Hindoſtan bramins, who teach their diſciples, that idols are emblems only of the Deity, intended merely to fix the attention of the populace!

The firſt ſtatues in Greece and Tuſcany, were made with wings, to ſignify the ſwift motion of the gods. Theſe ſtatues were ſo clumſy, as ſcarce to reſemble human creatures, not to talk of a divinity. But the admirable ſtatues executed in later times, were imagined to reſemble moſt accurately the deities repreſented by them: whence the vulgar notion, that gods have wings, and that angels have wings.

I proceed to what in the hiſtory of idolatry may be reckoned the ſecond part. Statues, we have ſeen, were at firſt uſed as repreſentatives only of the Deity; but came afterward to be metamorphoſed into divinities. The abſurdity did not ſtop there. People, not ſatisfied with the viſible deities erected in temples for public worſhip, became fond to have private deities of their own, whom they worſhipped as their tutelar deities; and this practice ſpred ſo wide, as that among many nations every family had houſehold gods cut in wood or ſtone. Every family in Kamſkatka has a tutelar deity in the ſhape of a pillar, with the head of a man, which is ſuppoſed to guard the houſe againſt malevolent ſpirits. They give it food daily, and anoint the head with the fat of fiſh. The Prophet Iſaiah (*a*) puts this ſpecies of deification in a moſt ridi-

(*a*) Chap. 44.

culous

culous light: "He burneth part thereof in the fire: with part "thereof he roaſteth fleſh: of the reſidue he maketh a god, even "his graven image: he falleth down, worſhipping, and praying "to it, and ſaith, Deliver me, for thou art my god." Multiplication could not fail to ſink houſehold-gods into a degree of contempt: expectation of good from them, might produce ſome cold ceremonial worſhip; but there could be no real devotion at heart. The Chineſe manner of treating their houſehold-gods, will vouch for me. When a Chineſe does not obtain what he prays for, "Thou ſpiritual dog," he will ſay, "I lodge thee well, thou "art beautifully gilded, treated with perfumes and burnt-offer-"ings; and yet thou with-holdeſt from me the neceſſaries of life." Sometimes they faſten a cord to the idol, and drag it through the dirt. The inhabitants of Ceylon treat their idols in the ſame manner. Thor, Woden, and Friga, were the great deities of the Scandinavians. They had at the ſame time inferior deities, who were ſuppoſed to have been men tranſlated into heaven for their good works. Theſe they treated with very little ceremony, refuſing to worſhip them if they were not propitious; and even puniſhing them with baniſhment; but reſtoring them after a time, in hopes of amendment. Domeſtic idols are treated by the Oſtiacs not more reverently than by the people mentioned. But they have public idols, ſome particularly of braſs, which are highly reverenced: the ſolidity of the metal is in their imagination connected with immortality; and great regard is paid to theſe idols, for the knowledge and experience they muſt have acquired in an endleſs courſe of time.

Saints, or tutelar deities, are ſometimes not better treated among Roman Catholics, than among Pagans. "When we were in Por-"tugal," ſays Captain Brydone, "the people of Caſtelbranco were "ſo enraged at St Antonio, for ſuffering the Spaniards to plunder "their town, contrary, as they affirmed, to his expreſs agree-

"ment

" ment with them, that they broke many of his ſtatues to pieces; " and one that had been more revered than the reſt, they took " the head off, and in its ſtead placed one of St Francis. The " great St Januarius himſelf was in imminent danger, during the " laſt famine at Naples. They loaded him with abuſe and invec- " tive; and declared point-blank, that if he did not procure them " corn by ſuch a time, he ſhould be no longer their ſaint." The tutelar ſaint of Cattania, at the foot of Mount Etna, is St Agatha. A torrent of lava burſt over the walls, and laid waſte great part of that beautiful city. Where was St Agatha at this time? The people ſay, that they had given her juſt provocation; but that ſhe has long ago been reconciled to them, and has promiſed never to ſuffer the lava to hurt them again. At the foot of Mount Etna, a ſtatue of a ſaint is placed as a memorial, for having prevented the lava from running up the mountain of Taurominum, and deſtroying that town; the ſaint having conducted the lava down a low valley to the ſea.

When a traveller once happens to deviate from the right road, there is no end of wandering. Porphyrius reports, that in Anubis, an Egyptian city, a real man was worſhipped as a god; which is alſo aſſerted by Minucius Fœlix, in his apology for the Chriſtians. A thouſand writers have ſaid, that the Tartars believe their high-prieſt, termed *Dalai Lama*, to be immortal. But that is a miſtake: his death is publiſhed through the whole country; and couriers, ſent even to Pekin, intimate it to the Emperor of China: his effigy, at the ſame time, is taken down from the portal of the great church, and that of his ſucceſſor is put in its ſtead. The ſyſtem of the metempſychoſis, adopted in that country, has occaſion'd the miſtake. They believe, that the holy ſpirit, which animates a Dalai Lama, paſſes upon his death into the body of his ſucceſſor. The ſpirit therefore is believed to be immortal, not the body. The Dalai Lama, however, is the object of profound veneration.

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The Tartar princes are daily ſending preſents to him, and conſulting him as an oracle: they even undertake a pilgrimage in order to worſhip him in perſon. In a retired part of the temple, he is ſhown covered with precious ſtones, and ſitting croſs-legged. They proſtrate themſelves before him at a diſtance, for they are not permitted to kiſs his toe. The prieſts make traffic even of his excrements, which are greedily purchaſed at a high price, and are kept in a golden box hanging from the neck, as a charm againſt every misfortune. Like the croſs of Jeſus, or the Virgin's milk, we may believe, there never will be wanting plenty of that precious ſtuff to anſwer all demands: the prieſts out of charity will furniſh a quota, rather than ſuffer votaries to depart with their money for want of goods to purchaſe. The perſon of the Japan Pope, or Eccleſiaſtical Emperor, is held ſo ſacred, as to make the cutting his beard, or his nails, a deadly ſin. But abſurd laws are never ſteadily executed. The beard and the nails are cut in the night-time, when the Pope is ſuppoſed to be ſleeping; and what is taken away by that operation, is underſtood to be ſtolen from him, which is no impeachment upon his Holineſs.

That the Jews were idolaters when they ſojourned in the land of Goſhen, were it not preſumable from their commerce with the Egyptians, would however be evident from the hiſtory of Moſes. Notwithſtanding their miraculous deliverance from the Egyptian king, notwithſtanding the daily miracles wrought among them in the wilderneſs; ſo addicted were they to a viſible deity, that, during even the momentary abſence of Moſes converſing with God on the mount, they fabricated a golden calf, and worſhipped it as their god. "And the Lord ſaid unto Moſes, Go, get thee "down: for thy people which thou broughteſt out of the land "of Egypt, have corrupted themſelves: they have turned aſide "quickly out of the way which I commanded them: they have "made them a molten calf, have worſhipped it, have ſacrificed "thereunto,

" thereunto, and ſaid, Theſe be thy gods, O Iſrael, which have " brought thee up out of the land of Egypt (*a*)." The hiſtory of the Jews, ſhows how difficult it is to reclaim from idolatry a bruti ſh people, addicted to ſuperſtition, and fettered by inveterate habit. What profuſion of blood, to bring that obſtinate and perverſe people to the true religion! all in vain. The book of Judges, in particular, is full of reiterated relapſes, from their own inviſible God, to the viſible gods of other nations. And in all probability, their anxious deſire for a viſible king, related in the firſt book of Samuel, aroſe from their being deprived of a viſible god. There was a neceſſity for prohibiting images (*b*); which would have ſoon been converted into deities viſible: and it was extremely prudent, to ſupply the want of a viſible god, with endleſs ſhews and ceremonies; which accordingly became the capital branch of the Jewiſh worſhip.

It appears to me from the whole hiſtory of the Jews, that a groſs people are not ſuſceptible but of a groſs religion; and without an enlightened underſtanding, that it is vain to think of eradicating ſuperſtition and idolatry. And after all the covenants made with the Jews, after all the chaſtiſements and all the miracles laviſh'd on them, that they were not however reclaimed from the moſt groveling idolatry, is evident from the two golden calves fabricated by Jeroboam, ſaying, " Behold thy gods, O Iſrael, " which brought thee up out of the land of Egypt (*c*)." The people alſo of Judah fell back to idol-worſhip under Rehoboam, ſon of Solomon (*d*). Jehu, king of the ten tribes, did not tolerate the

(*a*) Exod. xxxii. 7.

(*b*) Deuteronomy, xvi. 22.

(*c*) 1 Kings, xii. 28.

(*d*) 1 Kings, xiv. 23.

worſhip

worſhip of other gods (*a*); but he continued to worſhip the two golden calves fabricated by Jeroboam (*b*). Down to the days of King Hezekiah, the Jews worſhipped the brazen ſerpent erected by Moſes in the wilderneſs. The Jews ſeem indeed to have been a very perverſe people: the many promiſes and threatenings announced by their prophets, and the many miracles wrought among them, had no permanent effect to reſtrain them from idolatry; and yet, during their captivity in Babylon, ſeveral of them ſubmitted to be burnt alive, rather than to join in idol-worſhip (*c*). Captivity cured them radically of idolatry; and from that period to this day, they have not been guilty of a ſingle relapſe. Xiphilin, in his abridgement of Dion Caſſius, relating their war with Pompey, many centuries after the Babyloniſh captivity, gives the following account of them. "Their cuſtoms are quite "different from thoſe of other nations. Beſide a peculiar manner of "living, they acknowledge none of the common deities: they ac- "knowledge but one, whom they worſhip with great veneration. "There never was an image in Jeruſalem; becauſe they believe "their God to be inviſible and ineffable. They have built him a "temple of great ſize and beauty, remarkable in the following "particular, that it is open above, without any roof."

There lies no ſolid objection againſt images among an enlightened people, when uſed merely to rouſe devotion. But as images tend to pervert the vulgar, they ought not to be admitted into churches: pictures are leſs liable to be miſapprehended; and the Ethiopians accordingly indulge pictures, tho' they prohibit ſtatues, in their churches. The general council of Frankfort permit-

(*a*) 2 Kings, x. 25.

(*b*) 2 Kings, x. 29.

(*c*) Daniel, chap. 3.

ted the uſe of images in churches; but ſtrictly prohibited any worſhip to be addreſſed to them. So prone however to idolatry are the low and illiterate, that the prohibition loſt ground both in France and in Germany; and idol-worſhip became again general.

It is extremely probable, that the ſun and moon were early held to be deities, and that they were the firſt viſible objects of worſhip. It muſt indeed be acknowledged, that of all the different kinds of idolatry, it is the moſt excuſable. Upon the ſun depends health, vigour, and cheerfulneſs: during his retirement, all is dark and diſconſolate: when he performs his majeſtic round, to bleſs his ſubjects, and to beſtow fecundity upon every animal and vegetable, can a mere ſavage with-hold gratitude and veneration! Hear an old Pagan bard upon that ſubject. "O "thou who rolleſt above, round as the ſhield of my fathers! "Whence are thy beams, O ſun, thy everlaſting light? Thou "comeſt forth in thy awful beauty, and the ſtars hide themſelves in "the moon cold and pale ſinks in the weſtern wave: "thou moveſt alone, for who can be a companion of thy courſe! "The oaks of the mountain fall: the mountains themſelves decay with "years: the ocean ſhrinks and grows again: the moon herſelf is "loſt in heaven: but thou art for ever the ſame, rejoicing in the "brightneſs of thy courſe. When tempeſts deform the world, "when thunder rolls, and lightning flies, thou lookeſt in thy "beauty from the clouds, and laugheſt at the ſtorm (*a*)." Worſhip to the ſun as a real deity, was in former times univerſal; and prevails in many countries even at preſent. The American ſavages worſhip the ſun, as ſovereign of the univerſe, known by the name of *Ariskoui* among the Hurons, and of *Agriskoué* among the Iroquois. They offer him tobacco, which they term *ſmoking the ſun*: the chief man in the aſſembly lights the calumet, and offers

(*a*) Oſſian.

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it thrice to the riſing ſun; imploring his protection, and recommending the tribe to his care. The chief proceeds to ſmoke; and every one ſmokes in his turn. This ceremony is performed on important occaſions only: leſs matters are reſerved for their Manitou. The Miſſiſippi people offer to the ſun the firſt of what they take in hunting; which their commander artfully converts to his own uſe. The Apalachites, bordering on Florida, worſhip the ſun; but ſacrifice nothing to him that has life: they hold him to be the parent of life, and think that he can take no pleaſure in the deſtruction of any living creature: their devotion is exerted in perfumes and ſongs. The Mexicans, while a free people, preſented to the ſun a ſhare of their meat and drink. The inhabitants of Darien, believe in the ſun as their god, and in the moon as his wife, paying equal adoration to each. The people of Borneo, worſhip the ſun and moon as real divinities. The Samoides worſhip both, bowing to them morning and evening in the Perſian manner.

But if the ſun and moon were the firſt objects of idolatry, knowledge and reflection reformed many from the error of holding theſe luminaries to be deities. "That original intelligence," ſay the Magians, "who is the firſt principle of all things, diſco-"vers himſelf to the mind and underſtanding only: but he "hath placed the ſun as his image in the viſible univerſe; and "the beams of that bright luminary, are but a faint copy of the "glory that ſhines in the higher heavens." The Perſians, as Herodotus reports, had neither temples, nor altars, nor images: for, ſays that author, they do not think, like the Greeks, that there is any reſemblance between gods and men. The Gaures, who to this day profeſs the ancient religion of Perſia, celebrate divine worſhip before the ſacred fire, and turn with peculiar veneration toward the riſing ſun, as the repreſentative of God; but they adore neither the ſun, nor the ſacred fire. They are profeſſed e-

nemies to every image of the Deity cut with hands: and hen the havock made by the ancient Perſians, upon the ſtatues a temples of the Grecian gods. Such ſublimity of thought was bove the reach of other uninſpired nations, excepting only the Hindows and Chineſe.

I cloſe the hiſtory of idolatry with a brief recapitulation of the outlines. Admitting the ſun and moon to have been the firſt objects of idolatry, yet as Polytheiſm was once univerſal, they make only two of the many gods that were every where worſhipped. We have ſeen, that the ſacred fire was employ'd in the worſhip of the ſun, and that images were employ'd in the worſhip of other deities. Images were originally uſed for the ſole purpoſe of animating devotion: ſuch was their uſe in Perſia and Hindoſtan; and ſuch was their uſe in every country among philoſophers. The Emperor Julian, in an epiſtle to Theodore concerning the images of the gods, ſays, "We believe not that theſe images are gods: "we only uſe them in worſhipping the gods." In the progreſs toward idolatry, the next ſtep is, to imagine, that a deity loves his image, that he makes it his reſidence, or at leaſt communicates ſome virtue to it. The laſt ſtep is, to imagine the image itſelf to be a deity; which gained ground imperceptibly as ſtatuary advanced toward perfection. It would be incredible that men of ſenſe ſhould ever ſuffer themſelves to be impreſſed with ſo wild a deluſion, were it not the overbearing influence of religious ſuperſtition. *Credo quia impoſſibile eſt*, is applicable to idolatry as well as to tranſubſtantiation. The worſhipping the ſun and moon as deities, is idolatry in the ſtricteſt ſenſe. With reſpect to images, the firſt ſtep of the progreſs is not idolatry: the next is mixed idolatry: and the laſt is rank idolatry.

So much upon idolatry. I proceed to what approaches the neareſt to it, which is worſhip addreſſed to deified mortals. The ancient gods were exalted ſo little above men, that it was no hard

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taſk for the imagination to place in heaven, men who had made a figure on earth. The Grecian heaven was entirely peopled with ſuch men, as well as that of many other nations. Men are deified every day by the Romiſh church, under the denomination of ſaints: perſons are frequently ſelected for that honour who ſcarce deſerved a place on earth, and ſome who never had a place there. The Roman Catholics copy the Pagans, in worſhipping theſe ſubordinate divinities by prayers and oblations: and they are well rewarded, by being taken under protection of theſe ſaints in quality of tutelar deities. One branch of the office beſtow'd on theſe ſaints, is to explain the wants of their votaries to the King of heaven, and to ſupplicate for them. The mediatorial office prevails with reſpect to earthly potentates, as well as heavenly: being ſtruck with awe and timidity in approaching thoſe exalted above us, we naturally take hold of ſome intermediate perſon to ſolicit for us. In approaching the Almighty, the mind, ſinking down into humility and profound veneration, ſtops ſhort, relying upon ſome friend in heaven to intercede in its behalf. Temples among the Cochin-Chineſe are conſtructed with a deep and dark niche, which is their *ſanctum ſanctorum*. They hold, that no repreſentation, whether by painting or ſculpture, can be made of God, who is inviſible. The niche denotes his incomprehenſibility; and the good men placed by them in heaven, are believed to be their interceſſors at the throne of grace. The prayers of the Chinguleſe are ſeldom directed to the ſupreme being, but to his vicegerents. Interceſſors, at the ſame time, contribute to the eaſe of their votaries: a Roman Catholic need not aſſume a very high tone in addreſſing a tutelar ſaint choſen by himſelf.

Falſe notions of Providence have prompted groveling mortals to put confidence in mediators and interceſſors of a ſtill lower claſs, viz. living mortals, who by idle auſterities have acquired a reputation for holineſs. Take the following inſtance, the ſtrong-

eſt

eſt of the kind that can be figured. Louis XI. of France, ſenſible of the approach of death, ſent for a hermit of Calabria, named *Franciſco Martarillo*; and throwing himſelf at the hermit's feet in a flood of tears, entreated him to intercede with God, that his life might be prolonged; as if the voice of a Calabrian friar, ſays Voltaire, could alter the courſe of Providence, by preſerving a weak and perverſe ſoul in a worn-out body.

Having diſcuſſed the perſons that are the objects of worſhip, the next ſtep in order is, to take under view the forms and ceremonies employ'd in religious worſhip. Forms are neceſſary wherever a number of perſons join in one operation: they are eſſential in an army, and little leſs eſſential at public worſhip. The uſe of ceremonies is to excite devotion: but to preſerve a juſt medium, requires great delicacy of taſte; for tho' ceremonies are neceſſary at public worſhip to prevent languor, yet ſuperfluity of ceremonies quenches devotion, by occupying the mind too much upon externals. The Roman-Catholic worſhip is crowded with ceremonies: it reſembles the Italian opera, which is all ſound, and no ſentiment. The Preſbyterian form of worſhip is too naked: it is proper for philoſophers more than for the populace. This is fundamentally the cauſe of the numerous ſeceſſions from the church of Scotland that have made a figure of late: people diſlike the eſtabliſhed forms, when they find leſs comfort in public worſhip than is expected; and without being ſenſible of the real cauſe, they chuſe paſtors for themſelves, who ſupply the want of ceremonies by loud ſpeaking, with much external fervor and devotion.

The frequent ablutions or waſhings among the Mahometans and others, as acts of devotion, ſhow the influence that the ſlighteſt reſemblances have on the ignorant. Becauſe purification, in ſeveral languages, is a term applicable to the mind as well as to the body, ſhallow thinkers, miſled by the double meaning, imagine that the mind, like the body, is purified by water.

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The ſect of Ali uſe the Alcoran tranſlated into the Perſian language, which is their native tongue. The ſect of Omar eſteem this to be a groſs impiety; being perſuaded, that the Alcoran was written in Arabic, by the Angel Gabriel, at the command of God himſelf. The Roman Catholics are not then the only people who profeſs to ſpeak nonſenſe to God Almighty; or, which is the ſame, who profeſs to pray in an unknown tongue.

At meals, the ancients poured out ſome wine as a libation to the gods: Chriſtians pronounce a ſhort prayer, termed a *grace*.

The groſs notion of Deity entertained by the ancients, is exemplified in their worſhipping and ſacrificing on high places; in order, as they thought, to be more within ſight. Jupiter in Homer praiſes Hector for ſacrificing to him frequently upon the top of Ida; and Strabo obſerves, that the Perſians, who uſed neither images nor altars, ſacrificed to the gods in high places. Balak carried Balaam the prophet to the top of Piſgah, and other mountains, to ſacrifice there, and to curſe Iſrael. The votaries of Baal always worſhipped in high places. Even the ſage Tacitus was infected with that abſurdity. Speaking of certain high mountains where the gods were worſhipped, he expreſſes himſelf thus: *Maxime cœlo appropinquare, preceſque mortalium a Deo nuſquam propius audiri* *.

Ceremonies that tend to unhinge morality, belong more properly to the following ſection, treating of the connection between religion and morality.

It is now full time to take under conſideration an objection to the ſenſe of Deity hinted above, arguing from the groſs conceptions of deity among many nations, that this ſenſe cannot be innate. The objection is not indeed ſtated in the following paſſage,

* "As approaching nearer to heaven, the prayers of mortals are there more "diſtinctly heard."

borrowed

borrowed from a juſtly-celebrated author; but as it may be implied, the paſſage ſhall be fairly tranſcribed. "The univerſal "propenſity to believe inviſible intelligent power, being a general attendant on human nature, if not an original inſtinct, may "be conſidered as a kind of ſtamp which the Deity has ſet upon "his work; and nothing ſurely can more dignify mankind, "than to be the only earthly being who bears the ſtamp or image "of the univerſal Creator. But conſult this image as it commonly is in popular religions: how is the Deity disfigured! what "caprice, abſurdity, and immorality, are attributed to him (*a*)!" A ſatisfactory anſwer to the objection implied in this paſſage, will occur, upon recollecting the progreſs of men and nations from infancy to maturity. Our external ſenſes, neceſſary for ſelf-preſervation, ſoon arrive at perfection: the more refined ſenſes of propriety, of right and wrong, of Deity, of being accountable creatures, and many others of the ſame kind, are of ſlower growth: the ſenſe of right and wrong in particular, and the ſenſe of Deity, ſeldom reach perfection, but by good education and much ſtudy. If ſuch be the caſe among enlightened nations, what is to be expected from ſavages who are in the loweſt ſtage of underſtanding? To a ſavage of New Holland, whoſe ſenſe of deity is extremely obſcure, one may talk without end of a being who created the world, and who governs it by wiſe laws; but in vain; for the ſavage will be never the wiſer. The ſame ſavage hath alſo a glimmering of the moral ſenſe, as all men have; and yet in vain will you diſcourſe to him of approbation and diſapprobation, of merit and demerit: of theſe terms he has no clear conception. Hence the endleſs aberrations of rude and barbarous nations, from pure religion as well as from pure morality. Of the latter there are many inſtances collected in the preceding tract; and of

(*a*) Natural Hiſtory of Religion.

the

the former, inſtances ſtill more plentiful in the preſent tract. The ſenſe of deity in dark times has indeed been ſtrangely diſtorted by certain biaſſes and paſſions that enſlave the rude and illiterate: but theſe yield gradually to the rational faculty as it ripens, and at laſt leave religion free to ſound philoſophy. Then it is that men, liſtening to the innate ſenſe of deity purified from every bias, acquire a clear conviction of one ſupreme Deity who made and governs the world.

The foregoing objection then, impartially conſidered, weighs not againſt the ſenſe of deity more than againſt the moral ſenſe. If it have weight, it reſolves into a complaint againſt Providence for the weakneſs of the ſenſe of deity in rude and illiterate nations. If ſuch complaint be ſolidly founded, it pierces extremely deep: why have not all nations, even in their naſcent ſtate, the ſenſe of deity, and the moral ſenſe, in purity and perfection? why do they not poſſeſs all the arts of life without neceſſity of culture or experience? why are we born poor and helpleſs infants, inſtead of being produced complete in every member, internal and external, as Adam and Eve were? The plan of Providence is far above the reach of our weak criticiſms. I ſhall only obſerve, that as, with reſpect to individuals, there is a progreſs from infancy to maturity; ſo there is a ſimilar progreſs in every nation, from its ſavage ſtate to its maturity in arts and ſciences. A child that has juſt conceptions of the Deity and of his attributes, would be a great miracle; and would not ſuch knowledge in a ſavage be equally ſo? Nor can I diſcover what benefit a child or a ſavage could reap from ſuch knowledge; provided it remained a child or a ſavage in every other reſpect. The genuine fruits of religion, are gratitude to the Author of our being, veneration to him as the ſupreme being, abſolute reſignation to the eſtabliſhed laws of his providence, and chearful performance of every duty: but a child has not the ſlighteſt idea of gratitude nor of veneration, and very

little of moral duties; and a ſavage, with reſpect to theſe, is no much ſuperior to a child. The formation and government of the world, as far as we know, are excellent: we have great reaſon to preſume the ſame with reſpect to what we do not know; and every good man will reſt ſatisfied with the following reflection, That we would have been men from the hour of our birth, complete in every part, had it been conformable to the ſyſtem of unerring Providence.

SECT. II.

Morality conſidered as a branch of duty to our Maker.

HAving travelled long on a rough road, not a little fatiguing, the agreeable part lies before us; which is, to treat of morality as a branch of religion. It was that ſubject which induced me to undertake the hiſtory of natural religion; a ſubject that will afford ſalutary inſtruction, and will inſpire true piety, if inſtruction can produce that effect.

Bayle ſtarts a queſtion, Whether a people may not be happy in ſociety, and be qualified for good government, upon principles of morality ſingly, without any ſenſe of religion. The queſtion is ingenious, and may give opportunity for ſubtile reaſoning; but it is uſeleſs, becauſe the fact ſuppoſed cannot happen. The principles of morality and of religion are equally rooted in our nature: they are indeed weak in children and in ſavages; but they grow up together, and advance toward maturity with equal ſteps.

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Where-ever the moral ſenſe is in perfection, a ſenſe of religion cannot be wanting; and if a man who has no ſenſe of religion, live decently in ſociety, he is more indebted for his conduct to good temper than to ſound morals.

We have the authority of the Prophet Micah, formerly quoted, for holding, that religion, or, in other words, our duty to God, conſiſts in doing juſtice, in loving mercy, and in walking humbly with him. The laſt is the foundation of religious worſhip, diſcuſſed in the foregoing ſection: the two former belong to the preſent head. And if we have gratitude to our Maker and Benefactor, if we owe implicit obedience to his will as our rightful ſovereign, we ought not to ſeparate the worſhip we owe to him, from juſtice and benevolence to our fellow-creatures; for to be unjuſt to them, to be cruel or hard-hearted, is a tranſgreſſion of his will, no leſs groſs than a total neglect of religious worſhip. "Maſter, which is the great commandment in the law? "Jeſus ſaid unto him, Thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with "all thy heart, with all thy ſoul, and with all thy mind. This "is the firſt and great commandment. And the ſecond is like "unto it, Thou ſhalt love thy neighbour as thyſelf. On theſe "two commandments hang all the law and the prophets (*a*)." "Then ſhall the King ſay unto them on his right hand, Come, "ye bleſſed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you. "For I was hungry, and ye gave me meat: I was thirſty, and ye "gave me drink: I was a ſtranger, and ye took me in: naked, "and ye cloathed me: ſick, and ye viſited me: in priſon, and "ye came unto me. Then ſhall the righteous anſwer, ſaying, "Lord, when ſaw we thee hungry, and fed thee? or thirſty, "and gave thee drink? When ſaw we thee a ſtranger, and took "thee in? or naked, and cloathed thee? When ſaw we thee

(*a*) Matthew, xxii. 36.

" ſick, or in priſon, and came unto thee? And the King ſhall " anſwer, Verily I ſay unto you, in as much as ye have done it " unto one of the leaſt of theſe my brethren, ye have done it un- " to me (*a*)." " Pure religion and undefiled before God, is this, " To viſit the fatherleſs and widow in their affliction; and to keep " himſelf unſpotted from the world (*b*)." " Hoſtias et victimas " Domino offeram quas in uſum mei protulit, ut rejiciam ei ſuum " munus? Ingratum eſt; cum ſit litabilis hoſtia bonus animus, " et pura mens, et ſincera conſcientia. Igitur qui innocentiam co- " lit, Domino ſupplicat; qui juſtitiam, Deo libat; qui fraudi- " bus abſtinet, propitiat Deum; qui hominem periculo ſubripit, " optimam victimam cædit. Hæc noſtra ſacrificia, hæc Dei ſacra " ſunt. Sic apud nos religioſior eſt ille, qui juſtior * (*c*)." The laws of Zaleucus, lawgiver to the Locrians, who lived before the days of Pythagoras, are introduced with the following preamble. " No man can queſtion the exiſtence of Deity who obſerves the " order and harmony of the univerſe, which cannot be the pro- " duction of chance. Men ought to bridle their paſſions, and to " guard againſt every vice. God is pleaſed with no ſacrifice but " a ſincere heart; and differs widely from mortals, whoſe delight

* " Shall I offer to God for a ſacrifice thoſe creatures which his bounty has " given me for my uſe? It were ingratitude to throw back the gift upon the gi- " ver. The moſt acceptable ſacrifice is an upright mind, an untainted conſcience, " and an honeſt heart. The actions of the innocent aſcend to God in prayer; " the obſervance of juſtice is more grateful than incenſe; the man who is ſincere " in his dealings, ſecures the favour of his Creator; and the delivery of a fellow- " creature from danger or deſtruction, is dearer in the eyes of the Almighty than " the ſacrifice of blood."

(*a*) Matthew, xxv. 34.

(*b*) James, i. 27.

(*c*) Minucius Fœlix.

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" are ſplendid ceremonies and rich offerings. Let juſtice there-
" fore be ſtudied; for by that only can a man be acceptable to
" the Deity. Let thoſe who are tempted to do ill, have always
" before their eyes, the ſevere judgements of the gods againſt
" wicked men. Let them always keep in view the hour of death,
" that fatal hour which is attended with bitter remorſe for tranſ-
" greſſing the rules of juſtice. If a bad diſpoſition incline you
" to vice, pray to Heaven at the foot of the altar, to mend your
" heart."

Morality is thus included in religion. Some nations, however, leave not this propoſition to reaſoning or conviction, but ingroſs many moral duties in their religious creed. In the 67th chapter of the Sadder, a lie is declared to be a great ſin, and is diſcharged even where it tends to bring about good. So much purer is the morality of the ancient Perſians than of the preſent Jeſuits. The religion of the people of Pegu, inculcates charity, forbids to kill, to ſteal, or to injure others. Attend to the conſequence: that people, fierce originally, have become humane and compaſſionate. In a ſacred book of the ancient Perſians, it is written, " If you " incline to be a ſaint, give good education to your children; " for their virtuous actions will be imputed to you." The people of Japan pay great reſpect to their parents; it being an article in their creed, That thoſe who fail in duty to their parents, will be puniſhed by the gods. In theſe two inſtances, religion tends greatly to connect parents and children in the moſt intimate tie of cordial affection. The reverence the Chineſe have for their anceſtors, and the ceremonies performed annually at their tombs, tend to keep them at home, and prevent their wandering into foreign countries.

Superſtitious rites in ſome religions, are ſucceſsfully employ'd to enforce certain moral duties. The Romans commonly made their ſolemn covenants in the capitol, before the ſtatue of Jupi-

ter;

ter; by which ſolemnity he was underſtood to guarantee the covenant, ready to pour out vengeance upon the tranſgreſſor. The Burates, a people in Grand Tartary, have a cuſtom, which is, to demand an oath upon a mountain, held to be ſacred. They are firmly perſuaded, that the perſon who ſwears a falſehood, will not come down alive. The Eſſenes, a Jewiſh ſect, bound themſelves by a ſolemn oath, to ſhun unlawful gain, to be faithful to their promiſes, not to lie, and never to harm any one. In Cochin-China, the ſouls of thoſe who have been eminent for arts or arms, are worſhipped. Their ſtatues are placed in the temples; and the ſize of a ſtatue is proportioned to the merit of the perſon repreſented. If that cuſtom be executed with candor, there cannot be a nobler incitement to public ſpirit. The Egyptians did not reach the thought of honouring virtue after death; but they diſhonoured vice, by prohibiting it from the Elyſian fields.

The ſalutary influence of religion on morality, is not confined to pure religion, whether by its connection with morality in general, or by inculcating particular moral duties. There are many religious doctrines, doubtful or perhaps erroneous, that contribute alſo to enforce morality. Some followers of Confucius aſcribe immortality to the ſouls only of the juſt; and believe that the ſouls of the wicked periſh with their bodies. In the ſecond chapter of the Sadder, it is written, that a man whoſe good works are more numerous than his ſins, will go to paradiſe; otherwiſe that he will be thruſt into hell, there to remain for ever. It adds, that a bridge erected over the great abyſs where hell is ſituated, leads from this earth to paradiſe; that upon the bridge there ſtands an angel, who weighs in a balance the merits of the paſſengers; that the paſſenger whoſe good works are found light in the balance, is thrown over the bridge into hell; but that the paſſenger whoſe good works preponderate, proceeds in his journey to paradiſe, where there is a glorious city, gardens, rivers, and beautiful

tiful virgins, whoſe looks are a perpetual feaſt, but who muſt not be enjoy'd. In the fourth chapter of the Sadder, good works are zealouſly recommended in the following parable. Zeraduſht, or Zoroaſter, being in company with God, ſaw a man in hell who wanted his right foot. "Oh my Creator," ſaid Zoroaſter, "who is that man who wants the right foot? God anſwered, "He was the king of thirty-three cities, reigned many years, "but never did any good, except once, when, ſeeing a ſheep ty'd "where it could not reach its food, he with his right foot puſhed "the food to it; upon which account, that foot was ſaved from "hell." In Japan, thoſe of the Sinto religion believe, that the ſouls of good men are tranſlated to a place of happineſs, next to the habitation of their gods. But they admit no place of torment; nor have they any notion of a devil, but what animates the fox, a very miſchievous animal in that country. What then becomes of the ſouls of ill men? Being denied entrance into heaven, they wander about to expiate their ſins. Thoſe of the Bubſdo religion believe, that in the other world, there is a place of miſery as well as of happineſs. Of the latter, there are different degrees, for different degrees of virtue; and yet, far from envying the happier lot of others, every inhabitant is perfectly ſatisfied with his own. There are alſo different degrees of miſery; for juſtice requires, that every man be puniſhed according to the nature and number of his ſins. *Jemma O* is the ſevere judge of the wicked: their vices appear to him in all their horror, by means of a mirror, named *the mirror of knowledge*. When ſouls have expiated their ſins, after ſuffering long in the priſon of darkneſs, they are ſent back into the world, to animate ſerpents, toads, and ſuch vile animals as reſembled them in their former exiſtence. From theſe they paſs into the bodies of more innocent animals; and at laſt are again ſuffered to enter human bodies; after the diſſolution of which, they run the ſame courſe of happineſs or miſery as at firſt. The

people

people of Benin, in Africa, believe a man's ſhadow to be a real being, that gives teſtimony after death for or againſt him; and that he accordingly is made happy or miſerable in another world. A religious belief in ancient Greece, that the ſouls of thoſe who are left above ground without rites, have not acceſs to Elyſium, tended to promote humanity; for thoſe who are careful of the dead, will not be altogether indifferent about the living.

Immenſe are the bleſſings that men in ſociety reap, from the union of pure religion with ſound morality: but however immenſe, I boldly affirm, that they ſcarce counterbalance the manifold evils that ſociety has ſuffered from impure religion, indulging and even encouraging groſs immoralities. A few of the moſt glaring inſtances ſhall be ſelected. The firſt I ſhall mention is, the holding religion to conſiſt in the belief of points purely ſpeculative, ſuch as have no relation to good works. The natural effect of that doctrine is, to divorce religion from morality, in manifeſt contradiction to the will of God. What avails it, for example, to the glory of God, or to the happineſs of mankind, whether the conception of the Virgin Mary was maculate or immaculate? The following few inſtances, taken out of a large heap, are controverſies of that kind, which miſerably afflicted the Chriſtian church for ages, and engendered the bittereſt enmity, raging with deſtruction and ſlaughter among brethren of the ſame religion. In the fifth century, it was the employment of more than one general council, to determine, whether *the mother of God*, or *the mother of Chriſt*, is the proper epithet of the Virgin Mary. In the ſixth century, a bitter controverſy aroſe, whether Chriſt's body was corruptible. In the ſeventh century, Chriſtians were divided about the volition of Chriſt, whether he had one or two Wills, and how his Will operated. In the eighth and ninth centuries, the Greek and Latin churches divided about the Holy Ghoſt, whether he proceeded from the Father and Son, or only from the Father. In the eleventh cen-

there aroſe a warm conteſt between the Greek and Latin churches, about uſing unleavened bread in the euchariſt. In the fourteenth century, it was controverted between Pope John XXII. and the divines of his time, whether ſouls in their intermediate ſtate ſee God, or only the human nature of Chriſt. Franciſcans have ſuffered death in multitudes about the form of their hood. It was diſputed between the Dominicans and Franciſcans, whether Chriſt had any property. The Pope pronounced the negative propoſition to be a peſtilential and blaſphemous doctrine, ſubverſive of Catholic faith. Many councils were held at Conſtantinople, to determine what ſort of light it was that the diſciples ſaw on Mount Tabor: it was ſolemnly pronounced, to be the eternal light with which God is encircled; and which may be termed his energy or operation, but is diſtinct from his nature and eſſence. A heap of propoſitions in the creed of St Athanaſius, as far as intelligible, are merely ſpeculative, ſuch as may be adopted or rejected, without the leaſt danger to religion, or to morality; and yet we are commanded to believe every one of them, under the pain of eternal damnation. An endleſs number of ſuch propoſitions, adopted by the Romiſh church, clearly evince, that Chriſtianity was in that church held to conſiſt entirely in belief, without any regard to good works *. Whether the Alcoran was eternal, or whether it was created, is a diſpute that has occaſioned much effuſion of Mahometan blood. The Calif Mamoun, with many doctors, held it to have been created; but the greater number inſiſted, that being the word of God, it muſt like him be eternal. This opinion is embraced by the preſent Mahometants, who hold all who deny it to be infidels. There is among men great uniformity of opinion in

* The great weight that was laid upon orthodoxy, appears from a triumphal arch erected over the tomb of Charlemagne, upon which was the following inſcription: "Here lies the body of Charles, a great and orthodox emperor."

matters of importance. Religious differences are generally about trifles, where liberty ought to be indulged without reſerve (*a*); and yet upon theſe trifles are founded the bittereſt enmities. It ought therefore to be a fundamental law in every church, to abſtain from loading its creed with articles that are not eſſential; for ſuch articles tend to eradicate brotherly love, and to convert into bitter enemies, men who are fundamentally of the ſame faith.

In the next place ſhall be mentioned, certain articles of faith that tend to ſap the very foundation of one or other moral duty. What, for example, can more effectually promote cruelty, than the creed of the Idaans, a people in the iſland of Borneo, That every perſon they put to death muſt attend them as a ſlave in the other world? This belief makes them prone to war, and occaſions aſſaſſinations without end. According to the creed of the ſavages in Canada, the killing and burning enemies are what chiefly entitle them to be happy in another world; and that he who deſtroys the greateſt number, will be the moſt happy. At the ſame time, they have no notion of greater happineſs there, than plenty of game, great abundance of all things without labour, and full gratification of every ſenſual appetite. The Scandinavians had no notion of greater bliſs in another world, than to drink beer out of the ſkull of an enemy, in the hall of Woden, their tutelar deity: can hatred and revenge in this world be more honourably rewarded? The doctrine of tutelar deities is equally productive of hatred and revenge: relying on a ſuperior power who eſpouſes all my quarrels, I put no bounds to my reſentment, and every moral duty in oppoſition is trampled under foot. The following creed of the inhabitants of the Marian or Ladrone iſlands, is a great encouragement to cowardice. Heaven, according to that creed, is a region under the earth, filled with cocoa-trees, ſugar-

(*a*) Elements of Criticiſm, vol. 2. p. 493. edit. 5.

canes,

canes, and variety of other delicious fruits. Hell is a vaſt furnace, conſtantly red hot. Their condition in the other world depends not on good or bad actions, but on the manner of their death. Thoſe who die a natural death, go ſtraight to heaven: they may ſin freely, if they can but ſecure their perſons againſt violence. But war and bloodſhed are their averſion, becauſe thoſe who ſuffer a violent death go ſtraight to hell. In many ancient nations, a goddeſs was worſhipped, whoſe province it was to promote animal love without regard to matrimony. That goddeſs was in Greece termed *Aphrodité*, in Rome *Venus*, and in Babylon *Mylitta*. To her was ſacrificed, in ſome countries, the virginity of young women; which, it was believed, did ſecure their chaſtity for ever after. Juſtin mentions a cuſtom in the iſland of Cyprus, of ſending young women at ſtated times to the ſea-ſhore; where they proſtituted themſelves as a tribute to Venus, that they might be chaſte the reſt of their lives. His words are, "Pro reliqua "pudicitiæ libamenta Veneri ſoluturas (*a*)." In other nations, a ſmall number only were proſtituted, in order to ſecure to the remainder, a chaſte and regular life. This explains a cuſtom among the Babylonians, which, far from being thought a religious act, is held as a proof of abandoned debauchery. The cuſtom was, That every woman once in her life ſhould proſtitute herſelf in the temple of the goddeſs Mylitta. Herodotus reports, that thereby they became proof againſt all temptation. And Ælian obſerves the ſame of the Lydian ladies. *Credat Judeus Apella.* Margaret Poretta, who in the fourteenth century made a figure among the Beguines, preached a doctrine not a little favourable to incontinence. She undertook to demonſtrate, "That the ſoul, when "abſorbed in the love of God, is free from the reſtraint of law, "and may freely gratify every natural appetite, without contract-

(*a*) Lib. 18. cap. 5.

" ing guilt;" a cordial doctrine for a lady of pleaſure. That crazy perſon, inſtead of being laugh'd at, was burnt alive at Paris. In the fifteenth century, a ſect termed *brethren and ſiſters of the free ſpirit*, held, That modeſty is a mark of inhering corruption; and that thoſe only are perfect, who can behold nakedneſs without emotion. Theſe fanatics appeared at public worſhip, without the leaſt covering. Many tenets profeſſed by the Jeſuits, open a door to every immorality. " Perſons truly wicked, " and void of the love of God, may expect eternal life in heaven; " provided only they be impreſſed with fear of divine anger, and " avoid heinous crimes through the dread of future puniſhment." Again, " Perſons may tranſgreſs with ſafety, who have a probable " reaſon for tranſgreſſing, ſuch as any plauſible argument. A " judge, for example, may decide for the leaſt probable ſide of a " queſtion, and even againſt his own opinion, provided he be " ſupported by any tolerable authority." Again, " Actions in- " trinſically evil, and contrary to divine law, may however be in- " nocently performed, by thoſe who can join, even ideally, a good " end to the performance. For example, an eccleſiaſtic may ſafe- " ly commit ſimony, by purchaſing a benefice, if to the unlaw- " ful act, he join the innocent purpoſe of procuring to himſelf " a ſubſiſtence. A man who runs another through the body for " a ſlight affront, renders the action lawful, if his motive be ho- " nour, not revenge." A famous Jeſuit taught, that a young man may wiſh the death of his father, and even rejoice at his death, provided the wiſh proceed, not from hatred, but from fondneſs of his father's eſtate. And another Jeſuit has had the effrontery to maintain, that a monk may lawfully aſſaſſinate a calumniator, who threatens to charge his order with ſcandalous practices.

A doctrine that ſtrikes at the root of every moral duty, as well as of religion itſelf, is, That God will accept a compoſition for

ſin; a doctrine that prevailed univerſally during the days of ignorance. Compoſitions for crimes were countenanced by law in every country (*a*); and men, prone to indulge their paſſions, flatter'd themſelves, that they might compound with God for ſinning againſt him, as with their neighbours for injuring them. Thoſe who have no notion of any motive but intereſt, naturally think it to be equally powerful with the Deity. An opinion prevailed univerſally in the Chriſtian church, from the eighth century down to the Reformation, that liberal donations to God, to a ſaint, to the church, would procure pardon even for the groſſeſt ſins. During that period, the building churches and monaſteries was in high vogue. This abſurd or rather impious doctrine, proved a plentiful harveſt of wealth to the clergy; for the great and opulent, who are commonly the boldeſt ſinners, have the greateſt ability to compound for their ſins. There needs nothing but ſuch an opinion, to annihilate every duty, whether moral or religious; for what wicked man will think either of reſtitution or of reformation, who can purchaſe a pardon from Heaven with ſo little trouble? Louis XI. of France was remarkably ſuperſtitious, even in a ſuperſtitious age. To ingratiate himſelf with the Virgin Mary, he ſurrendered to her the county of Boulogne with great ſolemnity. Voltaire remarks, that godlineſs conſiſts, not in making the Virgin a Counteſs, but in abſtaining from ſin. Compoſition for ſins is a doctrine of the church of Rome, boldly profeſſed without diſguiſe. A book of rates, publiſhed by authority of the Pope, contains ſtated prices for abſolutions, not excepting the moſt heinous ſins that men are capable to commit. So true is the obſervation of Æneas Silvius, afterward Pope Paul II. "Nihil eſt "quod abſque argento Romana curia det: ipſa manuum impoſitio, "et Spiritus Sancti dona, venduntur; nec peccatorum venia niſi

(*a*) Hiſtorical Law-tracts, tract 1.

"nummatis

" nummatis impenditur *." Of all the immoral atonements for ſin, human ſacrifices are the moſt brutal; deviating no leſs from the purity of religion, than from the fundamental principles of morality. They wore out of uſe as kindly affections prevailed; and will never again be reſtored, unleſs we fall back to the ſavage manners of our forefathers. Compoſition for crimes, once univerſal, is now baniſhed from every enlightened nation. Compoſition for ſins, was once equally univerſal; and I wiſh it could be ſaid, that there are now no remains of that poiſonous opinion among Chriſtians: the practice of the church of Rome will not permit it to be ſaid. Were men deeply convinced, as they ought to be, that ſincere repentance and reformation of manners are the only means for obtaining pardon, they would never dream of making bargains with the Almighty, and of compounding with him for their ſins.

In the practice of religion, the laying too great weight on forms, ceremonies, and other external arbitrary acts, has an unhappy tendency on morality. That error has infected every religion. The Sadder, the Bible of the Gaures, prohibits calumny and detraction, lying, ſtealing, adultery, and fornication. It however enervates morality and religion, by placing many trifling acts on a level with the moſt important duties. It enjoins the deſtruction of five kinds of reptiles, frogs, mice, ants, ſerpents, and flies that ſting. It teaches, that to walk barefoot profanes the ground. Great regard for water is enjoin'd: it muſt not be uſed during the night; and when ſet upon the fire, a third part of the pot muſt be empty, to prevent boiling over. The bramins have wofully degenerated from their original inſtitutions, thinking at

* " There is nothing to be obtained from the court of Rome, but by the force " of money: even the ceremony of conſecration, and the gifts of the Holy Ghoſt, " are ſold; and the remiſſion of ſins is beſtowed only on thoſe who can pay for " it."

preſent,

preſent, that religion conſiſts in forms and ceremonies. As ſoon as an infant is born, the word *Oum* muſt be pronounced over it; otherwiſe it will be eternally miſerable: its tongue muſt be rubbed with conſecrated meal: the third day of the moon, it muſt be carried into open air, with its head to the north. The inhabitants of Formoſa believe in hell; but it is only for puniſhing thoſe who fail to go naked in certain ſeaſons, or who wear cotton inſtead of ſilk. In the time of Ghenhizcan, it was held in Tartary a mortal ſin, to put a knife into the fire, to whip a horſe with his bridle, or to break one bone with another; and yet theſe pious Tartars held treachery, robbery, murder, to be no ſins. A faction in Ægina, a Greek commonwealth, treacherouſly aſſaſſinated ſeven hundred of their fellow-citizens. They cut off the hands of a miſerable fugitive, who had laid hold of the altar for protection, in order to murder him without the precincts of the temple. Their treacherous aſſaſſinations made no impreſſion: but tho' they refrained from murder in the temple, yet by profaning it with blood, ſays Herodotus, they offended the gods, and contracted inexpiable guilt. Would one believe, that a tribunal was eſtabliſhed by Charlemagne more horrible than the inquiſition itſelf? It was eſtabliſhed in Weſtphalia, to puniſh with death every Saxon who eat meat in lent. The ſame law was eſtabliſhed in Flanders and in French-county, the beginning of the ſeventeenth century.

Liſten to a celebrated writer upon that poiſonous conceit. "It "is certain, that in every religion, however ſublime, many of "the votaries, perhaps the greateſt number, will ſtill ſeek the di-"vine favour, not by virtue and good morals, which alone can "be acceptable to a perfect being, but either by frivolous obſer-"vances, by intemperate zeal, by rapturous ecſtaſies, or by the "belief of myſterious and abſurd opinions. When the old Ro-"mans were attacked with a peſtilence, they never aſcribed their

"ſufferings

" ſufferings to their vices, or dreamed of repentance and amend-
" ment. They never thought that they were the general robbers
" of the world, whoſe ambition and avarice made deſolate the
" earth, and reduced opulent nations to want and beggary. They
" only created a dictator in order to drive a nail into a door; and
" by that means they thought that they had ſufficiently appeaſed
" their incenſed deity (*a*)." Thus, gradually, the eſſentials of religion wear out of mind, by the attention given to forms and ceremonies: theſe intercept and exhauſt the whole ſtock of devotion, which ought to be reſerved for the higher exerciſes of religion. The neglect or tranſgreſſion of mere punctilios, are puniſhed as heinous ſins; while ſins really heinous are ſuffered to paſs with impunity. The Jews exalted the keeping their ſabbath holy, above every other duty; and it was the general belief, that the ſtrict obſervance of that day was alone ſufficient to atone for every ſin. The command of reſting that day, was taken ſo literally, that they would not on that day defend themſelves even againſt an aſſaſſin. Ptolomy, ſon of Lagus, entered Jeruſalem on the Jewiſh ſabbath, in a hoſtile manner without reſiſtance. Nor did experience open the eyes of that fooliſh people. Xiphilin, relating the ſiege of Jeruſalem by Pompey, ſays, that if the Jews had not reſted on the ſabbath, Pompey would not have been ſucceſsful. Every Saturday he renewed his batteries; and having on that day made a breach, he marched into the town without oppoſition. One cannot help ſmiling at an Amſterdam Jew, who had no check of conſcience, for breaking open a houſe, and carrying off money; and yet being ſtopped in his flight by the ſabbath before he got out of the territory, he moſt piouſly reſted, till he was apprehended, and led to the gallows. Nor are the Jews to this day cured of that frenzy. In ſome late accounts from Conſtantinople, a fire

(*a*) Natural Hiſtory of Religion, by David Hume, Eſquire.

broke

broke out in a Jew's houſe on Saturday: rather than profane the ſabbath, he ſuffered the flames to ſpread, which occaſioned the deſtruction of five hundred houſes *. We laugh at the Jews, and we have reaſon; and yet there are many well-meaning Proteſtants, who lay the whole of religion upon punctual attendance at public worſhip. Are the Roman Catholics leſs ſuperſtitious with reſpect to the place of worſhip, than the Jews are with reſpect to the day of worſhip? In the year 1670, ſome Arabians, watching an opportunity, got into the town of Dieu when the gates were opened in the morning. They might eaſily have been expelled by the canon of the citadel; but the Portugueſe governor was obliged to look on without firing a gun, being threatened with excommunication, if the leaſt miſchief ſhould be done to any of the churches. The only doctrines inculcated from the Romiſh pulpit down to the Reformation, were the authority of holy mother church; the merit of the ſaints, and their credit in the court of heaven; the dignity, glory, and love of the bleſſed Virgin; the efficacy of relics; the intolerable fire of purgatory; and the vaſt importance of indulgences. Relying on ſuch pious acts for obtaining remiſſion of ſins, all orders of men ruſhed headlong into vice †; nor was there

a

* "And there was a woman which had a ſpirit of infirmity eighteen years, and "was bowed together. And Jeſus laid his hands on her: and immediately ſhe "was made ſtraight, and glorified God. And the ruler of the ſynagogue with "indignation ſaid unto the people, There are ſix days in which men ought to "work: in them therefore come and be healed, and not on the ſabbath-day. The "Lord then ſaid, Thou hypocrite, doth not each one of you on the ſabbath looſe "his ox or his aſs from the ſtall, and lead him away to watering? and ought not "this woman, whom Satan hath bound, be looſed from this bond on the ſabbath-"day?" *Luke*, xiii. 11.

† An ingenious writer pleaſantly obſerves, "That a croiſade was the South-ſea "project of former times: by the latter, men hoped to gain riches without indu-

a ſingle attempt to ſtem the current of immorality; for the traffic of indulgences could not but flouriſh in proportion to the growth of ſin. And thus was religion ſet in direct oppoſition to morality. St Eloy, biſhop of Noyon in the ſeventh century, and canonized by the church of Rome, delivers the following doctrine. "He is a good Chriſtian who goes frequently to church; "who preſents his oblations upon the altar; who taſtes not the "fruit of his own induſtry till part be conſecrated to God; who, "when the holy feſtivals approach, lives chaſtely even with his "own wife for ſeveral days; and who can repeat the creed and "the Lord's prayer. Redeem then your ſouls from deſtruction, "while you have the means in your power: offer preſents and "tithes to churchmen: come more frequently to church: humbly implore the patronage of ſaints. If you obſerve theſe "things, you may, in the day of judgement, go with confidence "to the tribunal of the eternal Judge, and ſay, Give to us, O "Lord, for we have given unto thee." A modern author ſubjoins a proper obſervation. "We ſee here a very ample deſcrip"tion of a good Chriſtian, in which there is not the leaſt men"tion of the love of God, reſignation to his will, obedience to "his laws, nor of juſtice, benevolence, nor charity." Groſs ignorance and wretched ſuperſtition prevailed ſo much even in the fourteenth century, that people reckoned themſelves ſecure of ſalvation, if at the day of judgement they could ſhow any connection with monks. Many at the point of death, made it their laſt requeſt, to be admitted into the mendicant order, or to be interred in their burial-place. Religion need not aſſociate with morality, if ſuch ſilly practices be ſufficient for obtaining the favour of

"ſtry: by the former, they hoped to gain heaven without repentance, amendment "of life, or ſanctity of manners." *Sir David Dalrymple, a judge in the court of ſeſſion.*

God;

God. Is this leſs abſurd than the Hindoſtan belief, That the water of the Ganges hath a ſanctifying virtue; and that thoſe who die on its banks, are not only exempted from future puniſhment, but are wafted ſtraight to paradiſe?

Forms and ceremonies are viſible acts, which make a deep impreſſion on the vulgar. Hence their influence in reaſoning and in morality, as we have ſeen in the two ſketches immediately foregoing; and hence alſo their influence in religion. Forms and ceremonies are uſeful at public worſhip; but they ought not to take place of eſſentials. People however, governed by what they ſee and hear, are more addicted to external acts of devotion, than to heart-worſhip, which is not known but by reflection.

It will be no excuſe for relying ſo much on forms and ceremonies, that they are innocent. In themſelves they may be innocent; but not ſo in their conſequences. For they have by ſuch reliance a violent tendency to relax the obligations of morality. Religious rites that contradict not any paſſion, are keenly embraced, and punctually performed; and men, flattering themſelves that they have thus been punctual in their duty to God, give vent to their paſſions againſt men. "They pay "tithes of mint, and aniſe, and cummin; but omit the weightier matters of the law, judgement, mercy, and faith (*a*)." Upon ſuch a man religion ſits extremely light. As he ſeldom exerciſes any act of genuine devotion, he thinks of the Deity with eaſe and familiarity: how otherwiſe is it accountable, that the plays, termed *Myſteries*, could be reliſhed, where mean and perhaps diſſolute perſons are brought on the ſtage, acting Jeſus Chriſt, the Virgin Mary, and even God himſelf? Theſe divine perſons were certainly not more regarded, than the Grecian gods, who frequently made part of the *Dramatis perſonæ* in Greek plays. Many other facts might be urged, to prove the low ebb of reli-

(*a*) Matthew, xxiii. 23.

gion in thoſe days: I ſelect one or two, which probably will afford ſome amuſement to the reader. Bartolus, the famous lawyer, in order to ſhew the form of proceeding in a court of juſtice, imagines a proceſs between the devil and mankind. The devil cites mankind to appear at the tribunal of Jeſus Chriſt, claiming them as belonging to him by Adam's fall. He ſwells in rage, demanding whether any one dares appear in their behalf. Againſt the Virgin Mary, offering herſelf as their advocate, the devil makes two objections; firſt, That being the mother of the Judge, her influence would be too great; ſecond, That a woman is debarred from being an advocate: and theſe objections are ſupported by numberleſs quotations from the *Corpus Juris*. The Virgin, on her part, quotes texts permitting women to appear for widows, orphans, and for perſons in diſtreſs. She is allowed to plead for mankind, as coming under the laſt article. The devil urges preſcription, as having been in poſſeſſion of mankind ever ſince the fall. The Virgin anſwers, That a *mala-fide poſſeſſor* cannot acquire by preſcription. Preſcription being repelled, the parties go to the merits of the cauſe, which are learnedly diſcuſſed with texts from the Pandects. The memoirs of the French academy of Belles Lettres (*a*) has the following ſtory. A monk returning from a houſe which he durſt not viſit in day-light, had a river to croſs. The boat was overturned by Satan, and the monk was drowned when he was beginning to invocate the Virgin Mary. Two devils having laid hold of his ſoul, were ſtopped by two angels. "My "Lords," ſaid the devils, "true it is, and not a fable, that God "died for his friends; but this monk was an enemy to God, and "we are carrying him to hell." After much altercation, it was propoſed by the angels, to refer the diſpute to the Virgin Mary. The devils were willing to accept of God for judge, becauſe he would judge according to law. "But from the Virgin Mary,"

(*a*) Vol. 18.

ſaid

ſaid they, " we expect no juſtice: ſhe would break to atoms eve-
" ry gate of hell, rather than ſuffer one to remain there a mo-
" ment who pays any worſhip to her image. She may ſay, that
" black is white, and that puddled water is pure.—God never
" contradicts her. The day on which God made his mother, was
" a fatal day to us."

People who profeſs the ſame religion, and differ only in forms and ceremonies, may juſtly be compared to neighbouring ſtates, who are commonly bitter enemies to each other, if they have any difference. At the ſame time, diſſocial paſſions never rage ſo furiouſly, as under the maſk of religion; for in that caſe they are held to be meritorious, as exerted in the cauſe of God. This obſervation is but too well verified in the diſputes among Chriſtians. However low religion was in the dark ages, yet men fought for forms and ceremonies as *pro aris et focis*. In the Armenian form of baptiſm, the prieſt ſays at the firſt immerſion, *In name of the Father*; at the ſecond, *In name of the Son*; at the third, *In name of the Holy Ghoſt*. This form is bitterly condemned by the Romiſh church, which appoints the three perſons of the Trinity to be joined in the ſame expreſſion, in token of their union. Strahlenberg gives an account of a Chriſtian ſect in Ruſſia, which differs from the eſtabliſhed Greek church in the following particulars. Firſt, In public worſhip they repeat *Halleluia* but twice; and it is a mortal ſin to repeat it thrice. Second, In celebrating maſs, not five but ſeven loaves ought to be uſed. Third, The croſs ſtamped upon a maſs-loaf ought to have eight corners. Fourth, In ſigning with the croſs at prayers, the end of the ring-finger muſt be joined to the end of the thumb, and the two intermediate fingers be held out at full length. How trifling are theſe differences! and yet for ſuch differences, all who diſſent from them are held unclean, and no better than Pagans: they will not eat nor drink with any of the eſtabliſhed church; and if

a perſon of that church happen to ſit down in a houſe of theirs, they waſh and purify the ſeat *. There are few ſects founded upon more trivial differences than the Turkiſh and Perſian Mahometans. The epithets given to the Perſians by the Turks are, "Forſaken of God, Abominable, Blaſphemers of the Holy "Prophet;" and ſo bitter is their enmity to the Perſians, that the ſchools of the ſeraglio are open to young men of all nations, thoſe of Perſia alone excepted. The Perſians are held to be ſuch apoſtates from the true faith, as to be utterly paſt recovery: they receive no quarter in war, being accounted unworthy of life or ſlavery. Nor do the Perſians yield to the Turks in hatred. Whether coffee be or be not prohibited in the Alcoran, has produced much controverſy in the Mahometan church, and conſequently much perſecuting zeal. A mufti, not fond of coffee, declared it, like wine, to have an inebriating quality, and therefore was virtually prohibited by Mahomet. Another mufti, fond of coffee for its exhilarating virtue, declared it lawful; "becauſe," ſaid he, "all things are lawful that are not expreſsly prohibited in "the Alcoran." The coffeehouſes in Conſtantinople, were for a long period alternately opened and ſhut, according to the taſte of the reigning mufti; till coffee at laſt, ſurmounting all obſtacles, came to be an eſtabliſhed Mahometan liquor. Religion thus runs wild, whenever it loſes ſight of its true ends, that of worſhipping God, and that of being juſt to man. The Hindows hate the Mahometans for eating the fleſh of cows: the Mahometans hate the Hindows for eating the fleſh of ſwine. The averſion that men of

* Chriſtians, occupy'd too much with external forms, have corrupted ſeveral of the fine arts. They have injured architecture, by erecting magnificent churches in the ugly form of a croſs. And they have injured painting, by withdrawing the beſt hands from proper ſubjects, and employing them on the legendary martyrdom of pretended ſaints, and other ſuch diſagreeable ſtories.

the ſame religion have at each other for the moſt trivial differences, converts them frequently into brutal ſavages. Suppoſe, for example, that a poor man, reduced to the extremity of hunger, makes a greedy meal of a dead horſe, a caſe ſo deplorable would wring every heart. And yet, let this be done in Lent, or on a meagre day—Behold! every zealot is inſtantly metamorphos'd into a devil incarnate. In the records of St Claude, a ſmall diſtrict of Burgundy, is engroſſed a ſentence againſt a poor gentleman named *Claude Guillon*. The words are, "Having conſider-"ed the proceſs, and taken advice of the doctors of law, we de-"clare the ſaid Claude Guillon duly convicted for having car-"ried away and boiled a piece of a dead horſe, and of having "eat the ſame on the 31ſt March, being Saturday." And he was beheaded accordingly 28th July 1629; notwithſtanding a defence above all exception, That he committed that irregularity to preſerve his life. How was it poſſible for the monſters to perſuade themſelves, that this ſentence was agreeable to God, who is goodneſs itſelf!

No leſs prejudicial to morality, than the relying too much on forms and ceremonies, is the treating ſome ſins with great ſeverity; neglecting others equally heinous, or perhaps more ſo. In a book of rates for abſolution, mentioned above, no juſt diſtinction is made among ſins; ſome venial ſins being taxed at a higher rate than many of the deepeſt dye. For example, the killing father, mother, brother, ſiſter, or wife, is taxed at five groſs; and the ſame for inceſt with a mother or ſiſter. The lying with a woman in the church is taxed at ſix groſs; and at the ſame time, abſolution for uſury is taxed at ſeven groſs, and for ſimony at no leſs than ſixteen groſs *.

A maxim adopted by many pious perſons, has a ſmiling ap-

* A groſs is the third part of a ducat.

pearance,

pearance, but in its conſequences is hurtful both to religion and morality; which is, That to teſtify our veneration for the Deity, and zeal for his ſervice, the performing public and private worſhip, and the fulfilling moral duties, are not alone ſufficient; that over and above we are bound to faſt, to do penance, to honour the prieſthood, and to puniſh the enemies of God, *i. e.* thoſe who differ from us in principles or practice. This maxim, which may be termed *the doctrine of ſupererogation*, is finely illuſtrated by an author mentioned above. "The duties which a man performs "as a friend or parent, ſeem merely owing to his benefactor or "children; nor can he be wanting to theſe duties without breaking through all the ties of nature and morality. A ſtrong inclination may prompt him to the performance: a ſentiment of "order and moral beauty joins its force to theſe natural ties: "and the whole man is drawn to his duty without any effort or "endeavour. Even with regard to the virtues which are more "auſtere, and more founded on reflection, ſuch as public ſpirit, "filial duty, temperance, or integrity: the moral obligation, in "our apprehenſion, removes all pretence to religious merit: and "the virtuous conduct is eſteemed no more than what we owe "to ſociety, and to ourſelves. In all this, a ſuperſtitious man "finds nothing which he has properly performed for the ſake of "his Deity, or which can peculiarly recommend him to the divine favour and protection. He conſiders not, that the moſt "genuine method of ſerving the Divinity is, by promoting the "happineſs of his creatures. He ſtill looks out for ſome more "immediate ſervice of the ſupreme Being: and any practice recommended to him, which either ſerves to no purpoſe in life, "or offers the ſtrongeſt violence to his natural inclinations; that "practice he will the more readily embrace, on account of thoſe "very circumſtances, which ſhould make him abſolutely reject "it. It ſeems the more purely religious, that it proceeds from-

"no

" no mixture of any other motive or conſideration. And if for its " ſake he ſacrifices much of his eaſe and quiet, his claim of merit " appears ſtill to riſe upon him, in proportion to the zeal and devotion " which he diſcovers. In reſtoring a loan, or paying a debt, his " divinity is no wiſe beholden to him; becauſe theſe acts of juſtice " are what he was bound to perform, and what many would " have performed, were there no God in the univerſe. But if he " faſt a day, or give himſelf a ſound whipping, this has a direct " reference, in his opinion, to the ſervice of God. No other mo- " tive could engage him to ſuch auſterities. By theſe diſtinguiſh- " ed marks of devotion, he has now acquired the divine favour; " and may expect in recompenſe, protection and ſafety in this " world, and eternal happineſs in the next (*a*)." My yoke is eaſy, ſaith our Saviour, and my burden is light. So they really are. Every eſſential of religion is founded on our nature, and to a pure heart is pleaſant in the performance: what can be more pleaſant, than gratitude to our Maker, and obedience to his will in comforting our fellow-creatures? But enthuſiaſts are not eaſily perſuaded, that to make ourſelves happy in the exerciſes of piety and benevolence, is the moſt acceptable ſervice to God that we can perform. In loading religion with unneceſſary articles of faith and practice, they contradict our Saviour, by making his yoke ſevere, and his burden heavy *. Law, upon Chriſtian perfection, enjoins ſuch unnatural auſterity of manners, as to be ſubverſive both of religion and morality: looſe education is not more ſo. Our paſſions, when denied their proper exerciſe, are apt to break their fetters, and to plunge us into every extrava-

* An old woman walking with others to a ſacrament, was obſerved to pick out the worſt bits of the road: " I never can do enough," ſaid ſhe, " for ſweet Jeſus."

(*a*) Natural Hiſtory of Religion.

gance: like the body, which ſqueezed in one part, ſwells the more in another. In the ſame way of thinking, the pious Jeremy Taylor, treating of mortification, preſcribes it as the indiſpenſable duty of a Chriſtian, to give no indulgence even to the moſt innocent emotions; becauſe, ſays he, the moſt indifferent action becomes ſinful, when there is no other motive for the performance but barely its being pleaſant. Could a malevolent deity contrive any thing more ſevere againſt his votaries?

In the ſame ſpirit of ſupererogation, holidays have been multiplied without end, depriving the working poor of time, that would be more uſefully employ'd in providing bread for themſelves and families. Such a number of holidays, beſide contradicting Providence, which framed us more for action than contemplation, have ſeveral poiſonous effects with reſpect to morality. The moral ſenſe has great influence on the induſtrious, who have no time for indulging their irregular appetites: the idle, on the contrary, are obvious to every temptation. Men likewiſe are apt to aſſume great merit from a rigid obſervance of holidays and other ceremonies; and having thus acquired, in their opinion, the favour of God, they rely on his indulgence in other matters which they think too ſweet for ſinners.

Monaſtic inſtitutions are an improvement upon holidays: the whole life of a monk is intended to be a holiday, dedicated entirely to the ſervice of God. The idleneſs of the monaſtic ſtate among Chriſtians, opens a wide door to immorality.

In the third ſection, penances are handled as a mode of worſhip, for obtaining pardon of ſin. But they are ſometimes ſubmitted to by the innocent, in order to procure from the Almighty ſtill more favour than innocence alone is entitled to; in which view they are evidently a work of ſupererogation. They ſeem to have no bad effect with reſpect to religion, as diſtinguiſhed from morality: the body is indeed cruciated unneceſſarily; but if enthuſiaſts

thuſiaſts voluntarily ſubmit to bodily diſtreſſes, they have themſelves only to blame. With reſpect to morality, their bad tendency is not ſlight. Thoſe who perform extraordinary acts of devotion, conceive themſelves peculiarly entitled to the favour of God. Proud of his favour, they attach themſelves to him alone, and turn indifferent about every other duty. The favourite of a terreſtrial potentate, aſſumes authority; and takes liberties that private perſons dare not venture upon: ſhall a favourite of Heaven be leſs indulged? The Faquirs in Hindoſtan ſubmit to dreadful penances; and, holding themſelves ſecure of God's favour, they are altogether indifferent about the duty they owe to their neighbour. So much are they above common decency, as to go about naked, not even concealing what modeſty forbids us to expoſe. The penances enjoined in the Romiſh church, ſuch as faſting and flagellation, have evidently the ſame bad tendency *. With reſpect to faſting in particular, to what good purpoſe it can ſerve, except to gluttons, is not readily conceived. Temperance in eating and drinking is eſſential to health: too much or too little are equally noxious, tho' their effects are different. Faſting therefore ought never to be enjoined to the temperate as a religious duty, becauſe it cannot be acceptable to a benevolent Deity. Liſten to a great prophet on that ſubject. "Behold, ye faſt for "ſtrife and debate, and to ſmite with the fiſt of wickedneſs; ye "ſhall not faſt as ye do this day, to make your voice to be heard "on high. Is it ſuch a faſt that I have choſen? a day for a man "to afflict his ſoul? Is it to bow down his head as a bulruſh, "and to ſpread ſackcloth and aſhes under him? Wilt thou call

* A ſect of Chriſtians, ſtyled *Flagellantes*, held, that flagellation is of equal virtue with baptiſm and the other ſacraments; that it will procure forgiveneſs of ſin; that the old law of Chriſt is to be aboliſhed, and a new law ſubſtituted; enjoining the baptiſm of blood to be adminiſtered by whipping.

" this a faſt, and an acceptable day to the Lord? Is not this the " faſt that I have choſen? to looſe the bands of wickedneſs, to " undo the heavy burdens, and to let the oppreſſed go free, and " that ye break every yoke? Is it not to deal thy bread to the " hungry, and that thou bring the poor that are caſt out, to thy " houſe? when thou ſeeſt the naked, that thou cover him, and " that thou hide not thyſelf from thine own fleſh (*a*)?"

The moſt extraordinary penance of all, is celibacy conſidered as a religious duty. Many fathers of the church declare againſt matrimony. St Jerom in particular ſays, That the end of matrimony is eternal death; that the earth indeed is filled by it, but heaven by virginity. The intemperate zeal of many primitive Chriſtians led them to abſtain from matrimony, and even from conjugal careſſes, if they had the misfortune to be married; believing that the carnal appetite is inconſiſtent with pure religion. Edward the Confeſſor was ſainted, for no better reaſon than the abſtaining from matrimonial duties. Jovinian, in the fourth century, taught, that all who obſerve the laws of piety and virtue laid down in the goſpel, have an equal title to happineſs in another life: conſequently, that thoſe who paſs their days in celibacy and mortification, are in no reſpect more acceptable to God than thoſe who live virtuouſly in marriage without mortification. He publiſhed his opinions in a book, againſt which Jerom wrote a bitter and abuſive treatiſe, ſtill extant. Theſe opinions were condemned by the church, and by St Ambroſe, in a council at Milan; and Jovinian was baniſhed by the Emperor Honorius. Such ridiculous ſelf-denial was not confined to Chriſtians. Strabo mentions a ſect among the Thracians, who made a vow of perpetual virginity; and were much reſpected on that account. Garcilaſſo mentions virgins in Peru conſecrated to the ſun: a veſtal guilty of

(*a*) Iſaiah, lviii. 4. &c.

frailty

frailty was buried alive, her lover hanged, and the inhabitants of the town where ſhe lived put to the ſword. Among all the abſurd acts of mortification, the preſent affords the ſtrongeſt inſtance of ſuperſtition triumphing over common ſenſe; for what can be more inconſiſtent with common ſenſe, not to talk of religion, than an endeavour to put an end to the human ſpecies? Some glimpſes of reaſon have abated the zeal of enthuſiaſts for celibacy; but have not totally extirpated it, for celibacy of the clergy remains to this day a law in the Romiſh church. It cannot however ſeriouſly be thought the will of our benevolent God, that his prieſts ſhould be denied the exerciſe of natural powers, beſtowed on all for a moſt valuable purpoſe. This impious reſtraint, which contradicts the great law of *Increaſe and multiply*, has opened the door to groſs debauchery in the paſtors of the Romiſh church, tho' eccleſiaſtics ought of all men to be the moſt circumſpect in their conduct. Men reſtrained from what is neceſſary and proper, are more prone than others to break out into groſs irregularities *. Marriage is warmly recommended in the laws of Zoroaſter. Children are ſaid to be a bridge that conducts men to heaven; and a man who has no children, is held to be under the power of Ahriman. The prayer of a prieſt who has no children, is held diſagreeable to Ormuſd.

The celibacy of the clergy was countenanced by the Pope; and enforced from a political conſideration, That it united the whole

* An ingenious writer, mentioned above, makes the following obſervation. "The celibacy of eccleſiaſtics was originally introduced by ſome ſuperſtitious refinements on the law of God and nature. Could men have been kept alive without eating or drinking, as well as without marriage, the ſame refinements would have prohibited eccleſiaſtics from eating and drinking, and thereby have elevated them ſo much nearer to the ſtate of angels. In proceſs of time, this fanatical interdiction became an inſtrument of worldly wiſdom: and thus, as frequently happens, what weak men began, politicians completed." *Sir David Dalrymple.*

clergy

clergy into one firm body under his ſpiritual Majeſty. How ſhort-ſighted is man! It was juſtly eſteemed at the time to be the corner-ſtone of Papal power; and yet became the chief cauſe of its downfall. Celibacy precipitated the Romiſh clergy into adultery, fornication, cunning, diſſimulation, and every ſecret vice. Will men of ſuch manners be liſtened to, when they preach purity to their hearers? There was no medium, but either to reform their own manners, or to give every indulgence to the laity. But the ignorance and ſuperſtition of the latter, rendered the former ſecure in their own opinion. The reſtoration of learning broke the charm. Men beginning to think for themſelves, were provoked at the diſſolute lives of their paſtors, and raiſed a loud cry againſt them, not yet thinking of their doctrines. Reformers were burnt as heretics; and clergymen were held to be emiſſaries from Satan, to eſtabliſh his throne upon earth. Knox, that violent reformer, believed ſeriouſly, that Cardinal Beaton was *a conjured enemy to Chriſt Jeſus*. Providence brings good out of ill. Had not the clergy been diſſolute, poor Chriſtians might have laboured under ignorance and eccleſiaſtical thraldom to this hour. Our reformers, beginning with their paſtors, extended inſenſibly their hatred to the doctrines taught by their paſtors. Every article of faith was ſifted: the chaff was ſeparated from the corn; and a reformation was eſtabliſhed upon the ſcriptures, rejecting every innovation of the Romiſh church.

There is not mentioned in hiſtory a more impudent attack upon moral principles, than a privilege aſſumed by the Biſhop of Rome, to diſengage men from their oaths and promiſes: it is not a greater ſtretch to diſengage them from every duty, whether of morality or of religion. The barons of Valentia, dreading a perſecution againſt the induſtrious Moors, their tenants, obtained the following clauſe to be inſerted in their king's coronation-oath: "That he ſhould not expell the Moriſcos, nor force them to be "baptized;

" baptized; that he ſhould never deſire to be relieved from the " oath by a diſpenſation from the Pope, nor accept a diſpenſa- " tion if offered." The Emperor Charles V. took this oath ſolemnly in preſence of his nobles; and yet accepted a diſpenſation from the Pope, abſolving him from the oath, and from the guilt of perjury in breaking it. Auguſtus King of Poland, in the treaty of Altramſtadt, renounced the kingdom of Poland to his competitor Staniſlaus. The defeat of the King of Sweden at Poltowa, was an inviting opportunity to renew his pretenſions. A ſolemn treaty ſtood in his way; but the Pope removed that obſtacle, by annulling the treaty, and ſetting him at liberty. The Pope has been known even to beſtow that wonderful privilege upon others. Pope Paſcal II. having with a ſolemn oath renounced the right of inveſtitures, empowered the cardinals to declare his oath null. Biſhops alſo, imitating their ſuperior, have aſſumed the privilege of diſpenſing with moral duties. Inſtances are not rare, of curates being authorized by their biſhop to entertain concubines, paying for each a regular tax of a crown yearly. Nay, in ſome provincial ſynods, they are enjoined to keep concubines, in order to prevent ſcandal. Common proſtitutes, licenſed in the city of Leghorn, have a church peculiar to themſelves, and muſt not enter into any other. They follow their trade with the utmoſt freedom; except in paſſion-week, during which they muſt forbear ſinning, under pain of baniſhment.

The power of beſtowing kingdoms, aſſumed by the Biſhop of Rome, was an encroachment on the rules of juſtice, no leſs bold. Chriſtian princes, not many ages ago, eſteemed the Pope's gift to be their beſt title of property. In the 1346, the Venetians requeſted the Pope's permiſſion to carry on commerce in Aſia, and to purchaſe there pepper and cinnamon. The Pope not only granted their requeſt, but pronounced anathemas upon any who ſhould dare to interfere in that commerce. Ferdinand and Iſabella of Spain,

Spain, applied to Pope Alexander VI. to veſt in them the property of America, diſcovered under their auſpices by Columbus. The Pope having formerly made a grant to the kings of Portugal of their diſcoveries in the Eaſt Indies, both grants were held ſacred; and it came to be ſtrenuouſly diſputed, under which of the grants the Molucca iſlands were comprehended. Both grants proceed upon a narrative, of the power beſtowed by Almighty God on the Pope as ſucceſſor to St Peter and vicar of Chriſt. To imagine, that the Almighty would beſtow ſuch powers on the Biſhop of Rome, or on any human being, ſhews groſs ignorance of the common rights of mankind, and of the government of Providence.

The groſſeſt of all deviations, not only from ſound morality but from pure religion, and the moſt extenſive in its baneful effects, is a doctrine embraced by eſtabliſhed churches, not many excepted, That becauſe heretics are odious in the ſight of God, it is the duty of the orthodox to extirpate them root and branch. Obſerve the conſequence: people who differ from the eſtabliſhed church, are held to be obſtinate ſinners, deſerving puniſhment here as well as hereafter. The religion of every country is changeable; and the religion at preſent dominant may ſoon be under depreſſion; which of courſe ſubjects all mankind to the rigour of perſecution. An invention more effectual for extirpating the human race, is not within the reach of human powers: the horror of human ſacrifices is as nothing in compariſon.

The old Romans, far from having any notion of perſecution, adopted the gods of every nation they conquered. A learned writer (*a*) obſerves, that as the number of their gods increaſed with their conqueſts, it is poſſible that they might have worſhipped all the gods in the world. Their belief in tutelar deities produced

(*a*) Morinus.

that

that effect. Titus Livius mentions a ſect of Bacchanals that ſpred through Italy. They performed their ceremonies during night, men and women mixing in the dark after intemperate eating and drinking. Never did wicked wretches deſerve more exemplary puniſhment; yet liſten to the following decree of the Roman ſenate, breathing the true ſpirit of toleration. "Ne qua Bacchana-" lia Romæ, neve in Italia eſſent. Si quis tale ſacrum, ſolenne, et " neceſſarium duceret, nec ſine religione et piaculo ſe id omittere " poſſe; apud prætorem urbanum profiteretur; prætor ſenatum " conſuleret. Si ei permiſſum eſſet, quum in ſenatu centum non " minus eſſent; ita id ſacrum faceret, dum ne plus quinque ſa-" crificio intereſſent; neu qua pecunia communis, neu quis ma-" giſter ſacrorum, aut ſacerdos eſſet *." The Jews however were prone to perſecution; for tho' they conſidered the ſupreme being as their tutelar deity, yet the malignity of their nature prevailed to make them hold in abhorrence the worſhip of every other god. Even among themſelves, they were abundantly diſpoſed to war; and nothing kept within bounds the Pharaſees, the Sadduces, and the Eſſenes, their three ſects, but terror of the Roman power. The Chriſtian religion implies toleration in its very nature and principles; but being corrupted by ignorance, intereſt, and ſuperſtition, it became prone to perſecution above all others. Chriſtian ſects were enflamed againſt each other to a degree of bruta-

* " Let there be no Bacchanalian ceremonies performed in the city, nor within " Italy. If there be any perſon who reckons it a matter of conſcience to perform " theſe rites, and that he ought not to omit them, let him ſtate his opinion " to the city-pretor, who ſhall thereupon conſult the ſenate. If liberty be grant-" ed him by the ſenate when no fewer than a hundred ſenators are preſent, let " him perform the ſacrifice, but privately, in preſence of no greater number than " five perſons. Let there be no public fund for them, nor any who ſhall preſide " as prieſt or maſter of the rites."

lity; the moſt oppoſite to peace and brotherly love, inculcated in the goſpel. It was propagated by the orthodox, that Arius expired in a common jakes, and that his intrails burſt out. The ſame is related of Huneric King of the Vandals, a zealous Arian; with the following addition, that being poſſeſſed with the devil, whom he had glutted with the blood of many martyrs, he tore his fleſh off with his teeth, and ended his wretched life in the moſt excruciating, tho' juſtly deſerved, torments. The falſehoods every where ſpred during the fourteenth century againſt the Jews, ſuch as their poiſoning the public fountains, killing Chriſtian infants, and drinking their blood, with many other falſehoods of the ſame ſtamp, were invented and greedily ſwallowed through the influence of religious hatred. The greater part of perſecutions have been occaſioned in the ſame manner; for men are not ſo deſperately wicked, as to approve of perſecution, unleſs when blinded by intemperate zeal. The ſame religious hatred produced the aſſaſſination of the Duke of Guiſe, and of two Henries, Kings of France; produced the gun-powder plot; and produced the moſt horrid deed that ever was perpetrated among men, the maſſacre of St Bartholomew *.

No falſe principle in religion has ſhed more innocent, or rather virtuous blood, than that of perſecuting heretics; *i. e.* thoſe who differ in any article from the religion eſtabliſhed by law. The doctrine of burning heretics, is in effect the profeſſing to burn

* Monſieur de Tavannes, afterward Mareſchal of France, was a great partiſan of the Queen-mother, and ſo active in the maſſacre, that with his own hand he murdered no fewer than ſeventeen Huguenots. Having on deathbed made a full confeſſion of his ſins, "What," ſaid the prieſt, "not a word of St Bartholomew?" "Of St Bartholomew!" anſwered the penitent; "the ſervice I did that memorable "day to God and the church, is alone a ſufficient atonement for all my tranſgreſ-"ſions."

men

men highly virtuous; for they muſt be ſo in an eminent degree, who ſubmit to be burnt alive, rather than be guilty even of diſſimulation. The Mahometan practice of converting people by the ſword, if not more rational, is at leaſt more manly. Louis IX. of France, one of its beſt princes, would have been a greater bleſſing to his people, had he been leſs pious: he had an implacable averſion to heretics, againſt whom he thought it more proper to employ racks and gibbets, than argument and perſuaſion. Torquemada, that infernal inquiſitor of Spain, brought into the inquiſition, in the ſpace of fourteen years, no fewer than 80,000 perſons; of whom 6000 were condemned to the flames, and burnt alive with the greateſt pomp and exultation. Of that vaſt number, there was perhaps not a ſingle perſon, who was not more pure in religion, as well as in morals, than their outrageous perſecutor. Hunter, a young man about nineteen years of age, was one of the unhappy victims to the zeal of Queen Mary of England for Popery. Having been inadvertently betray'd by a prieſt to deny tranſubſtantiation, he abſconded, to keep out of harm's way. Bonner, that arch-hangman of Popery, threatened ruin to the father, if he did not deliver up the young man. Hunter, hearing of his father's danger, made his appearance; and was burnt alive, inſtead of being rewarded for his filial piety. A woman of Guernſey was brought to the ſtake, without regard to her big belly; which burſting by the torture, ſhe was delivered in the midſt of the flames. One of the guards ſnatched the infant from the fire: but the magiſtrate who attended the execution, ordered it to be thrown back; being reſolved, he ſaid, that nothing ſhould ſurvive which ſprung from a parent ſo obſtinately heretical. Father Paul (Council of Trent, book 5.) computes, that in the Netherlands alone, from the time that the edict of Charles V. was promulgated againſt the reformers, fifty thouſand perſons were hanged,

beheaded, buried alive, or burnt, on account of religion. Some Faquirs, crazed with opium and fanaticiſm, have been known with poiſoned daggers to fall upon uncircumciſed Europeans, and to put every one to death whom they could maſter. In the laſt century, a faquir at Surate murdered, within the ſpace of a minute, ſeventeen Dutch ſailors with ſeventeen ſtabs of a dagger. We think with horror of human ſacrifices among the ancient Pagans; and yet we behold them every day among Chriſtians, rendered ſtill more horrid by the moſt atrocious torments that religious hatred can deviſe.

The great motive to ſuch cruelties, is the ſuperſtitious and abſurd notion, that heretics are God's enemies; which makes it thought an acceptable ſervice to God, not only to perſecute them by fire and ſword in this world, but to deliver them over to Satan in the world to come. Another circumſtance enflames religious hatred; which is, that neighbours are either intimate friends or bitter enemies. This holds with a ſlight variation in ſects of the ſame religion: however minute their differences be, they cannot be intimate friends; and therefore are bitter enemies: the nearer they approach to uniſon, if not entirely concordant, the greater in proportion is their mutual hatred. Such hatred, ſubduing the meek ſpirit of Chriſtianity, is an additional cauſe for perſecution. Blind zeal for what is believed to be the only true religion, never diſcovers error nor innocence in thoſe who differ, but perverſeneſs and criminal obſtinacy. Two religions totally different, like two countries in oppoſite parts of the globe, produce no mutual enmity. At the ſiege of Conſtantinople by the Turks, ann. 1453, the Emperor, in order to procure aſſiſtance from the princes of the Latin church, ordered maſs to be celebrated in one of his churches according to the form uſed in Rome. The people with great indignation proteſted, that they would rather ſee the Turks in their churches, than the hat of a cardinal.

The

The hiſtory of the Waldenſes, tho' well known, cannot be too often repeated. In the twelfth century, a merchant of Lyons, named *Peter Valdo*, diſſatisfied with the pomp and ceremonies of the Romiſh church, ill ſuited, in his opinion, to the humility of a Chriſtian, retired to a deſert in the high country of Provence, with ſeveral poor people his diſciples. There he became their ſpiritual guide, inſtructing them in certain doctrines, the ſame that were afterward adopted by the Proteſtants. Their inceſſant labour ſubdued the barren ſoil, and prepared it for grain as well as for paſture. The rent which in time they were enabled to pay for land that afforded none originally, endeared them to their landlords. In 250 years, they multiplied to the number of 18,000, occupying thirty villages, beſide hamlets, the work of their own hands. Prieſts they had none, nor any diſputes about religion: neither had they occaſion for a court of juſtice, as brotherly love did not ſuffer them to go to law: they worſhipped God in their own plain way, and their innocence was ſecured by inceſſant labour. They had long enjoy'd the ſweets of peace and mutual affection, when the reformers of Germany and Geneva ſent miniſters among them; which unhappily laid them open to religious hatred, the moſt unrelenting of all furies. In the year 1540, the parliament of Provence condemned nineteen of them to be burnt for hereſy, their trees to be rooted up, and their houſes to be raz'd to the ground. The Waldenſes, terrified at this ſentence, applied in a body to Cardinal Sadolet, biſhop of Carpentras; who received them kindly, and obtained from Francis I. of France, a pardon for the perſons under ſentence of death, on condition of abjuring hereſy. The matter lay over five years; when the parliament, irritated at them for perſevering in their tenets, prevailed on the King to withdraw his pardon. The ſentence was executed with great rigour; and the parliament, laying hold of that opportunity,

portunity, broke through every reſtraint of law, and commenced a violent perſecution againſt the whole nation. The ſoldiers began with maſſacring old men, women, and children, all having fled who were able to fly; and proceeded to burn their houſes, barns, and corn. There remained in the town of Cabriere ſixty men and thirty women; who having ſurrendered upon promiſe of life, were butchered each of them without mercy. Some women who had taken refuge in a church, were dragged out, and burnt alive. Twenty-two villages were reduced to aſhes; and that populous and flouriſhing diſtrict, became once more a deſert.

To conceive this horrid ſcene in all its deformity, the people perſecuted ought to be compared with the clergy their perſecutors; for the civil magiſtrate was the hand only that executed their vengeance: on the one ſide, an induſtrious people, pure in their morals, and no leſs pure in their religion: on the other, proud pampered prieſts, abandoned without ſhame to every wickedneſs, impure in their morals, and ſtill more impure in their religion—the world never furniſhed ſuch another contraſt. Had the ſcene been reverſed, to make theſe wretches ſuffer perſecution from the Waldenſes—but that people were too upright and too religious for being perſecutors. The manners of the Chriſtian clergy in general, before the Reformation, enliven's the contraſt. The doctrine promulgated during the dark times of Chriſtianity, That God is a mercenary being; and that every perſon, however wicked, may obtain pardon of his ſins by money, made riches flow into the hands of eccleſiaſtics in a plentiful ſtream. And riches had the ſame effect upon the Chriſtian clergy that they have upon all men, which is, to produce pride, ſenſuality, and profligacy: theſe again produced diſſipation of money, which prompted avarice, and every invention for recruiting exhauſted treaſures

treaſures *. Even as early as the eighth century, the Chriſtian clergy, tempted by opulence, abandoned themſelves to pleaſure, without moderation; and far exceeded the laity in luxury, gluttony, and luſt. When ſuch were the paſtors, what muſt have been the flock! Rejoice, O Scotland, over the poverty and temperance of thy paſtors. During that period, the clergy could read, and, like parrots, they could mumble prayers in Latin: in every other reſpect, they rivalled the laity in ignorance. They were indeed more cunning than the laity; and underſtood their intereſt better, if to covet riches at the expence of probity, deſerve that name. Three articles were eſtabliſhed that made religion an eaſy ſervice. Firſt, That faith is the eſſence of religion, without regard to good works; and hence the neceſſity of being ſtrictly orthodox, which the church only could determine. Second, Religious worſhip was reduced to a number of external ceremonies and forms, which, being declared ſufficient for ſalvation, abſolved Chriſtians from every moral duty. Remark, that a prieſt is always the chief perſon in ceremonial worſhip. The third article, That God is a mercenary being, is mentioned above, with its neceſſary conſequences. Theſe articles brought about a total neglect, both in clergy and laity, not only of morality, but of every eſſential religious duty. In fine, there never was a religion that deviated more from juſt principles, than that profeſſed by Chriſtians during the dark ages. Perſecution reached none but the ſincerely pious and virtuous. What a glorious tolerating ſentiment doth Arnobius (*a*) throw out, and what profuſion of blood

* In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, many of the clergy dealt in merchandiſe; and, being free of taxes, engroſſed all. In the Netherlands particularly, there was a great cry, that monaſteries were converted into ſhops and warehouſes, and the manſions of ſecular prieſts into tap-houſes and inns.

(*a*) Lib. 1. Adverſus Gentes.

would

would have been prevented, had it been adopted by all Chriſtians! "Da veniam, Rex ſumme, tuos perſequentibus famulos: et quod "tuæ benignitatis eſt proprium, fugientibus ignoſce tui nominis "et religionis cultum. Non eſt mirum, ſi ignoraris: majoris "eſt admirationis, ſi ſciaris *." The following parable againſt perſecution was communicated to me by Dr Franklin of Philadelphia, a man who makes a great figure in the learned world: and who would make a ſtill greater figure for benevolence and candour, were virtue in this declining age as much regarded as knowledge. "And it came to paſs after theſe things, that Abraham ſat in the "door of his tent, about the going down of the ſun. And behold "a man bent with age, coming from the way of the wilderneſs "leaning on a ſtaff. And Abraham aroſe, and met him, and "ſaid unto him, Turn in, I pray thee, and waſh thy feet, and "tarry all night; and thou ſhalt ariſe early in the morning, and "go on thy way. And the man ſaid, Nay; for I will abide un-"der this tree. But Abraham preſſed him greatly: ſo he turn-"ed, and they went into the tent: and Abraham baked un-"leavened bread, and they did eat. And when Abraham ſaw "that the man bleſſed not God, he ſaid unto him, Wherefore "doſt thou not worſhip the moſt high God, creator of heaven "and earth? And the man anſwered and ſaid, I do not wor-"ſhip thy God, neither do I call upon his name; for I have made "to myſelf a god, which abideth always in mine houſe, and pro-"videth me with all things. And Abraham's zeal was kindled "againſt the man, and he aroſe, and fell upon him, and drove "him forth with blows into the wilderneſs. And God called un-

* "Forgive, Almighty power, the perſecutors of thy ſervants; and, in the pe-"culiar benevolence of thy nature, pardon thoſe men whoſe unhappineſs it is to "be ſtrangers to thy name and worſhip. Ignorant as they are of thee, we cannot "wonder at the impiety of their actions."

"to

" to Abraham, ſaying, Abraham, where is the ſtranger? And " Abraham anſwered and ſaid, Lord, he would not worſhip thee, " neither would he call upon thy name; therefore have I driven " him out from before my face into the wilderneſs. And God " ſaid, Have I borne with him theſe hundred ninety and eight " years, and nouriſhed him, and clothed him, notwithſtanding " his rebellion againſt me; and couldſt not thou, who art thyſelf " a ſinner, bear with him one night?" The hiſtorical ſtyle of the Old Teſtament is here finely imitated; and the moral muſt ſtrike every one who is not ſunk in ſtupidity and ſuperſtition. Were it really a chapter of Geneſis, one is apt to think, that perſecution could never have ſhown a bare face among Jews or Chriſtians. But alas! that is a vain thought. Such a paſſage in the Old Teſtament, would avail as little againſt the rancorous paſſions of men, as the following paſſages in the New Teſtament, tho' perſecution cannot be condemned in terms more explicit. " Him that is weak " in the faith, receive you, but not to doubtful diſputations. For " one believeth that he may eat all things: another, who is weak, " eateth herbs. Let not him that eateth, deſpiſe him that eat- " eth not; and let not him which eateth not, judge him that " eateth. Who art thou that judgeſt another man's ſervant? to " his own maſter he ſtandeth or falleth. One man eſteemeth one " day above another: another eſteemeth every day alike. Let e- " very man be fully perſuaded in his own mind. But why doſt " thou judge thy brother? or why doſt thou ſet at nought thy " brother? for we ſhall all ſtand before the judgement-ſeat of " Chriſt, every one to give an account of himſelf to God. I know, " that there is nothing unclean of itſelf: but to him that eſteem- " eth any thing unclean, to him it is unclean. The kingdom of " God is not meat and drink, but righteouſneſs, and peace, and " joy in the Holy Ghoſt. Let us therefore follow after the things " which make for peace, and things wherewith one may edify an-

" other (*a*)." Our Saviour himſelf declared againſt perſecution in the moſt expreſs terms. The Jews and Samaritans were of the ſame religion; but ſome trivial differences in the ceremonial part of worſhip, rendered them odious to each other. Our Saviour being refuſed lodging in a village of Samaria, becauſe he was travelling to Jeruſalem, his diſciples James and John ſaid, " Lord, " wilt thou that we command fire to come down from heaven, and " conſume them, even as Elias did?" But he rebuked them, and ſaid, " The Son of man is not come to deſtroy mens lives, but to " ſave them (*b*)."

It gives me real concern, that even the hot fire of perſecution, did not altogether purify our Reformed clergy from that ſatanical ſpirit. No ſooner were the Diſſenters ſettled in New England, where they fled to avoid perſecution, than they ſet on foot a perſecution againſt the Quakers, no leſs furious than what they themſelves had ſuffered at home. Nor did the Reformed clergy in Scotland loſe ſight of that magiſterial authority, which had been aſſumed by their predeceſſors of the Romiſh church, on the ridiculous pretext, of being ambaſſadors to men from Jeſus Chriſt. Upon a repreſentation, ann. 1646, from the commiſſion of the kirk of Scotland, James Bell and Colin Campbell, bailies of Glaſgow, were committed to priſon by the parliament, merely for having ſaid, that kirk-men meddled too much in civil matters. Could a deſpotic prince have exerted a more arbitrary act? but the church was all-powerful in thoſe days *.

* Toleration in religion, tho' obvious to common underſtanding, was not however the production of reaſon, but of commerce. The advantage of toleration for promoting commerce, was diſcovered long before by the Portugueſe. They were too zealous Catholics to venture ſo bold a meaſure in Portugal; but it was permitted in Goa, and the inquiſition in that town was confined to Roman Catholics.

(*a*) Epiſtle of Paul to the Romans, chap. 14.

(*b*) Luke, ix. 54.

I would do juſtice to every church, not excepting that of Rome; and it is doing that church no more but juſtice to acknowledge, that the ſpirit of perſecution was not more eminent in it, than zeal for making converts. The former is retiring out of the world; and I wiſh it moſt profound reſt, never again to revive. People begin to be aſhamed of it, as of a garment long out of faſhion. Let the other continue for amuſement: it is innocent; and if it do no good, it is not productive of ſo much harm.

The deſire of making converts proceeds from two different cauſes. In ſuperſtitious zealots, it proceeds from an opinion, that all who differ from them are in the road to damnation: for which reaſon, there is a rage of making converts among Roman Catholics; who, without ceremony, deliver over to the flames of hell, every perſon who is not of their communion. The other cauſe is more natural: every man thinks himſelf in the right, eſpecially in matters of conſequence; and for that reaſon, he is happy to find others of his opinion (*a*). With reſpect to the firſt cauſe, I beg attention to the following conſiderations; not with any hope of converting zealots, but to prevent, if poſſible, others from becoming ſuch. In none of the works of God is variety more happily blended with uniformity, than in the formation of man. Uniformity prevails in the human face with reſpect to eyes, noſe, mouth, and other capital parts: variety prevails in the expreſſions of theſe parts, ſerving to diſtinguiſh one perſon from another, without hazard of error. In like manner, the minds of men are uniform with reſpect to their paſſions and principles; but the various tones and expreſſions of theſe, form different characters without end. A face deſtitute of a noſe or of a mouth, is monſtrous: a mind deſtitute of the moral ſenſe, or of a ſenſe of religion, is no leſs ſo. But variety of expreſſion in different faces,

(*a*) Elements of Criticiſm, vol. 2. p. 493. edit. 5.

is agreeable: becauſe we reliſh variety; and a ſimilar variety in the expreſſions or tones of paſſion, ought to be equally agreeable. Endleſs differences in temper, in taſte, and in mental faculties, that of reaſon in particular, produce neceſſarily variety in ſentiment and in opinion. Can God be diſpleaſed with ſuch variety, when it is his own work? He requires no uniformity except with reſpect to an upright mind and clear conſcience, which are indiſpenſable. Here at the ſame time is diſcovered an illuſtrious final cauſe. Different countenances in the human race, not only diſtinguiſh one perſon from another, but promote ſociety, by aiding us to chuſe a friend, an aſſociate, a partner for life. Differences in opinion and ſentiment, have ſtill more beneficial effects: they rouſe the attention, give exerciſe to the underſtanding, and ſharpen the reaſoning faculty. With reſpect to religion in particular, perfect uniformity, which furniſheth no ſubject for thinking nor for reaſoning, would produce languor in divine worſhip, and make us ſink into cold indifference. How frantic then is the rage of making proſelytes? Let every man enjoy his native liberty, of thinking as well as of acting; free to act as he pleaſes, provided he obey the rules of morality; equally free to think as he pleaſes, provided he obey the great God as his maker and maſter, and acknowledge the neceſſary connection of religion with morality. Strict uniformity in other matters, may be compared to a ſpring-day, calm and ſerene; neither ſo hot as to make us drop a garment, nor ſo cold as to require an addition; no wind to ruffle, nor rain to make ſhelter neceſſary. We enjoy the ſweet ſcene for a moment: we walk, we ſit, we muſe;—but ſoon fall aſleep. Agitation is the element of man, and the life of ſociety. Let us not attempt to correct the works of God: the attempt will betray us into abſurd errors. This doctrine cannot be better illuſtrated than by a converſation, reported by the Jeſuit Tachard, between the King of Siam, and a French ambaſſador, who, in his maſter's name,

name, urged that king to embrace the Chriſtian religion. "I "am ſurpriſed," ſaid his Majeſty of Siam, "that the King of "France, my good friend, ſhould intereſt himſelf ſo warmly in "what concerns God only. He hath given to his creatures dif- "ferent minds and different inclinations, which naturally lead "them to differ in opinion. We admire variety in the material "world: why not equally admire it in matters of religion? "Have we not then reaſon to believe, that God takes pleaſure in "all the different forms of worſhip? Had it been the intention "of God to produce uniformity in religion, he would have form- "ed all men with the ſame mind." Bernier introduces ſome Gentiles of Hindoſtan defending their religion much in the ſame manner: "That they did not pretend their law to be univerſal; "that they did not hold ours to be falſe, as, for ought they knew, "it might be a good law for us; and that God probably made "many roads to heaven."

With reſpect to the other cauſe above mentioned, viz. the deſire of putting people in the right road. To reaſon others into our religious principles, is natural; but it is not always prudent. I wiſh my neighbour to be of my opinion, becauſe I think my opinion right: but is there no danger of undermining his religious principles, without eſtabliſhing better in their ſtead? Ought I not to reſtrain my deſire of making converts, when the attempt may poſſibly reduce them to abandon religion altogether, as a matter of utter uncertainty? If a man of clear underſtanding has by ſome unhappy means been led into error, that man may be ſet right by fair reaſoning: but beware of endeavouring to convert people of low parts, who are indebted for their creed to parents, to education, or to example: it is ſafer to let them reſt as they are.

At any rate, let us never attempt to gain proſelytes by rewards nor by terror: what other effect can ſuch motives produce, but diſſimulation

diſſimulation and lying, parents of every ſecret crime. The Empreſs of Ruſſia uſes a method for converting her Pagan ſubjects of Kamſkatka, no leſs agreeable than effectual; which is, to exempt from taxes for ten years, ſuch of them as profeſs the Chriſtian religion. This practice may be political; but it tends not to advance religion, and is deſtructive of morality. Terror, on the other hand, may be equally effectual, but is not altogether ſo agreeable. The people of Rum, one of the Hebrides, were Papiſts till the beginning of the preſent century, when in one day they were all proſelyted to the Proteſtant faith. Maclean of Coll, their chieftain, went to the iſland with a Proteſtant miniſter, and ordered all the inhabitants to appear on Sunday at public worſhip. They came, but refuſed to hear a Proteſtant miniſter. The chieftain reaſoned with them: but finding that his reaſonings made no impreſſion, he laid hold of the moſt forward; and having made a deep impreſſion on him with his cane, puſh'd him into the church. The reſt followed like meek lambs; and from that day have continued firm Proteſtants. The Proteſtantiſm of Rum is ſtyled by their Popiſh neighbours, the faith of the *yellow ſtick*.

To apply rewards, terror, or any other means, for making proſelytes, except fair reaſoning, appears to me a ſtrange perverſion. Can God be pleaſed with ſuch means, or can any rational man juſtify them? What then ſhould move any one to put them in practice? I ſhould be utterly at a loſs to anſwer the queſtion, but for a fact mentioned more than once above, that the rude and illiterate, judge by ſight only, and not by reflection, which makes them lay weight on the external viſible act, without thinking of intention, becauſe it is not viſible. In truth, the bulk of mankind reſt upon the external profeſſion of religion: they never dip into the heart, nor conſider how that ſtands affected. What elſe is it but the external act merely, that moves the Romiſh miſſionaries to baptize the infants of ſavages even at the moment of expiring?

expiring? which they proſecute with much pious ardour. Their zeal merits applauſe, but by no means their judgement. Can any rational perſon ſeriouſly believe, that the dipping a ſavage or an infant in water, will make either of them a Chriſtian, or that the want of this ceremony will precipitate them into hell? The Lithuanians, before their converſion to Chriſtianity, worſhipped ſerpents, every family entertaining one as a houſehold god. Sigiſmundus, in his commentaries of Muſcovy, reports the following incident. A converted Chriſtian having perſuaded a neighbour to follow his example, and in token of his converſion to kill his ſerpent, was ſurpriſed at his next viſit, to find his convert in the deepeſt melancholy, bitterly lamenting that he had murdered his god, and that the moſt dreadful calamities would befal him. Was this perſon a Chriſtian more than nominally? At the end of the laſt century when Kempfer was in Japan, there remained but about fifty Japan Chriſtians, who were locked up in priſon for life. Theſe poor people knew no more of the Chriſtian religion, but the names only of our Saviour and of the Virgin Mary; and yet ſo zealous Chriſtians were they, as rather to die miſerably in jail, than to renounce the name of Chriſt, and be ſet at liberty.

I cannot with ſatisfaction conclude this ſketch, without congratulating my preſent countrymen of Britain, upon their knowledge of the intimate connection that true religion has with morality. May the importance of that connection, always at heart, excite us to govern every action of our lives by the united principles of morality and religion:—what a happy people would we be!

APPENDIX.

Sketches concerning SCOTLAND.

SKETCH I.

SCOTCH ENTAILS conſidered in Moral and Political views.

MAN is by nature a hoarding animal; and to ſecure to men what they acquire by honeſt induſtry, the ſenſe of property is made a branch of human nature (*a*). During the infancy of nations, when artificial wants are unknown, the hoarding appetite makes no figure. The uſe of money produced a great change in the human heart. Money having at command the goods of fortune, introduced inequality of rank, luxury, and artificial wants without end. No bounds are ſet to hoarding, where an appetite for artificial wants is indulged: love of money becomes the ruling paſſion: it is coveted by many in order to

(*a*) Book 1. ſketch 3.

be hoarded; and means are abſurdly converted into an end.

The ſenſe of property, weak among ſavages, ripens gradually till it arrives at maturity in poliſhed nations. In every ſtage of the progreſs, ſome new power is added to property; and now for centuries, men have enjoy'd every power over their own goods, that a rational mind can deſire (*b*): they have the free diſpoſal during life; and even after death, by naming an heir. Theſe powers are ſufficient for accompliſhing every rational purpoſe: they are ſufficient for commerce, and they are ſufficient for benevolence. But the artificial wants of men are boundleſs: not content with the full enjoyment of their property during life, nor with the proſpect of its being enjoy'd by a favourite heir, they are anxiouſly bent to preſerve it to themſelves for ever. A man who has amaſſed a great eſtate in land, is miſerable at the proſpect of being obliged to quit his hold: to ſooth his diſeaſed fancy, he makes a deed ſecuring it for ever to certain heirs; who muſt without end bear his name, and preſerve his eſtate entire. Death, it is true, muſt at laſt ſeparate him from his idol: it is ſome conſolation, however, that his will governs and gives law to every ſubſequent proprietor. How repugnant to the frail ſtate of man, are ſuch ſwollen conceptions! Upon theſe however are founded entails, which have prevailed in many parts of the world, and unhappily at this day infeſt Scotland. Did entails produce no other harm but the gratification of a diſtempered appetite for property, they might be endured, though far from deſerving approbation: but, like other tranſgreſſions of nature and reaſon, they are productive of much miſchief, not only to commerce, but to the very heirs for whoſe benefit it is pretended that they are made.

Conſidering that the law of nature has beſtow'd on man, every

(*a*) Hiſtorical Law-tracts, tract 3.

power

power of property that is neceſſary either for commerce or for benevolence, how blind was it in the Engliſh legiſlature to add a moſt irrational power, that of making an entail! But men will always be mending; and when a lawgiver ventures to tamper with the laws of nature, he hazards much miſchief. We have a pregnant inſtance above, of an attempt to mend the laws of God, in many abſurd regulations for the poor; and that the law authoriſing entails, is another inſtance of the ſame kind, will be evident from what follows.

The miſchievous effects of Engliſh entails were ſoon diſcovered: they occaſioned ſuch injuſtice and oppreſſion, that even the judges ventured to relieve the nation from them, by an artificial form, termed *fine and recovery*. And yet, though no moderate man would deſire more power over his eſtate than he has by common law, the legiſlature of Scotland enabled every land-proprietor to fetter his eſtate for ever; to tyrannize over his heirs; and to reduce their property to a ſhadow, by prohibiting alienation; and by prohibiting the contracting debt, were it even to redeem the propietor from death or ſlavery. Thus many a man, fonder of his eſtate than of his wife and children, grudges the uſe of it to his natural heirs, reducing them to the ſtate of mere liferenters. Behold the conſequences. A number of noblemen and gentlemen among us, lie in wait for every parcel of land that comes to market. Intent upon aggrandizing their family, or rather their eſtate, which is the favourite object, they ſecure every purchaſe by an entail; and the ſame courſe will be followed, till no land be left to be purchaſed. Thus every entailed eſtate in Scotland becomes in effect a mortmain, admitting additions without end, but abſolutely barring any alienation; and if the legiſlature interpoſe not, the period is not diſtant, when all the land in Scotland will be locked up by entails, and withdrawn from commerce.

The purpoſe of the preſent eſſay, is to ſet before our legiſlatu[illegible] cooly and impartially, the deſtructive effects of a Scotch ent[illegible] I am not ſo ſanguine as to hope, that men, who convert means into an end, and avariciouſly covet land for its own ſake, will be prevailed upon to regard, either the intereſt of their country or of their poſterity: but I would gladly hope, that the legiſlature may be rouſed to give attention to a national object of no ſlight importance.

I begin with effects of a private or domeſtic nature. To the poſſeſſor, an entail is a conſtant ſource of diſcontent, by ſubverting that liberty and independence, which all men covet, with reſpect to their goods as well as their perſons. What can be more vexatious to a proprietor of a great land-eſtate, than to be barred from the moſt laudable acts, ſuitable proviſions for example to a wife or children? not to mention numberleſs acts of benevolence, that endear individuals to each other, and make ſociety comfortable. Were he ever ſo induſtrious, his fields muſt lie waſte; for what man will lay out his own money upon an eſtate that is not his own? A great proportion of the land in Scotland is in ſuch a ſtate, that by laying out a thouſand pounds or ſo, an intelligent proprietor may add a hundred pounds yearly to his rent-roll. But an entail effectually bars that improvement: it affords the proprietor no credit; and ſuppoſing him to have the command of money independent of the eſtate, he will be ill-fated if he have not means to employ it more profitably for his own intereſt. An entail, at the ſame time, is no better than a trap for an improvident poſſeſſor: to avoid altogether the contracting debt, is impracticable; and if a young man be guided more by pleaſure than by prudence, which commonly is the caſe of young men; a vigilant and rapacious ſubſtitute, taking advantage of a forfeiting clauſe, turns him out of poſſeſſion, and delivers him over to want and miſery.

But

But an entail is productive of conſequences ſtill more diſmal, even with reſpect to heirs. A young man upon whom the family-eſtate is entailed, without any power reſerved to the father, is not commonly obſequious to advice, nor patiently ſubmiſſive to the fatigues of education: he abandons himſelf to pleaſure, and indulges his paſſions without control. In one word, there is no ſituation more ſubverſive of morals, than that of a young man, bred up from infancy in the certainty of inheriting an opulent fortune.

The condition of the other children, daughters eſpecially, is commonly deplorable. The proprietor of a large entailed eſtate, leaves at his death children who have acquired a taſte for ſumptuous living. The ſons drop off one by one, and a number of daughters remain, with a ſcanty proviſion, or perhaps with none at all. A collateral male heir ſucceeds, who after a painful ſearch is diſcovered in ſome remote corner, qualified to procure bread by the ſpade or the plough, but entirely unqualified for behaving as maſter of an opulent fortune. By ſuch a metamorphoſis, the poor man makes a ludicrous figure; while the daughters, reduced to indigence, are in a ſituation much more lamentable than are the brats of beggars.

Our entails produce another domeſtic evil, for which no proper remedy is provided. The ſums permitted in moſt entails to younger children, however adequate when the entail is made, become in time too ſcanty, by a fall in the value of money, and by increaſe of luxury; which is peculiarly hard upon daughters of great families: the proviſions deſtined for them will not afford them bread; and they cannot hope to be ſuitably matched, without a decent fortune. If we adhere to entails, nunneries ought to be provided.

But the domeſtic evils of an entail make no figure, compared with thoſe that reſpect the public. Theſe in their full extent would

would fill a volume: they are well known; and it may be ſufficient to keep them in view by ſome general hints.

As obſerved above, few tenants in tail can command money for improvements, however profitable. Such diſcouragement to agriculture, hurtful to proprietors of entailed eſtates, is ſtill more ſo to the public. It is now an eſtabliſhed maxim, That a ſtate is powerful in proportion to the product of its land: a nation that feeds its neighbours, can ſtarve them. The quantity of land that is locked up in Scotland by entails, has damped the growing ſpirit of agriculture. There is not produced ſufficiency of corn at home for our own conſumpt: and our condition will become worſe and worſe by new entails, till agriculture and induſtry be annihilated. Were the great entailed eſtates in Scotland, ſplit into ſmall properties of fifty or a hundred pounds yearly rent, we ſhould ſoon be enabled, not only to ſupply our own markets, but to ſpare for our neighbours.

In the next place, our entails are no leſs ſubverſive of commerce than of agriculture. There are numberleſs land-eſtates in Scotland of one, two, or three hundred pounds yearly rent. Such an eſtate cannot afford bare neceſſaries to the proprietor, if he pretend to live like a gentleman. But he has an excellent reſource: let him apply to any branch of trade, his eſtate will afford him credit for what money he wants. The profit he makes, pays the intereſt of the money borrowed, with a ſurplus; and this ſurplus, added to the rent of his eſtate, enables him to live comfortably. A number of land-proprietors in ſuch circumſtances, would advance commerce to a great height. But alas! there are not many who have that reſource; ſuch is the itch in Scotland for entailing, as even to deſcend lower than one hundred pounds yearly. Can one behold with patience, the countenance that is given to ſelfiſh wrong-headed people, acting in direct oppoſition to the proſperity of their country? Commerce is no leſs hurt in another reſpect:

when

when our land is withdrawn from commerce by entails, every proſperous trader will deſert a country where he can find no land to purchaſe; for to raiſe a family by acquiring an eſtate in land, is the ultimate aim of every merchant, and of every man who accumulates money.

Thirdly, An entail is a bitter enemy to population. Population is generally proportioned to the number of land-proprietors. A very ſmall portion of land, managed with ſkill and induſtry, affords bread to a numerous family; and the great aim of the frugal proprietor, is to provide a fund for educating his children, and for eſtabliſhing them in buſineſs. A numerous iſſue, at the ſame time, is commonly the lot of the temperate and frugal; becauſe they are ſtrangers to luxury and voluptuouſneſs, which enervate the body, and dry up the ſources of procreation. This is no chimera or fond imagination: traverſe Europe; compare great capitals with diſtant provinces; and it will be found to hold univerſally, that children abound much more among the induſtrious poor, than among the luxurious rich. But if diviſion of land into ſmall properties, tend to population; depopulation muſt be the neceſſary conſequence of an entail, the avowed intent of which is to unite many ſmall properties in one great eſtate; and conſequently, to reduce land-proprietors to a ſmall number.

Let us, in the fourth place, take under conſideration, the children of landholders with reſpect to education and induſtry; for unleſs men be uſefully employ'd, population is of no real advantage to a ſtate. In that reſpect, great and ſmall eſtates admit no compariſon. Children of great families, accuſtomed to affluence and luxury, are too proud for buſineſs; and were they even willing, are incapable to drudge at a laborious employment. At the ſame time, as the father's hands are tied up by his entail from affording them means to ſubſiſt as perſons of rank, they become a burden on the family, and on the ſtate, and can do no ſervice to either,

either, but by dying. Yet there are men ſo blind, or ſo callous as to be fond of entails. Let us try whether a more pleaſing ſcene will have any effect upon them. Children of ſmall landholders are from infancy educated in a frugal manner; and they muſt be induſtrious, as they depend on induſtry for bread. Among that claſs of men, education has its moſt powerful influence; and upon that claſs a nation chiefly relies, for its ſkilful artiſts and manufacturers, for its lawyers, phyſicians, divines, and even for its generals and ſtateſmen.

And this leads to conſider, in the fifth place, the influence that great and ſmall eſtates have on manners. Gentlemen of a moderate fortune, connected with their ſuperiors and inferiors, improve ſociety, by ſpreading kindly affection through the whole members of the ſtate. In ſuch only reſides the genuine ſpirit of liberty, abhorrent equally of ſervility to ſuperiors and of tyranny to inferiors. The nature of the Britiſh government, creates a mutual dependence of the great and ſmall on each other. The great have favours to beſtow: the ſmall have many more, by their privilege of electing parliament-men; which obliges men of high rank to affect popularity, if they have none at heart. This connection produces good manners at leaſt between different ranks, and perhaps ſome degree of cordiality. Accumulation of land into great eſtates, produces oppoſite manners: when all the land in Scotland is ſwallow'd up by a number of grandees, and few gentlemen of the middle rank are left; even the appearance of popularity will vaniſh, leaving pride and inſolence on the one hand, and abject ſervility on the other. In a word, the diſtribution of land into many ſhares, accords [illegible] with the free ſpirit of the Britiſh conſtitution; but nothing is more repugnant to that ſpirit, than overgrown eſtates in land.

In the ſixth place, Arts and ſciences can never flouriſh in a country, where all the land is engroſſed by a few men. Science will

will never be cultivated by the diſpirited tenant, who can ſcarce procure bread; and ſtill leſs, if poſſible, by the inſolent landlord, who is too ſelf-ſufficient for inſtruction. There will be no encouragement for arts: great and opulent proprietors, foſtering ambitious views, will cling to the ſeat of government, which is far removed from Scotland; and if vanity make them ſometimes diſplay their grandeur at their country-ſeats, they will be too delicate for any articles of luxury but what are foreign. The arts and ſciences being thus baniſhed, Scotland will be deſerted by every man of ſpirit who can find bread elſewhere.

In the ſeventh place, Such overgrown eſtates will produce an irregular and dangerous influence with reſpect to the Houſe of Commons. The parliament-boroughs will be ſubdued by weight of money; and with reſpect to county-elections, it is a chance if there be left in a county as many landholders capable to elect, and to be elected, as even to afford a choice. In ſuch circumſtances, will our conſtitution be in no danger, from the ambitious views of men elevated above others by their vaſt poſſeſſions? Is it unlikely, that ſuch men, taking advantage of public diſcord, will become an united body of ambitious oppreſſors, overawing their ſovereign as well as their fellow-ſubjects? Such was the miſerable condition of Britain, while the feudal oligarchy ſubſiſted: ſuch at preſent is the miſerable condition of Poland: and ſuch will be the miſerable condition of Scotland, if the legiſlature afford not a remedy.

If the public intereſt only were to be regarded, the axe ought to be applied, cutting down entails to the very root: but a numberleſs body of ſubſtitutes are intereſted, many of whom would be diſinherited, if the tenants in tail had power. To reconcile as much as poſſible theſe oppoſite intereſts, it is propoſed, that the following articles be authoriſed by a ſtatute. Firſt, That the act of parliament 1685 be repealed with reſpect to all future operations.

tions. Second, That entails already made and completed, ſhall continue effectual to ſuch ſubſtitutes as exiſt at the date of the act propoſed; but ſhall not benefit any ſubſtitute born after it. Third, That power be reſerved to every proprietor, after the act 1685 is at an end, to ſettle his eſtate upon what heirs he thinks proper, and to bar theſe heirs from altering the order of ſucceſſion; theſe powers being inherent in property at common law.

At the ſame time, the prohibiting entails will avail little, if truſt-deeds be permitted in their utmoſt extent, as in England. And therefore, in order to re-eſtabliſh the law of nature with reſpect to land-property, a limitation of truſt-deeds is neceſſary. My propoſal is, That no truſt-deed, directing or limiting the ſucceſſion of heirs to a land-eſtate, ſhall be effectual beyond the life of the heirs in exiſtence at the time.

SKETCH

SKETCH II.

Government of ROYAL BOROUGHS in Scotland.

BY a royal borough is in Scotland underſtood an incorporation that hold their lands of the crown, and are governed by magiſtrates of their own naming. The adminiſtration of the annual revenues of a royal borough, termed the *common good*, is truſted to the magiſtrates; but not without control. It was originally ſubjected to the review of the Great Chamberlain; and accordingly the chap. 39. § 45. of the *Iter Camerarii*, contains the following articles, recommended to the Chamberlain to be enquired into. "Giff there be an good aſſedation and uptaking of the "common good of the burgh, and giff faithful compt be made "thereof to the community of the burgh; and giff no compt is "made, he whom and in quhaes hands it is come, and how it "paſſes by the community." In purſuance of theſe inſtructions, the Chamberlain's precept for holding the ayr, or circuit, is directed to the provoſt and bailies, enjoining them, "to call all thoſe "who have received any of the town's revenues, or uſed any of-"fice within the burgh, ſince the laſt chamberlain-ayr, to an-"ſwer ſuch things as ſhall be laid to their charge." *Iter Camer. cap.* 1. And in the third chapter, which contains the forms of the chamberlain-ayr, the firſt thing to be done after fencing the court, is, to call the bailies and ſerjeants to be challenged and accuſed from the time of the laſt ayr.

This office, dangerous by exceſs of power, being ſuppreſſed, the royal boroughs were left in a ſtate of anarchy. The magiſtracy, being now no longer under any check or control, was coveted by noblemen and gentlemen in the neighbourhood; who, under the name of office-bearers, laid their hands on the revenues of the borough, and converted all to their own profit. This corruption was heavily complained of in the reign of James V.; and a remedy was provided by act 26. parl. 1535, enacting, 1ſt, That none be qualified to be provoſt, bailie, or alderman, but an indwelling burgeſs. 2dly, "That no inhabitant purchaſe lordſhip out of "burgh, to the terror of his comburgeſſes. And, 3dly, That all "provoſts, bailies, and aldermen of boroughs, bring yearly to "the chequer at a day certain, the compt-books of their common "good, to be ſeen and conſidered by the Lords Auditors, giff the "ſame be ſpended for the common well of the burgh, or not, "under the penalty of loſing their freedom. And that the ſaids "provoſts, bailies, and aldermen, warn yearly, fifteen days be-"fore their coming to the chequer, all thoſe who are willing to "come for examining the ſaid accounts, that they may impugn "the ſame, in order that all murmur may ceaſe in that behalf." And to enforce theſe regulations, a brieve was iſſued from the chancery, commanding the magiſtrates to preſent their accounts to the exchequer, and ſummoning the burgeſſes to appear and object to the ſame.

A defect in this ſtatute made it leſs effectual than it was intended to be. Magiſtrates, to avoid the penalty, brought the count-books of their common good to the exchequer; but they brought no rental of the common good to found a charge againſt them. This defect was remedied by act 28. parl. 1693, containing the following preamble. "That the royal boroughs, by the male-ad-"miniſtration of their magiſtrates, have fallen under great debts "and burdens, to the diminution of their dignity, and the diſ-

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"abling of them to ſerve the crown and government as they "ought; and that the care, overſight, and control of the com- "mon good of boroughs, belong to their Majeſties by virtue of "their prerogative-royal; therefore, for preventing the like abuſes "and miſapplications in all time thereafter, their Majeſties ſta- "tute and ordain, That every burgh-royal, ſhall, betwixt and "the firſt of November next, bring to the Lords of Treaſury and "Exchequer, an exact account of charge and diſcharge, ſubſcri- "bed by the magiſtrates and town-clerk, of their whole public- "good and revenues, and of the whole debts and incumbrances "that affect the ſame." This completed the remedy, by putting means into the hands of the Barons of Exchequer, to control the accounts enjoined by the former ſtatute to be yearly given in.

The foregoing regulations are kept in obſervance. Every year a precept iſſues from the exchequer, ſigned by one of the Barons, addreſſed to the director of the chancery, requiring him to make out a brieve for every royal borough. The brieve is accordingly made out, returned to the exchequer, and ſent to the ſeveral ſheriffs, to be ſerved in all the royal boroughs within their bounds, as directed by the ſtatute. Theſe brieves are accordingly ſo ſerved by the ſheriffs; and particularly it is a conſtant form in moſt of the royal boroughs, to iſſue a proclamation, fifteen days before the day named for appearance in exchequer, warning the inhabitants to repair there, in order to object to the public accounts of the town: and further, in order to give them opportunity to frame objections, the book and counts are laid open for theſe fifteen days, to be inſpected by all the inhabitants.

We learn from the records of exchequer, that from the year 1660 to the year 1683, accounts were regularly given in to exchequer, in obedience to the ſtatute. The town of Edinburgh only having failed for ſome ſhort time, Captain Thomas Hamilton merchant there, by an action in exchequer, compelled the magiſtrates

magiſtrates to produce upon oath their treaſurer's accounts, which were accordingly audited. And we alſo learn, that from the Reſtoration down to the Union, a clerk to the borough-roll was appointed by the crown, whoſe proper buſineſs it was to examine and audite the accounts of the boroughs.

Notwithſtanding the foregoing ſalutary regulations, and the form conſtantly practiſed to make them effectual, the boroughs of late years have forborn to preſent their accounts in exchequer; hoping that they would be overlooked by the Engliſh court of exchequer, eſtabliſhed in Scotland after the Union; which accordingly happened. This neglect in the court of exchequer is greatly to be regretted, becauſe it reduces the royal boroughs, by the male-adminiſtration of their magiſtrates, to the ſame miſerable condition that is ſo loudly complained of in the ſtatutes above mentioned. It is undoubtedly in the power of the Barons to reſtore good government to the boroughs, by compelling the magiſtrates to account yearly in the court of exchequer, according to the foregoing regulations. And to that end no more is neceſſary, but to ſignify publicly that they are reſolved hereafter to put theſe regulations in execution.

How beneficial that ſtep would be to this country in general, and to the royal boroughs in particular, will appear from conſidering, firſt, the unhappy conſequences that reſult from ſuffering magiſtrates to diſpoſe of the town's revenues, without any check or control; and next the good effects that muſt reſult from a regular and careful management, under the inſpection of the King's judges.

The unhappy conſequences of leaving magiſtrates without any check or control, are too viſible to be diſguiſed. The revenues of a royal borough are ſeldom laid out for the good of the town, but in making friends to the knot who are in poſſeſſion of the magiſtracy; and in rioting and drunkenneſs, for which every pre-

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text is laid hold of, particularly that of hoſpitality to ſtrangers. Such miſmanagement tends to idleneſs, and corruption of manners; which accordingly are remarkable in moſt royal boroughs. Nor is the contagion confined within the town: it commonly ſpreads all around.

Another conſequence, no leſs fatal, of leaving magiſtrates to act without control, is a ſtrong deſire in every licentious burgeſs, of ſtepping into the magiſtracy, for his own ſake, and for that of his friends. Hence the factions and animoſities that prevail in almoſt all the royal boroughs; which are violently and indecently purſued, without the leaſt regard to the good of the community.

The greateſt evil of all, reſpects the choice of their repreſentatives in parliament. A habit of riot and intemperance, makes them fit ſubjects to be corrupted, by every adventurer who is willing to lay out money for purchaſing a ſeat in parliament. Hence the infamous practice of bribery at elections, which tends not only to corrupt the whole maſs of the people, but, which is ſtill more dreadful, tends to fill the Houſe of Commons with men of diſſolute manners, void of probity and honour.

But turning from ſcenes ſo diſmal, let us view the beautiful effects that reſult, from an adminiſtration regularly carried on, as directed by the ſtatutes above mentioned. The revenues of the royal boroughs are ſuppoſed to be above L. 40,000 yearly. And were this ſum, or the half of it, prudently expended, for promoting arts and induſtry among the numerous inhabitants of royal boroughs, the benefit, in a country ſo narrow and poor as Scotland, would be immenſe: it would tend to population, it would greatly increaſe induſtry, manufactures, and commerce, beſide augmenting the public revenue. In the next place, as there would be no temptation for deſigning men to convert the burden of magiſtracy into a benefit, faction and diſcord would vaniſh; and there would be no leſs ſolicitude to ſhun the burden, than at preſent

preſent is ſeen to obtain it. None would ſubmit to the burden but the truly patriotic, men who would chearfully beſtow their time, and perhaps their money, upon the public; and whoſe ambition it would be to acquire a character, by promoting induſtry, temperance, and honeſty, among their fellow-citizens.

And when the government of the royal boroughs comes to be in ſo good hands, bribery, which corrupts the very vitals of our conſtitution, will be baniſhed of courſe. And conſidering the proper and conſtitutional dependence of the royal boroughs upon the king's judges, we may have reaſonable aſſurance, that few repreſentatives will be choſen, but who are friends to their country and to their ſovereign.

SKETCH

SKETCH III.

Plan for improving and preſerving in order the HIGHWAYS in Scotland.

PREFACE.

HIghways have in Scotland become a capital object of police, by the increaſe of inland commerce, upon which bad roads are a heavy tax. Happily for our country, no perſon is ignorant of this truth; and we ſee with pleaſure the fruits of their conviction in various attempts, public and private, to eſtabliſh this valuable branch of police upon the beſt footing. As this will be found no eaſy taſk, it may reaſonably be hoped, that men of genius will ſeriouſly apply themſelves to it, and in general that every perſon will freely produce ſuch hints as occur to them. In the latter view the following plan is offered to the public: and if, from the various propoſals that have been or ſhall be publiſhed, an effective plan can be framed, ſuch as completely to anſwer its purpoſe, it may ſafely be pronounced, that it will produce more benefit to this country, than has been produced by any other ſingle improvement ſince the union of the two kingdoms.

1. THE juſtices of peace, commiſſioners of ſupply, the ſheriff or ſtewart depute, and the firſt magiſtrate of royal boroughs, ſhall be commiſſioners for making and repairing highways, bridges, and ferries, in the ſeveral ſhires and ſtewartries. All the powers given by law to the juſtices of peace, and commiſſioners of ſupply, with reſpect to highways, bridges, and ferries, ſhall be transferred to them; and any two ſhall be a quorum, except where a greater number is required by this act.

2. The ſheriff or ſtewart depute ſhall appoint the firſt day of meeting of the ſaid commiſſioners, as ſoon as may conveniently be after the date of the act, by an intimation at each pariſh-church upon a Sunday at the cloſe of the forenoon-ſervice. And the laſt Tueſday of March ſhall yearly thereafter be a day of meeting at the head borough of the ſhire or ſtewartry, in place of the firſt or third Tueſday of May appointed by former acts. The commiſſioners ſhall appoint a preſes, convener, and clerk: and they ſhall be impowered to adjourn themſelves from time to time.

3. The commiſſioners, at their firſt meeting, ſhall ſet about a diviſion of the ſhire or ſtewartry into two or more diſtricts, as they ſee convenient. And if they cannot overtake this work at that meeting, they ſhall appoint proper perſons to form a plan of the intended diviſions, which plan ſhall be reported to the commiſſioners at their next meeting, in order to be approved or altered by them. This being ſettled, the commiſſioners ſhall appoint the heritors in theſe ſeveral diſtricts, or any three of them, to meet on a certain day and place, to make liſts of the whole public roads within their reſpective diſtricts, and to ſettle the order of reparation, beginning with thoſe that are the moſt frequented. The proceedings of theſe diſtrict-meetings muſt be reported to the commiſſioners, at their next meeting; who are empowered to ſettle the order of reparation, in caſe of variance among the heritors;

tors; and alſo to add any road that may have been omitted. And they ſhall record a ſcheme or plan of the whole roads in the ſhire, thus enliſted, with their reſolutions thereupon, to be ſeen in the clerk's hands *gratis*. But upon any juſt cauſe appearing in the courſe of adminiſtration, the commiſſioners ſhall be empowered to alter or vary this plan, provided it be at a meeting previouſly appointed for that purpoſe, and where three fifths at leaſt of the commiſſioners are preſent.

4. If the ſheriff or ſtewart neglect to appoint the firſt meeting of the commiſſioners, he ſhall incur a penalty of L. 100, upon a ſummary complaint to the court of ſeſſion by any one heritor of the ſhire; with coſts of ſuit, the one half to the plaintiff, and the other half to be applied by the commiſſioners for the purpoſes of this act. If the commiſſioners fail to meet at the day appointed by the ſheriff or ſtewart, or fail to divide the ſhire or ſtewartry into diſtricts, within ſix months of their firſt meeting, the ſheriff or ſtewart depute, under the foreſaid penalty, ſhall be bound to do that work himſelf; and alſo to appoint the heritors in the ſeveral diſtricts, or any three of them, to make liſts of the public roads as above mentioned, and to report their reſolutions to him; and he is empowered to ſettle the order of reparation, in caſe of variance among the heritors. If the heritors fail to meet, and to make a liſt of the roads as aforeſaid, this work ſhall be performed by the ſheriff or ſtewart depute himſelf. And he ſhall be indemnified of whatever expences he is at in proſecuting the ſaid work, out of the ſums that are to be levied by authority of this act, in manner after mentioned, with an additional ſum for his own trouble, to be named by the circuit-judges.

5. No perſon ſhall act as a commiſſioner upon this ſtatute, but who has an eſtate within the county of L. 200 Scots valuation, or is heir-preſumptive to ſuch an eſtate, or is named a commiſſioner *virtute officii*, under the penalty of L. 20 Sterling *toties quoties*, to

be proſecuted before any competent court, by a popular action, with coſts of ſuit; the one half to the plaintiff, the other half to the purpoſes of this act.

6. Whereas the ſum of 10 d. directed by the act 1669 to be impoſed upon each L. 100 of valued rent, is inſufficient for the purpoſes therein expreſſed; and whereas the ſix days ſtatute-work for repairing the highways is in many reſpects inconvenient; therefore inſtead of the 10 d. and inſtead of the ſtatute-work; the commiſſioners, together with the heritors poſſeſſed of L. 200 Scots of valued rent, five, whether commiſſioners or heritors, making a quorum, ſhall annually, upon the ſaid laſt Tueſday of March, aſſeſs each heritor in a ſum not exceeding upon each L. 100 valued rent; the aſſeſſment impoſed on the heritors to be levied by the collector of ſupply, along with the ceſs, and by the ſame legal remedies. The heritors are entitled to relieve themſelves of the one half of the ſaid aſſeſſment, by laying the ſame upon their tenants, in proportion to their rents; an heritor being always conſidered as a tenant of the land he has in his natural poſſeſſion.

7. With reſpect to boroughs of royalty, regality, and barony, and large trading villages, the commiſſioners are empowered to levy from each houſeholder, a ſum not exceeding 2 s. yearly, more or leſs in proportion to the aſſeſſment of the ſhire, to be paid within forty days after notice given, under the penalty of double, beſides expence of proceſs. Provided, that any of theſe houſeholders who have country-farms, by which they contribute to relieve their landlords as above mentioned, ſhall be exempted from this part of the aſſeſſment.

8. If the commiſſioners and heritors neglect to aſſeſs their ſhire, or name ſo ſmall a ſum as to be an eluſory aſſeſſment, inſufficient to anſwer the purpoſes of this act, the court of juſticiary, or the circuit-judges, are in that caſe empowered and required to lay on the

the higheſt aſſeſſment that is made lawful by this act. In caſe of a total omiſſion, the commiſſioners and heritors who, by neglecting to convene without a good cauſe of abſence, have occaſioned the ſaid omiſſion, ſhall be ſubjected each of them to a penalty of L. 20 Sterling. And to make theſe penalties effectual, the truſtees for fiſheries and manufactures are appointed to ſue for the ſame before the court of ſeſſion, and to apply the ſame, when recovered, to any uſeful purpoſe within the ſhire, eſpecially to the purpoſes of this act. And to preſerve the ſaid fines entire for the public ſervice, the truſtees ſhall be entitled to coſts of ſuit.

9. The ſums levied as aforeſaid ſhall be laid out annually upon the highways, bridges, and ferries, for making, repairing, or improving the ſame; proceeding regularly with the reparation according to the ſcheme or plan ordered as above to be ſettled in each ſhire and ſtewartry.

10. With reſpect to roads that are not the firſt in order, and for which there is no interim proviſion by this act during reparation of the more frequented roads, the commiſſioners are impowered to exact from cottars and day-labourers their ſtatute-work according to the acts preſently in force, to be applied to thoſe ſecondary roads. The ſtatute-work is not to be demanded unleſs for this purpoſe; and is to ceaſe totally after the highways have, by means of the preſent act, been once totally repaired.

11. The commiſſioners and heritors, at all their meetings, ſhall bear their own charges.

12. The clauſe in the act 1661, empowering heritors, at the ſight of the ſheriff, to caſt about highways for their convenience, ſhall be repealed; and it ſhall be declared unlawful, in time coming, to turn about or change any highway, unleſs for the benefit of the public, as by ſhortening it, carrying it through firmer ground, or making it more level; and to that purpoſe the commiſſioners

miſſioners ſhall be impowered to turn about highways, as alſo to widen the ſame, not exceeding thirty feet, free of ditches. But the commiſſioners ſhall have no power to carry a road through any houſe, garden, orchard, or pleaſure-ground.

13. The commiſſioners ſhall have power to take from the adjacent lands, ſtones, ſand, gravel, or other materials for making the highways, paying always for the damage done.

14. With reſpect to high-roads which bound the properties of neighbouring heritors, and which it may be found neceſſary to alter or widen, the commiſſioners ſhall be empowered to adjudge to one heritor any ſmall bits of ground cut off from the other by the road ſo altered; and if land cannot be given for land, to make a compenſation in money, valuing the land at the current price of the country.

15. In order to prevent water ſtagnating on the highways, the commiſſioners ſhall be impowered to make ditches or drains through neighbouring grounds; and ſuch ditches or drains ſhall be preſerved entire by the proprietors of the land, or at their charges.

16. As the foreſaid aſſeſſment, after repairing the highways, may not be ſufficient for building bridges, or making ferries, where rivers are large; any five of the commiſſioners may, for building bridges, or making ferries, eſtabliſh a pontage or toll; ſo much for horſes, ſo much for horned cattle, and ſo much for ſheep, and the double for each beaſt in a wheel-carriage. Upon the credit of the toll, the ſaid commiſſioners may borrow money, to be employed wholly upon the bridge or ferry where the toll is gathered. But before borrowing the money, an eſtimate muſt be made of the expence of the work. After the work is finiſhed, the ſum beſtowed on it muſt be aſcertained: an accurate account muſt be kept of the gradual payment of this ſum by the toll; and when it

it is completely paid, the commiſſioners muſt declare the bridge or ferry to be free.

17. The determinations of the commiſſioners ſhall be final, unleſs complained of in manner following.

18. If any heritor apprehend that undue preference is given to a certain highway, or conceive himſelf aggrieved by any order or ſentence of the commiſſioners, it ſhall be lawful for him, within forty days of the act complained of, to enter a complaint in the court of ſeſſion; and the judgement upon ſuch complaint ſhall be final. But ſuch complaint ſhall only be effectual for damages, and ſhall not ſtay execution of the work. At the ſame time, no complaint ſhall be admitted till ſecurity be given to pay full coſts, in caſe the plaintiff be found in the wrong.

19. Former laws concerning highways, bridges, or ferries, to continue in force, unleſs as far as altered by this act.

20. An annual ſtate of what is done by virtue of this act, made up by the commiſſioners, or their clerk, ſhall, before the laſt Tueſday of March, be laid before the truſtees for fiſheries and manufactures, in order to be made a part of their annual report to the King; and theſe truſtees ſhall direct proper perſons to inſpect what work is done upon the high-roads, and in what manner. Upon any miſapplication or embezzlement of the money levied, any neglect in levying, or any wrong done to the public, contrary to the intention of this act, the truſtees are required to ſet on foot and proſecute what redreſs is competent in law or equity, provided the proſecution be commenced within a year after the offence.

Query, Ought not broad wheels to be required?

CONSIDERATIONS on the preceding PLAN.

THE laws in Scotland relating to this branch of public police, are numerous; ſome enacted while Scotland was a ſeparate kingdom, ſome after its union with England. It is not the purpoſe of this paper to enter into a detail of the various regulations eſtabliſhed by theſe laws: they are generally known; and in the late abridgement of our ſtatute-law, they are all recapitulated with brevity and preciſion. It ſhall ſuffice curſorily to obſerve, that the acts made during the reign of Charles II. form the groundwork of our regulations concerning highways: the later acts are little more than explanatory of the former.

It ſeems to have been the plan of the legiſlature, that highways ſhould be repaired by thoſe who are employed in huſbandry; and accordingly, the ſix days annual labour is, in the ſtatutes of Charles II. impoſed upon them only.

This was a meaſure not ill ſuited to the ſtate of Scotland at that period. During the laſt century, we had little inland commerce to require good roads, except that of corn carried to market; and for that reaſon, it was natural to impoſe upon huſbandmen the burden of repairing highways. Theſe perſons, at the ſame time, paſſing the whole ſummer in idleneſs, unleſs when called to perform perſonal ſervices to capricious and unfeeling landlords, could not think it a hardſhip to have ſome part of their time employed in ſerving themſelves inſtead of their landlords.

That annual labour upon highways, limited to a few days, ould be required from men in that condition, appears not un-

And why may we not ſuppoſe the legiſlature at that time

capable of ſuch enlarged views, as to prefer this method for repairing highways, in order to bring on gradually a habit of labour and induſtry? But the condition of Scotland at preſent differs widely from what it was in the reign of Charles II.; and the regulations for repairing highways which were then proper, have, by alteration of circumſtances, become both unjuſt and inexpedient.

Unjuſt they have become in a high degree. Inland commerce, which begins to flouriſh in Scotland, is greatly promoted by good roads; and every dealer, and indeed every traveller, profits by them. But no men are leſs intereſted in good roads than day-labourers, or thoſe who are commonly called *cottars*; and yet theſe chiefly are burdened with the reparation. Such men, at the ſame time having commonly many children, find it difficult to ſupport their families, even with their utmoſt induſtry. Nothing can be more unjuſt, than to impoſe upon ſuch men an annual tax of ſix days labour for repairing roads, the goodneſs of which contributes little or nothing to their convenience.

Our preſent laws are inexpedient, as well as unjuſt. In the firſt place, a tax of this nature diſcourages the propagation of children, in which the ſtrength of a ſtate conſiſts: the poor labourer ought to be encouraged with a reward, inſtead of being diſcouraged with a tax. In the next place, cottars called out to perform the ſtatute-work, obey with reluctance, and trifle away time without doing any thing effectual. To enforce the law, and to compel ſuch men to labour, is grievous to the gentlemen who are empowered to execute the law: they cannot puniſh with rigour or firmneſs, men who have ſo good reaſon to decline the ſervice: they are ſoon diſguſted with being taſkmaſters, and the generality deſiſt altogether.

Laws concerning private property are always kept in obſervance, and they execute themſelves, as is commonly expreſſed, becauſe

becauſe there are always a multitude of individuals ſtrongly intereſted to have them executed. But in making public laws, the great difficulty has ever been, to lay down effectual meaſures for putting them in execution; and by what means to make ſuch laws execute themſelves, is one of the moſt intricate problems in politics. Our laws concerning highways, are eminently defective in that reſpect: and accordingly, tho' moſt of them have exiſted near a century, they never have at any period been executed to any extent. Take the following ſpecimen, among many that may be urged, of this defect. Overſeers are forc'd into the ſervice under a penalty, in order to compel the peaſants to perform faithfully their ſix-days labour. To hope any good from a reluctant overſeer ſet over a ſet of reluctant labourers, is a fond conceit: it is much if his reſentment tempt him not to encourage their idleneſs. In vain would we expect, that any overſeer, without a ſuitable reward, will exert himſelf in promoting the work.

To remedy the hardſhip of laying the burden of reparation upon thoſe who are leaſt able and leaſt benefited, and at the ſame time to make this remedy effectual, is the purpoſe of the foregoing plan. And upon conſidering the matter in its different views, the only method that promiſes ſucceſs, appears to be a county-tax laid upon land according to the valuation, and a capitation-tax on the inhabitants of boroughs. Theſe taxes relieve the labouring poor, and lay the burden where it ought to be laid: and the law will execute itſelf, if that effect can be hoped from any public law. Effectual meaſures are laid down for levying the tax: and, if once levied, there is no danger of its being allowed to lie unemploy'd in the hands of the collector; for every heritor will be anxious to have ſome part employ'd for his benefit. The danger will rather be of factious diſputes about the diſtribution. This danger alſo is attempted to be prevented; and, it is hoped, with ſucceſs.

Some

Some narrow-minded perſons may poſſibly grudge a t loads the preſent generation for the advantage of thoſe wh after: but is it rational to grudge, that others ſhould ben meaſures evidently calculated for advancing our own intereſt: us ſuppoſe, that the heritors of a ſhire were to concer meaſu in common, for improving their lands: to make good ro[illegible] wou[illegible] be one effectual meaſure; for ſuppoſing the reparation to coſt L. 5000, their eſtates would be bettered double that ſum.

To conclude: It is not to be expected that any regulations concerning highways, or concerning any branch of police, can be ſo framed as to pleaſe every individual. Wiſe men are practicable men, to uſe an expreſſion of Lord Bacon, and will make conceſſions in order to promote a general good, if without ſuch conceſſions it cannot be obtained. Better far to have a good law, tho' in our opinion defective in ſome articles, than to have no law at all, or, which is worſe, a law eminently defective, unjuſt, and inexpedient.

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